<div dir="ltr">A lot of replies since last night<br><br>>>Would you be able to carry out your investigations normally if access to WHOIS thick were restricted only by the need to enter an email? <div><br></div><div>I am personally OK with being held accountable for the data i search for. I think a lot of the desire to require subpeonas or search warrants for WHOIS data is a need for the "watchers" to be held accountable, which I do believe in on a philosophical level. My search history would include NDA and sensitive information such as identities of clients and investigations in progress, so I wouldn't want it broadcasted, but I am absolutely prepared to demonstrate that my use is not abusive.</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div>>>So basicaly what you say are… Buhu my work will get harder, let all innocent registrants suffer from spam/scam mail sprung out of the whois data published, all those registrants who get fake mails about renewing there domain or buying fake SEO plans?</div><div>How can anyone defend that we have data published to get abused just because some bad guys registrer domains? And those of you who does will still have access to the date just not in the same easy way…</div><div>>>Sorry for my harsh tone but I really don’t see why we cant look past our own walls and find a solution which are to the better for all..<br></div><div><br></div><div>I don't take it personally at all. And the spam to WHOIS data is a problem. I used to use real data on some old domains of mine, until I started receiving the spam, and discovered the existence of WHOIS and how easy it is to access. I have not used real info since that time.</div><div><br></div><div>But the reality is that cybercrime is a growing multi billion dollar "industry", and the community of people that resist this industry is VERY small, and VERY overwhelmed. If our jobs get harder, it won't be us who are "buhu"ing, it will be you and everyone else who will pay higher fees on everything. We will be paid handsomely regardless, so I'm not speaking on behalf of myself but on behalf of the people I try to protect. If you want to make light of a global problem, please choose one that doesn't involve unbelievable amounts of monetary losses, and doesn't cause far worse privacy violations than the stuff yall seem to be concerned about.</div><div><br></div><div>Here are some hard facts about the volume of abuse going on:</div><div><a href="https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds/">https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds/</a></div><div>Right now, 93.3 percent of all domains registered under the .science TLD are malicious!</div><div><br></div><div>>><span style="font-size:12.8px">the question should be: Do you have a legally enforceable right to access that data and do with it whatever you please.</span></div><div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><span style="font-size:12.8px">At the moment, the answer to that is yes. And network owners also have a right to decide who they want to interact with. WHOIS is used as part of that determination. Not only is registrant data correlated with past malicious registrants, but the age of the domain is also determined through WHOIS. Without this granularity, network owners will absolutely err on the side of blocking too much over too little. We already see this with residential ISPs blocking entire TCP and UDP ports for their customer base, because the alternative is a level of abuse that takes the entire network down. Where is the "free and open Internet" when the Internet doesn't work anymore? Those are the battles that are being fought right now, and pretending this isn't a problem is a "wall" on yalls part, not mine.</span></div><div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><span style="font-size:12.8px">Here is a list of all the ports that Comcast blocks for its users. This has nothing to do with freedom of speech and everything to do with the fact that Comcast's network will die if they don't do this. As a consequence I can't send outbound TCP/25 SMTP anymore:</span></div><div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><a href="https://www.xfinity.com/support/internet/list-of-blocked-ports/">https://www.xfinity.com/support/internet/list-of-blocked-ports/</a></span><br></div><div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br></span></div><div><span style="font-size:12.8px">And over-blocking is going to be a worse problem when granularity is taken away from network defenders. When Spamhaus decides an entire country's TLD has too much abuse, most network operators will agree, and legitimate sites (like that country's government, companies, and media outlets) are an acceptable loss. You're going to see more of this, and that country's government has little recourse aside from cleaning up their entire TLD so network operators can be convinced to remove the blocks. But since abuse-laden TLDs are usually that way due to lack of budget, it's more likely that the entire country will simply suffer harms instead.</span></div><div><br></div><div>I am really surprised at how little credence is being given to these problems.</div><div><br></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 9:41 AM, theo geurts <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:gtheo@xs4all.nl" target="_blank">gtheo@xs4all.nl</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<p><br>
</p>
Hi John, <br>
<br>
I agree we do not want to create a centralized registration and
surveillance scheme. <br>
<br>
Such a system would be subject to many regulations and fines from
Data Regulators. If we do not execute privacy properly we are
creating a system that will cost millions of dollars in fines alone.
