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<p>I may be out on a limb here (although I doubt it) but it seems to
me that installing gated access to private registration data and
then turning around and allowing third parties access to harvest,
repackage and republish that data somehow defeats the purpose of
what we are trying to achieve here. <br>
</p>
<p>If that is the ultimate result, we may as well stop right here. <br>
</p>
<p>Best,</p>
<p>Volker<br>
</p>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Am 26.04.2017 um 16:27 schrieb allison
nixon:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
cite="mid:CACLR7wJkZ06su8+4OVk6W6jEeEwt+conWv0oUZBYrVdqKWcv3A@mail.gmail.com"
type="cite">
<p dir="ltr">Thank you for your email Tim. </p>
<p dir="ltr">Full disclosure(because I believe in being
transparent about this sort of thing), we do business with
Domaintools and use their tools to consume whois data.</p>
<p dir="ltr">"i'll close by saying I think Allison's point about
economic value has merit. yes, the point of the WG is not to
protect anyone's economic interest. I agree 100% with that
statement and will disagree with anyone who thinks the future of
DomainTools or other commercial service should have one iota of
impact on this discussion."</p>
<p dir="ltr">I will however disagree vehemently with you on this
point. It is obvious that many of the arguments to cut off
anonymous querying to WHOIS data are economically motivated.
Financial concerns are cited numerous times in approved
documents. I also believe the "vetting" process is likely to
become a new revenue stream for someone as well. A revenue
stream with HIGHLY questionable privacy value-add. </p>
<p dir="ltr">Every dollar of income for the Domaintools company
and others like it come from their clients, who see a multiplier
of value from it. That means for every dollar spent on the
entire whois aggregator industry means that a much larger amount
of money is saved through prevented harms like fraud, abuse, and
even fake medications which kill people.</p>
<p dir="ltr">I think it is extremely important to identify what
critical systems rely on whois (either directly or downstream),
and determine if we are ready to give up the utility of these
systems. </p>
<p dir="ltr">We also need to identify the value of the ability to
anonymously query whois and what that loss of privacy will mean
as well. While I obviously do not make many queries
anonymously(although our vendor has their own privacy policy), I
understand this is important especially to those researching
more dangerous actors. Why would $_COUNTRY dissidents want to
query domains when their opponents would surely be hacking into
the audit logs for this?<br>
<br>
</p>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Apr 25, 2017 11:41 PM, "Chen, Tim"
<<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:tim@domaintools.com">tim@domaintools.com</a>>
wrote:<br type="attribution">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr"><span style="font-size:12.8px">"And I hope
more stakeholders in this multi-stakeholder process will
come forward with their own perspectives, as they will
differ from mine."</span><br>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">happy to do so.
DomainTools is clearly a stakeholder in this debate.
and we have a fair amount of experience around the
challenges, benefits and risks of whois data
aggregation at scale. </span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">from the beginning of
this EWG/RDS idea we've stood down bc i didn't believe
our opinion would be seen as objective-enough given
our line of business. but it is apparent to me having
followed this debate for many weeks now, that this is
a working group of individuals who all bring their own
biases into the debate. whether they care to admit
that to themselves or not. so we might as well wade
in too. bc I think our experience is very relevant to
the discussion.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">i'll do my best to be
as objective as I can, as a domain registrant myself
and as an informed industry participant.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">since our experience
is working with security minded organizations, that is
the context with which I will comment. </span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">since this is an ICANN
working group, I start with the ICANN mission
statement around the security and stability of the
DNS. I find myself wanting to fit this debate to that
as the north star. i do not see the RDS as purpose
driven to fit the GDPR or any region-specific legal
resolution. but I do see those as important inputs to
our discussion.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">from a security
perspective, my experience is that the benefits of the
current Whois model, taken with this lens, far
outweigh the costs. again, I can only speak from my
experience here at DomainTools, and obviously under
the current Whois regime. This is not to say it
cannot be improved. From a data accuracy perspective
alone there is enormous room for improvement as I
think we can all agree. every day I see the tangible
benefits to security interests, which for the most
part are "doing good", from the work that we do. when
I compare that to the complaints that we get bc "my
PII is visible in your data", it's not even close by
my value barometer (which my differ from others').
this is relevant bc any future solution will be
imperfect as I have mentioned before. as Allison and
others point out we need to measure the harm done by
any new system that may seek to solve one problem
(privacy?) and inadvertently create many more. since
this group is fond of analogies I'll contribute one
from the medical oath (not sure if this is just U.S.)
