<html>
<head>
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
</head>
<body bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<p>Ultimately, everyone accessing the internet can be identified at
the level of the access provider. The domain name is probably the
most useless point to identify a user, as the domain name
registrant may not even have to do anything with a specific use. <br>
</p>
<p>Best,</p>
<p>Volker<br>
</p>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Am 04.07.2016 um 19:25 schrieb
Stephanie Perrin:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:9eff015d-403f-b7f7-ecfe-04b2800bc9ef@mail.utoronto.ca"
type="cite">
<meta content="text/html; charset=windows-1252"
http-equiv="Content-Type">
<p><font size="+1"><font face="Lucida Grande">One point here, and
it is not a big one. I don't accept that accuracy is a sine
qua non (see para 5). Contactability is, I think it ends
there. Excessive focus on accuracy of data, when that data
is not necessary any more is a cost and consumer burden, not
to mention an invasion of privacy. (eg. if I have changed
my mastercard number but my registration is paid for two
years, no need to change it in the record) <br>
</font></font></p>
<p><font size="+1"><font face="Lucida Grande">I did not comment
earlier on Volker's remark that responsibility for accuracy
of data rests with the registrant, but I agree whole
heartedly. How can it be otherwise? Some parties would
like to authenticate every individual and every transaction
on the INternet, and see the registrars as the entry point
and therefore the logical ones to bear this (enormous)
burden. </font></font><font size="+1"><font face="Lucida
Grande"><font size="+1"><font face="Lucida Grande">This is
unnecessary and will price domains out of the range of
individuals who can benefit most from their own place on
the Internet, in my view. </font></font> It would
hardly be appropriate for the policy person to point out
that in any authentication scheme, identifying the
individual in the first place (prior to tying that
individual to some identifier) is a big, costly and complex
matter that has slowed down many an implementation of secure
transactions. We need to limit our attempts to identify
individuals to only what is necessary.</font></font></p>
<p><br>
</p>
<font size="+1">Stephanie Perrin<br>
PS I wish I had taken better notes on the whole thick/thin whois
issue during EWG. Since it took me a good while to figure out
how this thing had developed in the first place, (and many
thanks to my EWG colleagues who patiently explained it to me
over and over again) I may have missed an invitation to throw it
out and discuss it again from scratch.....but I doubt it.
Anyway, we were already talking about tiered access by then and
different configurations of the model which would make it much
less relevant.<br>
</font>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix"><font size="+1">On 2016-07-04 12:22,
Carlton Samuels wrote:</font><br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CAOZQb9T+p9T8ZLtSKzYJqjBfCkSUXN2Y+SSN1fpOZqLVpA7+xg@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html;
charset=windows-1252">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><font size="+1">Coming to
this conversation late but as a member of the EWG, my
recollection is we took seriously the stated objective to
chart a next generation RDDS unfettered by existing WHOIS
constraints.</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><font size="+1"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><font size="+1">To that end,
I was one of those who insisted and the group accepted and
grappled with the basic question; was there a need for a
RDDS and, to what purpose. For those mindful of the ALAC
perspective, this would not be new; the ALAC is on record
from as early as 2009 insisting that for policy
development purposes, the need and purpose for a RDDS
ought, by reason and judgment, to be the first declarative
act of any policy development process. You would have
seen a reprise of that principle here. </font></div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><font size="+1"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><font size="+1">We were
acutely aware that some principles we espoused are
contrary by nature - privacy vs. security, transparency
vs. confidentiality and so on - and that balancing the
scale between contention sets of principles was not going
to be for the faint-hearted. Some time ago I used a
metaphor to describe what was achieved; we set out to
design and build a sleek racehorse but with the
contentions, likely ended up with a two-humped camel.
