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<p>Hi Allison,</p>
<p>I really think this should continue off-list, but I think
cooperation is the main point: We _are_ being asked for
cooperation. And we would love to give it, if we can confirm that
the domain name in question is actually used in crime, which often
we cannot as we are not privy to the same amount of information as
the reporter is. But we cannot simply rely on the word of the
reporter, we need to be able to verify the complaint ourselves.
That is what makes this so frustration for us. We want to help,
but some reporters are not providing us with the information we
need to do it properly. <br>
</p>
<p>What would you want to have us do? <br>
</p>
<p>And I never said or wanted to imply spamhouse were criminals, I
merely said some of the methods employed match those used by those
with less pure intent. And lying to ICANN compliance or
blacklisting a domain used by a reseller as nameserver for
thousands of domain names just because they found one domain name
allegedly used in spam that uses that name server certainly does
not count as a white hat approach in my book. <br>
</p>
<p>I will never ask them to stop reporting but I am asking to start
reporting in a form we can actually use. Many reporters actually
do that and we take care of these issues swiftly and effectively.
We do not want abuse on our platform and we certainly do not make
money off people abusing our services for abuse. If anything, they
will always end up costing us money. So we benefit from running a
clean ship as well, but we do need cooperation and data to
identify the bad apples. <br>
</p>
<p>This entire set-up is too antagonistic. Us vs. them! We cannot
trust you! Well, if you did, maybe the problems would go away much
faster.</p>
<p>Best,</p>
<p>Volker<br>
</p>
<br>
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">Am 30.11.2017 um 17:19 schrieb allison
nixon:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:CACLR7wK42FX_z2P0_UNAQHX_JR4tN=9=FVNnVJvqB0tYfABTUA@mail.gmail.com">
<div dir="ltr">
<div dir="auto">Hi volker, as far as i can tell, your
cooperation is not required. You are simply being notified of
crime, and your effectiveness at cleaning up that crime(for
whatever the root cause was) affects your company's
reputation. Companies who refuse to cooperate simply get added
to more lists.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">blocklists function just fine without your
cooperation. </div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto">As far as I know, a lot of spamhaus and other
spam fighters get data from spamtrap email addresses, who no
real person can ever send mail to, and those identities must
remain secret- which includes the recipient email address and
any mail contents that include tracking. Sharing that data
will ruin the quality of the feeds, especially if the
registrar themselves are in on the criminal scheme, which
happens too much. I don't even get that data from my spam
fighting colleagues. You certainly wouldn't. It's not
something you're entitled to, and it's not something they are
obligated to give.</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div>I also have to note the irony here that a lawyer is
accusing another company of being criminals due to their
"egregious" act of informing you that your networks are being
used for crime, and to please stop it. This is something that
I would expect coming from the mouth of Sven Olaf Kamphuis,
not a lawyer at a reputable company who is highly concerned
with following laws such as GDPR.</div>
<div dir="auto">
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
<div dir="auto"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Nov 30, 2017 10:04 AM, "Volker
Greimann" <<a href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>>
wrote:<br type="attribution">
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>Hi Allison,</p>
<p>I'd be happy to discuss our abuse handling procedures
(off-list), but suffice it to say that any complaint
must be accompanied by appropriate evidence that will
allow us to make a determination. When someone engaged
in fighting abuse is unwilling to provide the
necessary data elements that will allow us to make
that determination, that is suspicious to say the
least. When you request cooperation, you must be
willing to do the same. <br>
</p>
<p>Again, we cannot simply willy-nilly take action on
someones' say-so. We need evidence that will allow us
to defend our decision to take action if we are
challenged on that call. <br>
</p>
<p>We have seen complaints where:</p>
<p>a) the complaint is based solely on the mention of a
domain in the "From" field<br>
b) the domain name sending the spam message is not
registered through us, but the domain name used as a
name-server for that domain is <br>
c) it clearly is an issue of a hacked CMS<br>
d) the recipient had previously opted in to receive
such messages and the alleged spammer was able to
demonstrate that<br>
</p>
<p>and many other examples, all from well-known spam
fighters or through their reporting engines. <br>
</p>
<p>If you do not trust us with the data we need to make
a determination, we will not get this issue resolved.</p>
<p>Now, back to whois!</p>
<p>Volker<br>
</p>
<br>
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247moz-cite-prefix">Am
30.11.2017 um 15:48 schrieb allison nixon:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">
<div dir="ltr">See this is another example of the
attitude I'm describing. If you're going to hold
the requirement for evidence so high that you're
requesting details that they are not willing to
hand over (probably the identities of their email
addresses that received the spam, or something
like that, right? Or a large volume of evidence
that would tie up their time procuring?), then you
aren't going to get what you want. Your company is
just another registrar in a vast ocean of
registrars that get complaints, and none of us
have time to spend on any of them. Registrars are
not trusted by default, either. </div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">You can classify that as blackhat
behavior if you want, but where is the extortion?
