<div dir="ltr"><div dir="auto">Hi volker, as far as i can tell, your cooperation is not required. You are simply being notified of crime, and your effectiveness at cleaning up that crime(for whatever the root cause was) affects your company's reputation. Companies who refuse to cooperate simply get added to more lists.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">blocklists function just fine without your cooperation. </div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto">As far as I know, a lot of spamhaus and other spam fighters get data from spamtrap email addresses, who no real person can ever send mail to, and those identities must remain secret- which includes the recipient email address and any mail contents that include tracking. Sharing that data will ruin the quality of the feeds, especially if the registrar themselves are in on the criminal scheme, which happens too much. I don't even get that data from my spam fighting colleagues. You certainly wouldn't. It's not something you're entitled to, and it's not something they are obligated to give.</div><div dir="auto"><br></div><div>I also have to note the irony here that a lawyer is accusing another company of being criminals due to their "egregious" act of informing you that your networks are being used for crime, and to please stop it. This is something that I would expect coming from the mouth of Sven Olaf Kamphuis, not a lawyer at a reputable company who is highly concerned with following laws such as GDPR.</div><div dir="auto"><div dir="auto"><br></div><div dir="auto"><br></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Nov 30, 2017 10:04 AM, "Volker Greimann" <<a href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>> wrote:<br type="attribution"><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>Hi Allison,</p>
<p>I'd be happy to discuss our abuse handling procedures (off-list),
but suffice it to say that any complaint must be accompanied by
appropriate evidence that will allow us to make a determination.
When someone engaged in fighting abuse is unwilling to provide the
necessary data elements that will allow us to make that
determination, that is suspicious to say the least. When you
request cooperation, you must be willing to do the same. <br>
</p>
<p>Again, we cannot simply willy-nilly take action on someones'
say-so. We need evidence that will allow us to defend our decision
to take action if we are challenged on that call. <br>
</p>
<p>We have seen complaints where:</p>
<p>a) the complaint is based solely on the mention of a domain in
the "From" field<br>
b) the domain name sending the spam message is not registered
through us, but the domain name used as a name-server for that
domain is <br>
c) it clearly is an issue of a hacked CMS<br>
d) the recipient had previously opted in to receive such messages
and the alleged spammer was able to demonstrate that<br>
</p>
<p>and many other examples, all from well-known spam fighters or
through their reporting engines. <br>
</p>
<p>If you do not trust us with the data we need to make a
determination, we will not get this issue resolved.</p>
<p>Now, back to whois!</p>
<p>Volker<br>
</p>
<br>
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247moz-cite-prefix">Am 30.11.2017 um 15:48 schrieb allison
nixon:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="auto">
<div dir="ltr">See this is another example of the attitude I'm
describing. If you're going to hold the requirement for
evidence so high that you're requesting details that they are
not willing to hand over (probably the identities of their
email addresses that received the spam, or something like
that, right? Or a large volume of evidence that would tie up
their time procuring?), then you aren't going to get what you
want. Your company is just another registrar in a vast ocean
of registrars that get complaints, and none of us have time to
spend on any of them. Registrars are not trusted by default,
either. </div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">You can classify that as blackhat behavior if you
want, but where is the extortion? They seem to be only
requesting that you reduce the volume of lawbreaking customers
that pay you money for the opportunity. Find me a judge that
won't sympathize with that. The spammers haven't been able to,
in all their lawsuits filed against spamhaus.</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">There is also the credibility issue. From the
perspective of a network operator, when they see a conflict
between spamhaus saying something is spam, and a registrar
saying they wont do anything about it because the spam email
doesnt literally pass through their nameservers(of course it
wouldn't), spamhaus has far more credibility than anything
your company says. You've already lost in the court of public
opinion, which is the only one that matters in this situation.
