[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Use Case - Dissident Group Using the Internet to Communicate Information

Stephanie Perrin stephanie.perrin at mail.utoronto.ca
Tue Jul 26 18:51:35 UTC 2016


Thanks for pointing this out Rod.  There are a few rather difficult 
authorization issues we described but did not necessarily solve (who 
vouches for you, and how)....the secure credentials was for particular, 
desperate cases.  It does not solve situations where all of a sudden 
what was legitimate political dissent becomes treason (I don't need to 
point to any recent examples, I am sure) and the unsuspecting group is 
outed because they did not think they needed to go the extra mile and 
apply for a secure credential.  I think the broad category of banned 
religions, speech, and political dissent needs a variety of solutions.  
But if we could make anonymous registration easy (as you point out, much 
necessary work has progressed in the past two years) it would be wonderful.
Stephanie Perrin

On 16-07-26 1:17 PM, Rod Rasmussen wrote:
> So let point out that the EWG spent a huge amount of time on exactly 
> this use case area to address these very difficult issues and concerns 
> to life and liberty.  One reason that this took a lot of time is that 
> the option that Ayden is advocating for here that you cannot store ANY 
> personally identifiable data in any place anywhere (paraphrasing, 
> please correct if I’m misinterpreting you here) due to risk of its 
> exposure due to some compromise in the chain (RDS, registry, 
> registrar, P/P service) runs counter to one of the *primary* use case 
> building blocks for domain registrants.  That primary concept is for a 
> registrant to be able to definitively prove their ownership (or “right 
> to control/use" if you don’t like the concept of “owning” domains) of 
> a domain name.  Someone has to have that information - the registrar 
> is the base case - in order for the vast, vast majority of domain 
> holders to do things like transfer their domain between registrars, 
> sell the rights to their domain to some other party, obtain 
> domain-related services, ensure their domain is not hijacked or can be 
> recovered if it is, etc.  So imposing requirements for a minuscule 
> fraction of the domain registrant population in order to handle an 
> uncommon (yet vitally important!) use case is simply disproportional. 
>  This is a great example of why you develop use cases - to tease out 
> where they conflict, and instead of proscribing solutions up front (in 
> this case not collecting information at all) you explore what the 
> goals are (in this case, making sure that an oppressive regime cannot 
> get ahold of the personal information of a dissident that could put 
> that at risk of harm) to see how to solve those while imposing such 
> restrictions on the system that you can’t accomplish other, equal or 
> in this case, far more important goals of the system.
>
> So, what did we do on the EWG?  We proposed an entire system for 
> dealing with such circumstances and that is explained in section VII 
> b. Secure Protected Credentials Principals on pages 101-108 of the EWG 
> report 
> (https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-report-06jun14-en.pdf). 
>  I would refer people with an interest in this topic to that rather 
> detailed section of our report to see a potential way forward on these 
> issues.  Since the writing of the EWG report, much more work has 
> occurred within the space of providing anonymous, yet verifiable 
> credentialing, particularly with the use of blockchain technologies 
> which are open source, and largely available at very low cost for 
> usage in software products and online services.  Domain registration 
> is not the only area where people have this sort of interest, and the 
> market, along with the technical community, are responding 
> accordingly.  So while this is just one way of solving this use case, 
> and may not be fully fleshed out to the implementation level in the 
> current level of documentation, I will posit that when you run into a 
> use case like this that runs counter to many others, there will often 
> be a way to solve it without hampering or invalidating other use 
> cases, particularly fundamental ones.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Rod
>
> Rod Rasmussen
> VP, Cybersecurity
>
> - <http://www.infoblox.com/>
> <http://www.infoblox.com/>
>
>> On Jul 26, 2016, at 8:57 AM, Ayden Férdeline <icann at ferdeline.com 
>> <mailto:icann at ferdeline.com>> wrote:
>>
>> Thanks for the questions, Alex. I am happy to clarify.
>>
>>     Based on the details you outline, particularly the limitations
>>     you place on the RDS data elements, can you comment on how
>>     technical issues with the dissidents domain name operation are
>>     handled?
>>
>>
>> I consider this to be registrar-registrant contract information. As 
>> such, it is up to the registrar to determine which additional data 
>> elements they wish to collect (if any), how they wish to store this 
>> data (if applicable), and to whom they wish to release it, in 
>> accordance with local laws and the informed consent of their customers.