They seem to be only requesting that you reduce
the volume of lawbreaking customers that pay you
money for the opportunity. Find me a judge that
won't sympathize with that. The spammers haven't
been able to, in all their lawsuits filed against
spamhaus.</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">There is also the credibility issue.
From the perspective of a network operator, when
they see a conflict between spamhaus saying
something is spam, and a registrar saying they
wont do anything about it because the spam email
doesnt literally pass through their nameservers(of
course it wouldn't), spamhaus has far more
credibility than anything your company says.
You've already lost in the court of public
opinion, which is the only one that matters in
this situation. Your domains won't get unblocked.</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">You can complain about blackhat
activity till the cows come home but you won't
find a judge in the civilized world that will side
with you. And if whois goes away, you may find
that spamhaus's opinions of your domains are going
to affect you even more.</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Further verbal assaults against
spamhaus only make your company look like a spam
friendly organization in the eyes of network
operators. It won't get you unblocked and will
probably only make the situation worse.</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at
4:39 AM, Volker Greimann <span dir="ltr"><<a
href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px
0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>I can just re-iterate that any responsible
registrar will take action when provided
with actionable evidence of abuse by their
customers. Reports by black-hats like
Spamhouse that usually only make
unsubstantiated claims and refuse to provide
actual evidence and instead rely on threats
like the ones you are making do not deserve
the same consideration. We will take any of
their reports and if they can be
independently verified, we will take action,
but we cannot take their word as gospel.</p>
<p>The usual communication with them goes
something like this:</p>
<p>Them: "This domain is bad and you should
feel bad for having registered it."</p>
<p>Us: "Well, we cannot check that ourselves
since the abuse does not pass our servers!
Can you provide evidence?"</p>
<p>Them: "Here is the link to the evidence!"</p>
<p>Us: "That is not evidence, those are
claims. Can you show us these claims are
true?"</p>
<p>Them: "We do not share our methodologies."</p>
<p>Us: "As we cannot confirm the complaint and
have seen no evidence that we can verify, so
I am afraid we cannot help you until you do
give us something more substantial"</p>
<p>Them: "If you do not immediately take
action, we will: (1) Lie to ICANN about you
not responding to abuse complaints; (2)
blacklist your all services even though they
were not involved in the alleged abuse."<br>
</p>
That, to me, is a black hat. They may mean
well, but it makes them unreliable as a
source. We need evidence of abuse to take
action, not claims and of you cannot provide
such evidence, then you have no business in
fighting abuse. <br>
<span
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888"> <br>
Volker</font></span>
<div>
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737moz-cite-prefix">Am
29.11.2017 um 18:39 schrieb allison
nixon:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">This is the exact
attitude I'm referring to. Not
specifically only from Volker, but
also from other people. This is why
Internet users will increasingly turn
their backs on ICANN's DNS. Unless the
ICANN community steps outside of their
bubble and actually recognizes the
problems the average Internet user
faces. ICANN may have a monopoly on
domain names, but it's not immune to
consequences caused by bad
caretaking.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>And wholly invalidating the
opinions of a blacklist provider
that enjoys the largest support base
(AFAIK) of average Internet users is
a perfect example of this. It is to
ignore evidence of a serious defect
in your(the collective you) own
product, when people are actively
trying to notify you of such.
