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Hi John,<br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CADW+euvsQU42Rt_O1pPbvAy=Zm4AO9UJOyR7vnvXLaKvEDqYBw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default"><font color="#073763" face="arial,
helvetica, sans-serif">Sure, happy to clarify, and also
provide a few comments in response to yours. I think
re-verification actually does serve a purpose. </font></div>
<div class="gmail_default">
<font color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"><font color="#073763" face="arial,
helvetica, sans-serif">One of the questions before the group
is whether "ICANN-accredited privacy/proxy service providers
(should) be
required to conduct periodic checks to ensure accuracy of
customer contact
information; and if so, how?" There has been some argument
that criminals always falsify their Whois information, and
therefore re-verification in general is pointless because
criminals would lie anyway. My first point is that that
isn't true: rather, it depends on the type of criminal
activity in question. So, to the extent that's being used as
an argument against re-verification (or, for that matter,
against verification), it shouldn't be. <br>
</font></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<font color="#073763"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif">This
may very well be the case but I do not follow how
re-verification of already verified data will help anyone. The
result will in all likelyhood be the same.</font></font><br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CADW+euvsQU42Rt_O1pPbvAy=Zm4AO9UJOyR7vnvXLaKvEDqYBw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default"><font color="#073763" face="arial,
helvetica, sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"><font color="#073763" face="arial,
helvetica, sans-serif">My second point is that there is
value in re-verification or periodic checks. Let me offer
some thoughts on the value of re-verification at some
intervals.</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default">
<ul>
<li><font color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif">First -- and certainly let me know if I'm
wrong on this, since I think you helped negotiate the
2013 RAA and surely are more familiar with it than I am!
-- I think it's fair to say that the Registrar's
verification requirement as specified in the <b><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.icann.org/en/resources/registrars/raa/approved-with-specs-27jun13-en.htm#whois-accuracy"
target="_blank">Whois Accuracy Program Specification</a></b>
doesn't constitute comprehensive verification of all
fields. That is, most of the verification requirements
pertain to the format of the data, with additional
verification that the email and telephone numbers are
responsive correlated with the registrant. One of the
questions before the group is whether P/P entities
should engage in the same level of verification, or some
different level. Reasonable minds can differ on this,
but some members of this group have suggested an
additional level of verification. <br>
</font></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<font color="#073763"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif">First
of all, it is: email _or_ telephone! This mistake is often made
when quoting the obligation, so I feel I have to correct it to
prevent this from spreading. ;-). <br>
Second, there is no real difference between the underlying data
of the registrant with a p/p service and the public data with a
registrar. If anything the quality of the hidden data is usually
better than the public data. I fail to see why it would need to
be treated differently.<br>
<br>
</font></font>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CADW+euvsQU42Rt_O1pPbvAy=Zm4AO9UJOyR7vnvXLaKvEDqYBw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default">
<ul>
<li><font color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif">Second, addresses can change over time:
people and businesses move, and they may forget to
update their registration data. Re-verification serves
to highlight cases where the contact information has
changed and, even if not malicious, is no longer
accurate. (So, although data can't become "more
accurate" as you point out, it can certainly become
"more inaccurate" over time.)</font></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<font color="#073763"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif">Not
updating outdated data is a violation of the registration
agreement and can lead to the </font></font>suspension or
deletion of the domain name. For this reason, registrars are
required to inform registrants annually about the data they have on
file and request the data is checked. And I would suggest that
enforcement of such "outdated whois" violations usually hits
legitimate registrants more than illegitimate ones. <br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CADW+euvsQU42Rt_O1pPbvAy=Zm4AO9UJOyR7vnvXLaKvEDqYBw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default">
<ul>
<li><font color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif">Third, I would also assume (as you do) that
verification and re-verification will need to be heavily
automated, and to the extent that external data sets
(for example, here in the US, postal data) are used to
help highlight -- for example -- non-existent addresses
or inaccurate correlations, those external data sets are
likely being improved or updated over time. So, if
errors or inaccurate data aren't caught in the first
round, re-verification may catch them simply due to the
verification tools being improved, or the underlying
data being updated, over time. <br>
</font></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<font color="#073763"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif">Currently,
all that is required under the RAA is sanity checks of address
data (is the format correct) and trigger-response verification </font></font>of