Your domains won't get unblocked.</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">You can complain about blackhat activity till the
cows come home but you won't find a judge in the civilized
world that will side with you. And if whois goes away, you may
find that spamhaus's opinions of your domains are going to
affect you even more.</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr">Further verbal assaults against spamhaus only
make your company look like a spam friendly organization in
the eyes of network operators. It won't get you unblocked and
will probably only make the situation worse.</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
<div dir="ltr"><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Nov 30, 2017 at 4:39 AM, Volker
Greimann <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>I can just re-iterate that any responsible registrar
will take action when provided with actionable evidence
of abuse by their customers. Reports by black-hats like
Spamhouse that usually only make unsubstantiated claims
and refuse to provide actual evidence and instead rely
on threats like the ones you are making do not deserve
the same consideration. We will take any of their
reports and if they can be independently verified, we
will take action, but we cannot take their word as
gospel.</p>
<p>The usual communication with them goes something like
this:</p>
<p>Them: "This domain is bad and you should feel bad for
having registered it."</p>
<p>Us: "Well, we cannot check that ourselves since the
abuse does not pass our servers! Can you provide
evidence?"</p>
<p>Them: "Here is the link to the evidence!"</p>
<p>Us: "That is not evidence, those are claims. Can you
show us these claims are true?"</p>
<p>Them: "We do not share our methodologies."</p>
<p>Us: "As we cannot confirm the complaint and have seen
no evidence that we can verify, so I am afraid we cannot
help you until you do give us something more
substantial"</p>
<p>Them: "If you do not immediately take action, we will:
(1) Lie to ICANN about you not responding to abuse
complaints; (2) blacklist your all services even though
they were not involved in the alleged abuse."<br>
</p>
That, to me, is a black hat. They may mean well, but it
makes them unreliable as a source. We need evidence of
abuse to take action, not claims and of you cannot provide
such evidence, then you have no business in fighting
abuse. <br>
<span class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"> <br>
Volker</font></span>
<div>
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737moz-cite-prefix">Am
29.11.2017 um 18:39 schrieb allison nixon:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">This is the exact attitude I'm
referring to. Not specifically only from Volker,
but also from other people. This is why Internet
users will increasingly turn their backs on
ICANN's DNS. Unless the ICANN community steps
outside of their bubble and actually recognizes
the problems the average Internet user faces.
ICANN may have a monopoly on domain names, but
it's not immune to consequences caused by bad
caretaking.
<div><br>
</div>
<div>And wholly invalidating the opinions of a
blacklist provider that enjoys the largest
support base (AFAIK) of average Internet users
is a perfect example of this. It is to ignore
evidence of a serious defect in your(the
collective you) own product, when people are
actively trying to notify you of such.
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at
12:21 PM, Volker Greimann <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF"> I think
we are moving away from the topic, but
suffice it to say that I do not consider
their publications evidence. "Domains seen"
indeed... Ignoring them is the better
options unless they develop better
methodologies _and_ start sharing them for
peer examination.<span class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
<br>
Volker</font></span>
<div>
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352moz-cite-prefix">Am
29.11.2017 um 18:03 schrieb allison
nixon:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Spamhaus's list IS
"actual evidence"
<div><br>
</div>
<div>They are based on domains they
have seen, which are e-mails sent
using domains from that registrar.
Most of the hate out there against
Spamhaus comes from spammers but
they are AFAIK the largest
provider of blocklists out there.
That only happens because their
customers see the results they
want.<br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Love them or hate them, you
can't ignore them. If Spamhaus
listed an IP range, that range
would suffer severe connectivity
issues across the entire Internet.
When it comes to interoperability,
Spamhaus's lists effectively
matter more than ICANN's
accreditation. The Internet is
relying more and more heavily on
these services because ICANN has
failed to keep its product clean.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On Wed, Nov
29, 2017 at 11:51 AM, Volker
Greimann <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">
<div bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<p>Interesting statistic, but
as it is coming from
Spamhaus, I'll take it with
a grain of salt, especially
if the "Domains seen" number
does not match the number of
domains a registrar actually
has under management. I am
not disputing that some of
these registrars may be
problematic, but will
reserve judgment until I see
some actual evidence. <br>
<span class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"> </font></span></p>
<span class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
<p>Volker<br>
</p>
</font></span>
<div>
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352h5">
<br>
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-cite-prefix">Am
29.11.2017 um 17:23