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Nov
29, 2017 at 12:21 PM, Volker
Greimann <span dir="ltr"><<a
href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"> I think we
are moving away from the topic,
but suffice it to say that I do
not consider their publications
evidence. "Domains seen"
indeed... Ignoring them is the
better options unless they
develop better methodologies
_and_ start sharing them for
peer examination.<span
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888"><br>
<br>
Volker</font></span>
<div>
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352moz-cite-prefix">Am
29.11.2017 um 18:03
schrieb allison nixon:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Spamhaus's
list IS "actual
evidence"
<div><br>
</div>
<div>They are based on
domains they have
seen, which are
e-mails sent using
domains from that
registrar. Most of the
hate out there against
Spamhaus comes from
spammers but they are
AFAIK the largest
provider of blocklists
out there. That only
happens because their
customers see the
results they want.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Love them or hate
them, you can't ignore
them. If Spamhaus
listed an IP range,
that range would
suffer severe
connectivity issues
across the entire
Internet. When it
comes to
interoperability,
Spamhaus's lists
effectively matter
more than ICANN's
accreditation. The
Internet is relying
more and more heavily
on these services
because ICANN has
failed to keep its
product clean.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On
Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at
11:51 AM, Volker
Greimann <span
dir="ltr"><<a
href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px
0px 0px
0.8ex;border-left:1px
solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div
bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>Interesting
statistic, but
as it is coming
from Spamhaus,
I'll take it
with a grain of
salt, especially
if the "Domains
seen" number
does not match
the number of
domains a
registrar
actually has
under
management. I am
not disputing
that some of
these registrars
may be
problematic, but
will reserve
judgment until I
see some actual
evidence. <br>
<span
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888"> </font></span></p>
<span
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352HOEnZb"><font
color="#888888">
<p>Volker<br>
</p>
</font></span>
<div>
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352h5">
<br>
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-cite-prefix">Am
29.11.2017 um
17:23 schrieb
allison nixon:<br>
</div>
<blockquote
type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Hi
Bastiaan,
<div><br>
</div>
<div>>>A
question
though. I
understand how
’TLD blocking’
would work as
an effective
albeit sledge
hammer way of
mitigating
certain forms
of spam. And I
get the
concept of
blocking all
traffic coming
from
particular
hosting-providers,
ignoring cases
where spoofing
of prefixes is
involved. But
what exactly
is ‘registrar
level
blocking’?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>>>The
example you
refer to is
(also) a
hosting/cloud-provider
- but if that
were not the
case, what can
‘blocked’
purely looking
at the
registrar
service
provided?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>"registrar
level
blocking"
isn't a
feature that's
available to
most e-mail
inbox owners
because it is
a lot more
complicated
than writing a
wildcard for
example *.xyz
for an entire
TLD. It would
probably
require a
multi step
process of
WHOIS querying
the domain
-> parse
for registrar
-> check
block lists.
I'm unsure how
the large
operators do
it exactly.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>But if
you look at
this page:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><a
href="https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/registrars/"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.spamhaus.org/stati<wbr>stics/registrars/</a><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>you can
see a list of
which
registrars
feature most
prominently in
spam.
Registrars
that get to
the point have
a business
model where
they profit
from these
types of
customers.
Alpnames in
particular was
in the news
because leaked
communications
revealed they
were aware of
the spamming
and offered to
not suspend
the domains
for abuse. A
bulletproof
registrar, if
you will.
Despite this
incident, and
despite being
on the
Spamhaus list
of "worst
registrars"
months later,
they are still
an actual
registrar
accredited by
ICANN. An
equally valid
participant in
the DNS as any
of you here.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>And that
is barely
scratching the
surface.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>So you
can also see
how the desire
to block an
entire
registrar's
customerbase
is directly
linked to
ICANN's
failure to
decertify the
registrar. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Compare
this "not my
problem"
attitude to
the attitude
that the
Google Chrome
team has
towards its
list of
trusted
certificate
providers.
They have no
qualms about
giving the
death penalty
to abusers.