Tho that would actually answer the question are the costs of RDS
viable. The answer would be no. <br>
<br>
Theo <br><div><div class="h5">
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054moz-cite-prefix">On 14-2-2017 14:59, John Horton wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">Nathalie
and others,</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">I
wanted to take a moment and explain why I'm strongly opposed
to requiring email or other registration in order to view thin
or thick details. For the reasons outlined below, I think it's
antithetical to the open and decentralized nature of the
internet, and constitutes a form of internet surveillance. </div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">First,
putting aside repressive regimes, private networks and edge
cases, one of the hallmark principles of the internet is that
it's open; you don't have to register or justify your need to
access information on the internet. And, it's decentralized.
Historically, its open nature has included not only being able
to see a website, but also the registration details for the
website's domain name. And, whatever governments may do (which
isn't the question here), there's no centralized internet
surveillance or registration authority for internet users
generally. </div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">If
we impose a scheme where there is a central organization with
the authority to a) require registration and b) centrally
control access, and c) (as has been proposed) require the user
to provide a reason for their access, that organization then
also has the ability to d) make judgment calls about what
reasons are valid and which are not and e) maintain data on
who accessed what RDS data, for what reason, for how long and
why. Note also that at least one version of the EWG report
said that f) the organization would be empowered to levy
punitive measures against internet users who accessed more
data than the RDS deems appropriate.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">So:
you have a system that surveils internet users who access some
information and maintains data on their use of that data.
Let's think about the following scenarios from the point of
view of openness, decentralization and civil liberties.</div>
<div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">
<div class="gmail_default" style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif">
<ul>
<li>A journalist (or blogger) is writing an investigative
article and wants to find out who is behind a domain
name. If we require registration and disclosure of the
reason, that in essence creates a situation where the
RDS de facto is monitoring that journalist and
determining if their basis for conducting the
investigation is worthy. It also allows the RDS the
ability to monitor the journalist's use of the domain
name registration data. This potentially chills free
speech. </li>
<li>Consider a political activist who wishes to expose
corruption by an elected politician and wants to access
RDS information to show, for example, conflicts of
interests in the politician's business operations. Once
the political activist has to disclose who they are, let
alone why they are accessing the information, that not
only chills legitimate political activism but also
potentially opens up a route for government abuse (e.g.,
if a government agency were able to subpoena the list of
who accessed RDS information for which domain names and
why). </li>
<li>Academic researchers periodically review Whois/RDS
data; requiring them to register before reviewing data
and disclose why they are doing the research potentially
empowers the RDS to monitor academic research and
determine its worthiness. </li>
<li>Imagine that a cybercrime network is under
investigation (as they are wont to be); requiring law
enforcement to register -- particularly if there is a
log of which domain names they reviewed RDS for -- can
potentially compromise the investigation if that
information is disclosed. Would registrants have the
right to be informed every time that someone registered
to review their RDS details? </li>
</ul>
<div>For one central entity to possess that much power over
internet users is something that I think we should avoid,
and it's antithetical to the principles of openness and
decentralization. There are other well-known solutions to
spam and inappropriate contacts; forcing all other
legitimate activities to grind to a screeching halt --
particular under the umbrella of a surveillance scheme --
is a cure worse than the disease. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I recognize and agree that we should try to find
constructive solutions to this that require some
compromise, and I'm grateful not only for the expertise
that Stephanie and others have brought to this group, but
also that Benny and others have pointed out some of the