schrieb allison nixon:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite">
<div dir="ltr">Hi
Bastiaan,
<div><br>
</div>
<div>>>A
question though. I
understand how ’TLD
blocking’ would work
as an effective
albeit sledge hammer
way of mitigating
certain forms of
spam. And I get the
concept of blocking
all traffic coming
from particular
hosting-providers,
ignoring cases where
spoofing of prefixes
is involved. But
what exactly is
‘registrar level
blocking’?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>>>The
example you refer to
is (also) a
hosting/cloud-provider
- but if that were
not the case, what
can ‘blocked’ purely
looking at the
registrar service
provided?</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>"registrar level
blocking" isn't a
feature that's
available to most
e-mail inbox owners
because it is a lot
more complicated
than writing a
wildcard for example
*.xyz for an entire
TLD. It would
probably require a
multi step process
of WHOIS querying
the domain ->
parse for registrar
-> check block
lists. I'm unsure
how the large
operators do it
exactly.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>But if you look
at this page:</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div><a href="https://www.spamhaus.org/statistics/registrars/" target="_blank">https://www.spamhaus.org/stati<wbr>stics/registrars/</a><br>
</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>you can see a
list of which
registrars feature
most prominently in
spam. Registrars
that get to the
point have a
business model where
they profit from
these types of
customers. Alpnames
in particular was in
the news because
leaked
communications
revealed they were
aware of the
spamming and offered
to not suspend the
domains for abuse. A
bulletproof
registrar, if you
will. Despite this
incident, and
despite being on the
Spamhaus list of
"worst registrars"
months later, they
are still an actual
registrar accredited
by ICANN. An equally
valid participant in
the DNS as any of
you here.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>And that is
barely scratching
the surface.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>So you can also
see how the desire
to block an entire
registrar's
customerbase is
directly linked to
ICANN's failure to
decertify the
registrar. </div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>Compare this "not
my problem" attitude
to the attitude that
the Google Chrome
team has towards its
list of trusted
certificate
providers. They have
no qualms about
giving the death
penalty to abusers.
Google is also
requiring companies
to produce
"certificate
transparency" logs,
a real time feed of
all the certs they
sign, and who they
are for. Instead of
wringing their hands
about privacy solely
on the website
owner's side, they
understand that
these are tools
massively used for
abuse and actually
take into account
the rights of people
being abused by
these tools.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
<div>As a result of
these differing
attitudes, the
Chrome browser
enjoys a lot of
public trust, with
almost no demand for
custom trust lists,
and ICANN's naming
system loses
legitimacy every day
as the collective
masses of the
Internet
increasingly turn
their backs on them.</div>
<div><br>
</div>
</div>
<div class="gmail_extra"><br>
<div class="gmail_quote">On
Wed, Nov 29, 2017 at
2:36 AM, Bastiaan
Goslings <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:bastiaan.goslings@ams-ix.net" target="_blank">bastiaan.goslings@ams-ix.net</a>></span>
wrote:<br>
<blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0px 0px 0px 0.8ex;border-left:1px solid rgb(204,204,204);padding-left:1ex">Thanks,
Allison:<br>
<span><br>
> On 28 Nov
2017, at 22:30,
allison nixon
<<a href="mailto:elsakoo@gmail.com" target="_blank">elsakoo@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
><br>
> I do not
believe it is
off topic to
consider the
downstream
implications of
the actions we
take. It is of
critical
importance!<br>
><br>
> When the
WHOIS for
.amsterdam and
.frl became
largely
obfuscated, I
was not worried
much about it,
because the
extremely high
cost of those
domains
precluded abuse
from them in the
first place. For
that reason,
nothing
happened.<br>
><br>
> In the
defender world,
if we lose WHOIS
as a reputation
factor, other
reputation
factors become
much more
prominent. TLD
blocking is very
easy with the
tools we already
have, but with
the loss of
WHOIS we are
going to see a
strong upsurge
in the demand
for registrar
level blocking.
So, say Alpnames
is spamming a
lot of people,
and as an owner
of an e-mail
inbox, I don't
want to get any
more e-mails
from Alpnames
customers.
Multiple of my
colleagues at
large networks
have revealed to
me that in the
past, they have
done a registrar
level block, and
the economic
pressure on the
registrars
caused them to
clean up their
act with an
impressive
amount of
motivation. It's
something that
most tools don't
currently
support, but
likely will in
the future.<br>
><br>
> If the
registrars will
be the only
people who have
any clue who
their customers
are, I think we
will see a
strong shift
towards forcing
those registrars
to take more
responsibility
for their
pollution. This
is something I
am seeing
increasingly
advocated in
defender
circles, so
outsiders are
likely going to
see the results
of this in
upcoming years.<br>
><br>
> With the
direction I see
things going, I
believe that
anti-abuse will
involve imposing
economic
pressure on
registrars. It's
not unlike how
notorious
hosting
providers have
been de-peered
in the past due
to abuse, and
there is a lot
of legal
precedent to
support the
legitimacy of
this strategy.<br>
><br>
> Also, many
of us outside
the ICANN
community don't
see the death of
the new TLDs as
a bad thing.