>>
>>     As for the cost of P/P services I appreciate the view it is an
>>     added cost (and even FWIW that one should not have to pay for
>>     privacy) but so is the purchase of the domain name, hosting
>>     provider, web-site, tis cert (the non-free ones) to enable
>>     transport encryption, etc. If there are funds available to
>>     purchase (and maintain) a domain name (and the site behind it)
>>     I’m not sure the extra cost for the P/P add-on is truly prohibitive.
>>
>>
>> It is possible that the web hosting or these other required 
>> products/services have been donated.
>>
>> But the principle is less about the cost and more about the data 
>> being collected in the first place. If there exists a database which 
>> contains personally identifiable information, even if this 
>> information is stored behind a locked door, it is not unimaginable to 
>> anticipate it will be breached at some stage. And once data is 
>> leaked, the damage is permanent.
>>
>>     Lastly, can you clarify the term “foreign nation” in the scenario
>>     description? Is it the same or different from the nation of the
>>     dissident? This is a small detail perhaps but one that got me
>>     thinking about how (or even if) this use case would play out in a
>>     real world scenario.
>>
>>
>> The dissident lives in country X. The foreign nation is any other 
>> sovereign state except X.
>>
>> Best wishes,
>>
>> Ayden
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 4:46 PM, Deacon, AlexAlex_Deacon at mpaa.org 
>> <mailto:Alex_Deacon at mpaa.org>wrote:
>>
>>     Thanks for the use case Ayden.  A few questions/comments.
>>
>>     Based on the details you outline, particularly the limitations
>>     you place on the RDS data elements, can you comment on how
>>     technical issues with the dissidents domain name operation are
>>     handled?
>>
>>     As for the cost of P/P services I appreciate the view it is an
>>     added cost (and even FWIW that one should not have to pay for
>>     privacy) but so is the purchase of the domain name, hosting
>>     provider, web-site, tis cert (the non-free ones) to enable
>>     transport encryption, etc.  If there are funds available to
>>     purchase (and maintain) a domain name (and the site behind it)
>>     I’m not sure the extra cost for the P/P add-on is truly prohibitive.
>>
>>     Lastly, can you clarify the term “foreign nation” in the scenario
>>     description?  Is it the same or different from the nation of the
>>     dissident?   This is a small detail perhaps but one that got me
>>     thinking about how (or even if) this use case would play out in a
>>     real world scenario.
>>
>>     Thanks!!
>>
>>     Alex
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>>     On Jul 26, 2016, at 6:38 AM, Ayden Férdeline
>>>     <icann at ferdeline.com <mailto:icann at ferdeline.com>> wrote:
>>>
>>>     Thanks for your comments, Greg. Without wanting to dive too deep
>>>     into our deliberations, I would just like to briefly comment on
>>>     this:
>>>
>>>         The actual market price of such services is inexpensive (for
>>>         example GoDaddy’s is US$7.00 per year). It may be reasonable
>>>         to assume that at-risk dissidents are aware that privacy
>>>         services exist, and can afford the minimal cost.
>>>
>>>
>>>     I do not think it is reasonable to make such an assumption.
>>>     Privacy proxy services have not reached critical mass, as most
>>>     domain names are not protected through such cloaks.
>>>
>>>     In addition, the subscription cost of such services must be seen
>>>     as relative to local incomes and the ability to make a purchase
>>>     in a foreign currency. It is not easy for everyone in every
>>>     country to purchase goods online; not everyone has access to a
>>>     credit card, and in many regions payment processors do not
>>>     accept all currencies. And while US$7.00 per year may not be a
>>>     lot to you or I, it is a significant amount of money to some.
>>>
>>>     When I was living in Argentina in 2014, the government imposed
>>>     restrictions on online purchases as part of efforts to prevent
>>>     foreign currency reserves from dwindling. At one stage, I
>>>     believe that Argentine credit cards were limited to making no
>>>     more than US$25 per month in foreign transactions. In such a
>>>     case a dissent group would have to choose carefully how to
>>>     allocate their resources. Do they buy Skype credit to make calls
>>>     abroad? Do they buy a privacy proxy cloak? Do they purchase
>>>     literature from abroad that cannot be purchased locally?
