[gnso-rpm-wg] Action Items, Slides and Notes from the Working Group call held earlier today

Sun Apr 9 16:51:47 UTC 2017

My responses are in-line.

G
reg

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 1:39 PM, Michael Karanicolas <mkaranicolas at gmail.com>
wrote:

> Hi,
>
> I think that Michael Graham brings up a salient point in terms of falling
> too far down the rabbit hole on background matters, but I should address a
> few issues in response to questions that were directly asked of me.
>
> First off, while Greg is correct to point out that the UDHR is not
> formally legally binding as a UNGA resolution, it is (quite literally) the
> textbook example of customary international law. I realize that can be a
> fuzzy concept to rely on, but luckily I don't have to rely on it because
> the freedom of expression protections in the UDHR are substantially
> identical to those found in the ICCPR, which IS a formally binding treaty.
>

Binding on states.  Of course, ICANN is not a state.  Luckily, we have the
new human rights Core Value in the ICANN Bylaws, Section 1.2(b)(viii),
which states that one of ICANN's eight Core Values (which must be subject
to a balancing analysis involving all Core Values).  is "within the scope
of its Mission and other Core Values, respecting internationally recognized
human rights as required by applicable law." The Bylaw specifically notes
that "This Core Value does not create, and shall not be interpreted to
create, any obligation on ICANN outside its Mission, or beyond obligations
found in applicable law."  As such, ICANN's obligations do not go beyond
what would otherwise be required by applicable law.  There's been a great
deal of discussion of this in CCWG-Accountability WS1 and in the Human
Rights Subgroup of WS2, so I won't go further into the concepts here, which
would be a rabbit hole down a rabbit hole from the viewpoint of this group.

>
> Also, while I appreciate Greg's caution against "cherrypicking" by viewing
> Article 19 in isolation, in this context that argument is just a
> smokescreen.
>

Concerns about cherrypicking are in no way a "smokescreen" -- unless the
reference is to the saying "where there's smoke, there's fire." John
Levine's blog nicely expressed a number of concerns about such
cherrypicking, especially for what he calls the "fashionable human rights,"
so I won't repeat them here.  It is important to keep in mind, as Michael
notes, that "human rights are fundamentally about balance," so perhaps we
are not so far apart, as "balance" and "cherrypicking" are mutually
exclusive concepts.

Of course the UDHR and ICCPR need to be viewed holistically - that
understanding in no way supports an argument that domains are not speech.

I'm puzzled by the second part of this sentence.  I think this point is
unrelated to the issue of whether or not domain names are speech, so it
neither supports nor negates any argument on that topic.

There's no conflict between believing in personal privacy as protected by
the ICCPR (as I do), and believing in the need to combat hate speech as
spelled out in the ICCPR (as I do), and believing in freedom of expression.
Human rights are fundamentally about balance (more on that in a second).

There are certainly conflicts (e.g., between combating hate speech and
supporting free speech); the issue is how to balance these countervailing
issues to resolve these conflicts.

>
> With regard to Ballantyne, Davidson & McIntyre, I probably should have
> been more specific in my original post. Of course, as Greg notes, the case
> is not specifically about domain names - which would be a pretty niche area
> for the Human Rights Committee to dig into. But the decision contains the
> clearest statement of the extent of what constitutes "speech" under the
> ICCPR, namely that Article 19: "must be interpreted as encompassing every
> form of subjective ideas and opinions capable of transmission to others".
> It's an incredibly broad formulation - to cover virtually anything that
> conveys meaning. I, personally, can't see an interpretation of that that
> doesn't include domain names.
>

This is not really that broad a formulation -- it dovetails nicely with
the concept of "expressive speech" under US law (as in the excerpt from
*Gibson*).  Furthermore, there is a considerable difference between the
speech constituting "subjective ideas and opinions" protected in
*Ballantyne* and the "incredibly broad formulation" that would elevate
"virtually anything that conveys meaning."  "Subjective ideas and opinions"
in no way embraces domain names *per se*; whether and to what extent it
embraces domain names is certainly not a question answered in *Ballantyne*.