More people are
interested in
blocking them
than supporting
them. Companies
are also
realizing that
it isn't a good
idea to run
their businesses
on new TLDs.
Some of us will
cheer when they
finally go away.<br>
<br>
<br>
</span>Without any
specific knowledge
of the industry,
your line of
reasoning makes
sense to me, i.e.
‘If the registrars
will be the only
people who have
any clue who their
customers are, I
think we will see
a strong shift
towards forcing
those registrars
to take more
responsibility’ as
well as the
‘anti-abuse will
involve imposing
economic pressure
on registrars’.<br>
<br>
(Fyi I will not
comment on the
’their pollution’)<br>
<br>
A question though.
I understand how
’TLD blocking’
would work as an
effective albeit
sledge hammer way
of mitigating
certain forms of
spam. And I get
the concept of
blocking all
traffic coming
from particular
hosting-providers,
ignoring cases
where spoofing of
prefixes is
involved. But what
exactly is
‘registrar level
blocking’?<br>
<br>
The example you
refer to is (also)
a
hosting/cloud-provider
- but if that were
not the case, what
can ‘blocked’
purely looking at
the registrar
service provided?<br>
<br>
-Bastiaan<br>
<div>
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898h5"><br>
<br>
<br>
><br>
><br>
> On Tue,
Nov 28, 2017
at 3:11 PM,
theo geurts
<<a href="mailto:gtheo@xs4all.nl" target="_blank">gtheo@xs4all.nl</a>> wrote:<br>
> Agreed
Kris,<br>
><br>
> Thanks,
Allison,
though this
is, I guess,
the cold hard
truth, selling
domains dirt
cheap or
giving them
away is a sure
method to
poison a TLD,
I think it is
a separate
issue when
discussing
RDS.<br>
><br>
> And the
examples are
clear, and at
a point, such
TLD operators
need to
re-think their
business model
and act
accordingly to
keep their TLD
alive.<br>
><br>
> So in May
2018, we will
see a lot of
use of the
privacy
services due
to the GDPR, I
guess mostly
at a Registrar
level, but
let's not rule
out that it
might be on a
Registry
level, the
dynamics here
are shifting
day by day.<br>
> So my
question here,
and I hope we
can discuss
this in good
faith, but it
seems to me
that the WHOIS
will be an
irrelevant
factor when it
comes to the
risk/reputation
score?<br>
> How
does/will that
play out?<br>
> And yes,
this is not
exactly
related to our
work when it
comes to RDS,
but since we
have the
expertise
here, I think
it would be
useful to
explore this a
little more
even though
off topic. I
hope the
leadership
team allows
this to get a
better
understanding,
for the
community on
what is going
down and might
happen in a
just a few
months here.<br>
> And if we
need to do
this offlist,
sure, no
problem. I am
just trying to
get a sense to
here to comply
with the law
and keep a
business
running.<br>
><br>
><br>
> Thanks<br>
><br>
> Theo<br>
><br>
><br>
> On
28-11-2017
20:57, John
Bambenek via
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
wrote:<br>
>> Full
agreement on
this point<br>
>><br>
>> On
11/28/2017
01:30 PM, Kris
Seeburn wrote:<br>
>>>
As we move on
…one way or
the other the
GDPR and other
aligned
privacy laws
will catch up
eventually. We
will need to
find levels
and technical
ways and
reasons to get
things to
work. We move
to RDAPis fine
as we look
ahead but we
should be able
to not only
look at the
laws that we
need to
respect but
also to find
technical ways
to get and
make sure
things still
continue
towork. As
this stage
personally
both are as
important.<br>
>>><br>
>>>> On Nov 28, 2017, at 23:15, allison nixon <<a href="mailto:elsakoo@gmail.com" target="_blank">elsakoo@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Most systems operators are not afraid to block entire
TLDs. While
there are no
scientific
studies out on
this matter
AFAIK, the
help forums
are littered
with people
asking how to
block entire
TLDs, and also
registrants on
those TLDs
asking why
everyone is
blocking them.
