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In response to my comments of the ICANN scope of remit within DNS
and the RDS Volker Greimann wrote:<br>
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<font color="#660000"><i>I disagree that the problem of how to
authenticate law enforcement requests should be dumped at the
doorstep of contracted parties. The policy must be complete
and give structure to this issue.</i></font><br>
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I agree with the sense of Volker's position and did not mean that
ICANN should or can wash it hands clean of the process of defining
how to authenticate law enforcement requests, but it should not try
to go it alone on just DNS data. Here, I would separate out the
"how to authenticate" from the rest of the RDS discussion. I would
suggest that it be carried out in a wider multistakeholder
discussion where ICANN is an interested stakeholder working with
interested constituencies (human rights, etc.) governments and law
enforcement officials, working to fashion a policy that probably
results in multilateral agreements. <br>
<br>
There will not be a authentication process for DNS data that is
separate from the authentication process for data elsewhere in the
Internet and digital ecosystem. As current case after case
demonstrates, law enforcement access to DNS related data is only a
small slice of the data now being requested. The trans-border nature
of data means that multilateral agreements are inevitable and the
only path to a sustainable (and hopefully sane) policy.<br>
<br>
Sam Lanfranco, NPOC/CSIH<br>
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