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That old horse again?<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CACLR7wLFYxf+XF4NnSmWYNA3ycZk3ciZ=tSDD7YtyjLfUwv2aw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Here are some hard facts about the volume of abuse going
on:</div>
<div><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds/">https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/tlds/</a></div>
<div>Right now, 93.3 percent of all domains registered under the
.science TLD are malicious!</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
Those statistics are only their perceived truth just like the
audience at Trumps inauguration was the largest ever! <br>
<br>
Their statistics are deeply flawed as they only look at a small part
of domain names and disregard major pieces of the puzzle:<br>
According to nTLD stats, .science has 232,611 <span
class="percentbar p0"></span>domains, yet the Spamhaus reports
bases their badness rating on an arbitrary number of domains "seen".
They even state that if a domain is not in the focus of their
anti-abuse systems, it will not be counted as seen. By ignoring the
majority of domains in a TLD one can dream up any percentage one
likes, apparently. <br>
<br>
Look at the numbers for .top: Apparently <span class="body">400,469
domains are used maliciously. </span><span class="body">400,469!
That is a lot of abuse that I somehow have not heard about from
any other source, never seen in my spam filters, etc. </span><br>
<br>
But I will not dispute that there may be a large number of domains
in that TLD may be used for abuse. Yet the report does not go into
further detail? Could a contributing factor of "badness" be a low
price, attracting the wrong kind of customer? How is this badness
distributed amongst registrars? They also do not detail how they
decided a domain was malicious in the first place? Yet on the other
hand they accuse registries and registrars of knowingly aiding and
abetting criminals. Without providing proof. Or even complaining to
ICANN about them, apparently. I would assume that when you make such
bold statements as Spamhaus does, they have the evidence to back
them up...<br>
<br>
I trust these statistics by spamhaus less than anything coming out
of the mouth of the orange menace. And that is saying something. <br>
<br>
Best,<br>
Volker<br>
<br>
<br>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CACLR7wLFYxf+XF4NnSmWYNA3ycZk3ciZ=tSDD7YtyjLfUwv2aw@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
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<div><br>
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<div>>><span style="font-size:12.8px">the question should
be: Do you have a legally enforceable right to access that
data and do with it whatever you please.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">At the moment, the answer to
that is yes. And network owners also have a right to decide
who they want to interact with. WHOIS is used as part of
that determination. Not only is registrant data correlated
with past malicious registrants, but the age of the domain
is also determined through WHOIS. Without this granularity,
network owners will absolutely err on the side of blocking
too much over too little. We already see this with
residential ISPs blocking entire TCP and UDP ports for their
customer base, because the alternative is a level of abuse
that takes the entire network down. Where is the "free and
open Internet" when the Internet doesn't work anymore? Those
are the battles that are being fought right now, and
pretending this isn't a problem is a "wall" on yalls part,
not mine.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">Here is a list of all the
ports that Comcast blocks for its users. This has nothing to
do with freedom of speech and everything to do with the fact
that Comcast's network will die if they don't do this. As a
consequence I can't send outbound TCP/25 SMTP anymore:</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.xfinity.com/support/internet/list-of-blocked-ports/">https://www.xfinity.com/support/internet/list-of-blocked-ports/</a></span><br>
</div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">And over-blocking is going
to be a worse problem when granularity is taken away from
network defenders. When Spamhaus decides an entire country's
TLD has too much abuse, most network operators will agree,
and legitimate sites (like that country's government,
companies, and media outlets) are an acceptable loss. You're
going to see more of this, and that country's government has
little recourse aside from cleaning up their entire TLD so
network operators can be convinced to remove the blocks. But
since abuse-laden TLDs are usually that way due to lack of
budget, it's more likely that the entire country will simply
suffer harms instead.</span></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I am really surprised at how little credence is being given
to these problems.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at 9:41 AM, theo
geurts <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gtheo@xs4all.nl" target="_blank">gtheo@xs4all.nl</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
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<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF" text="#000000">
<p><br>