>
> With regard to Gibson v. Texas - I don't want to dig too deeply into this
> because, honestly, US law is not my specialisation. But I think that part
> of the disconnect between our positions is due to a particular aspect of
> the American understanding of free speech, that's sort of different to how
> it's understood virtually everywhere else. Under most systems, including
> the international example I just cited, virtually everything is classed as
> "speech", and then there's a balancing as to whether particular
> restrictions are justified. But because of the absolutist way the US
> Constitution is phrased ("Congress shall make *no law*"), the Courts have
> had to go through some unusual legal gymnastics to find that speech that
> they feel justified restricting isn't actually speech.
>

Simply reading the excerpt from *Gibson v. Texas* in my prior email shows
that this "speech/not speech" analysis is incorrect.  *Gibson*, and the
cases cited in it, distinguish between protected speech and speech that
that is "not to be protected." Specifically, *Gibson* mentions that "courts
have held that domain names that use trademarks to misidentify the source
of a product are outside the reach of the First Amendment" and also cites a
line of cases where "the domain name was actually held not to be protected
speech because it was not expressive, not because it was misleading."  More
broadly, the idea that the US approach to free speech is anomalous is
incorrect.  Of course, free speech regimes vary broadly throughout the
world -- so there's no such thing as a single "understanding of free
speech... virtually everywhere else" aside from the US.  Unfortunately,
there are many places in the world where there is no understanding of free
speech at all.)  If the US approach to free speech tends to be different,
it is in a greater tolerance for controversial and offensive speech (what
John Levine calls "the absolutist U.S. first amendment approach").  This is
why US law doesn't find it so easy to restrict alleged "hate speech" as
"virtually everywhere else", and also why I can't be so comfortable in
finding "no conflict" between free speech and  restricting hate speech.
(And I say this as a member of a group that is finding itself increasingly
on the wrong end of both offensive speech and hate speech.)

>
> So, without trying to belabour these issues, my point in the above is not
> to try and invalidate the trademark protection system - indeed, Greg's
> quite right to point out that trademarks are also speech. My point here is
> simply to try and demonstrate that *there are free speech issues at play*.
>
>

It's clear that this is false as a general statement, unless this is meant
as a statement that could possibly true in a large enough sample, like
"people are 7 feet tall".  Whether one looks at *Ballantyne* or *Gibson*,
one sees clear distinctions being drawn being "subjective ideas and
opinions" and speech that is "not expressive" or "inherently misleading."
 This is probably a good time to note that the UDHR and the ICCPR both
refer to "freedom of expression" and not to "free speech."  So, it would be
more proper to discuss whether "expressive speech" is at issue, not whether
the over-broad "virtually anything that conveys meaning" is at issue,
before we even get to the question of whether free speech issues are at
play, to what extent, and how that might affect any discussion that is
relevant to this Working Group.

> To me, that's not a controversial point - and if we can agree on that,
>

I don't think we can agree on that, and certainly not as an assumed
agreement from which one can proceed blithely on.  Rather, I think that is
an elemental aspect of the discussion, and as noted above, at best
"controversial" and possibly sometimes true, and at worst false (at least
as a general statement).

As an aside, it's worth noting what Article 19 of the ICCPR actually
protects: "the right to hold opinions without interference" and "the right
to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice."   I admit to struggling to find instances where
the right to hold opinions or to express oneself freely is truly being
violated in this context -- especially in a world where holding or
expressing an opinion can come under threat of oppression, suppression,
violence, imprisonment or worse. As someone who strongly supports First
Amendment rights and who has worked on litigation defending First Amendment
freedoms, I wonder whether this discussion trivializes free speech concerns
rather than promoting them.  That is not to dismiss the possibility of free
speech concerns here, but just to say that, to the extent there is a viable
point here, it pales in comparison to the significant freedom of expression
concerns elsewhere (including elsewhere on the Internet, where access to
websites with undesirable opinions or expression, or even to the Internet
as a whole, is under escalating attack).