Google is also
requiring
companies to
produce
"certificate
transparency"
logs, a real
time feed of
all the certs
they sign, and
who they are
for. Instead
of wringing
their hands
about privacy
solely on the
website
owner's side,
they
understand
that these are
tools
massively used
for abuse and
actually take
into account
the rights of
people being
abused by
these tools.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>As a
result of
these
differing
attitudes, the
Chrome browser
enjoys a lot
of public
trust, with
almost no
demand for
custom trust
lists, and
ICANN's naming
system loses
legitimacy
every day as
the collective
masses of the
Internet
increasingly
turn their
backs on them.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div
class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div
class="gmail_quote">On
Wed, Nov 29,
2017 at 2:36
AM, Bastiaan
Goslings <span
dir="ltr"><<a
href="mailto:bastiaan.goslings@ams-ix.net" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">bastiaan.goslings@ams-ix.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote
class="gmail_quote"
style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid
rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Thanks,
Allison:<br>
<span><br>
> On 28 Nov
2017, at
22:30, allison
nixon <<a
href="mailto:elsakoo@gmail.com"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">elsakoo@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> I do not
believe it is
off topic to
consider the
downstream
implications
of the actions
we take. It is
of critical
importance!<br>
><br>
> When the
WHOIS for
.amsterdam and
.frl became
largely
obfuscated, I
was not
worried much
about it,
because the
extremely high
cost of those
domains
precluded
abuse from
them in the
first place.
For that
reason,
nothing
happened.<br>
><br>
> In the
defender
world, if we
lose WHOIS as
a reputation
factor, other
reputation
factors become
much more
prominent. TLD
blocking is
very easy with
the tools we
already have,
but with the
loss of WHOIS
we are going
to see a
strong upsurge
in the demand
for registrar
level
blocking. So,
say Alpnames
is spamming a
lot of people,
and as an
owner of an
e-mail inbox,
I don't want
to get any
more e-mails
from Alpnames
customers.
Multiple of my
colleagues at
large networks
have revealed
to me that in
the past, they
have done a
registrar
level block,
and the
economic
pressure on
the registrars
caused them to
clean up their
act with an
impressive
amount of
motivation.
It's something
that most
tools don't
currently
support, but
likely will in
the future.<br>
><br>
> If the
registrars
will be the
only people
who have any
clue who their
customers are,
I think we
will see a
strong shift
towards
forcing those
registrars to
take more
responsibility
for their
pollution.
This is
something I am
seeing
increasingly
advocated in
defender
circles, so
outsiders are
likely going
to see the
results of
this in
upcoming
years.<br>
><br>
> With the
direction I
see things
going, I
believe that
anti-abuse
will involve
imposing
economic
pressure on
registrars.
It's not
unlike how
notorious
hosting
providers have
been de-peered
in the past
due to abuse,
and there is a
lot of legal
precedent to
support the
legitimacy of
this strategy.<br>
><br>
> Also,
many of us
outside the
ICANN
community
don't see the
death of the
new TLDs as a
bad thing.
More people
are interested
in blocking
them than
supporting
them.
Companies are
also realizing
that it isn't
a good idea to
run their
businesses on
new TLDs.
