[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Reputation systems are not just nice to have (was Re: What we want redux)

Wed Oct 4 19:26:49 UTC 2017

Jonathan,

>From a process point of view, the WG doesn’t write its own charter nor do we have the authority to rewrite our charter.  We were given a charter that was prepared with community input and approved by the GNSO Council.  The question we were discussing in our WG meeting came straight out of our charter.  We can go back to the Council and request changes to our charter but that would take a lot of time.  I think a better approach is to work with the charter as is and in cases where we think wording in the charter may be problematic, answers questions with qualifications in that regard.

In the end, we do need to answer the question as to whether the existing registration data system meets or can be modified to meet data protection and privacy requirements that vary across different jurisdictions.  

I don’t think that we are creating conflict. The conflict has existed for most of ICANN’s history.  Our task is to try to find ways to deal with the conflicts.

Chuck

From: jonathan matkowsky [mailto:jonathan.matkowsky at riskiq.net] 
Sent: Wednesday, October 04, 2017 11:02 AM
To: Chuck' Gomes <consult at cgomes.com>; Maxim Alzoba <m.alzoba at gmail.com>
Cc: gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org
Subject: Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Reputation systems are not just nice to have (was Re: What we want redux)

One more thought - sort of reflections on the last call, and where we are at. I think we are wasting time because we are being asked to come up with an RDS on the basis existing Whois policies including exemptions available, conflict with GDPR or other potentially more strict data protection regimes we have not studied. This is a big mistake. It is not necessary. It’s pretty clear to me that a privacy impact assessment is needed in designing the next generation of Whois, which should run in parallel with Whois at least for a while if not foreseeably forever, with the goal of improving Whois functionality, which clearly at least to me, can be greatly improved. We just have to make sure it functions as intended.

So I don’t see why our work needs to create all this conflict deciding about existing Whois policies frankly, which we clearly have not adequately addressed because we have never studied the exemptions available etc.  And this group would be a lot more productive frankly, if we framed our charter in that regard differently. Just food for thought.

On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 12:31 PM jonathan matkowsky <jonathan.matkowsky at riskiq.net <mailto:jonathan.matkowsky at riskiq.net> > wrote:

Hello, Maxim ,

I disagree with your analysis. The memo supports that economic repercussions for cyber security firms does not take precedence over fundamental human rights, and that private cyber security firms are not exempt under GDPR currently, absent specific legislation coming into effect consistent with GDPR. I agree with both of these conclusions.

Specifying the purposes of processing is expressly outside the scope of the memorandum, and in that regard, private cyber security firms may very well play a special role. I believe they do. This doesn’t mean GDPR exempts them but that they may need very thinly gated access to certain information that registrants consent to providing for certain specified purposes.

I also understand there may be a privacy framework in Europe that addresses public directories that may still be in effect when GDPR is implemented, and additional analysis may be needed in this regard, but I am still looking into this as it has been only anecdotal information provided to me at this time. I hope to have more in that regard by next week.

Cheers,

Jonathan Matkowsky 

On Wed, Oct 4, 2017 at 9:04 AM Maxim Alzoba <m.alzoba at gmail.com <mailto:m.alzoba at gmail.com> > wrote:

Hello Chuck, 

Reading the memo I came to the conclusion that all cyber investigating companies, which do not have accreditation of sorts of at least one EU country 

are pure third parties and police exemptions from personal data legislation will not work for them.

(it was page 9)

Following this logic, they play no special role according to GDPR and thus I am not sure we can make it a primary purpose (or at least I am not sure it will be accepted by EU DPAs).

P.s: I do understand importance of anti-abuse cyber investigations, but not sure how to fit their special role into purposes, compliant with GDPR.

And which might be worse, local Law Enforcement do not fit either (if they are not from EU or there is no special treaty between EU and that country). 

Sincerely Yours,

Maxim Alzoba
Special projects manager,
International Relations Department,
FAITID

m. +7 916 6761580(+whatsapp)

skype oldfrogger

Current UTC offset: +3.00 (.Moscow)

On Oct 4, 2017, at 16:08, Chuck <consult at cgomes.com <mailto:consult at cgomes.com> > wrote:

Note that the WG has already reached rough consensus that anti-abuse is a legitimate purpose for at least the minimum public data set.  (WG Agreement 11:  “Criminal Investigation & DNS Abuse Mitigation is a legitimate purpose for “Minimum Public Data Set” collection.”

Chuck

From:  <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org> gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org [ <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org> mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of allison nixon
Sent: Tuesday, October 03, 2017 2:57 PM
To: Jeremy Malcolm < <mailto:jmalcolm at eff.org> jmalcolm at eff.org>
Cc:  <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org> gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org >>  <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org> gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org < <mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org> gnso-rds-pdp-wg at icann.org>
Subject: Re: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Reputation systems are not just nice to have (was Re: What we want redux)

Thank you for the clarification. I still disagree with it but it makes more sense. 

I would like to highlight the ICANN webpage on WHOIS:

 <https://whois.icann.org/en/what-whois-data-used> https://whois.icann.org/en/what-whois-data-used

What is WHOIS data used for?

WHOIS is indispensable to the smooth operation of the DNS and is used for many legitimate purposes, including:

*	To contact network administrators for resolution of technical matters related to networks associated with a domain name (e.g., DNS or routing matter, origin and path analysis of DoS and other network-based attacks).
*	To obtain the real world identity, business location and contact information of an online merchant or business, or generally, any organization that has an online presence.
*	To establish or look into an identity in cyberspace, and as part of an incident response following an Internet or computer attack. (Security professionals and law enforcement agents use WHOIS to identify points of contact for a domain name.)
*	To gather investigative leads (i.e., to identify parties from whom additional information might be obtained). Law enforcement agents use WHOIS to find email addresses and attempt to identify the location of an alleged perpetrator of a crime involving fraud.
*	To investigate spam, law enforcement agents look to the WHOIS database to collect information on the website advertised in the spam.

Those and others are currently listed on ICANN's website as uses for WHOIS data. To reject anti-abuse as a purpose would be to shift away from the currently accepted purposes of WHOIS. 

On Tue, Oct 3, 2017 at 5:41 PM, Jeremy Malcolm < <mailto:jmalcolm at eff.org> jmalcolm at eff.org> wrote:

On 3/10/17 2:31 pm, John Bambenek via gnso-rds-pdp-wg wrote:
>
> To confirm and clarify your meaning... you don't think there should be
> a WHOIS/RDS and the only means to contact a domain owner should be on
> their website. Is that correct?
>

No, we are fine with registrants making some information available
through WHOIS/RDS subject to data protection law (eg. informed consent,
etc).  But we don't think that a starting point for the design of the
RDS has to take the requirements of anti-abuse specialists or reputation
systems as an essential element.

--
Jeremy Malcolm
Senior Global Policy Analyst
Electronic Frontier Foundation
 <https://eff.org/> https://eff.org
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Tel:  <tel:415.436.9333%20ext%20161> 415.436.9333 ext 161

:: Defending Your Rights in the Digital World ::

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Jonathan Matkowsky

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Jonathan Matkowsky

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