> then that is relevant to the transparency question, since in my mind it
> bolsters arguments for why openness in the system is important.
>

I don't get the logical leaps here, from the possibility of a free speech
issue, to the claimed relevance to the transparency question, to the even
more attenuated idea that this bolsters arguments regarding changing access
rules for the TMCH.  In other words, I don't really think that any of this
changes the discussion on TMCH database access, nor do I really think it is
relevant to any of the work we are undertaking right now.  That is not to
say that this is an uninteresting discussion (or else I would not have
engaged in it), just that it is a rabbit hole in relation to our work.

>
> Best,
>
> Michael
>
> On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 2:19 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> It's important to keep in mind that the rights set forth in the UDHR are
>> interrelated and interdependent, so understanding the applicability of any
>> one Article also requires understanding the applicability of the other
>> rights in the UDHR, including some which may be countervailing to others.
>> Looking at Article 19 in isolation is "cherrypicking."  A recent CircleID
>> article by John Levine is quite enlightening on this very point:
>> http://www.circleid.com/posts/20170401_human_rights_and_regu
>> lar_internet_users/
>>
>> The article is short, but for those who don't get there, this quote goes
>> to the heart of the matter: "it devalues the whole topic of human rights
>> to pay attention only to a few fashionable rights, while ignoring ones that
>> are at least as important in people's daily lives."
>>
>> (It should also be noted that the UDHR, while adopted by the United
>> Nations and widely used, does not constitute some form of "universal law"
>> nor is it universally accepted.)
>>
>> The case mentioned, *Gibson v. Texas*, has portions that are directly
>> applicable to the discussion at hand.  However, the Gibson decision
>> actually distinguishes cases involving trademarks from the situation in
>> that case.  As a matter of fact, the Gibson case tells us that *there
>> are at least two types of domain names that do not constitute speech
>> protected by the First Amendment: domain names that infringe trademarks,
>> and domain names that do not constitute "expressive speech."*
>>
>> (In other words, there can be no "freedom of expression" issue when the
>> speech is not expressive.)
>>
>> Before getting to an excerpt from the case, it's important to note that
>> the court did not find that domain names are speech, much less find that
>> domain names are speech protected by the First Amendment.  The court made
>> no findings about all domain names.  Rather, the court assumed, for the
>> purpose of considering a motion to dismiss, that the domain name in
>> question (texasworkerscomplaw.com) constituted commercial speech.  It's
>> also important to note that the case involved the Constitutionality of a
>> law that broadly prohibited the use of the terms "Texas" and "workers
>> comp," and not a trademark infringement matter.
>>
>> The excerpt is quite instructive:
>>
>>
>> In order for speech to fall outside of the First Amendment’s protection,
>> the speech must either be “inherently likely to deceive,” or “the record
>> [must] indicate[] that a particular form or method of advertising has in
>> fact been deceptive.” *R.M.J.*, 455 U.S. at 202.
>>
>>
>> Appellees primarily argue that the Texas statute is constitutional
>> because Gibson’s domain name amounts to inherently misleading speech. In
>> support of this proposition, they cite to a series of cases in which *courts
>> have held that domain names that use trademarks to misidentify the source
>> of a product are outside the reach of the First Amendment.* The case law
>> cited by Appellees, however, is unique to the field of trademark
>> infringement, see, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774 (8th Cir.
>> 2004), and does not necessarily extend to a case such as this one, where
>> Texas is prohibiting Gibson from using words that are otherwise in the
>> public domain.[1]
>> <#m_450629144727756903_m_-3779040697164605871_m_3120687686914692157__ftn1>*
>> Cases involving trademark infringement involve inherently deceptive speech
>> because they contain a significant risk that an infringing party will
>> freeload on the goodwill that has been created by the original trademark.*