</p>
Hi John, <br>
<br>
I agree we do not want to create a centralized
registration and surveillance scheme. <br>
<br>
Such a system would be subject to many regulations and
fines from Data Regulators. If we do not execute privacy
properly we are creating a system that will cost millions
of dollars in fines alone. Tho that would actually answer
the question are the costs of RDS viable. The answer would
be no. <br>
<br>
Theo <br>
<div>
<div class="h5">
<div class="m_-7998131626756526054moz-cite-prefix">On
14-2-2017 14:59, John Horton wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">Nathalie
and others,</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">I
wanted to take a moment and explain why I'm
strongly opposed to requiring email or other
registration in order to view thin or thick
details. For the reasons outlined below, I think
it's antithetical to the open and decentralized
nature of the internet, and constitutes a form
of internet surveillance. </div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">First,
putting aside repressive regimes, private
networks and edge cases, one of the hallmark
principles of the internet is that it's open;
you don't have to register or justify your need
to access information on the internet. And, it's
decentralized. Historically, its open nature has
included not only being able to see a website,
but also the registration details for the
website's domain name. And, whatever governments
may do (which isn't the question here), there's
no centralized internet surveillance or
registration authority for internet users
generally. </div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">If
we impose a scheme where there is a central
organization with the authority to a) require
registration and b) centrally control access,
and c) (as has been proposed) require the user
to provide a reason for their access, that
organization then also has the ability to d)
make judgment calls about what reasons are valid
and which are not and e) maintain data on who
accessed what RDS data, for what reason, for how
long and why. Note also that at least one
version of the EWG report said that f) the
organization would be empowered to levy punitive
measures against internet users who accessed
more data than the RDS deems appropriate.</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)"><br>
</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">So:
you have a system that surveils internet users
who access some information and maintains data
on their use of that data. Let's think about the
following scenarios from the point of view of
openness, decentralization and civil liberties.</div>
<div class="gmail_default"
style="font-family:arial,helvetica,sans-serif;color:rgb(68,68,68)">
<div class="gmail_default"
style="color:rgb(34,34,34);font-family:arial,sans-serif">
<ul>
<li>A journalist (or blogger) is writing an
investigative article and wants to find
out who is behind a domain name. If we
require registration and disclosure of the
reason, that in essence creates a
situation where the RDS de facto is
monitoring that journalist and determining
if their basis for conducting the
investigation is worthy. It also allows
the RDS the ability to monitor the
journalist's use of the domain name
registration data. This potentially chills
free speech. </li>
<li>Consider a political activist who wishes
to expose corruption by an elected
politician and wants to access RDS
information to show, for example,
conflicts of interests in the politician's
business operations. Once the political
activist has to disclose who they are, let
alone why they are accessing the
information, that not only chills
legitimate political activism but also
potentially opens up a route for
government abuse (e.g., if a government
agency were able to subpoena the list of
who accessed RDS information for which
domain names and why). </li>
<li>Academic researchers periodically review
Whois/RDS data; requiring them to register
before reviewing data and disclose why
they are doing the research potentially
empowers the RDS to monitor academic
research and determine its worthiness. </li>
<li>Imagine that a cybercrime network is
under investigation (as they are wont to
be); requiring law enforcement to register
-- particularly if there is a log of which
domain names they reviewed RDS for -- can
potentially compromise the investigation
if that information is disclosed. Would
registrants have the right to be informed
every time that someone registered to
review their RDS details? </li>
</ul>
<div>For one central entity to possess that
much power over internet users is something
that I think we should avoid, and it's
antithetical to the principles of openness
and decentralization. There are other
well-known solutions to spam and
inappropriate contacts; forcing all other
legitimate activities to grind to a
screeching halt -- particular under the
umbrella of a surveillance scheme -- is a
cure worse than the disease. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I recognize and agree that we should try
to find constructive solutions to this that
require some compromise, and I'm grateful
not only for the expertise that Stephanie
and others have brought to this group, but
also that Benny and others have pointed out
some of the problems with Whois details
being inappropriately used (e.g., for spam).