Some of us
will cheer
when they
finally go
away.<br>
<br>
<br>
</span>Without
any specific
knowledge of
the industry,
your line of
reasoning
makes sense to
me, i.e. ‘If
the registrars
will be the
only people
who have any
clue who their
customers are,
I think we
will see a
strong shift
towards
forcing those
registrars to
take more
responsibility’
as well as the
‘anti-abuse
will involve
imposing
economic
pressure on
registrars’.<br>
<br>
(Fyi I will
not comment on
the ’their
pollution’)<br>
<br>
A question
though. I
understand how
’TLD blocking’
would work as
an effective
albeit sledge
hammer way of
mitigating
certain forms
of spam. And I
get the
concept of
blocking all
traffic coming
from
particular
hosting-providers,
ignoring cases
where spoofing
of prefixes is
involved. But
what exactly
is ‘registrar
level
blocking’?<br>
<br>
The example
you refer to
is (also) a
hosting/cloud-provider
- but if that
were not the
case, what can
‘blocked’
purely looking
at the
registrar
service
provided?<br>
<br>
-Bastiaan<br>
<div>
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
><br>
><br>
> On Tue,
Nov 28, 2017
at 3:11 PM,
theo geurts
<<a
href="mailto:gtheo@xs4all.nl"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">gtheo@xs4all.nl</a>> wrote:<br>
> Agreed
Kris,<br>
><br>
> Thanks,
Allison,
though this
is, I guess,
the cold hard
truth, selling
domains dirt
cheap or
giving them
away is a sure
method to
poison a TLD,
I think it is
a separate
issue when
discussing
RDS.<br>
><br>
> And the
examples are
clear, and at
a point, such
TLD operators
need to
re-think their
business model
and act
accordingly to
keep their TLD
alive.<br>
><br>
> So in May
2018, we will
see a lot of
use of the
privacy
services due
to the GDPR, I
guess mostly
at a Registrar
level, but
let's not rule
out that it
might be on a
Registry
level, the
dynamics here
are shifting
day by day.<br>
> So my
question here,
and I hope we
can discuss
this in good
faith, but it
seems to me
that the WHOIS
will be an
irrelevant
factor when it
comes to the
risk/reputation
score?<br>
> How
does/will that
play out?<br>
> And yes,
this is not
exactly
related to our
work when it
comes to RDS,
but since we
have the
expertise
here, I think
it would be
useful to
explore this a
little more
even though
off topic. I
hope the
leadership
team allows
this to get a
better
understanding,
for the
community on
what is going
down and might
happen in a
just a few
months here.<br>
> And if we
need to do
this offlist,
sure, no
problem. I am
just trying to
get a sense to
here to comply
with the law
and keep a
business
running.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Thanks<br>
><br>
> Theo<br>
><br>
><br>
> On
28-11-2017
20:57, John
Bambenek via
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
wrote:<br>
>> Full
agreement on
this point<br>
>><br>
>> On
11/28/2017
01:30 PM, Kris
Seeburn wrote:<br>
>>>
As we move on
…one way or
the other the
GDPR and other
aligned
privacy laws
will catch up
eventually. We
will need to
find levels
and technical
ways and
reasons to get
things to
work. We move
to RDAPis fine
as we look
ahead but we
should be able
to not only
look at the
laws that we
need to
respect but
also to find
technical ways
to get and
make sure
things still
continue
towork. As
this stage
personally
both are as
important.<br>
>>><br>
>>>> On Nov 28, 2017, at 23:15, allison nixon <<a
href="mailto:elsakoo@gmail.com"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">elsakoo@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Most systems operators are not afraid to block entire
TLDs. While
there are no
scientific
studies out on
this matter
AFAIK, the
help forums
are littered
with people
asking how to
block entire
TLDs, and also
registrants on
those TLDs
asking why
everyone is
blocking them.
It's enough to
conclusively
say this is
already an
issue, and we
can thank
abuse for
this.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> In this Reddit post, a user learns the hard truth about
his brand new
XYZ domain:<br>
>>>> <a
href="https://www.reddit.com/r/webdev/comments/6jq6f5/getting_blocked_should_i_abandon_my_xyz_domain/"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.reddit.com/r/webde<wbr>v/comments/6jq6f5/getting_bloc<wbr>ked_should_i_abandon_my_xyz_do<wbr>main/</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> This article discusses Facebook's block of all XYZ
domains:<br>
>>>> <a
href="http://adamyamada.com/facebook-blocks-xyz-domains-new-domains-pages/"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">http://adamyamada.com/facebook<wbr>-blocks-xyz-domains-new-domain<wbr>s-pages/</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> This Malwarebytes staff member explains to a legitimate
registrant
that all
.SCIENCE TLDs
are blocked
and he gets no
exception:<br>
>>>> <a