either email or phone address. ICANN has not provided access to any
international database that could be used for data checks. But even
then, such checks would not ever be able to differentiate between
stolen data and accurate data. <br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CADW+euvsQU42Rt_O1pPbvAy=Zm4AO9UJOyR7vnvXLaKvEDqYBw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default">
<ul>
<li><font color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif">Fourth, in an ideal world, the verification
process used by Registrars would catch 100% of
inaccuracies, but that probably won't be the real-world
result. Additional and periodic re-verification by P/P
providers provides another layer of assurance. <br>
</font></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<font color="#073763"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif">Actually,
the checks that return false positives worry me more, because
those cause real work, customer confusion, etc. Any "solution"
resulting in a significant amount of false positives is simply
unacceptable.</font></font><br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CADW+euvsQU42Rt_O1pPbvAy=Zm4AO9UJOyR7vnvXLaKvEDqYBw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default">
<ul>
<li><font color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif">Fifth, as to the problem of inaccurate
correlations with real data (what you correctly refer to
as "the data is accurate, but stolen") I would concur
that this might present more of a challenge, but I don't
think I'd agree that the inaccurate correlation wouldn't
ever be uncovered, depending upon the verification
algorithm and approach. We actually do look for this in
our ongoing monitoring and have seen instances of
inaccurate correlations but with real data. <br>
</font></li>
</ul>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<font color="#073763"><font face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif">The
only way it can be uncovered it the good old "hey, what is my
data doing there" complaint (and we get one of those from time
to time). And that requires no verification whatsoever, that
only requires someone googling his name and finding the whois
record.</font></font><br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CADW+euvsQU42Rt_O1pPbvAy=Zm4AO9UJOyR7vnvXLaKvEDqYBw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default">
<ul>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default">I think that those are some arguments
in favor of why re-verification by the P/P provider has merit
at periodic intervals. I think there's a reasonable question
of whether the Registrar's verification of the email and phone
number should be sufficient for those portions of the P/P
service provider's verification process within a limited time
frame after the Registrar's verification occurs. (Perhaps that
eliminates some redundancy.)</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
I do not follow these arguments. Re-verification will just add
costs, confusion and annoyance to an already cumbersome process and
will bring no benefits. Please note that I am specifically excluding
from the term re-verification those cases where the registrar is
compelled to recheck because of notifications or positive knowledge
of incorrect or outdated data.<br>
<br>
Volker<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CADW+euvsQU42Rt_O1pPbvAy=Zm4AO9UJOyR7vnvXLaKvEDqYBw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 3:29 AM,
Volker Greimann <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF"> Hi John, <br>
<br>
I am having a bit of a hard time understanding your
point here.<br>
<br>
You are describing three different cases here, two of
which will not benefit from verification in the least
bit and one might, but only in some cases:<br>
<br>
a) The data is accurate, but stolen: Here verification
would not uncover any issues with the data as it is
essentially correct and will most likely be identified
as accurate.<br>
b) The data is false: Here, depending on the methods
used, the inaccuracy may be uncovered and would lead to
an automated request to provide updated data or
deactivation after a set time. Remember, in order to
keep providing services in a sensible manner, this needs
to be automated in some form, i.e. no individual record
would likely see any manual review.<br>
c) The data is already accurate: If the data is already
correct, what purpose does verification fulfill? The
data cannot become more accurate. Verification in this
case seems like an exercise in self-gratification.<br>
<br>
That said, even if there is a benefit to be derived from
verification, such benefits are achieved once
verification concludes. Re-verification of already
verified data fulfills no purpose whatsoever. So if a
set of data has already been verified by the registrar,
there is no need for the p/p provider to again verify
the same data. Only if no verification is or can be
performed on the registrar level does verification by
providers come into play.<br>
<br>
Volker<br>
<br>
<div>Am 28.02.2014 00:32, schrieb John Horton:<br>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(7,55,99)">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial"><font
color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif">Thanks, Marika. I also wanted
to provide a comment pertaining to
Question 2 in the attachments (relating to
periodic checks).</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial"><font
color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial">
<span
style="color:rgb(7,55,99);font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif">In
a few of the recent discussions, there's
been some reference to criminals always or
nearly always being untruthful in their
Whois records (even if privacy-protected),
leading to the conclusion that there is
little purpose in having a registrar or
any third party have to verify or
re-verify the information (especially if
it is difficult to prove that the data is