However, I wanted to outline my strong
concerns about creating a centralized
registration and surveillance scheme over
one subset of internet users as part of the
solutions. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra">
<div>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796gmail_signature"
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<div dir="ltr"><font
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<br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Tue, Feb 14, 2017 at
4:10 AM, nathalie coupet via gnso-rds-pdp-wg <span
dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org"
target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px
#ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div>
<div
style="color:#000;background-color:#fff;font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica
Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida
Grande,sans-serif;font-size:16px">
<div
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184"><span>Hi
Allison,</span></div>
<div
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184"><span><br>
</span></div>
<div
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184"
dir="ltr"><span
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39362">Would
you be able to carry out your
investigations normally if access to
WHOIS thick were restricted only by
the need to enter an email? </span></div>
<div
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184"
dir="ltr"><span><br>
</span></div>
<div
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184"
dir="ltr">With regards to privacy by
design, instead of pushing for the
implementation of this concept inside
the realm of WHOIS where it is
foreign, since it is an engineering
concept, why not advocate for its
implementation at the design level of
the Internet, where it belongs? </div>
<span
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888">
<div
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39184"
dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39185"> </div>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531signature"
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yui_3_16_0_ym19_1_1487072479779_39232">Nathalie </div>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531qtdSeparateBR"><br>
<br>
</div>
</font></span>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yahoo_quoted"
style="display:block">
<div
style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica
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<div
style="font-family:HelveticaNeue,Helvetica
Neue,Helvetica,Arial,Lucida
Grande,sans-serif;font-size:16px"><span>
<div dir="ltr"><font
face="Arial" size="2"> On
Tuesday, February 14, 2017
12:38 AM, allison nixon <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:elsakoo@gmail.com"
target="_blank">elsakoo@gmail.com</a>>
wrote:<br>
</font></div>
<br>
<br>
</span>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531y_msg_container">
<div
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549">
<div><span>
<div dir="ltr">This car
metaphor isn't complete
without also stating
that some car owners
purchase them for the
sole purpose of running
over people!
<div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Some car owners
purchase fleets of
cars to run over as
many people as
possible. Even
though they re-use
their name on every
single vehicle
registration, the
subpeona takes so
long that the city
can no longer
automatically block
the cars as they
enter, and need to
wait for them to run
over a few people
before they can do
anything about it.</div>
</div>
<div><br clear="none">
This metaphor has
obviously been
tortured past the
point of absurdity,
I'll leave it alone
now.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I've mostly been
lurking for the whole
duration of this
group, and please
forgive me if I'm
missing something
massive here, but I
get the impression
that most people here
don't spend a lot of
time doing
investigations. But
this is my life. If I
needed a subpeona for
every single
historical lookup,
pivot, and reverse
search, I would get
zero done due to a
lack of legal
authority. Many if not
most of the people
doing the heavy
lifting in
anti-cybercrime
efforts are private
citizens with no
government issued
authority. It seems
that the general
expectation here is
that limiting access
to people with badges
is OK, but I'm telling
you there is a severe
lack of those
skillsets and it will
be years before we see
widespread technical
literacy among the
police. Whatever
system results,
private citizens need
a path for
unrestricted and
automated access. And
if we want to talk
protecting privacy, I
think criminally
motivated violations
of privacy are far
more likely to affect
everyone's day to day
life right now, and
automated WHOIS
lookups are used
heavily especially in
anti-phishing and
anti-spam operations.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>With the status
quo, I can go on
fishing expeditions
through the WHOIS data
and turn up hundreds
of domains used for
the same type of
malicious activity,
and predict with a
high accuracy which
domains will be
malicious before they
are used for anything.
It sometimes turns up
domains owned by
innocent people, and I
doubt privacy minded
people would like
that, but the reality
is I rarely ever
encounter WHOIS data
that is convincing
PII. It's almost all
fake. And if it's not
fake, it's a company's
public contact info,
or it's a foolish
person who turned down
WHOIS privacy
protection, and will
change their WHOIS as
soon as the spam
starts flowing.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>Have there been any
studies on what
percentage of WHOIS
data is real and
correct? Can we ever
expect to have
meaningful data when
registrars are allowed
to take Bitcoins over
Tor as payment? At
what point does
"privacy" become an
empty argument when
some of these Internet
hosting/registrar
companies clearly
profit from
facilitating abuse,
and network defenders
block entire TLDs due
to the saturation of
abuse?</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>From my vantage
point, I see great
benefit from seeing
patterns in the fake
data submitted by
fraudsters, and I see
few harms from the
privacy side of
things, because people
seem to generally
realize that "123 fake
st" is a perfectly
acceptable WHOIS
entry.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
<div>I also recognize
this situation is
completely absurd.