problems with Whois details being inappropriately used
(e.g., for spam). However, I wanted to outline my strong
concerns about creating a centralized registration and
surveillance scheme over one subset of internet users as
part of the solutions. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature">
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<div dir="ltr"><font face="arial,
helvetica,
sans-serif" color="#073763">John
Horton<br>
President and
CEO,
LegitScript</font>
<div><img height="36" width="96"><br>
<div>
<div>
<p style="margin:0.0px 0.0px 0.0px 0.0px;font:12.0px Helvetica"><br>
</p>
<p style="margin:0px;font-style:normal;font-variant:normal;font-size:12px;line-height:normal;font-family:Helvetica"><b><font color="#444444">Follow</font><font color="#0b5394"> </font><font color="#000000">Legit</font><font color="#0b5394">Script</font></b>: <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/company/legitscript-com" style="font-weight:normal" target="_blank"><font color="#cc0000">LinkedIn</font></a>
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<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 4:10 AM,
nathalie coupet via gnso-rds-pdp-wg <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div style="color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:16px">
<div id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184"><span>Hi
Allison,</span></div>
<div id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184"><span><br>
</span></div>
<div id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184" dir="ltr"><span id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39362">Would
you be able to carry out your investigations
normally if access to WHOIS thick were restricted
only by the need to enter an email? </span></div>
<div id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184" dir="ltr"><span><br>
</span></div>
<div id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184" dir="ltr">With regards to privacy by design, instead
of pushing for the implementation of this concept
inside the realm of WHOIS where it is foreign, since
it is an engineering concept, why not advocate for
its implementation at the design level of the
Internet, where it belongs? </div>
<span class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<div id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184" dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39185"> </div>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531signature" id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39232">Nathalie </div>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531qtdSeparateBR"><br>
<br>
</div>
</font></span>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yahoo_quoted" style="display:block">
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<div style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida Grande,sans-serif;font-size:16px"><span>
<div dir="ltr"><font face="Arial" size="2"> On
Tuesday, February 14, 2017 12:38 AM,
allison nixon <<a href="mailto:elsakoo@gmail.com" target="_blank">elsakoo@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</font></div>
<br>
<br>
</span>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531y_msg_container">
<div id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549">
<div><span>
<div dir="ltr">This car metaphor isn't
complete without also stating that
some car owners purchase them for the
sole purpose of running over people!
<div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Some car owners purchase fleets
of cars to run over as many people
as possible. Even though they
re-use their name on every single
vehicle registration, the subpeona
takes so long that the city can no
longer automatically block the
cars as they enter, and need to
wait for them to run over a few
people before they can do anything
about it.</div>
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
This metaphor has obviously been
tortured past the point of
absurdity, I'll leave it alone now.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I've mostly been lurking for the
whole duration of this group, and
please forgive me if I'm missing
something massive here, but I get
the impression that most people here
don't spend a lot of time doing
investigations. But this is my life.
If I needed a subpeona for every
single historical lookup, pivot, and
reverse search, I would get zero
done due to a lack of legal
authority. Many if not most of the
people doing the heavy lifting in
anti-cybercrime efforts are private
citizens with no government issued
authority. It seems that the general
expectation here is that limiting
access to people with badges is OK,
but I'm telling you there is a
severe lack of those skillsets and
it will be years before we see
widespread technical literacy among
the police. Whatever system results,
private citizens need a path for
unrestricted and automated access.
