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<p><font size="+1"><font face="Lucida Grande">Peter Kimpian,
formerly with the Hungarian DPA, now assigned to the Council
of Europe, participates in this group. I doubt that any
others are willing to devote the time, they have many
responsibilities.</font></font></p>
<p><font size="+1"><font face="Lucida Grande">Stephanie</font></font><br>
</p>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 2017-05-18 06:24, Paul Keating
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote cite="mid:D5434292.9E093%25Paul@law.es" type="cite">
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<div>Chuck,</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>I may be going out on a limb here but wouldn’t it be
appropriate to have the privacy authorities actually
participating in this WG? </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>There are many opinions floating around in the emails and I
see a continuing pattern of confusion.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Given the importance of the governmental authorities here is
it not rationale to have their direct participation so we can
reach a workable solution?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Paul</div>
<div><br>
</div>
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style="font-weight:bold">From: </span> <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg-bounces@icann.org</a>>
on behalf of "Gomes, Chuck via gnso-rds-pdp-wg" <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>><br>
<span style="font-weight:bold">Reply-To: </span> "Gomes,
Chuck" <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cgomes@verisign.com">cgomes@verisign.com</a>><br>
<span style="font-weight:bold">Date: </span> Tuesday, May 16,
2017 at 3:14 AM<br>
<span style="font-weight:bold">To: </span> "<a
moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:gca@icginc.com">gca@icginc.com</a>"
<<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:gca@icginc.com">gca@icginc.com</a>>,
"<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:lisa@corecom.com">lisa@corecom.com</a>"
<<a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:lisa@corecom.com">lisa@corecom.com</a>>,
"<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>"
<<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>><br>
<span style="font-weight:bold">Subject: </span> Re:
[gnso-rds-pdp-wg] Definitions: Authentication and Anonymity<br>
</div>
<div><br>
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<p class="MsoNormal">Greg,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Considering that we already have
rough consensus that requestor does not have to be
identified, what would need to be authenticated? In
other words, why would we need to add ‘without
authentication’?<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">It would be helpful if you could
respond to these questions on Tuesday before our WG
meeting on Wednesday considering you will not be able
to attend the WG call.<b><o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Chuck<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a moz-do-not-send="true"
name="_MailEndCompose"><o:p> </o:p></a></p>
<span style="mso-bookmark:_MailEndCompose"></span>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Greg Aaron [<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gca@icginc.com">mailto:gca@icginc.com</a>]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Monday, May 15, 2017 8:14 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Lisa Phifer <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:lisa@corecom.com">lisa@corecom.com</a>>;
Gomes, Chuck <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cgomes@verisign.com">cgomes@verisign.com</a>>;
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> [EXTERNAL] RE: Definitions:
Authentication and Anonymity<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thanks you, Lisa.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I will be unable to make the next
meeting because the 05:00 UTC meeting time.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Based on last week’s meeting, I I
think we are aiming for something like:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">"Thin data elements must be
accessible to anonymous requestors, without
authentication.”<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If we say:<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">"Thin data elements must be
accessible without requestor authentication"<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">then that means consumers of
registration data might or might not be anonymous.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">For example, a registry operator
could make me register my IP address, from which I can
query registration data. Those queries could be made
without authentication (a username/password), and so
the registry’s registration program could be allowed.
But arguably I would not be anonymous. <o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Whatever policy language is
proposed must be examined for how it can be
interpreted and possibly bypassed. Both the intent
of the WG and the specific language will eventually
need to be laid out.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">So I also suggest it be made
explicit that access to registration data remain free,
without charge.