>>>
>>>         Government authorities in the dissident’s country request
>>>         the underlying registrant data from the privacy service
>>>         provider. The privacy service provider must then decide
>>>         whether it will accept the government’s complaint.
>>>
>>>
>>>     This operates on the assumption that due process is followed. A
>>>     privacy service provider is not a court and, as far as I am
>>>     aware, there is no binding entitlement to domain name
>>>     registrants to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable
>>>     time by an independent, competent, and impartial tribunal as to
>>>     whether the registrant's data should be released to that
>>>     government authority?
>>>
>>>     This also assumes that the data is requested and not simply
>>>     taken. Given efforts are underway globally to restrict
>>>     encryption, we cannot presume that all governments worldwide
>>>     will follow due process if the data they desire exists in some
>>>     form where it can somehow be extracted.
>>>
>>>     Best wishes,
>>>
>>>     Ayden
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     On Tue, Jul 26, 2016 2:10 PM, Greg Aarongca at icginc.com
>>>     <mailto:gca at icginc.com>wrote:
>>>
>>>         Here are three cases that are variations of the scenario
>>>         that Ayden presented.
>>>
>>>         1.Member of the dissident group registers a gTLD domain name
>>>         using a privacy service, located in a different country from
>>>         the registrant.  The actual market price of such services is
>>>         inexpensive (for example GoDaddy’s is US$7.00 per year).  It
>>>         may be reasonable to assume that at-risk dissidents are
>>>         aware that privacy services exist, and can afford the
>>>         minimal cost.  Government authorities in the dissident’s
>>>         country request the underlying registrant data from the
>>>         privacy service provider. The privacy service provider must
>>>         then decide whether it will accept the government’s
>>>         complaint.  The decision may depend mainly on whether the
>>>         service provider believes the registrant has breached the
>>>         service provider’s terms of service, as interpreted under
>>>         the laws of the service provider’s country (not the country
>>>         of the registrant and the complaining government).
>>>
>>>         2.Instead of a gTLD domain, member of the dissident group
>>>         chooses to register a ccTLD domain, in a ccTLD that does not
>>>         provide registrant contact data in its WHOIS.  The ccTLD
>>>         registry and registrar are outside the dissident’s country. 
>>>          If the government authorities in the dissident’s country
>>>         wish to obtain contact data, the government authorities must
>>>         contact either the registrar or registry, which will then
>>>         consider the complaint according to their terms of service,
>>>         as interpreted under the laws of the registrar’s or
>>>         registry’s country.
>>>
>>>         3.Member of the dissident group registers a gTLD domain name
>>>         using a proxy, such as a law firm located in another
>>>         country.  If government authorities in the dissident’s
>>>         country request the identity of the dissident, the proxy
>>>         must decide whether to reveal its client’s name.  The proxy
>>>         is not subject to the jurisdiction of the foreign government.
>>>
>>>         These use cases assume that dissidents wish to take steps to
>>>         keep their identities from their government regime.  All
>>>         three cases allow the registrant to work within existing
>>>         ICANN registration data policies, including the
>>>         recommendations that have come out of the recent
>>>         privacy/proxy PDP.
>>>
>>>         All best,
>>>
>>>         --Greg
>>>
>>>         *From:*gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org
>>>         <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org>[mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org]*On
>>>         Behalf Of*Ayden Férdeline
>>>         *Sent:*Monday, July 25, 2016 6:41 PM
>>>         *To:*gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
>>>         <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>
>>>         *Subject:*[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Use Case - Dissident Group Using
>>>         the Internet to Communicate Information
>>>
>>>         Hello all,
>>>
>>>         I would like to introduce an additional use case. This is
>>>         just a rough draft for now, and I welcome your feedback on
>>>         how this use case can be strengthened.
>>>
>>>         The scenario is: a dissident group launches a website to
>>>         bring important news and information to the public. They
>>>         register their domain name in a foreign nation and do not
>>>         want law enforcement, or other parties, to be able to
>>>         identify the website’s administrators, management, and/or
>>>         sources of information. If this information was made known,
>>>         their publishing could be silenced and their sources and
>>>         contributors could suffer harm. The registrant is not aware
>>>         of the existence of privacy proxy services at the time they
>>>         register their domain name.