And if we want to talk protecting
privacy, I think criminally
motivated violations of privacy are
far more likely to affect everyone's
day to day life right now, and
automated WHOIS lookups are used
heavily especially in anti-phishing
and anti-spam operations.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>With the status quo, I can go on
fishing expeditions through the
WHOIS data and turn up hundreds of
domains used for the same type of
malicious activity, and predict with
a high accuracy which domains will
be malicious before they are used
for anything. It sometimes turns up
domains owned by innocent people,
and I doubt privacy minded people
would like that, but the reality is
I rarely ever encounter WHOIS data
that is convincing PII. It's almost
all fake. And if it's not fake, it's
a company's public contact info, or
it's a foolish person who turned
down WHOIS privacy protection, and
will change their WHOIS as soon as
the spam starts flowing.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Have there been any studies on
what percentage of WHOIS data is
real and correct? Can we ever expect
to have meaningful data when
registrars are allowed to take
Bitcoins over Tor as payment? At
what point does "privacy" become an
empty argument when some of these
Internet hosting/registrar companies
clearly profit from facilitating
abuse, and network defenders block
entire TLDs due to the saturation of
abuse?</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>From my vantage point, I see
great benefit from seeing patterns
in the fake data submitted by
fraudsters, and I see few harms from
the privacy side of things, because
people seem to generally realize
that "123 fake st" is a perfectly
acceptable WHOIS entry.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I also recognize this situation
is completely absurd. Every aspect
of this is surely an abuse of the
original system. But it seems like
building a pyramid from the top
down, restricting access to supposed
"PII" that is unlikely to contain
PII, to the detriment of legitimate
efforts that also seek to enhance
privacy by preventing criminal theft
of private data like bank account
numbers.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
</span>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549gmail_extra"><br clear="none">
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549yqt3115795380" id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549yqtfd25452">
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549gmail_quote"><span>On
Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at 9:14 PM, Sam
Lanfranco <span dir="ltr"><<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:sam@lanfranco.net" target="_blank">sam@lanfranco.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br clear="none">
</span>
<blockquote class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>I
have to strongly agree with Alex
that whatever the criteria are
for thin data, they cannot
include that thin data "is
transitive" in some sort of
bread crumb trail manner.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Everything is potentially
transitive in that sense. I
observe a vehicle but all I get
is make, model and license
plate, and in most jurisdictions
that is all I get. It is the
vehicle owner's "thin data". Of
course I can hang around, see
that the car has a baby seat,
witness a woman or man putting a
child in the car, assume that
she/he has legitimate access to
the car, follow the car and
assemble more personal
information (lives at; works at;
shops at; visits;) The license
plate didn't facilitate that
crumb train discovery, but no
license plate would hamper
legitimate seeking of
information about who owns the
car (issuing a parking ticket,
LEA investigation, etc.) .
License plate is part of thin
data with no gated access. Of
course, this will change in the
era of the digital vehicle.
Depending on security, and
authorization, one will be able
to just ask the car, and ask
about a lot of things...like
whose cell phone was in the
passenger's seat last night,
when I was supposed to be alone
)-:<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
There needs to be a similar
balance (license plate but no
owner's name unless wanted, like
Sam's Curry Pizza Barn logo,
phone number and website URL
painted on the side).<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
More Important, have we made
progress (convergence) on the
working principles that should
be brought to bear in building a
thin data set. A lot of time has
been spent looking at good case
and bad case scenarios. What
operational principles have been
distilled from all these
examples? What is the balance
between thin data inclusion and
exclusion, and design and
technical solutions that can be
used to prevent (for example)
robotic harvesting? There is
another frontier here, and that
is what governments will do to
restrain or enable certain uses
of thin data? While ICANN needs
to be aware of what is going on
there, that part is beyond
ICANN's remit, but those
policies will help shape some of
the context within which ICANN
deals with the thin data task.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Sam L</span>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549HOEnZb">
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549h5"><span><br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
On 2017-02-14 1:23 AM,
Deacon, Alex wrote:<br clear="none">
</span>
<blockquote class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>
All,<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
So it seems the debate has
progressed from “thin
data” to “thick data”
(i.e. data that includes
email). I know we are all
super excited to talk
about “thick data” but I
don’t think we are there
yet (are we? Hopefully I
didn’t miss the party…)<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Focusing on thin data for
the moment I struggle to
understand how it is
personal data. I do not
believe it is. As for
the odd logic proposed by
some that the property of
privacy is transitive
(i.e. Because “thin data”
can be used to
link/point/discover other
data then “thin data”
equals “personal data”) I
just don’t buy it.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
I don’t disagree with much
of what was expressed in
this thread, however we
must keep in mind that
balance and
proportionality are
important concepts in many
(all?) data privacy laws.