It's enough to
conclusively
say this is
already an
issue, and we
can thank
abuse for
this.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> In this Reddit post, a user learns the hard truth about
his brand new
XYZ domain:<br>
>>>> <a href="https://www.reddit.com/r/webdev/comments/6jq6f5/getting_blocked_should_i_abandon_my_xyz_domain/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.reddit.com/r/webde<wbr>v/comments/6jq6f5/getting_bloc<wbr>ked_should_i_abandon_my_xyz_do<wbr>main/</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> This article discusses Facebook's block of all XYZ
domains:<br>
>>>> <a href="http://adamyamada.com/facebook-blocks-xyz-domains-new-domains-pages/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://adamyamada.com/facebook<wbr>-blocks-xyz-domains-new-domain<wbr>s-pages/</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> This Malwarebytes staff member explains to a legitimate
registrant
that all
.SCIENCE TLDs
are blocked
and he gets no
exception:<br>
>>>> <a href="https://forums.malwarebytes.com/topic/173535-all-my-science-domains-blocked/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://forums.malwarebytes.co<wbr>m/topic/173535-all-my-science-<wbr>domains-blocked/</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> In fact, the Malwarebytes "false positive" forum is
littered with
owners of
hacked domains
that
discovered
their problem
because of a
block, not
because of a
notification:<br>
>>>> <a href="https://forums.malwarebytes.com/forum/123-website-blocking/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://forums.malwarebytes.co<wbr>m/forum/123-website-blocking/</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> This user asks for an 'Existing list of garbage "new"
TLDs' to block<br>
>>>> <a href="https://vamsoft.com/forum/topic/597/existing-list-of-garbage-new-tlds" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://vamsoft.com/forum/topi<wbr>c/597/existing-list-of-garbage<wbr>-new-tlds</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> There are 179 Google search results for people asking
Microsoft's
help service
for ways to
block entire
TLDs:<br>
>>>> <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=how+do+i+block+TLD+site:answers.microsoft.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.google.com/search?<wbr>q=how+do+i+block+TLD+site:answ<wbr>ers.microsoft.com</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> There are 72,500 Google search results for "how to
block" "tld":<br>
>>>> <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=%22how+to+block%22+%22tld%22" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://www.google.com/search?<wbr>q=%22how+to+block%22+%22tld%22</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> The Internet is effectively "broken" for any legitimate
registrants on
these TLDs.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> As a seller of some of those same TLDs, should you be
concerned if
your customers
purchase
domains
rendered
useless due to
blocking?<br>
>>>> Would you actually refund a customer if they told you
they couldn't
use the domain
for e-mail due
to the TLD?<br>
>>>> Would you warn your prospective .XYZ, .STUDY, .PRESS,
.PARTY, etc,
customers that
they should
not use the
domains for
e-mail?<br>
>>>> When ICANN releases new gTLDs in the future, do you
think that
those domains
will ever be
able to send
e-mail?<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Truly, the rest of the world will be fine. The more
that ICANN has
the "not my
problem"
attitude, the
more the rest
of the world
is going to
push back.
ICANN seems to
have lost the
ability to
release new
gTLDs without
severe
connectivity
issues, so we
also need to
ask the
question: "why
are these guys
selling the
digital
equivalent of
the scarlet
letter and not
warning their
customers
beforehand?"<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> I think the question of selling defective products is
one that needs
to be
addressed more
seriously by
regulators and
outside
parties.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> I can also tell you that security vendors are already
looking into
other
anti-abuse
techniques for
domains
post-WHOIS,
and I can also
tell you that
they will
result in an
increase in
the percentage
of legitimate
domains that
are blocked.
This is your
problem now.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 12:43 PM, Volker Greimann <<a href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>>
wrote:<br>
>>>> Hi Andrew,<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> re:hotbed I was rather intending to ask whether there
is a direct
correllation
between TLDs
with redacted
whois and
issues that go
unresolved. So
do you have
more
unresolved
issues in .<a href="http://co.uk" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">co.uk</a>
than in .com
(if numbers
are normalized
for registered
domain names).<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> I am sure no one would consider blocking the entire
mail traffic
originating
from the
United Kingdom
Top Level
Domain just
because you
cannot resolve
some issues in
a few domains,
correct?<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> So if everyone followed their (or a similar) model, the
internet would
not break.
Some issues
would get
harder to
solve (or take
longer). I am
asking because
that is what
most likely
will happen on
May 25 or
sooner.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Volker<br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Am 28.11.2017 um 18:27 schrieb Andrew Sullivan:<br>
>>>> On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 04:31:56PM +0100, Volker
Greimann
wrote:<br>
>>>> case of internet operability issues. While I appreciate
that there can
be<br>
>>>> issues that would necessitate the ability to quickly
contact
whoever can
fix<br>
>>>> the issue, I wonder how this problem is solved in TLDs
where whois is<br>
>>>> already redacted.<br>
>>>> It's not. In that case, if I am the one who has this
experience and
I<br>
>>>> can't reach the target, then the problem goes
unresolved.
