[GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of action" followup (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)

George Kirikos icann at leap.com
Tue Oct 16 20:03:40 UTC 2018


P.S. Just to add to the "history" of the development of the UDRP 4(k), see:

http://www.dnso.org/dnso/notes/19990729.NCwga-report.html

"   The need to address the situation wherein a domain name
registrant who has been unsuccessful in the ADR process is effectively
prevented from �appealing� the result in a court due to the absence of a cause
of action in contract, tort, regulation, statute or constitutional right.  It
was noted that there is an imbalance in the WIPO process in that an
unsuccessful complainant will always be able to judicially challenge an ADR
result by virtue of the jurisdiction of the registry being imposed over the
dispute by the WIPO Report.

One suggested solution to this problem which WG-A agrees merits further
consideration, is the requirement that a complainant enter into a contract with
the registrant (or the arbitral institution in a jurisdiction that recognizes
third party beneficiary agreements) as a condition of initiating ADR, that
provides for consent to be sued in the jurisdiction where the registrant is
ordinarily resident, and in the jurisdiction where the subject registrar is
located (assuming both parties do not agree to voluntarily contract out of the
right to subsequent litigation). "

As I noted earlier, 4(k) of the UDRP (and the corresponding version in
the URS) attempted to address the problem, but weren't effective. They
weren't a proper solution to the problem identified back in 1999, that
persists today. URS Proposal #18 is completely effective at addressing
the situation, and solves the problem.