Any arguments that imply
that no such balance
exists (or should exist)
is obstructive IMO.<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Alex<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
</span>
<div>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796h5">
On 2/13/17, 5:42 AM,
<<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann
.org</a> on behalf of
<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:michele@blacknight.com" target="_blank">michele@blacknight.com</a>>
wrote:<br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
I agree and I know
from how I’ve used
various email addresses
that they are actively
being harvested and
spammed.<br clear="none">
Also it’s one
of the biggest sources
of complaints we get
from our clients
(registrants)<br clear="none">
It’s
definitely not an “edge
case”.<br clear="none">
Regards<br clear="none">
Michele<br clear="none">
--<br clear="none">
Mr Michele Neylon<br clear="none">
Blacknight
Solutions<br clear="none">
Hosting, Colocation
& Domains<br clear="none">
<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="https://www.blacknight.com/" target="_blank">https://www.blacknight.com/</a><br clear="none">
<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="http://blacknight.blog/" target="_blank">http://blacknight.blog/</a><br clear="none">
Intl. <a rel="nofollow" shape="rect">+353 (0)
59 9183072</a><br clear="none">
Direct Dial: <a rel="nofollow" shape="rect">+353
(0)59 9183090</a><br clear="none">
Social: <a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="http://mneylon.social/" target="_blank">http://mneylon.social</a><br clear="none">
Some thoughts: <a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="http://ceo.hosting/" target="_blank">http://ceo.hosting/</a><br clear="none">
-----------------------------
--<br clear="none">
Blacknight Internet
Solutions Ltd, Unit
12A,Barrowside Business
Park,Sleaty<br clear="none">
Road,Graiguecullen,Carlow,R93
X265,Ireland Company
No.: 370845<br clear="none">
______________________________
_________________<br clear="none">
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mailing list<br clear="none">
<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br clear="none">
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______________________________ _________________<br clear="none">
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing
list<br clear="none">
<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br clear="none">
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istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
<br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
<span class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
-- <br clear="none">
*-----------------------------
---------------*<span><br clear="none">
"It is a disgrace to be rich
and honoured<br clear="none">
in an unjust state"
-Confucius<br clear="none">
------------------------------ ----------------<br clear="none">
Dr Sam Lanfranco (Prof
Emeritus & Senior
Scholar)<br clear="none">
Econ, York U., Toronto,
Ontario, CANADA - M3J 1P3<br clear="none">
YorkU email:
<a class="m_-7998131626756526054moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:Lanfran@Yorku.ca" target="_blank">Lanfran@Yorku.ca</a> Skype:
slanfranco<br clear="none">
blog: <a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="http://samlanfranco.blogspot.com/" target="_blank">http://samlanfranco.blogspot.c
om</a><br clear="none">
Phone: <a rel="nofollow" shape="rect">613 476-0429</a>
cell: <a rel="nofollow" shape="rect">416-816-2852</a></span></font></span>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549HOEnZb">
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549h5"><br clear="none">
<br clear="none">
______________________________
_________________<span><br clear="none">
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br clear="none">
<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br clear="none">
<a rel="nofollow" shape="rect" href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l
istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a></span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<br clear="none">
<br clear="all">
<span>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
-- <br clear="none">
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549gmail_signature">______________________________<wbr>___<br clear="none">
Note to self: Pillage BEFORE
burning.</div>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549yqt3115795380" id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549yqtfd22628">
</div>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<span>
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yqt3115795380" id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yqtfd09601">______________________________<wbr>_________________<br clear="none">
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br clear="none">
<a shape="rect" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br clear="none">
<a shape="rect" href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a></div>
<br>
<br>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
<a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset class="m_-7998131626756526054mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre>______________________________<wbr>_________________
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
<a class="m_-7998131626756526054moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>
<a class="m_-7998131626756526054moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a></pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
</div></div></div>
<br>______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
<a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/<wbr>listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br></blockquote></div><br><br clear="all"><div><br></div>-- <br><div class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature">_________________________________<br>Note to self: Pillage BEFORE burning.</div>
</div>