>> See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 11-16. No such risk is present here. Texas has
>> made no showing that its own talents and energy contributed to the creation
>> of any goodwill in the name “texasworkerscomplaw.com.” See San Francisco
>> Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 533-34 (1987).
>> Instead the regulation at issue is forward-thinking; intended to prohibit
>> confusion for individuals seeking information from the government agency.
>> It is not retrospective in the same way as most trademark litigation, which
>> is generally intended to preserve the reputation that has been built upon a
>> trade name. See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 11-16. Accordingly, the case law
>> cited by Appellees is inapposite.
>>
>> ------------------------------
>>
>> [1]
>> <#m_450629144727756903_m_-3779040697164605871_m_3120687686914692157__ftnref1> *In
>> most of the cases cited by Appellees the domain name was actually held not
>> to be protected speech because it was not expressive, not because it was
>> misleading. *See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bucci, No.
>> 97-cv-0629, 1997 WL 133313, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997); Morrison &
>> Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F.Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (D. Colo. 2000); Jews for
>> Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F.Supp. 282, 286 n.1 (D.N.J. 1998). Here, in
>> contrast, Gibson’s domain name is expressive because it does more than
>> simply mimic the state agency’s website or identify a source of Texas
>> Workers’ Compensation Law. See Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313, at *11.
>> The domain name is intended to direct visitors to a forum for discussing
>> workers’ compensation laws and their potential reform, as well as to convey
>> to visitors the message of Gibson’s website as a whole. Accordingly, in the
>> context of this case, the domain name is “‘sufficiently imbued with the
>> elements of communication’” to place it in the realm of expressive speech.
>> Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 585 (2d Cir.
>> 2000) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974)).
>>
>> Greg Shatan
>>
>>
>>
>> *Greg Shatan *C: 917-816-6428 <8%20(917)%20816-64-28>
>> S: gsshatan
>> Phone-to-Skype: 646-845-9428 <(646)%20845-9428>
>> gregshatanipc at gmail.com
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 10:58 PM, Michael Karanicolas <
>> mkaranicolas at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> It's an interesting question. Different national courts have handled
>>> the issue in different ways. In the US, for example, the Fifth Circuit
>>> Court of Appeals found in Gibson v. Texas that domain names are
>>> protected as speech under the 1st amendment. But freedom of expression
>>> in the US context tends to be understood differently than elsewhere,
>>> since the way it's protected under the US constitution is a bit
>>> different from how most constitutions frame their equivalent
>>> protections.
>>>
>>> That said - when you're asking about Article 19, the discussion comes
>>> at the international level where, as far as I know, there's no single
>>> authoritative treatment to point to. Generally, discussions of Article
>>> 19 by standard setting bodies tend to focus on the sharper and more
>>> controversial issues: hate speech, defamation, national security
>>> restrictions, etc.
>>>
>>> However - there's a clear and well developed test for restrictions on
>>> freedom of expression that's built right into the ICCPR, and which
>>> applies equally to all restrictions, namely that they should be: (1)
>>> provided by Law (which includes a requirement for clarity and
>>> transparency), (2) fulfill a legitimate purpose, and (3) be necessary
>>> and proportionate to the achievement of that goal. If we establish
>>> that domain names qualify as speech under Article 19 (which, according
>>> to UN Human Rights Committee in Ballantyne, Davidson & McIntyre v.
>>> Canada, is a fairly sure interpretation), then understanding the
>>> applicability of Article 19 just means understanding that three part
>>> test.
>>>
>>> If you want more info, I'd recommend this briefing note as a useful
>>> (and concise!) introduction to restrictions on freedom of expression
>>> under Article 19:
>>> http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2015/02
>>> /foe-briefingnotes-2.pdf
>>>
