[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Definitions: Authentication and Anonymity
Gomes, Chuck
cgomes at verisign.com
Thu May 18 15:23:22 UTC 2017
Good suggestion Stephanie. As we continue our deliberations we will be highlighted the answers from the DP experts as they apply.
Chuck
From: gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org [mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Stephanie Perrin
Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 11:21 AM
To: gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Definitions: Authentication and Anonymity
Unless I have missed something, we have not responded (nor reviewed in group) the responses the DPAs sent to our last set of questions. I would recommend that new members take a look at those answers before we ask new ones.
Stephanie Perrin
On 2017-05-18 08:44, Gomes, Chuck via gnso-rds-pdp-wg wrote:
Paul,
They would of course be welcome. I would like to point out that Peter Kimpian is one of them and is a WG member.
Chuck
From: Paul Keating [mailto:Paul at law.es]
Sent: Thursday, May 18, 2017 6:25 AM
To: Gomes, Chuck <cgomes at verisign.com><mailto:cgomes at verisign.com>; gca at icginc.com<mailto:gca at icginc.com>; lisa at corecom.com<mailto:lisa at corecom.com>; gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org<mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Definitions: Authentication and Anonymity
Chuck,
I may be going out on a limb here but wouldn't it be appropriate to have the privacy authorities actually participating in this WG?
There are many opinions floating around in the emails and I see a continuing pattern of confusion.
Given the importance of the governmental authorities here is it not rationale to have their direct participation so we can reach a workable solution?
Paul
From: <gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org<mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org>> on behalf of "Gomes, Chuck via gnso-rds-pdp-wg" <gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org<mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>>
Reply-To: "Gomes, Chuck" <cgomes at verisign.com<mailto:cgomes at verisign.com>>
Date: Tuesday, May 16, 2017 at 3:14 AM
To: "gca at icginc.com<mailto:gca at icginc.com>" <gca at icginc.com<mailto:gca at icginc.com>>, "lisa at corecom.com<mailto:lisa at corecom.com>" <lisa at corecom.com<mailto:lisa at corecom.com>>, "gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org<mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>" <gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org<mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>>
Subject: Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Definitions: Authentication and Anonymity
Greg,
Considering that we already have rough consensus that requestor does not have to be identified, what would need to be authenticated? In other words, why would we need to add 'without authentication'?
It would be helpful if you could respond to these questions on Tuesday before our WG meeting on Wednesday considering you will not be able to attend the WG call.
Chuck
From: Greg Aaron [mailto:gca at icginc.com]
Sent: Monday, May 15, 2017 8:14 PM
To: Lisa Phifer <lisa at corecom.com<mailto:lisa at corecom.com>>; Gomes, Chuck <cgomes at verisign.com<mailto:cgomes at verisign.com>>; gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org<mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>
Subject: [EXTERNAL] RE: Definitions: Authentication and Anonymity
Thanks you, Lisa.
I will be unable to make the next meeting because the 05:00 UTC meeting time.
Based on last week's meeting, I I think we are aiming for something like:
"Thin data elements must be accessible to anonymous requestors, without authentication."
If we say:
"Thin data elements must be accessible without requestor authentication"
then that means consumers of registration data might or might not be anonymous.
For example, a registry operator could make me register my IP address, from which I can query registration data. Those queries could be made without authentication (a username/password), and so the registry's registration program could be allowed. But arguably I would not be anonymous.
Whatever policy language is proposed must be examined for how it can be interpreted and possibly bypassed. Both the intent of the WG and the specific language will eventually need to be laid out.
So I also suggest it be made explicit that access to registration data remain free, without charge.
All best,
--Greg
From: Lisa Phifer [mailto:lisa at corecom.com]
Sent: Wednesday, May 10, 2017 12:04 PM
To: Greg Aaron <gca at icginc.com<mailto:gca at icginc.com>>; Gomes, Chuck <cgomes at verisign.com<mailto:cgomes at verisign.com>>; gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org<mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>
Subject: Definitions: Authentication and Anonymity
All,
Starting a new thread to pursue Greg's suggestion to agree upon definitions for "authentication" and "anonymity" to help the WG address the charter question now under deliberation.