Sincerely,

George Kirikos
416-588-0269
http://www.leap.com/


On Tue, Oct 16, 2018 at 2:57 PM, George Kirikos <icann at leap.com> wrote:
> Hi folks,
>
> 1. All the use of colour doesn't get archived properly in the web
> archive, so folks should try to be aware of that (i.e. if you look at
> the web archive, it's difficult to see who is making which argument).
>
> 2. I've trimmed all the "cc"s to just the mailing list.
>
> 3. Responding to some of the point that were made:
>
> (a) Phil Corwin wrote:
>
> "The UDRP system cannot provide judicial review, it can merely step
> back when either party invokes relevant national law in which it has a
> right of action, whether that occurs before, during, or after the UDRP
> – and it does so. Providing access to relevant law in various
> jurisdictions in which a domain registrant has a right of action is a
> task of industry trade and cyber-rights groups."
>
> and also:
>
> "We simply disagree on what the “bargain” was when the UDRP was
> established. It was a guarantee that available legal rights would be
> respected and be superior to the UDRP, not a guarantee that they would
> be available – and certainly there was no understanding that a domain
> registrant would be immune from a UDRP if the relevant mutual
> jurisdictions failed to provide adequate legal rights or associated
> cause of action. The cure for this situation is an expansion of domain
> registrant rights or  causes of actions in jurisdictions where they
> are now lacking – or, in the alternative, discussion of an internal
> appeals process when such rights are unavailable."
>
>
> These statement are entirely at odds with the history of the UDRP, as
> documented at:
>
> https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/schedule-2012-02-25-en
> https://www.icann.org/resources/unthemed-pages/white-paper-2012-02-25-en
>
> "The proposals were designed to provide trademark holders with the
> ****same rights**** they have in the physical world, to ensure
> transparency, and to guarantee a dispute resolution mechanism
> *****with resort to a court system.***** " (emphasis added)
>
> Notice the "same rights" and "with resort to a court system." It can't
> get much clearer than that.
>
> The White Paper goes on to say:
>
> "Further, it should be clear that whatever dispute resolution
> mechanism is put in place by the new corporation, that mechanism
> should be directed toward disputes about cybersquatting and
> cyberpiracy and not to settling the disputes between two parties with
> legitimate competing interests in a particular mark. ****Where
> legitimate competing rights are concerned, disputes are rightly
> settled in an appropriate court.**** (emphasis added)
>
> That counters the incorrect notion being advanced  these DRPs were
> intended to be the "final word". The only purpose of the DRPs (both
> UDRP and URS) is to provide a low cost alternative to litigation, not
> to replace the courts.
>
> It's not up to "industry trade groups" etc. to create new laws. It's
> up to us to design the UDRP/URS in such a manner that the access to
> courts is preserved, so that disputes are rightly settled in the
> courts. A bad ICANN implementation of DRPs that *thwarts* having
> disputes getting settled in an appropriate court means that we need to
> fix the implementation of the DRPs, not change the courts/national
> laws.
>
> Now, section 4(k) of the UDRP and the corresponding URS rules were an
> attempt to accomplish that, but they are not entirely effective.
> Indeed, if one goes to the Staff report:
>
> http://archive.icann.org/en/meetings/santiago/udrp-staff-report.htm
>
> "DNSO Recommendation 4(b): The need to address the situation wherein a
> domain name registrant who has been unsuccessful in the ADR process is
> effectively prevented from "appealing" the result in a court due to
> the absence of a cause of action in contract, tort, regulation,
> statute or constitutional right. It was noted that there is an
> imbalance in the WIPO process in that an unsuccessful complainant will
> always be able to judicially challenge an ADR result by virtue of the
> jurisdiction of the registry being imposed over the dispute by the
> WIPO Report;
>
> Staff Suggestion on DNSO Recommendation 4(b): The staff agrees that
> both registrants and challengers should have equal opportunities to
> "appeal" an outcome of the administrative dispute-resolution
> procedure. Some commentators have suggested that the DNSO-recommended
> proposal would afford challengers significantly superior "appeal"
> rights. The staff notes that this result would be a clearly unintended
> consequence of the DNSO proposal. The staff believes that this concern
> can and should be fully addressed in the implementation of the
> dispute-resolution policy, which should explicitly negate this
> possibility."
>
> So, not only was this "absence of a cause of action" issue KNOWN in
> 1999, staff recognized it as a problem. However, they failed to fully
> address things in the implementation.
>
> But, have no fear, the "A-Team" is here. :-)  URS Proposal #18 *fully*
> addresses this problem, unlike Section 4(k) etc. (proposal 19 also
> solves it, albeit less elegantly, and proposal 20 is another way to
> address it).
>
> So, this is exactly WHY a review of the DRPs is needed, because their
> current *implementation* doesn't always work (because they introduced
> that "role reversal" issue that I've talked about, whereas the URS
> Proposal #18 doesn't have that problem). i.e. the "unintended
> consequences" that were noted in 1999 are *still* present, but would
> be fixed by Proposal #18.
>
> (b) Paul Keating wrote: "I disagree.  Your position is akin to the old