href="https://forums.malwarebytes.com/topic/173535-all-my-science-domains-blocked/"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://forums.malwarebytes.co<wbr>m/topic/173535-all-my-science-<wbr>domains-blocked/</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> In fact, the Malwarebytes "false positive" forum is
littered with
owners of
hacked domains
that
discovered
their problem
because of a
block, not
because of a
notification:<br>
>>>> <a
href="https://forums.malwarebytes.com/forum/123-website-blocking/"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://forums.malwarebytes.co<wbr>m/forum/123-website-blocking/</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> This user asks for an 'Existing list of garbage "new"
TLDs' to block<br>
>>>> <a
href="https://vamsoft.com/forum/topic/597/existing-list-of-garbage-new-tlds"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://vamsoft.com/forum/topi<wbr>c/597/existing-list-of-garbage<wbr>-new-tlds</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> There are 179 Google search results for people asking
Microsoft's
help service
for ways to
block entire
TLDs:<br>
>>>> <a
href="https://www.google.com/search?q=how+do+i+block+TLD+site:answers.microsoft.com"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.google.com/search?<wbr>q=how+do+i+block+TLD+site:answ<wbr>ers.microsoft.com</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> There are 72,500 Google search results for "how to
block" "tld":<br>
>>>> <a
href="https://www.google.com/search?q=%22how+to+block%22+%22tld%22"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.google.com/search?<wbr>q=%22how+to+block%22+%22tld%22</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> The Internet is effectively "broken" for any legitimate
registrants on
these TLDs.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> As a seller of some of those same TLDs, should you be
concerned if
your customers
purchase
domains
rendered
useless due to
blocking?<br>
>>>> Would you actually refund a customer if they told you
they couldn't
use the domain
for e-mail due
to the TLD?<br>
>>>> Would you warn your prospective .XYZ, .STUDY, .PRESS,
.PARTY, etc,
customers that
they should
not use the
domains for
e-mail?<br>
>>>> When ICANN releases new gTLDs in the future, do you
think that
those domains
will ever be
able to send
e-mail?<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Truly, the rest of the world will be fine. The more
that ICANN has
the "not my
problem"
attitude, the
more the rest
of the world
is going to
push back.
ICANN seems to
have lost the
ability to
release new
gTLDs without
severe
connectivity
issues, so we
also need to
ask the
question: "why
are these guys
selling the
digital
equivalent of
the scarlet
letter and not
warning their
customers
beforehand?"<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> I think the question of selling defective products is
one that needs
to be
addressed more
seriously by
regulators and
outside
parties.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> I can also tell you that security vendors are already
looking into
other
anti-abuse
techniques for
domains
post-WHOIS,
and I can also
tell you that
they will
result in an
increase in
the percentage
of legitimate
domains that
are blocked.
This is your
problem now.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Volker Greimann <<a
href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>>
wrote:<br>
>>>> Hi Andrew,<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> re:hotbed I was rather intending to ask whether there
is a direct
correllation
between TLDs
with redacted
whois and
issues that go
unresolved. So
do you have
more
unresolved
issues in .<a
href="http://co.uk" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">co.uk</a>
than in .com
(if numbers
are normalized
for registered
domain names).<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> I am sure no one would consider blocking the entire
mail traffic
originating
from the
United Kingdom
Top Level
Domain just
because you
cannot resolve
some issues in
a few domains,
correct?<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> So if everyone followed their (or a similar) model, the
internet would
not break.
Some issues
would get
harder to
solve (or take
longer). I am
asking because
that is what
most likely
will happen on
May 25 or
sooner.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Volker<br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Am 28.11.2017 um 18:27 schrieb Andrew Sullivan:<br>
>>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 04:31:56PM +0100, Volker
Greimann
wrote:<br>
>>>> case of internet operability issues. While I appreciate
that there can
be<br>
>>>> issues that would necessitate the ability to quickly
contact
whoever can
fix<br>
>>>> the issue, I wonder how this problem is solved in TLDs
where whois is<br>
>>>> already redacted.<br>
>>>> It's not. In that case, if I am the one who has this
experience and
I<br>
>>>> can't reach the target, then the problem goes
unresolved.