>>>
>>>         *Misuse Case:*The RDS could be used by State actors or other
>>>         parties to identify members of or contributors to the
>>>         dissident group, and this could result in their voices being
>>>         silenced through legal, political, or physical means.
>>>
>>>         *Main Misuse Case:*An actor is unhappy that a website in a
>>>         country is publishing material that speaks unfavourably
>>>         about a given topic. They wish to launch political and legal
>>>         attacks to silence the website’s publishers and to alter the
>>>         narrative of the historical record on this topic. They thus
>>>         utilise the RDS to identify a contact of someone involved in
>>>         the administration of this website, with the view of
>>>         torturing or otherwise extracting from this contact the
>>>         names and contact details of contributors to the dissenting
>>>         website. As the registrant does not subscribe to a privacy
>>>         proxy service (possibly because of limited financial
>>>         resources, or lack of awareness that such a service exists),
>>>         their contact details have been permanently published into
>>>         the public record and their privacy is thus permanently
>>>         breached. As a result the RDS threatens the ability of
>>>         dissenting voices to exercise their inalienable rights in an
>>>         online environment.
>>>
>>>         *Primary Actor:*Government or other entity wanting to censor
>>>         a dissident group.
>>>
>>>         *Other stakeholders:*Domain name registrant.
>>>
>>>         *Scope:*
>>>
>>>         *Level:*
>>>
>>>         *Data Elements:* In order to prevent misuse by another
>>>         actor, no personally identifiable information should be
>>>         stored in the RDS whatsoever. The only data elements that
>>>         the RDS requires to operate on a technical level are: the
>>>         domain name itself, the registrar, the domain name’s expiry
>>>         date, and its status (registered / not registered). For it
>>>         to be of functional use, there are two optional fields: name
>>>         servers, and the auth-code.
>>>
>>>         *Story: *
>>>
>>>           * A requestor accesses the RDS to obtain information about
>>>             a registered domain name. The RDS immediately returns
>>>             the registration data associated with the domain name,
>>>             which may include a name and physical address of the
>>>             registrant.
>>>           * The requestor passes the extracted information on to a
>>>             third party who visits the physical address of the
>>>             contact. The registrant suffers physical harm as a
>>>             result of the RDS and no longer feels comfortable using
>>>             the Internet to convey to the public important information.
>>>
>>>         *Privacy implications:*Article 19 of the Universal
>>>         Declaration of Human Rights states that everyone has the
>>>         right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
>>>         includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference
>>>         and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
>>>         through any media and regardless of frontiers. These
>>>         principles must be upheld in the RDS. An RDS that contains
>>>         any personally-identifiable information would threaten these
>>>         very freedoms. Accordingly, the RDS must only collect and
>>>         store data for limited, lawful, and appropriate purposes.
>>>
>>>         *Who has control of and access to the data:*
>>>
>>>         **
>>>
>>>         *Conditions under which the data are accessible:*
>>>
>>>         *How data can be accessed:*At this time, personally
>>>         identifiable information can be accessed by any party in the
>>>         world, for any reason. This is not consistent with best
>>>         practices in privacy protection.
>>>
>>>         *Other?*
>>>
>>>         As you can see, I have left a few of the fields in Lisa's
>>>         template for use cases blank. I do not have all the answers,
>>>         so I would very much welcome your suggestions on how this
>>>         use case could be strengthened. I'm still a little uncertain
>>>         as to whether we are designing use cases for what the WHOIS
>>>         protocol is like today (this is an assumption I have gone by
>>>         in this first draft) or if this is meant to be more like a
>>>         use case in a dream system instead. I'll revise this use
>>>         case once I understand this exercise a bit better.
>>>
>>>         Thank you for your time, consideration, and feedback.
>>>
>>>         Best wishes,
>>>
>>>         Ayden Férdeline
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>     Ayden Férdeline
>>>     Statement of Interest
>>>     <https://community.icann.org/display/gnsosoi/Ayden+F%C3%A9rdeline+SOI>
>>>     _______________________________________________
>>>     gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
>>>     gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>
>>>     https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
>>
>>
>>
>> Ayden Férdeline
>> Statement of Interest 
>> <https://community.icann.org/display/gnsosoi/Ayden+F%C3%A9rdeline+SOI>
>> _______________________________________________
>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>
>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg
>
>
>
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