Naturally, some took umbrage on behalf of camels. </font></div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><font size="+1"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><font size="+1">My
recollection - and the record will show - the EWG spent an
inordinate amount of time looking at use cases, the
thinking being it would allow extraction of a set of
principles grounded in facts on the ground. Yes, some of
us had concerns about this as starting point to get to
principles; use cases conflated both appropriate and
alleged inappropriate uses, highlighting some of the
alleged noisome abuses. Some of us soldiered on ,
embracing the idea that a comprehensive problem statement
provides the best indicator to an improved model. This is
why the gripes of current stakeholders, the expert
opinions and deeper knowledge of what ails the current
system took so much time of our deliberations. </font></div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><font size="+1">The
mitigation model that emerged is fairly easy to script. I
cannot recall any contest to the idea that data accuracy
is sine qua non for any RDDS. Yes, we are very much aware
of the distributed nature of current WHOIS and even
examined a model so configured in the solution set we
discussed. Again, balancing the contentions, the
centralized database offers certain advantages - and these
are listed in details - at least for standard enforcement,
query and access control. The concept of a minimum set of
RDDS data elements for global unfettered display stems
from privacy concerns and, coincidentally, a nod to the
'thin' model. Gated access in the model addressed the
concerns from the perspective of a broader set of business
reasons for RDDS access, privacy and the evaluation of and
better knowledge of purposeful use. <br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><font size="+1"><br>
</font></div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><font size="+1">I could give
a lot more examples that underscore a different
narrative. Not just because I spent almost 2 years of my
life working this on a truly voluntary basis - I do not
make a living from the ecosystem and my day job has no
connection to it - but for the fact I sincerely believe
that what was achieved was remarkable in and of itself. </font><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:comic sans
ms,sans-serif;font-size:small">-Carlton</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br clear="all">
<div>
<div class="gmail_signature"
data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><br>
==============================<br>
Carlton A Samuels<br>
Mobile: 876-818-1799<br>
<i><font color="#33CC00">Strategy, Planning, Governance,
Assessment & Turnaround</font></i><br>
=============================</div>
</div>
<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Jun 29, 2016 at 8:04 PM,
Gomes, Chuck <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cgomes@verisign.com" target="_blank">cgomes@verisign.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">Andrew,<br>
<br>
I am sorry to take so long to respond to your very
thoughtful message but as you know I have been pretty busy
here in Helsinki. It seems to me personally that you make
some suggestions that could possibly be constructive to
the work ahead but I have two primary concerns:<br>
<br>
1. I am pretty sure that it would require a charter
change. To do that would require going back to the GNSO
Council with the proposed changes and seeking their
approval. That is something that is not out of the
question but it could cause some delays and I would want
to make sure that there is strong WG support for doing
so. Also, I think we need to remember that a lot of very
smart people spent quite a bit of time developing the
framework that resulted in the charter so I think we
should consider possible changes with that in mind.<br>
<br>
2. My understanding is that EWG debated things like you
are suggesting quite intensely. As you know I was not a
member of the EWG but Lisa has provided some thoughts
about that I include below.<br>
<br>
" It might be useful to reflect upon the EWG's experience
with system modeling. After starting with use cases, some
EWG members needed a system model against which to test
principles on purposes, data needs, and associated
privacy, access, and accuracy issues. This led to the
EWG's Initial Report proposing both a set of principles
and an Aggregated RDS system model to support those
principles - but without much explanation of the ARDS.
Over the year that followed, the EWG evaluated half a
dozen system models, drilling deeper into two (Federated
and Synchronized) to examine feasibility and costs before
recommending the SRDS. Both SRDS and FRDS models use RDAP;
neither stores data in a single physical location. While
the SRDS is a "thick" storage model where queries are
served from synchronized data, the runner-up FRDS actually
uses "thin" registries, querying data from registrars and
validators in real-time.<br>
<br>
"While some possible requirements may reflect a particular
system model - for example, those drawn from today's WHOIS
policies -- our PDP WG has yet to consider whether to
recommend a next-gen system. But no matter what model we
recommend, perhaps we can learn from the EWG's experience.