falsified). I wanted to share our
experience and observations on that point,
in the hope that it's relevant to future
discussion regarding Question 2.</span><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial"><font
color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial">
<font color="#073763" face="arial,
helvetica, sans-serif">Our consistent
observation has been that when it comes to
a particular sub-category of criminal
activity, spam, phishing, malware, and so
forth, it's probably safe to say that that
statement is true -- the registrant's
Whois information is nearly always
inaccurate. Even in cases, such as some
where we've worked with law enforcement,
when the Whois record for a domain name
involved in spam, phishing or malware is
privacy-protected and is subsequently
unmasked, the Whois record is still not
accurate behind the privacy curtain. There
are probably exceptions, but that's what
we've seen well over 95% of the time. On
occasion, it's a real address and phone
number, just not one genuinely connected
to the registrant. </font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial"><font
color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial">
<font color="#073763" face="arial,
helvetica, sans-serif">But there are other
types of criminal activity where the Whois
record is not so regularly obfuscated. For
example, we investigate a lot of websites
selling tainted dietary supplements that
end up containing some toxin or adulterant
that harms people. In those cases, we've
overwhelmingly seen that even if the Whois
record is privacy-protected, the trend is
that the underlying Whois record is
accurate. The same has been true for
illegal or counterfeit medical device
websites that we've researched. On illegal
Internet pharmacies not engaged in spam,
it's probably 50-50. (It might be a shell
corporation, but that's still valuable
information.)</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial"><font
color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial">
<font color="#073763" face="arial,
helvetica, sans-serif">One important point
to consider is that the Whois registration
can be relevant information from a banking
perspective for commercial entities. That
is, some banks are going to look at an
online merchant's domain name registration
record and if it's either inaccurate or
protected, they may require disclosure, or
ask about any discrepancy, which can be an
incentive for criminals selling products
online who nevertheless want to get paid
via credit card to have an accurate Whois.
Hackers, malware providers and spammers
will find a way around that, but they
don't necessarily constitute "most"
criminal activity.</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial"><font
color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial">
<font color="#073763" face="arial,
helvetica, sans-serif">The point here is,
I think verification can still be a useful
and necessary tool in either scenario,
even if it doesn't uncover useful
information a portion of the time. I
realize that only pertains to a portion of
the issues related to Question 2, but I
hope that our observations on that are
relevant. </font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial"><font
color="#073763" face="arial, helvetica,
sans-serif"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial">
<font color="#073763" face="arial,
helvetica, sans-serif">Thanks, </font></div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br clear="all">
<div>
<div dir="ltr"><font color="#073763"
face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif">John
Horton<br>
President, LegitScript</font>
<div> <img moz-do-not-send="true"
src="https://static.legitscript.com/assets/logo-smaller-cdb8a6f307ce2c6172e72257dc6dfc34.png"
width="96" height="21"><br>
<div>
<div>
<p
style="margin:0px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-weight:normal;font-size:12px;line-height:normal;font-family:Helvetica"><br>
</p>
<p
style="margin:0px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-size:12px;line-height:normal;font-family:Helvetica"><b><font
color="#444444">Follow</font><font
color="#0b5394"> </font><font
color="#000000">Legit</font><font
color="#0b5394">Script</font></b>:
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://www.linkedin.com/company/legitscript-com"
style="font-weight:normal"
target="_blank"><font
color="#cc0000">LinkedIn</font></a>
| <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.facebook.com/LegitScript"
style="font-weight:normal"
target="_blank"><font
color="#6aa84f">Facebook</font></a>
| <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://twitter.com/legitscript"
style="font-weight:normal"
target="_blank"><font
color="#674ea7">Twitter</font></a>
| <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.youtube.com/user/LegitScript"
style="font-weight:normal"
target="_blank"><font
color="#bf9000">YouTube</font></a>
| <font color="#ff9900"><u><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://blog.legitscript.com"
target="_blank">Blog</a></u></font>
|<font color="#ff9900"> <font
style="font-weight:normal"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://plus.google.com/112436813474708014933/posts"
target="_blank">Google+</a></font></font></p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Feb 26, 2014
at 2:39 AM, Marika Konings <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:marika.konings@icann.org"
target="_blank">marika.konings@icann.org</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left-width:1px;border-left-color:rgb(204,204,204);border-left-style:solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div
style="font-size:14px;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif;word-wrap:break-word">
<div>Dear All,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Following our call yesterday,
please find attached the updated
templates for Category B – questions 1
& 2. Please review these templates
to make sure the WG discussions have
