[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] On "authoritative" (was: Off the Simplicity Wall or Simply Off the Wall)

Gomes, Chuck cgomes at verisign.com
Wed Apr 26 14:50:48 UTC 2017


Very helpful in my opinion Andrew.  Thanks.

Chuck

-----Original Message-----
From: gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org [mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan
Sent: Tuesday, April 25, 2017 11:22 PM
To: gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] On "authoritative" (was: Off the Simplicity Wall or Simply Off the Wall)

Hi,

If I've done this right, this will be a new thread in the mailing list; but I'm still responding to something below and trying to pull out one new topic.

TL;DR: we need some other term than "authoritative data".  (There are some ideas for what they should be, but I'm waiting for David Cake's message to post mine.)  The basic idea is that we need to capture the sense of "data from the source repository" somehow.  Reasons below.

On Tue, Apr 25, 2017 at 04:36:43PM -0400, Sam Lanfranco wrote:

> Might there be some merit in defining “authoritative data” simply as:
> verified (as best the registrar can); at a designated repository; and
> with defined terms of access (Open, Gated, Closed).

No, or at least that's not what we were trying to do with the previous discussion.  But your list is quite helpful.

The little sub-group that was working on "authoritative" foundered on the basic problem that the data-theoretic sense of "authoritative data" is quite clear, but unfortunately overloaded in the legal sense of the same term.  In data-theoretic terms, "authoritative data" means approximately "the data from a source that is an official repository for that data".  The Ministry of Transportation of Ontario is the authoritative source for my driver's license status.  There are specific DNS servers that can tell you the correct IP address for mx4.yitter.info.  And the registry operated by CIRA is authoritative for the data associated with crankycanuck.ca.  (Yes, those are both domains that I control.  Geeks!)

The problem, I am informed, is that for lawyers "authoritative" also means something close to "true fact".  The idea here is that authoritative data is not only the data from some official repository, but _also_ that it is somehow the correct data with respect to the world.

In the data-theoretic sense, we can distinguish among three things.
One is the _authoritative_ data -- that is, that data that comes from the data authority (the relevant database or whatever).  When you get the thin data from the Verisign whois servers today, you are getting this kind of data, and when you get the results of

    dig @ns4.p13.dynect.net -t NS internetcarrot.org

you are also getting this kind of data.

The second thing is _provably authentic_ data.  This is data that you can be sure you may use even if you can't ask the authoritative source.  For instance, if you issue

    dig @ns4.p13.dynect.net -t NS internetcarrot.org +dnssec

you get that kind of data.  In the whois today we do not have this, and RDAP does not have by default mechanisms for this (but I suppose
-- not "think", please note! -- it'd be fairly easy to add it).

The third thing is _verified_ data.  This is data that has undergone some sort of additional check to make sure not only that the data is correct in the source repository, but that the data actually represents some state of affairs somewhere.  The MTO's information about my driver's license is not only about whether it is valid: it also ensures that I actually am the person pictured.  Note that it is not impossible to fake this sort of thing, but it is harder than simply entering bad data into the authoritative repository.  On the Internet, we often see efforts along these lines in the so-called "Extended Validation" X.509 certificate that is used on certain TLS
("SSL") websites.  In theory, it provides additional evidence that the
X.509 certificate is in fact controlled by the legal entity that controls the domain name.  As a matter of practice, EV certificates have a somewhat inglorious history, but they are still an example of "verified data" even in the cases where the verification has failed.

I think what we were looking for in the Copenhagen meeting is the above sense(s) of "authoritative" and maybe "provably authentic".
Separate from that is the question of verified data, which I think everyone agrees is important but that I, at least, think should not be balled up with the other two issues.

I hope this helps make that issue a little clearer.

Best regards,

A
--
Andrew Sullivan
ajs at anvilwalrusden.com
_______________________________________________
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg


More information about the gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list