"first, do no harm".</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">i'll close by saying I
think Allison's point about economic value has merit.
yes, the point of the WG is not to protect anyone's
economic interest. I agree 100% with that statement
and will disagree with anyone who thinks the future of
DomainTools or other commercial service should have
one iota of impact on this discussion. but I also
think "it's too expensive" or "it's too hard" are weak
and dangerous excuses when dealing with an issue like
this which has enormous and far reaching consequences
for the very mission of ICANN around the security and
stability of our internet.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">Tim</span></div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 3:50 PM,
allison nixon <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:elsakoo@gmail.com" target="_blank">elsakoo@gmail.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
.8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
<div dir="ltr">Thanks for the documentation in your
earlier email. While I understand that's how things
are supposed to work in theory, it's not implemented
very widely, and unless there is enforcement, then
it's unlikely to be useful at all.
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>"<span style="font-size:12.8px">as a given, we
put ourselves in a certain position in terms of
the actions we can and cannot recommend. We can
make similar statements focused on registry
operators, registrars, or any other stakeholder
in this space. If we all approach this WG's task
with the goal of not changing anything, we're
all just wasting our time."</span><br>
<br>
<span style="font-size:12.8px">There are things
that people would be willing to change about
WHOIS. Changes purely relating to the data
format would not be as controversial. Changing
to that RDAP json format would probably be an
agreeable point to most here.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">There are two
different major points of contention here. The
first is the data format, second is the creation
of a new monopoly and ceding power to it. By
monopoly I mean- who are the gatekeepers of
"gated" access? Will it avoid all of the
problems that monopolies are historically prone
to? Who will pay them? It seems like a massive
leap of faith to commit to this without knowing
who we are making the commitment to.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
<br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">"</span><span
style="font-size:12.8px">I do not believe it is
this WG's responsibility to protect anyone's</span></div>
<span style="font-size:12.8px">commercial services
if those things are basically in response to</span><br
style="font-size:12.8px">
<span style="font-size:12.8px">deficiencies in the
existing Whois protocol. "</span>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">From my
understanding of past ICANN working groups,
registrars have fought against issues that would
have increased their costs. And the destruction
of useful WHOIS results(or becoming beholden to
some new monopoly) stand to incur far more costs
for far larger industries. </span><span
style="font-size:12.8px">So this shouldn't
surprise you. If those economic concerns are not
valid then I question why the economic concerns
of registrars are valid.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">If entire
industries are built around a feature you would
consider a "deficiency", then your opinion may
solely be your own. And I hope more stakeholders
in this multi-stakeholder process will come
forward with their own perspectives, as they
will differ from mine.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">"Not</span><span
style="font-size:12.8px"> trying to hamstring
the WG. Just asking if this is not something
that has already been solved.."</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">Hi Paul,</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">It's an
interesting thought. This document was
recommended to me as one that was approved in
the past by the working group that outlined what
the resulting system might look like. I'm still
learning and reading about these working groups
and what they do, and this document is massive.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-report-06jun14-en.pdf"
target="_blank">https://www.icann.org/en/syste<wbr>m/files/files/final-report-<wbr>06jun14-en.pdf</a></span><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">In the document,
it says: <i>"Central to the remit of the EWG is
the question of how to design a system that
increases </i></span><i><span
style="font-size:12.8px">the accuracy of the
data collected while also offering protections
for those Registrants </span><span
style="font-size:12.8px">seeking to guard and
maintain their privacy."</span></i></div>
<div><i><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></i></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">One of the
things I notice is that any talk about actually
increasing accuracy of whois info- via
enforcement- is vigorously opposed in this
group, and it's merely assumed that people will
supply better quality data under the new
system. </span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">Throughout the
document it talks about use-cases and features
(whois history, reverse query, etc), which are
indeed identical to the features of the whois
aggregators of current day. Such a system would
replace them. Will the service quality be as
good?</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">On page 63 it
gets into thoughts on who would be "accredited"
to access the gated whois data. Every proposed
scenario seems to recognize the resulting system
will need to handle a large query volume from a
large number of people, and one proposes
accrediting bodies which may accredit
organizations which may accredit individuals. It
even proposes an abuse handling system which is
also reminiscent in structure to how abuse is
handled currently in our domain name system.