In mail<br>
>>>> cases, as John suggests elsewhere in this thread, the
answer is very<br>
>>>> likely that mail is blocked. People seem surprised
these days
that<br>
>>>> mail is so fragile, but this sort of thing is part of
the reason.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> So how does it work there? Are these TLDs hotbeds of
DNS issues and<br>
>>>> unresolved problems?<br>
>>>> I don't know what you mean by "hotbed", or whether that
is intended to<br>
>>>> be dismissive. Some TLDs defintely have more DNS
problems than<br>
>>>> others. Given how hard the DNS works to make
connections
happen even<br>
>>>> when things are badly misconfigured, lots of stuff will
work to some<br>
>>>> extent even when it is badly configured. But DNS
operations
people<br>
>>>> trade stories about problems amongst themselves, after
giving up on<br>
>>>> sites because whois can't help and the mname in the SOA
record is<br>
>>>> broken. I find this happens more often than you might
expect.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> But yes, there are broken domains on the Internet. I
find it hard
to<br>
>>>> believe that would be even slightly remarkable.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Best regards,<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> A<br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> --<br>
>>>> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur
Verfügung.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Volker A. Greimann<br>
>>>> - Rechtsabteilung -<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Key-Systems GmbH<br>
>>>> <a
href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert&entry=gmail&source=g"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Im Oberen Werk 1</a><br>
>>>> <a
href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert&entry=gmail&source=g"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">66386 St. Ingbert</a><br>
>>>> Tel.: <a href="tel:+49%206894%209396901"
value="+4968949396901"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">+49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901</a><br>
>>>> Fax.: <a href="tel:+49%206894%209396851"
value="+4968949396851"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">+49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851</a><br>
>>>> Email: <a href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Web: <a href="http://www.key-systems.net"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a
href="http://www.RRPproxy.net"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.RRPproxy.net</a><br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a
href="http://www.BrandShelter.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">www.BrandShelter.com</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Folgen Sie uns bei Twitter oder werden Sie unser Fan
bei Facebook:<br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a><br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin<br>
>>>> Handelsregister Nr.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken<br>
>>>> Umsatzsteuer ID.: DE211006534<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP<br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.keydrive.lu" rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">www.keydrive.lu</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für
den
angegebenen
Empfänger
bestimmt. Jede
Form der
Kenntnisgabe,
Veröffentlichung oder Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist
unzulässig.
Sollte diese
Nachricht
nicht für Sie
bestimmt sein,
so bitten wir
Sie, sich mit
uns per E-Mail
oder
telefonisch in
Verbindung zu
setzen.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> ------------------------------<wbr>--------------<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Should you have any further questions, please do not
hesitate to
contact us.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Best regards,<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Volker A. Greimann<br>
>>>> - legal department -<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Key-Systems GmbH<br>
>>>> <a
href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert&entry=gmail&source=g"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Im Oberen Werk 1</a><br>
>>>> <a
href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert&entry=gmail&source=g"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">66386 St. Ingbert</a><br>
>>>> Tel.: <a
href="tel:%2B49%20%280%29%206894%20-%209396%20901"
value="+4968949396901" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">+49 (0)
6894 - 9396
901</a><br>
>>>> Fax.: <a
href="tel:%2B49%20%280%29%206894%20-%209396%20851"
value="+4968949396851" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">+49 (0)
6894 - 9396
851</a><br>
>>>> Email: <a href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Web: <a href="http://www.key-systems.net"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a
href="http://www.RRPproxy.net"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.RRPproxy.net</a><br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a
href="http://www.BrandShelter.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">www.BrandShelter.com</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on
Facebook and
stay updated:<br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a><br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> CEO: Alexander Siffrin<br>
>>>> Registration No.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken<br>
>>>> V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP<br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.keydrive.lu" rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">www.keydrive.lu</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for
the person to
whom it is
addressed.
Furthermore it
is not
permitted to
publish any
content of
this email.