First, while envisioning a possible new model early on was
helpful to some, reaching agreement on a recommended model
was not possible until the EWG was nearly finished,
following feasibility and cost analysis. Second, while
each had pros/cons, both models were found to be capable
of supporting the EWG's principles. In other words, model
choice did not drive the EWG's principles - principles and
criteria such as cost drove the EWG's choice of model."<br>
<br>
I want to add to Lisa's thoughts my own personal opinion:
I don't think the issue of Federated v. Synchronized is a
closed issue. My understanding is that the final
recommendation in the EWG report could have been more the
result of the desire to finish the work than a strong
consensus. Whether I am right on that or not, our WG can
consider both and make our own decision between either one
or some variation.<br>
<br>
Finally, I want to encourage all WG members to share your
thoughts on Andrews comments and on my responses above.<br>
<span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
Chuck<br>
</font></span>
<div class="HOEnZb">
<div class="h5"><br>
<br>
-----Original Message-----<br>
From: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann.org</a>
[mailto:<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann.org</a>]
On Behalf Of Andrew Sullivan<br>
Sent: Friday, June 24, 2016 10:04 PM<br>
To: <a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
Subject: [gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Apologies, and some
reflections on requirements<br>
<br>
Dear colleagues,<br>
<br>
Apologies first. I'm not going to be in Helsinki.
I'm in the middle of a move from NH back to Toronto,
and it turns out that my movers'<br>
understanding of, "I need to leave on $date," entails
arranging things such that goods will arrive after
$date. Alas, in this case the goods arrive Monday. I
will attempt to follow the ICANN meetings remotely
next week, but I expect it will be tricky.<br>
<br>
I have been deeply dissatisfied with the way the work
is going, and I believe it is because I see a mismatch
in what we are trying to do and the kind of system we
are trying to do it to. In particular, I think we are
trying to treat the RDS as a single monolithic system,
and attempting to build "requirements" that match that
assumption. Here is an effort to sketch why I think
that. I didn't have time to write a short note,
&c. &c. Sorry this is long.<br>
<br>
Since the very introduction of the
competitive-registrar model (and arguably before
that), the RDS has been a distributed database. It is
far less successful than the other distrubuted
database we all know and love -- DNS -- but it is
nevertheless distributed.<br>
<br>
The distribution comes from different parties having
various parts of the data. In so-called "thin"
registries, this was always the case.<br>
The registry has names and nameservers, and since the
invention of registrars knows who the registrar is.
But if you wanted to know certain kinds of data, you
had to ask the registrar in question.<br>
<br>
Because in (say) 1999-2001 nobody had anything better
than the whois/rwhois/whois++ protocol(s) to deliver
this kind of data, a whole bunch of bad compromises
got enshrined in policy. First, we continued to use
whois and its descendents (anything on port 43) as the
model for all of this. The plain fact is that whois
was obsolete nearly at birth. It's a terrible
protocol, and should be taken behind the ice house and
put out of its misery.<br>
<br>
Second, in order to "fix up" whois, clients were
created all over the Internet that built in a bunch of
assumptions about whom to ask for what data. The
consequence of this was that clients routinely got bad
data as they queried the wrong server. Old registrar
data hung around even after a transfer. When I worked
on the org transition from Verisign to PIR in 2003
(?), it took a long time before whois clients stopped
asking Verisign about org data. And so on.<br>
<br>
Third, in an attempt to hack around the above
technical flaws in an already-obsolete protocol,
"thick whois" gained popularity in possibly the worst
possible arrangement known to data science. Instead
of insisting that registries hold the data and that
registrars and everyone else treat the registry data
as The Truth, we created "thick"<br>
whois in registries _without allowing registrars to
stop their service_. Any half-competent database
person will tell you that storing "the same data" in
two places that don't have tight connections is an
excellent way to create data inconsistency, but is not
a good way to arrive at the truth. (Latterly, as
though illustrating the tendency of people to double
down on bad ideas, there have been suggestions that
ICANN should run the One Giant RDS of the Universe and
hold all the data in a central place. What could
possibly go wrong?)<br>
<br>
The thread running through this history of error is
the idea that the RDS is one system. But like the
DNS, it only appears to be one system. It's actually
a "distributed database", where in this case the
distribution is separable on organization lines. That
is, registries -- including ICANN, who can be thought
of in this case as both the registry and registrar for
the root zone -- have some data.<br>
Registrars have some other data. Resellers and
privacy/proxy services have yet other data. In many
cases, the data does not need to be shared across
these organizational lines to make it queryable by
humans.<br>
<br>