>>> Or if you want to go into a little more depth, you can check out this
>>> one: http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2012/08
>>> /Paper-on-Restrictions.10.03.22.rev_.pdf
>>>
>>> Unfortunately - neither is specifically about domain names, but the
>>> discussion is basically analogous to how we understand other kinds of
>>> restrictions and protections.
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 6:50 PM, Michael Graham (ELCA)
>>> <migraham at expedia.com> wrote:
>>> > Michael:
>>> >
>>> > Where can I find a discussion how Article 19 and similar "Freedom of
>>> Expression" requirements relate to or impact the registration of domain
>>> names?
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > Michael R.
>>> >
>>> > Article 19.
>>> >  Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
>>> right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek,
>>> receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless
>>> of frontiers.
>>> >
>>> > -----Original Message-----
>>> > From: gnso-rpm-wg-bounces at icann.org [mailto:gnso-rpm-wg-bounces at ic
>>> ann.org] On Behalf Of Michael Karanicolas
>>> > Sent: Thursday, April 06, 2017 5:53 AM
>>> > To: J. Scott Evans <jsevans at adobe.com>
>>> > Cc: gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>>> > Subject: Re: [gnso-rpm-wg] Action Items, Slides and Notes from the
>>> Working Group call held earlier today
>>> >
>>> > Once again - I have to jump in. Freedom of expression is very much a
>>> universal concept:
>>> >
>>> > http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/
>>> > http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx
>>> >
>>> > That's why we call them "human" rights. Not "American" rights.
>>> >
>>> >
>>> > On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 9:49 AM, J. Scott Evans via gnso-rpm-wg <
>>> gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org> wrote:
>>> >> The law is clear: an exact match isn't free speech. It is trademark
>>> infringement. A domain that coveys a message (e.g., hotels suck.com) is
>>> free speech and protected accordingly. Also, "free speech" is a US
>>> constitutional concept adopted by some countries, but it is not a universal
>>> legal concept. Perhaps universal free speech is aspirational, but it is not
>>> reality.
>>> >>
>>> >> Sent from my iPhone
>>> >>
>>> >>> On Apr 6, 2017, at 5:44 AM, George Kirikos <icann at leap.com> wrote:
>>> >>>
>>> >>> I'm not sure where J. Scott is getting his "facts", but my company
>>> >>> doesn't "arbitrage" nor has it registered *any* new gTLD domain names
>>> >>> (and I have no desire for any), nor is it a "bad actor." If you have
>>> >>> proof that my company is a "bad actor", put it forward, rather than
>>> >>> sling unsupported innuendo.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> The whole point is that the "barriers" are put forth as *required* to
>>> >>> deal with so-called "bad actors", but are instead used to advantage
>>> >>> certain groups, far beyond the "damage" that is claimed to be caused
>>> >>> by the "bad actors."
>>> >>>
>>> >>> I don't want to delve into politics, but some might see parallels to
>>> >>> certain government measures in some countries, where a "problem" is
>>> >>> claimed, but a Draconian solution is applied to deal with it.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> When it comes to the sunrise periods for new gTLDs, the "problem" is
>>> >>> claimed to be cybersquatting, but instead of relying on curative
>>> >>> rights, the Sunrise policy went too far and gave too many advantages
>>> >>> to TM holders, essentially creating an unlevel playing field between
>>> >>> *good actors* and TM holders.
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Free speech means *no prior restraints* (with very rare exceptions),
>>> >>> but harsh penalties for unlawful speech (curative rights).
>>> >>>
>>> >>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww
>>> .
>>> >>> law.cornell.edu%2Fwex%2Fprior_restraint&data=02%7C01%7C%7C81
>>> 1dc6e8437
>>> >>> 245583fce08d47cea9d30%7Cfa7b1b5a7b34438794aed2c178decee1%7C0
>>> %7C0%7C63
>>> >>> 6270794483518369&sdata=IyEiG%2FsY%2BTgJkYPGzDiGtCEbfBWA4SVgJ
>>> 4g%2FOWfC
>>> >>> H7s%3D&reserved=0
>>> >>>
>>> >>> Sincerely,
>>> >>>
>>> >>> George Kirikos
>>> >>> 416-588-0269 <8%20(416)%20588-02-69>
>>> >>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2
>>> F%2Fwww.l
>>> >>> eap.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7C811dc6e8437245583fce08d47cea9d3