<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">All best,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">--Greg<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:10.0pt"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<div>
<div style="border:none;border-top:solid #E1E1E1
1.0pt;padding:3.0pt 0in 0in 0in">
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From:</b> Lisa Phifer [<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:lisa@corecom.com">mailto:lisa@corecom.com</a>]
<br>
<b>Sent:</b> Wednesday, May 10, 2017 12:04 PM<br>
<b>To:</b> Greg Aaron <<a
moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gca@icginc.com">gca@icginc.com</a>>;
Gomes, Chuck <<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:cgomes@verisign.com">cgomes@verisign.com</a>>;
<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
<b>Subject:</b> Definitions: Authentication and
Anonymity<o:p></o:p></p>
</div>
</div>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">All,<br>
<br>
Starting a new thread to pursue Greg's suggestion to
agree upon definitions for "authentication" and
"anonymity" to help the WG address the charter
question now under deliberation.<br>
<br>
Below are a few definitions copied verbatim from RFC
4949 (<a moz-do-not-send="true"
href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949">
https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4949</a>) as a
starting point for WG discussion of these and other
possible sources/definitions.<br>
<br>
Lisa<br>
<br>
From RFC 4949:<o:p></o:p></p>
<pre> $ anonymity<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> (I) The condition of an identity being<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>unknown or concealed. (See:<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> alias, anonymizer, anonymous credential,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>anonymous login,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> identity, onion routing, persona<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>certificate. Compare: privacy.)<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p> </o:p></pre>
<pre> Tutorial: An application may require<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>security services that<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> maintain anonymity of users or other<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>system entities, perhaps to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> preserve their privacy or hide them from<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>attack. To hide an<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> entity's real name, an alias may be used;<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>for example, a financial<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> institution may assign account numbers.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>Parties to transactions<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> can thus remain relatively anonymous, but<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>can also accept the<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> transactions as legitimate. Real names of<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>the parties cannot be<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> easily determined by observers of the<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>transactions, but an<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> authorized third party may be able to map<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>an alias to a real name,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> such as by presenting the institution with<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>a court order. In other<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> applications, anonymous entities may be<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>completely untraceable.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p> </o:p></pre>
<p class="MsoNormal">From RFC 4949:<o:p></o:p></p>
<pre>$ anonymous login<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> (I) An access control feature (actually,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>an access control<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> vulnerability) in many Internet hosts that<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>enables users to gain<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> access to general-purpose or public<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>services and resources of a<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> host (such as allowing any user to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>transfer data using FTP)<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> without having a pre-established,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>identity-specific account (i.e.,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> user name and password). (See:<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>anonymity.)<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p> </o:p></pre>
<pre> Tutorial: This feature exposes a system to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>more threats than when<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> all the users are known, pre-registered<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>entities that are<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> individually accountable for their<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>actions. A user logs in using a<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> special, publicly known user name (e.g.,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>"anonymous", "guest", or<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> "ftp"). To use the public login<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>name, the user is not required to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> know a secret password and may not be<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>required to input anything<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> at all except the name. In other cases, to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>complete the normal<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> sequence of steps in a login protocol, the<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>system may require the<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> user to input a matching, publicly known<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>password (such as<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> "anonymous") or may ask the user<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>for an e-mail address or some<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> other arbitrary character string.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p> </o:p></pre>
<p class="MsoNormal">From RFC 4949:<o:p></o:p></p>
<pre>$ authenticate<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> (I) Verify (i.e., establish the truth of)<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>an attribute value<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> claimed by or for a system entity or<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>system resource. (See:<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> authentication, validate vs. verify,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>"relationship between data<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> integrity service and authentication<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>services" under "data<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> integrity service".)<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p> </o:p></pre>
<pre> Deprecated Usage: In general English<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>usage, this term is used with<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> the meaning "to prove genuine"<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>(e.g., an art expert authenticates<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> a Michelangelo painting); but IDOCs should<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>restrict usage as<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> follows:<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> - IDOCs SHOULD NOT use this term to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>refer to proving or checking<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> that data has not been<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>changed, destroyed, or lost in an<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> unauthorized or<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>accidental manner. Instead, use "verify".<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> - IDOCs SHOULD NOT use this term to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>refer to proving the truth or<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> accuracy of a fact or<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>value such as a digital signature.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> Instead, use<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>"verify".<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> - IDOCs SHOULD NOT use this term to<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>refer to establishing the<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> soundness or correctness<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>of a construct, such as a digital<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> certificate. Instead,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>use "validate".<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p> </o:p></pre>
<p class="MsoNormal">From RFC 4949:<o:p></o:p></p>
<pre> $ authentication<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> (I) The process of verifying a claim that<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>a system entity or<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> system resource has a certain attribute<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>value. (See: attribute,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> authenticate, authentication exchange,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>authentication information,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> credential, data origin authentication,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>peer entity<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> authentication, "relationship between<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>data integrity service and<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> authentication services" under<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>"data integrity service", simple<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> authentication, strong authentication,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>verification, X.509.)<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p> </o:p></pre>
<pre> Tutorial: Security services frequently<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>depend on authentication of<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> the identity of users, but authentication<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>may involve any type of<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> attribute that is recognized by a system.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>A claim may be made by a<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> subject about itself (e.g., at login, a<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>user typically asserts its<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> identity) or a claim may be made on behalf<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>of a subject or object<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> by some other system entity (e.g., a user<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>may claim that a data<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> object originates from a specific source,<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>or that a data object is<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> classified at a specific security level).<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p> </o:p></pre>
<pre> An authentication process consists of two<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>basic steps:<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> - Identification step: Presenting<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>the claimed attribute value<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> (e.g., a user<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>identifier) to the authentication subsystem.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> - Verification step: Presenting or<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>generating authentication<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> information (e.g., a<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>value signed with a private key) that acts<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> as evidence to prove the<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>binding between the attribute and that<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre> for which it is claimed.<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre>(See: verification.)<o:p></o:p></pre>
<pre><o:p> </o:p></pre>
<p class="MsoNormal">---------<o:p></o:p></p>
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