The reason that isn't clear to most of us is because
whois -- the RDS we use today -- _was_ designed as a
monolithic system. It was designed that way because
back when it was created -- RFC 812 is from _1982_! --
the database _was_ a monolithic database. Whois (the
protocol and the client program) continues to have all
the deficiencies for distributed use that you might
expect of a program or protocol designed to talk to
exactly one authoritative service.<br>
Whois++ and rwhois attempted to graft on to this basic
protocol some<br>
distributed operation, but the graft didn't really
take and the ornamental shrub now looks like a weed.<br>
<br>
People have nevertheless internalized the whois-based
thinking, which is why we keep asking things like,
"What data should be collected?"<br>
In a distributed system like this, that's barely
interesting, for the commercial interests in this case
all militate against collecting data that nobody needs
for any function. Instead, we should ask what data
should be collected _by different actors_. This
implicitly involves describing what those actors are
doing to require the data.<br>
<br>
The nice thing, of course, is that protocol designers
have done _a lot_ of this work for us, when they were
working on RDAP. They did this because they were
trying to come up with use cases for the protocol,
which finally did away with the monolithic-system
thinking of whois and offers us a protocol designed
precisely to work in the distributed-database
environment that is the actual registration system.
That we even still have a work step that involves
evaluating what protocol we're going to use for all
this makes me a little ill.<br>
<br>
It seems to me that we can just say that we have to
embrace the distributed-database fact. For first,
it's a fact of how registration actually works now.
If we don't agree with that, I think we should give
up. Second, it's consistent with how every single
other thing on the Internet that has not crashed and
burned works. The Internet cannot scale depending on
monolithic systems. And nobody has the power to
impose one anyway.<br>
<br>
Once we have done that, there are still important
policy issues about what data ought to be collected by
anyone, under what conditions they might reveal it to
someone else (and who that someone else is), and so
on. But there are empirical tests for whether some of
the answers people are proposing really match the
distributed nature of the system. If they don't, we
can close off those avenues of inquiry, because
they'll never be productive.<br>
<br>
Best regards,<br>
<br>
A<br>
<br>
<br>
--<br>
Andrew Sullivan<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com">ajs@anvilwalrusden.com</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
_______________________________________________<br>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>
<a moz-do-not-send="true" class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a></pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<br>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a></pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Volker A. Greimann
- Rechtsabteilung -
Key-Systems GmbH
Im Oberen Werk 1
66386 St. Ingbert
Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
Email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>
Web: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.key-systems.net">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.RRPproxy.net">www.RRPproxy.net</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.BrandShelter.com">www.BrandShelter.com</a>
Folgen Sie uns bei Twitter oder werden Sie unser Fan bei Facebook:
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a>
Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin
Handelsregister Nr.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
Umsatzsteuer ID.: DE211006534
Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.keydrive.lu">www.keydrive.lu</a>
Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für den angegebenen Empfänger bestimmt. Jede Form der Kenntnisgabe, Veröffentlichung oder Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist unzulässig. Sollte diese Nachricht nicht für Sie bestimmt sein, so bitten wir Sie, sich mit uns per E-Mail oder telefonisch in Verbindung zu setzen.
--------------------------------------------
Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Best regards,
Volker A. Greimann
- legal department -
Key-Systems GmbH
Im Oberen Werk 1
66386 St. Ingbert
Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
Email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>
Web: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.key-systems.net">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.RRPproxy.net">www.RRPproxy.net</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.BrandShelter.com">www.BrandShelter.com</a>
Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on Facebook and stay updated:
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a>
CEO: Alexander Siffrin
Registration No.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.keydrive.lu">www.keydrive.lu</a>
This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. Furthermore it is not permitted to publish any content of this email. You must not use, disclose, copy, print or rely on this e-mail. If an addressing or transmission error has misdirected this e-mail, kindly notify the author by replying to this e-mail or contacting us by telephone.
</pre>
</body>
</html>