Every aspect of this
is surely an abuse of
the original system.
But it seems like
building a pyramid
from the top down,
restricting access to
supposed "PII" that is
unlikely to contain
PII, to the detriment
of legitimate efforts
that also seek to
enhance privacy by
preventing criminal
theft of private data
like bank account
numbers.</div>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
</div>
</span>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549gmail_extra"><br
clear="none">
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549yqt3115795380"
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<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549gmail_quote"><span>On
Mon, Feb 13, 2017 at
9:14 PM, Sam
Lanfranco <span
dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
shape="rect"
href="mailto:sam@lanfranco.net"
target="_blank">sam@lanfranco.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br
clear="none">
</span>
<blockquote
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px
#ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>I
have to strongly
agree with Alex
that whatever the
criteria are for
thin data, they
cannot include
that thin data "is
transitive" in
some sort of bread
crumb trail
manner.<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Everything is
potentially
transitive in that
sense. I observe a
vehicle but all I
get is make, model
and license plate,
and in most
jurisdictions that
is all I get. It
is the vehicle
owner's "thin
data". Of course I
can hang around,
see that the car
has a baby seat,
witness a woman or
man putting a
child in the car,
assume that she/he
has legitimate
access to the car,
follow the car and
assemble more
personal
information (lives
at; works at;
shops at; visits;)
The license plate
didn't facilitate
that crumb train
discovery, but no
license plate
would hamper
legitimate seeking
of information
about who owns the
car (issuing a
parking ticket,
LEA investigation,
etc.) . License
plate is part of
thin data with no
gated access. Of
course, this will
change in the era
of the digital
vehicle. Depending
on security, and
authorization, one
will be able to
just ask the car,
and ask about a
lot of
things...like
whose cell phone
was in the
passenger's seat
last night, when I
was supposed to be
alone )-:<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
There needs to be
a similar balance
(license plate but
no owner's name
unless wanted,
like Sam's Curry
Pizza Barn logo,
phone number and
website URL
painted on the
side).<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
More Important,
have we made
progress
(convergence) on
the working
principles that
should be brought
to bear in
building a thin
data set. A lot of
time has been
spent looking at
good case and bad
case scenarios.
What operational
principles have
been distilled
from all these
examples? What is
the balance
between thin data
inclusion and
exclusion, and
design and
technical
solutions that can
be used to prevent
(for example)
robotic
harvesting? There
is another
frontier here, and
that is what
governments will
do to restrain or
enable certain
uses of thin data?
While ICANN needs
to be aware of
what is going on
there, that part
is beyond ICANN's
remit, but those
policies will help
shape some of the
context within
which ICANN deals
with the thin data
task.<br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
Sam L</span>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549HOEnZb">
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549h5"><span><br
clear="none">
<br
clear="none">
On 2017-02-14
1:23 AM,
Deacon, Alex
wrote:<br
clear="none">
</span>
<blockquote
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549gmail_quote"
style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><span>
All,<br
clear="none">
<br
clear="none">
So it seems
the debate has
progressed
from “thin
data” to
“thick data”
(i.e. data
that includes
email). I
know we are
all super
excited to
talk about
“thick data”
but I don’t
think we are
there yet (are
we? Hopefully
I didn’t miss
the party…)<br
clear="none">
<br
clear="none">
Focusing on
thin data for
the moment I
struggle to
understand how
it is personal
data. I do
not believe it
is. As for
the odd logic
proposed by
some that the
property of
privacy is
transitive
(i.e. Because
“thin data”
can be used to
link/point/discover other data then “thin data” equals “personal data”)
I just don’t
buy it.<br
clear="none">
<br
clear="none">
I don’t
disagree with
much of what
was expressed
in this
thread,
however we
must keep in
mind that
balance and
proportionality
are important
concepts in
many (all?)