> laws in the US which guaranteed blacks the right to vote but in which
> those same people were faced with huge and unfair hurdles to register
> to vote."
>
> Phil Corwin responded: " This is highly inappropriate and inflammatory
> reference – we are discussing trademark law, not voting rights in the
> “Jim Crow” era."
>
> I agree with Paul Keating, and that was an apt *metaphor* which brings
> into focus the issues. It wasn't "inappropriate" or "inflammatory".
> We're adults here, and should be able to point to historical legal
> references, to be able to present our arguments. Paul Keating showed
> how a bad *implementation* can thwart the claimed "right". In his
> case, it involved the right to vote. In our case, it involves the
> right to have the dispute handled by the courts. URS Proposal #18
> doesn't suffer from the same bad implementation that 4(k) and its
> equivalent experiences, in trying to get matters to the courts if
> either side objects to the outcome of the URS (or UDRP in phase 2).
>
> Sincerely,
>
> George Kirikos
> 416-588-0269
> http://www.leap.com/
>
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> On Mon, Oct 15, 2018 at 7:01 PM, Corwin, Philip <pcorwin at verisign.com> wrote:
>> Thank you Paul.
>>
>>
>>
>> My further personal responses below.
>>
>>
>>
>> Philip S. Corwin
>>
>> Policy Counsel
>>
>> VeriSign, Inc.
>>
>> 12061 Bluemont Way
>> Reston, VA 20190
>>
>> 703-948-4648/Direct
>>
>> 571-342-7489/Cell
>>
>>
>>
>> "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
>>
>>
>>
>> From: Paul Keating [mailto:Paul at law.es]
>> Sent: Monday, October 15, 2018 7:53 AM
>> To: Corwin, Philip <pcorwin at verisign.com>; Griffin at Winterfeldt.law;
>> rtushnet at law.harvard.edu; ghn at kilpatricktownsend.com;
>> SAustin at vlplawgroup.com; ncohen at telepathy.com; icann at leap.com
>> Cc: gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org; Zak Muscovitch <zak at muscovitch.com>; John
>> berryhill <john at johnberryhill.com>; Jason Schaeffer <jason at esqwire.com>; Nat
>> Cohen <ncohen at telepathy.com>; Ari Goldberg <ari at esqwire.com>; gmlevine
>> <gmlevine at researchtheworld.com>
>>
>>
>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of
>> action" followup (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Phil,
>>
>>
>>
>> My further comments are below for simplicity.  Further debate is more than
>> welcomed.
>>
>>
>>
>> PRK
>>
>>
>>
>> From: "Corwin, Philip" <pcorwin at verisign.com>
>> Date: Monday, October 15, 2018 at 2:25 AM
>> To: Paul Keating <Paul at law.es>, "Griffin at Winterfeldt.law"
>> <Griffin at Winterfeldt.law>, "rtushnet at law.harvard.edu"
>> <rtushnet at law.harvard.edu>, Georges Nahitchevansky
>> <ghn at kilpatricktownsend.com>, "SAustin at vlplawgroup.com"
>> <SAustin at vlplawgroup.com>, Nat Cohen <ncohen at telepathy.com>,
>> "icann at leap.com" <icann at leap.com>
>> Cc: "gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org" <gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org>
>> Subject: RE: [GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of action" followup
>> (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> Paul:
>>
>>
>>
>> Please see my personal comments and inquiries below. Any further response
>> would be welcome.
>>
>>
>>
>> Philip
>>
>>
>>
>> Philip S. Corwin
>>
>> Policy Counsel
>>
>> VeriSign, Inc.
>>
>> 12061 Bluemont Way
>> Reston, VA 20190
>>
>> 703-948-4648/Direct
>>
>> 571-342-7489/Cell
>>
>>
>>
>> "Luck is the residue of design" -- Branch Rickey
>>
>>
>>
>> From: GNSO-RPM-WG [mailto:gnso-rpm-wg-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Paul
>> Keating
>> Sent: Friday, October 12, 2018 4:34 PM
>> To: Griffin Barnett <Griffin at Winterfeldt.law>; Tushnet, Rebecca
>> <rtushnet at law.harvard.edu>; Nahitchevansky, Georges
>> <ghn at kilpatricktownsend.com>; Scott Austin <SAustin at vlplawgroup.com>; Nat
>> Cohen <ncohen at telepathy.com>; George Kirikos <icann at leap.com>
>> Cc: gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>> Subject: [EXTERNAL] Re: [GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of
>> action" followup (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> Griffin,
>>
>>
>>
>> While it is certainly true that the Mutual Jurisdiction is either (a) the
>> location of the registrar or (b) the location of the registrant, it is the
>> Complainant that gets to select which.  Most use the registrar (option (a)).
>> – Are you stating that the Complainant can control which national court the
>> Respondent can utilize to seek de novo review of the alleged infringement
>> that gave rise to a UDRP decision adverse to the Respondent?
>>
>>
>>
>> PRK:       Yes.  The rules state that the UDRP decision will be implemented
>> unless the Respondent files an action in the Mutual Jurisdiction selected by
>> the Complainant.  The actual text is:
>>
>>
>>
>> We will then implement the decision unless we have received from
>>
>> you during that ten (10) business day period official documentation (such as
>>
>> a copy of a complaint, file-stamped by the clerk of the court) that you have
>>
>> commenced a lawsuit against the complainant in a jurisdiction to which the
>>
>> complainant has submitted under Paragraph 3(b)(xiii) of the Rules of
>>
>> Procedure.
>>
>>
>>
>>                                 This is certainly something that can be
>> discussed in Phase 2 of our work when we turn to the UDRP.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Please understand that registrants do not select registrars based upon the
>> jurisdiction in which the registrar is located (although I advise using US
>> registrars for high value domains because it allows access to the ACPA).