Many of these proposed schemes appear to mimic
the ways that the hosting industry and registrar
industry operate, so we can expect that the
patterns of abuse will be equally frequent,
especially if higher quality data is supplied.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">The proposed
scenarios all paint a picture of "gated" access
with very wide gates, while simultaneously
representing to domain purchasers that their
data is safe and privacy protected. And this is
supposed to *reduce* the total number of privacy
violations? This doesn't even appeal to me as a
consumer of this data.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">Whoever sets up
this system also stands to inherit a lot of
money from the soon-to-be-defunct whois
aggregation industry. They would certainly win
our contract, because we would have no choice.
All domain reputation services, anti-spam,
security research, etc, efforts will all need to
pay up. </span></div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">After being
supplied with the above document, I also saw a
copy of a rebuttal written by a company that
monitors abusive domains. I strongly agree with
the sentiments in this document and I do not see
evidence that those concerns have received fair
consideration. While I do not see this new
gatekeeper as an existential threat, I do see it
as a likely degradation in the utility i do see
from whois. To be clear, we do not do any
business with this company.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/input-to-ewg/attachments/20130823/410038bb/LegitScriptCommentsonICANNEWGWhoisReplacementStructure-0001.pdf"
target="_blank">http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/<wbr>input-to-ewg/attachments/20130<wbr>823/410038bb/LegitScriptCommen<wbr>tsonICANNEWGWhoisReplacementSt<wbr>ructure-0001.pdf</a></span><br>
</div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">I also found
John Bambenek's point in a later thread to be
interesting- concentrating WHOIS knowledge
solely to one organization allows the country it
resides in to use it to support its intelligence
apparatus, for example monitoring when its
espionage domains are queried for, and targeting
researchers that query them (since anonymous
querying will be revoked). Nation states already
use domains in operations so this monopoly is a
perfect strategic data reserve. </span><span
style="font-size:12.8px">The fact that this
system is pushed by privacy advocates is indeed
ironic.</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px"><br>
</span></div>
<div><span style="font-size:12.8px">None of those
concerns appear to have been addressed by this
group in any serious capacity. Before the
addition of new members, I don't think many
people had the backgrounds or skillsets to even
understand why they are a concern. But I think
this is a discussion worth having at this point
in time for this group.</span></div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at
1:50 PM, Andrew Sullivan <span dir="ltr"><<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com"
target="_blank">ajs@anvilwalrusden.com</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0
0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
solid;padding-left:1ex">Hi,<br>
<span><br>
On Mon, Apr 24, 2017 at 07:25:47PM +0200, Paul
Keating wrote:<br>
> Andrew,<br>
><br>
> Thank you. That was helpful.<br>
><br>
> ""Given this registrant, what other<br>
> domains are registered?" is a solved
problem, and has been since the<br>
> early 2000s.²<br>
><br>
> This is also traceable via alternative
means such as consistencies in<br>
> various WHOIS fields such as email,
address, name, etc.<br>
<br>
</span>Well, sort of. The email, address, and
name fields are _user_<br>
supplied. So they come from the other party to
the transaction. The<br>
ROID is assigned by the registry itself. So
once you have a match,<br>
you know that you are looking at the same
object, only the same<br>
object, and all the same object(s).<br>
<br>
Email addresses in particular are guaranteed
unique in the world at<br>
any given time (though not guaranteed as unique
identifiers over<br>
time), so they may be useful for these
purposes. Take it from someone<br>
named "Andrew Sullivan", however, that names are
pretty useless as<br>
context-free identifiers :)<br>
<span><br>
> In reality finding out answers to
questions such as<br>
> yours (above) requires investigation
using a plethora of data.<br>
<br>
</span>To be clear, finding out the answer to
what I (meant to) pose(d)<br>
requires no plethora of data: it requires a
single query and access to<br>
the right repository (the registry). In some
theoretical system, the<br>
correct underlying database query would be
something like this:<br>
<br>
SELECT domain_roid, domain_name FROM domains
WHERE registrant_roid = ?;<br>
<br>
and you put the correct ROID in where the