data privacy
laws. Any
arguments that
imply that no
such balance
exists (or
should exist)
is obstructive
IMO.<br
clear="none">
<br
clear="none">
Alex<br
clear="none">
<br
clear="none">
<br
clear="none">
</span>
<div>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796h5">
On 2/13/17,
5:42 AM, <<a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" shape="rect"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann.org"
target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann .org</a> on behalf of <a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" shape="rect"
href="mailto:michele@blacknight.com"
target="_blank">michele@blacknight.com</a>> wrote:<br clear="none">
<br
clear="none">
I agree
and I know
from how I’ve
used various
email
addresses that
they are
actively being
harvested and
spammed.<br
clear="none">
Also
it’s one of
the biggest
sources of
complaints we
get from our
clients
(registrants)<br
clear="none">
It’s
definitely not
an “edge
case”.<br
clear="none">
Regards<br
clear="none">
Michele<br
clear="none">
--<br
clear="none">
Mr
Michele Neylon<br
clear="none">
Blacknight
Solutions<br
clear="none">
Hosting,
Colocation
& Domains<br
clear="none">
<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
shape="rect"
href="https://www.blacknight.com/"
target="_blank">https://www.blacknight.com/</a><br clear="none">
<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
shape="rect"
href="http://blacknight.blog/"
target="_blank">http://blacknight.blog/</a><br clear="none">
Intl. <a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" shape="rect">+353 (0) 59 9183072</a><br
clear="none">
Direct
Dial: <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
shape="rect">+353
(0)59 9183090</a><br
clear="none">
Social: <a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" shape="rect"
href="http://mneylon.social/"
target="_blank">http://mneylon.social</a><br clear="none">
Some
thoughts: <a
moz-do-not-send="true" rel="nofollow" shape="rect"
href="http://ceo.hosting/"
target="_blank">http://ceo.hosting/</a><br clear="none">
-----------------------------
--<br
clear="none">
Blacknight
Internet
Solutions Ltd,
Unit
12A,Barrowside
Business
Park,Sleaty<br
clear="none">
Road,Graiguecullen,Carlow,R93
X265,Ireland
Company No.:
370845<br
clear="none">
______________________________
_________________<br clear="none">
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
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</blockquote>
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</div>
<span
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888">
-- <br
clear="none">
*----------------------------- ---------------*<span><br clear="none">
"It is a
disgrace to be
rich and
honoured<br
clear="none">
in an unjust
state"
-Confucius<br
clear="none">
------------------------------ ----------------<br clear="none">
Dr Sam
Lanfranco
(Prof Emeritus
& Senior
Scholar)<br
clear="none">
Econ, York U.,
Toronto,
Ontario,
CANADA - M3J
1P3<br
clear="none">
YorkU email: <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
class="m_-7998131626756526054moz-txt-link-abbreviated"
href="mailto:Lanfran@Yorku.ca" target="_blank">Lanfran@Yorku.ca</a>
Skype:
slanfranco<br
clear="none">
blog: <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
shape="rect"
href="http://samlanfranco.blogspot.com/"
target="_blank">http://samlanfranco.blogspot.c om</a><br clear="none">
Phone: <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
shape="rect">613
476-0429</a>
cell: <a
moz-do-not-send="true"
rel="nofollow"
shape="rect">416-816-2852</a></span></font></span>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549HOEnZb">
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549h5"><br
clear="none">
<br clear="none">
______________________________ _________________<span><br clear="none">
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<a
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<a
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rel="nofollow"
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href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg"
target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a></span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<br clear="none">
<br clear="all">
<span>
<div><br clear="none">
</div>
-- <br clear="none">
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549gmail_signature">______________________________<wbr>___<br
clear="none">
Note to self: Pillage
BEFORE burning.</div>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549yqt3115795380"
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yiv9108844549yqtfd22628">
</div>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<span>
<div
class="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yqt3115795380"
id="m_-7998131626756526054m_-9163358764285633796m_3299425158225197531yqtfd09601">______________________________<wbr>_________________<br
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gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br
clear="none">
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
shape="rect"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org"
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shape="rect"
href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg"
target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a></div>
<br>
<br>
</span></div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
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<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org"
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rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset
class="m_-7998131626756526054mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre>______________________________<wbr>_________________
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</blockquote>
</div></div></div>
______________________________<wbr>_________________
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<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>
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</blockquote></div>
<div>
</div>--
<div class="gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature">_________________________________
Note to self: Pillage BEFORE burning.</div>
</div>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a></pre>
</blockquote>
<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Volker A. Greimann
- Rechtsabteilung -
Key-Systems GmbH
Im Oberen Werk 1
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Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
Email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>
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--------------------------------------------
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