>>> 0%7Cfa7b1
>>> >>> b5a7b34438794aed2c178decee1%7C0%7C0%7C636270794483518369&sda
>>> ta=6BJPNx
>>> >>> olmCYrJK3jZ5%2B7ZFJhorIvFPrA11%2FRit4QYdY%3D&reserved=0
>>> >>>
>>> >>>
>>> >>>> On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 8:08 AM, J. Scott Evans <jsevans at adobe.com>
>>> wrote:
>>> >>>> The same logic applies to you and other domaines, cybersquatters,
>>> speculators and small businesses. The fact that you want to arbitrage in
>>> terms that are also trademarks is your choice and you have to deal with the
>>> barriers put in place to deal with the bad actors.
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>> >>>>
>>> >>>>> On Apr 6, 2017, at 4:59 AM, George Kirikos <icann at leap.com> wrote:
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> Hi folks,
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>>> On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:19 AM, Beckham, Brian <
>>> brian.beckham at wipo.int> wrote:
>>> >>>>>> Finally, since the chart references the EFF letter, it is worth
>>> >>>>>> mentioning here that the fact that a trademark owner may pay
>>> >>>>>> (sometimes extremely high
>>> >>>>>> amounts) to defensively register a domain name exactly matching
>>> >>>>>> its trademark in a Sunrise process (and thereby taking it “off the
>>> >>>>>> market”) does not prevent free expression, which may be undertaken
>>> >>>>>> in countless other ways.  The number of terms that may be appended
>>> >>>>>> to a trademark (not to mention typos) to engage in all manner of
>>> >>>>>> speech – fair or otherwise – is, practically-speaking, all but
>>> limitless.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> By that "logic", the number of terms that may be appended to a
>>> >>>>> common dictionary word (not to mention typos) to create a
>>> >>>>> trademarkable brand is, practically-speaking, all but limitless.
>>> >>>>> :-)
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> In other words, those creating a new brand/trademark certainly had
>>> >>>>> the opportunity to create a longer (and thus inferior) alternative
>>> >>>>> to a commonly used dictionary word or other common term. The fact
>>> >>>>> that they decided instead to choose a common term that is widely
>>> >>>>> used by the public shouldn't give them any priority access in a
>>> >>>>> launch of a new gTLD.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> "I created a problem for myself, and I want ICANN to fix it" is the
>>> >>>>> essence of the sunrise argument for commonly used terms, like
>>> >>>>> dictionary words and short acronyms.
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> Sincerely,
>>> >>>>>
>>> >>>>> George Kirikos
>>> >>>>> 416-588-0269
>>> >>>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2
>>> F%2Fwww
>>> >>>>> .leap.com%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7C2b7c1e08334543cacbff08d47ce46
>>> e63%7Cf
>>> >>>>> a7b1b5a7b34438794aed2c178decee1%7C0%7C0%7C636270767931993418
>>> &sdata=
>>> >>>>> 6px9twhTFpg2YYaKWPoClt%2FQGQKnakm1jerYcSj%2F2w0%3D&reserved=0
>>> >>>>> _______________________________________________
>>> >>>>> gnso-rpm-wg mailing list
>>> >>>>> gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>>> >>>>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%
>>> 2F%2Fmm
>>> >>>>> .icann.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fgnso-rpm-wg&data=02%7C01%7
>>> C%7C2b7
>>> >>>>> c1e08334543cacbff08d47ce46e63%7Cfa7b1b5a7b34438794aed2c178de
>>> cee1%7C
>>> >>>>> 0%7C0%7C636270767931993418&sdata=jZh3dzb5ycHMZLxsR4ZLmQdR%2B
>>> 2kWcBkF
>>> >>>>> D%2Fj6BAXDjiI%3D&reserved=0
>>> >>> _______________________________________________
>>> >>> gnso-rpm-wg mailing list
>>> >>> gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>>> >>> https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%
>>> 2F%2Fmm.i
>>> >>> cann.org%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%2Fgnso-rpm-wg&data=02%7C01%7C%
>>> 7C811dc6e
>>> >>> 8437245583fce08d47cea9d30%7Cfa7b1b5a7b34438794aed2c178decee1
>>> %7C0%7C0%
>>> >>> 7C636270794483518369&sdata=mJrIOSHwtTJCADlJ8m6UiUx7baKNfoXhI
>>> pZQh1s99f
>>> >>> s%3D&reserved=0
>>> >> _______________________________________________
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>>> >> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rpm-wg
>>> > _______________________________________________
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>>
>>
>
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