You must not
use, disclose,
copy, print or
rely on this
e-mail. If an
addressing or
transmission
error has
misdirected
this e-mail,
kindly notify
the author by
replying to
this e-mail or
contacting us
by telephone.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>>>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br>
>>>> <a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>>>> <a
href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> --<br>
>>>> ______________________________<wbr>___<br>
>>>> Note to self: Pillage BEFORE burning.<br>
>>>> ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>>>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br>
>>>> <a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org"
target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>>>> <a
href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>>
Kris Seeburn<br>
>>> <a
href="mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">seeburn.k@gmail.com</a><br>
>>>
• <a
href="http://www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/</a><br>
>>><br>
</div>
</div>
>>>
<KeepItOn_Social_animated.gif><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>>
______________________________<br>
<span>>>>
_________________<br>
>>>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
mailing list<br>
>>><br>
>>> <a
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank"
moz-do-not-send="true">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>>> <a
href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg"
rel="noreferrer"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
</span>>>
______________________________<br>
<span
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898imm_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898HOEnZb">>>
_________________<br>
>>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
mailing list<br>
>><br>
>> <a
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>> <a
href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
><br>
><br>
>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
mailing list<br>
> <a
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
> <a
href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> --<br>
>
______________________________<wbr>___<br>
> Note to
self: Pillage
BEFORE
burning.<br>
</span>
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898HOEnZb">
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898h5">>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
mailing list<br>
> <a
href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
> <a
href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg"
rel="noreferrer" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
<br
clear="all">
<div><br>
</div>
-- <br>
<div
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898gmail_signature">______________________________<wbr>___<br>
Note to self:
Pillage BEFORE
burning.</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset
class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre>______________________________<wbr>_________________
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
<a class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>
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<pre class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-signature" cols="72">--
Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Volker A. Greimann
- Rechtsabteilung -
Key-Systems GmbH
<a href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert+%3Chttps://maps.google.com/?q%3DIm%2BOberen%2BWerk%2B1%2B%250D%2B%253E%253E%253E%253E%2B66386%2BSt.%2BIngbert%26entry%3Dgmail%26source%3Dg%3E&entry=gmail&source=g" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">Im Oberen Werk 1</a>
<a href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert+%3Chttps://maps.google.com/?q%3DIm%2BOberen%2BWerk%2B1%2B%250D%2B%253E%253E%253E%253E%2B66386%2BSt.%2BIngbert%26entry%3Dgmail%26source%3Dg%3E&entry=gmail&source=g" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">66386 St. Ingbert</a>
Tel.: <a href="tel:+49%206894%209396901" value="+4968949396901" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">+49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901</a>
Fax.: <a href="tel:+49%206894%209396851" value="+4968949396851" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">+49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851</a>
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Web: <a class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.key-systems.net" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.RRPproxy.net" target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true">www.RRPproxy.net</a>
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<pre class="moz-signature" cols="72">--
Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Volker A. Greimann
- Rechtsabteilung -
Key-Systems GmbH
Im Oberen Werk 1
66386 St. Ingbert
Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
Email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>
Web: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.key-systems.net">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.RRPproxy.net">www.RRPproxy.net</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.BrandShelter.com">www.BrandShelter.com</a>
Folgen Sie uns bei Twitter oder werden Sie unser Fan bei Facebook:
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a>
Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin
Handelsregister Nr.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
Umsatzsteuer ID.: DE211006534
Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.keydrive.lu">www.keydrive.lu</a>
Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für den angegebenen Empfänger bestimmt. Jede Form der Kenntnisgabe, Veröffentlichung oder Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist unzulässig. Sollte diese Nachricht nicht für Sie bestimmt sein, so bitten wir Sie, sich mit uns per E-Mail oder telefonisch in Verbindung zu setzen.
--------------------------------------------
Should you have any further questions, please do not hesitate to contact us.
Best regards,
Volker A. Greimann
- legal department -
Key-Systems GmbH
Im Oberen Werk 1
66386 St. Ingbert
Tel.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901
Fax.: +49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851
Email: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>
Web: <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.key-systems.net">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.RRPproxy.net">www.RRPproxy.net</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.BrandShelter.com">www.BrandShelter.com</a>
Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on Facebook and stay updated:
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a>
CEO: Alexander Siffrin
Registration No.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken
V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534
Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.keydrive.lu">www.keydrive.lu</a>
This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for the person to whom it is addressed. Furthermore it is not permitted to publish any content of this email. You must not use, disclose, copy, print or rely on this e-mail. If an addressing or transmission error has misdirected this e-mail, kindly notify the author by replying to this e-mail or contacting us by telephone.
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