Below are a few definitions copied verbatim from RFC 4949 ( https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949) as a starting point for WG discussion of these and other possible sources/definitions.
Lisa
From RFC 4949:
$ anonymity
(I) The condition of an identity being
unknown or concealed. (See:
alias, anonymizer, anonymous credential,
anonymous login,
identity, onion routing, persona
certificate. Compare: privacy.)
Tutorial: An application may require
security services that
maintain anonymity of users or other
system entities, perhaps to
preserve their privacy or hide them from
attack. To hide an
entity's real name, an alias may be used;
for example, a financial
institution may assign account numbers.
Parties to transactions
can thus remain relatively anonymous, but
can also accept the
transactions as legitimate. Real names of
the parties cannot be
easily determined by observers of the
transactions, but an
authorized third party may be able to map
an alias to a real name,
such as by presenting the institution with
a court order. In other
applications, anonymous entities may be
completely untraceable.
From RFC 4949:
$ anonymous login
(I) An access control feature (actually,
an access control
vulnerability) in many Internet hosts that
enables users to gain
access to general-purpose or public
services and resources of a
host (such as allowing any user to
transfer data using FTP)
without having a pre-established,
identity-specific account (i.e.,
user name and password). (See:
anonymity.)
Tutorial: This feature exposes a system to
more threats than when
all the users are known, pre-registered
entities that are
individually accountable for their
actions. A user logs in using a
special, publicly known user name (e.g.,
"anonymous", "guest", or
"ftp"). To use the public login
name, the user is not required to
know a secret password and may not be
required to input anything
at all except the name. In other cases, to
complete the normal
sequence of steps in a login protocol, the
system may require the
user to input a matching, publicly known
password (such as
"anonymous") or may ask the user
for an e-mail address or some
other arbitrary character string.
From RFC 4949:
$ authenticate
(I) Verify (i.e., establish the truth of)
an attribute value
claimed by or for a system entity or
system resource. (See:
authentication, validate vs. verify,
"relationship between data
integrity service and authentication
services" under "data
integrity service".)
Deprecated Usage: In general English
usage, this term is used with
the meaning "to prove genuine"
(e.g., an art expert authenticates
a Michelangelo painting); but IDOCs should
restrict usage as
follows:
- IDOCs SHOULD NOT use this term to
refer to proving or checking
that data has not been
changed, destroyed, or lost in an
unauthorized or
accidental manner. Instead, use "verify".
- IDOCs SHOULD NOT use this term to
refer to proving the truth or
accuracy of a fact or
value such as a digital signature.
Instead, use
"verify".
- IDOCs SHOULD NOT use this term to
refer to establishing the
soundness or correctness
of a construct, such as a digital
certificate. Instead,
use "validate".
From RFC 4949:
$ authentication
(I) The process of verifying a claim that
a system entity or
system resource has a certain attribute
value. (See: attribute,
authenticate, authentication exchange,
authentication information,
credential, data origin authentication,
peer entity
authentication, "relationship between
data integrity service and
authentication services" under
"data integrity service", simple
authentication, strong authentication,
verification, X.509.)
Tutorial: Security services frequently
depend on authentication of
the identity of users, but authentication
may involve any type of
attribute that is recognized by a system.
A claim may be made by a
subject about itself (e.g., at login, a
user typically asserts its
identity) or a claim may be made on behalf
of a subject or object
by some other system entity (e.g., a user
may claim that a data
object originates from a specific source,
or that a data object is
classified at a specific security level).
An authentication process consists of two
basic steps:
- Identification step: Presenting
the claimed attribute value
(e.g., a user
identifier) to the authentication subsystem.
- Verification step: Presenting or
generating authentication
information (e.g., a
value signed with a private key) that acts
as evidence to prove the
binding between the attribute and that
for which it is claimed.
(See: verification.)
---------
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