In mail<br>
>>>> cases, as John suggests elsewhere in this thread, the
answer is very<br>
>>>> likely that mail is blocked. People seem surprised
these days
that<br>
>>>> mail is so fragile, but this sort of thing is part of
the reason.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> So how does it work there? Are these TLDs hotbeds of
DNS issues and<br>
>>>> unresolved problems?<br>
>>>> I don't know what you mean by "hotbed", or whether that
is intended to<br>
>>>> be dismissive. Some TLDs defintely have more DNS
problems than<br>
>>>> others. Given how hard the DNS works to make
connections
happen even<br>
>>>> when things are badly misconfigured, lots of stuff will
work to some<br>
>>>> extent even when it is badly configured. But DNS
operations
people<br>
>>>> trade stories about problems amongst themselves, after
giving up on<br>
>>>> sites because whois can't help and the mname in the SOA
record is<br>
>>>> broken. I find this happens more often than you might
expect.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> But yes, there are broken domains on the Internet. I
find it hard
to<br>
>>>> believe that would be even slightly remarkable.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Best regards,<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> A<br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> --<br>
>>>> Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur
Verfügung.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Mit freundlichen Grüßen,<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Volker A. Greimann<br>
>>>> - Rechtsabteilung -<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Key-Systems GmbH<br>
>>>> <a href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert&entry=gmail&source=g" target="_blank">Im Oberen Werk 1</a><br>
>>>> <a href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert&entry=gmail&source=g" target="_blank">66386 St. Ingbert</a><br>
>>>> Tel.: <a href="tel:+49%206894%209396901" value="+4968949396901" target="_blank">+49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901</a><br>
>>>> Fax.: <a href="tel:+49%206894%209396851" value="+4968949396851" target="_blank">+49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851</a><br>
>>>> Email: <a href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Web: <a href="http://www.key-systems.net" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a href="http://www.RRPproxy.net" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.RRPproxy.net</a><br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a href="http://www.BrandShelter.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.BrandShelter.com</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Folgen Sie uns bei Twitter oder werden Sie unser Fan
bei Facebook:<br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a><br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Geschäftsführer: Alexander Siffrin<br>
>>>> Handelsregister Nr.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken<br>
>>>> Umsatzsteuer ID.: DE211006534<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP<br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.keydrive.lu" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.keydrive.lu</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Der Inhalt dieser Nachricht ist vertraulich und nur für
den
angegebenen
Empfänger
bestimmt. Jede
Form der
Kenntnisgabe,
Veröffentlichung oder Weitergabe an Dritte durch den Empfänger ist
unzulässig.
Sollte diese
Nachricht
nicht für Sie
bestimmt sein,
so bitten wir
Sie, sich mit
uns per E-Mail
oder
telefonisch in
Verbindung zu
setzen.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> ------------------------------<wbr>--------------<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Should you have any further questions, please do not
hesitate to
contact us.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Best regards,<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Volker A. Greimann<br>
>>>> - legal department -<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Key-Systems GmbH<br>
>>>> <a href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert&entry=gmail&source=g" target="_blank">Im Oberen Werk 1</a><br>
>>>> <a href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert&entry=gmail&source=g" target="_blank">66386 St. Ingbert</a><br>
>>>> Tel.: <a href="tel:%2B49%20%280%29%206894%20-%209396%20901" value="+4968949396901" target="_blank">+49 (0)
6894 - 9396
901</a><br>
>>>> Fax.: <a href="tel:%2B49%20%280%29%206894%20-%209396%20851" value="+4968949396851" target="_blank">+49 (0)
6894 - 9396
851</a><br>
>>>> Email: <a href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Web: <a href="http://www.key-systems.net" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a href="http://www.RRPproxy.net" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.RRPproxy.net</a><br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.domaindiscount24.com</a> / <a href="http://www.BrandShelter.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.BrandShelter.com</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Follow us on Twitter or join our fan community on
Facebook and
stay updated:<br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.facebook.com/KeySystems" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.facebook.com/KeySystems</a><br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.twitter.com/key_systems" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.twitter.com/key_systems</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> CEO: Alexander Siffrin<br>
>>>> Registration No.: HR B 18835 - Saarbruecken<br>
>>>> V.A.T. ID.: DE211006534<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Member of the KEYDRIVE GROUP<br>
>>>> <a href="http://www.keydrive.lu" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.keydrive.lu</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> This e-mail and its attachments is intended only for
the person to
whom it is
addressed.