been accurately reflected and feel
free to share any comments / edits you
may have with the mailing list. We've
created a page on the wiki where we'll
post the templates that have been
finalised for now (noting that for
some of these the WG will need to come
back to the template at a later date),
see <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://community.icann.org/x/ihLRAg"
target="_blank">https://community.icann.org/x/ihLRAg</a>. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>The WG will continue its
deliberations on Category B – Question
2 next week. Some of the questions
that came up during the conversation
yesterday and which you are encouraged
to share your views on (and/or add
additional questions that need to be
considered in this context) are:</div>
<ul>
<li>What would be the arguments for
not using the same standards /
requirements for validation and
verification as per the 2013 RAA?</li>
<li>Should there be a requirement for
re-verification, and if so, what
instances would trigger such
re-verification?</li>
<li>In case of affliction between the
P/P service and the registrar, if
the registration information has
already been verified by the
registrar, should this exempt the
P/P provider from doing so?</li>
<li>Should the same requirements apply
to privacy and proxy services or is
there a reason to distinguish
between the two?</li>
</ul>
<div>Best regards,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Marika</div>
</div>
<br>
_______________________________________________<br>
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<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg"
target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-ppsai-pdp-wg</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset></fieldset>
<br>
<pre>_______________________________________________
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</blockquote>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<pre cols="72">--
Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
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Fax.: <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="tel:%2B49%20%280%29%206894%20-%209396%20851" value="+4968949396851" target="_blank">+49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851</a>
Email: <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>
Web: <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.key-systems.net" target="_blank">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.RRPproxy.net" target="_blank">www.RRPproxy.net</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com" target="_blank">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.BrandShelter.com" target="_blank">www.BrandShelter.com</a>
Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on Facebook and stay updated:
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems" target="_blank">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems" target="_blank">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a>
CEO: Alexander Siffrin
Registration No.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="http://www.keydrive.lu" target="_blank">www.keydrive.lu</a>
This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. Furthermore it is not permitted to publish any content of this email. You must not use, disclose, copy, print or rely on this e-mail. If an addressing or transmission error has misdirected this e-mail, kindly notify the author by replying to this e-mail or contacting us by telephone.
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<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Volker A. Greimann
- Rechtsabteilung -
Key-Systems GmbH
Im Oberen Werk 1
66386 St. Ingbert
Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
Email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>
Web: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.key-systems.net">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.RRPproxy.net">www.RRPproxy.net</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.BrandShelter.com">www.BrandShelter.com</a>
Folgen Sie uns bei Twitter oder werden Sie unser Fan bei Facebook:
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a>
Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin
Handelsregister Nr.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
Umsatzsteuer ID.: DE211006534
Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.keydrive.lu">www.keydrive.lu</a>
Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für den angegebenen Empfänger bestimmt. Jede Form der Kenntnisgabe, Veröffentlichung oder Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist unzulässig. Sollte diese Nachricht nicht für Sie bestimmt sein, so bitten wir Sie, sich mit uns per E-Mail oder telefonisch in Verbindung zu setzen.
--------------------------------------------
Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Best regards,
Volker A. Greimann
- legal department -
Key-Systems GmbH
Im Oberen Werk 1
66386 St. Ingbert
Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
Email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>
Web: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.key-systems.net">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.RRPproxy.net">www.RRPproxy.net</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.BrandShelter.com">www.BrandShelter.com</a>
Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on Facebook and stay updated:
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a>
CEO: Alexander Siffrin
Registration No.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.keydrive.lu">www.keydrive.lu</a>
This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. Furthermore it is not permitted to publish any content of this email. You must not use, disclose, copy, print or rely on this e-mail. If an addressing or transmission error has misdirected this e-mail, kindly notify the author by replying to this e-mail or contacting us by telephone.
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