question mark is, and off<br>
you go. That will give you the list of all the
domain names, and<br>
their relevant ROIDs, registered by a given
registrant contact. At<br>
least one registry with which I am familiar once
had a WHOIS feature<br>
that allowed something close to the above, only
it would stop after<br>
some number of domains so as not to return too
much data. I think the<br>
default was therefore LIMIT 50, but I also think
the feature was<br>
eventually eliminated about the time that the
ICANN community rejected<br>
IRIS as an answer to "the whois problem".<br>
<br>
What the above will of course not do is help you
in the event Bob The<br>
Scammer has created dozens of different contacts
for himself by (say)<br>
registering names through many different
registrars. I do not believe<br>
that any registry is going to support such a use
at least without<br>
access controls, because it can be expensive to
answer such things.<br>
So, what you understood me to be asking, I
think, is the question I<br>
did _not_ ask: given this human being or
organization, what other<br>
domains are registered?" That does require a
lot of different data,<br>
and it requires cross-organizational searches,
and it requires sussing<br>
out when someone has lied also. Such research
is, I agree, completely<br>
outside the scope of what any technical system
will ever be able to<br>
offer reliably.<br>
<span><br>
> An entire<br>
> industry exists for this purpose and I
don¹t think we should be<br>
> considering replacing what has already
been existing in the cyber security<br>
> marketplace.<br>
<br>
</span>I do not believe it is this WG's
responsibility to protect anyone's<br>
commercial services if those things are
basically in response to<br>
deficiencies in the existing Whois protocol. In
this case, however,<br>
that's not the problem. Linking data in
multiple databases to a given<br>
real-world human being is hard even in systems
without competition and<br>
multiple points of access. It's always going to
require researchers<br>
for the domain name system.<br>
<br>
Best regards.<br>
<div
class="m_-7832141262075475097m_-293638207015338475HOEnZb">
<div
class="m_-7832141262075475097m_-293638207015338475h5"><br>
A<span class="m_-7832141262075475097HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888"><br>
<br>
--<br>
Andrew Sullivan<br>
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:ajs@anvilwalrusden.com"
target="_blank">ajs@anvilwalrusden.com</a><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br>
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href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org"
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rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a></font></span></div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<span class="m_-7832141262075475097HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888"><br>
<br clear="all">
<div><br>
</div>
-- <br>
<div
class="m_-7832141262075475097m_-293638207015338475gmail_signature"
data-smartmail="gmail_signature">______________________________<wbr>___<br>
Note to self: Pillage BEFORE burning.</div>
</font></span></div>
<br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br>
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href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org"
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</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
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</blockquote>
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Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für den angegebenen Empfänger bestimmt. Jede Form der Kenntnisgabe, Veröffentlichung oder Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist unzulässig. Sollte diese Nachricht nicht für Sie bestimmt sein, so bitten wir Sie, sich mit uns per E-Mail oder telefonisch in Verbindung zu setzen.
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Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Best regards,
Volker A. Greimann
- legal department -
Key-Systems GmbH
Im Oberen Werk 1
66386 St. Ingbert
Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
Email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>
Web: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.key-systems.net">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.RRPproxy.net">www.RRPproxy.net</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.BrandShelter.com">www.BrandShelter.com</a>
Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on Facebook and stay updated:
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a>
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CEO: Alexander Siffrin
Registration No.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.keydrive.lu">www.keydrive.lu</a>
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