Furthermore it
is not
permitted to
publish any
content of
this email.
You must not
use, disclose,
copy, print or
rely on this
e-mail. If an
addressing or
transmission
error has
misdirected
this e-mail,
kindly notify
the author by
replying to
this e-mail or
contacting us
by telephone.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>>>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br>
>>>> <a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>>>> <a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>><br>
>>>> --<br>
>>>> ______________________________<wbr>___<br>
>>>> Note to self: Pillage BEFORE burning.<br>
>>>> ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>>>> gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list<br>
>>>> <a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>>>> <a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>>
Kris Seeburn<br>
>>> <a href="mailto:seeburn.k@gmail.com" target="_blank">seeburn.k@gmail.com</a><br>
>>>
• <a href="http://www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">www.linkedin.com/in/kseeburn/</a><br>
>>><br>
</div>
</div>
>>>
<KeepItOn_Social_animated.gif><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>>
______________________________<br>
<span>>>>
_________________<br>
>>>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
mailing list<br>
>>><br>
>>> <a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>>> <a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
>><br>
>><br>
>><br>
</span>>>
______________________________<br>
<span class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898imm_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898HOEnZb">>>
_________________<br>
>>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
mailing list<br>
>><br>
>> <a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>> <a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
><br>
><br>
>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
mailing list<br>
> <a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
> <a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
><br>
><br>
><br>
> --<br>
>
______________________________<wbr>___<br>
> Note to
self: Pillage
BEFORE burning.<br>
</span>
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898HOEnZb">
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898h5">>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>
gnso-rds-pdp-wg
mailing list<br>
> <a href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a><br>
> <a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a><br>
<br>
</div>
</div>
</blockquote>
</div>
<br>
<br clear="all">
<div><br>
</div>
-- <br>
<div class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898gmail_signature">______________________________<wbr>___<br>
Note to self:
Pillage BEFORE
burning.</div>
</div>
<br>
<fieldset class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
<br>
<pre>______________________________<wbr>_________________
gnso-rds-pdp-wg mailing list
<a class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rds-pdp-wg@icann.org</a>
<a class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rds-pdp-wg</a></pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<pre class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-signature" cols="72">--
Bei weiteren Fragen stehen wir Ihnen gerne zur Verfügung.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Volker A. Greimann
- Rechtsabteilung -
Key-Systems GmbH
<a href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert+%3Chttps://maps.google.com/?q%3DIm%2BOberen%2BWerk%2B1%2B%250D%2B%253E%253E%253E%253E%2B66386%2BSt.%2BIngbert%26entry%3Dgmail%26source%3Dg%3E&entry=gmail&source=g" target="_blank">Im Oberen Werk 1</a>
<a href="https://maps.google.com/?q=Im+Oberen+Werk+1+%0D+%3E%3E%3E%3E+66386+St.+Ingbert+%3Chttps://maps.google.com/?q%3DIm%2BOberen%2BWerk%2B1%2B%250D%2B%253E%253E%253E%253E%2B66386%2BSt.%2BIngbert%26entry%3Dgmail%26source%3Dg%3E&entry=gmail&source=g" target="_blank">66386 St. Ingbert</a>
Tel.: <a href="tel:+49%206894%209396901" value="+4968949396901" target="_blank">+49 (0) 6894 - 9396 901</a>
Fax.: <a href="tel:+49%206894%209396851" value="+4968949396851" target="_blank">+49 (0) 6894 - 9396 851</a>
Email: <a class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:vgreimann@key-systems.net" target="_blank">vgreimann@key-systems.net</a>
Web: <a class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.key-systems.net" target="_blank">www.key-systems.net</a> / <a class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.RRPproxy.net" target="_blank">www.RRPproxy.net</a>
<a class="gmail-m_-1231152848796205088m_-4307138376063297247m_-9220732214027584385m_7168477860784410894m_-3258645503691039737m_-6593500956563796352m_-847882815422705898moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="http://www.domaindiscount24.com" target="_blank"></a></pre></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote></div></div></div></blockquote></div></div></blockquote></div>...</blockquote></div></div>
</div>