>> The selection is often based upon pricing but also may not even be up to the
>> registrant to decide (e.g. domains acquired at auction or via escrow).  Many
>> registrars have a 60-90 day hold on transfers following any change to WHOIS
>> (e.g. a change of registrant after acquisition).  – But after the hold
>> period ends the registrant may transfer the domain(s) to any other
>> registrar.
>>
>>
>>
>> PRK:       yes this is correct.  However, most investors end up with domains
>> in multiple registers.  This is the result of a combination of factors
>> including time, difficulty in dealing with multiple renewal periods, etc.
>> During this time the registrant is subject to whatever rules may apply.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Further, some “registrars” are not really registrars but rather resellers
>> acting on behalf of registrars.  This is not always apparent to the
>> registrant AND it is not always clear who the actual registrar is until the
>> registration process is completed and the domain is already registered. –
>> This would seem to argue for greater education of registrants and
>> transparency in the registration process.
>>
>>
>>
>> PRK:       Agreed.  However, this does not justify continuing with a system
>> that in reality does not provide the remedy that formed the fundamental
>> basis for the UDRP/URS – judicial review.
>>
>>
>>
>> The UDRP system cannot provide judicial review, it can merely step back when
>> either party invokes relevant national law in which it has a right of
>> action, whether that occurs before, during, or after the UDRP – and it does
>> so. Providing access to relevant law in various jurisdictions in which a
>> domain registrant has a right of action is a task of industry trade and
>> cyber-rights groups.
>>
>>
>>
>> The above aside, however, the foundational underpinning of the UDRP (and the
>> URS) was that the decisions would remain subject to court action (either
>> during or following the UDRP).  Most if not all of the drafters of the UDRP
>> were US based (attorneys and non-attorneys) and in all honesty not much
>> thought was spent questioning if in fact causes of action existed to ensure
>> that the foundational underpinning was even possible. – Agreed. The UDRP was
>> adopted in 1999, when the public Internet and DNS was in its infancy,
>> Cyberlaw was in a primitive state, and the Internet was highly US-Centric.
>> It was also the year in which the ACPA was enacted, and that was likely a
>> prominent influence on UDRP drafters. But given that environment, the only
>> “grand bargain” that could have been intended was that the availability of
>> the UDRP would not block access to any other available legal proceeding –
>> and that bargain has been fully kept. There could have been no intention to
>> guarantee that such legal process would be available to all potential global
>> domain registrants, or that the UDRP would be available only against
>> registrants who had such judicial access.
>>
>>
>>
>> PRK:  I disagree.  Your position is akin to the old laws in the US which
>> guaranteed blacks the right to vote but in which those same people were
>> faced with huge and unfair hurdles to register to vote. This is highly
>> inappropriate and inflammatory reference – we are discussing trademark law,
>> not voting rights in the “Jim Crow” era.
>>
>>
>>
>> The bargain has not been fully kept as evidenced by the lack of the
>> available remedy.  The fact that “domain law” was in its infancy or that the
>> authors of the UDRP were US Centric is no excuse.  The fundamental bargain
>> was that the parties would have access to judicial review.  While I agree
>> that the UDRP/URS as contractual provisions cannot obligate a court to
>> accept jurisdiction, there remain many options to more appropriately ensure
>> that the respondent benefits from having access to the judicial process
>> without having to risk loss of the domain.  For example, a US complainant
>> bringing a UDRP against an English registrant with registration at
>> Fabulous.com would face the barrier.    Regardless of the MJ selected by the
>> Complainant the respondent has no recourse under Rule 4(k) because neither
>> the UK nor Australia recognize a post-UDRP claim as a result of the lack of
>> subject matter jurisdiction.    The respondent could file in the US but
>> would not benefit form the 10 day rule.  By the time the respondent obtained
>> an injunction – even via TRO – the domain would be gone.   At least my minor
>> suggestion of changing the language to permit filing in any court of
>> competent jurisdiction would provide relief.  There would be no real
>> detriment to the complainant as the domain would remain locked pending a
>> determination as to either jurisdiction or the merits.  The domain would,
>> however, remain registered in the name of the respondent during that time.
>>
>>
>>
>> We simply disagree on what the “bargain” was when the UDRP was established.
>> It was a guarantee that available legal rights would be respected and be
>> superior to the UDRP, not a guarantee that they would be available – and
>> certainly there was no understanding that a domain registrant would be
>> immune from a UDRP if the relevant mutual jurisdictions failed to provide
>> adequate legal rights or associated cause of action. The cure for this
>> situation is an expansion of domain registrant rights or  causes of actions
>> in jurisdictions where they are now lacking – or, in the alternative,
>> discussion of an internal appeals process when such rights are unavailable.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> The problem most often arises in the post-UDRP environment in which the
>> losing respondent has only 10 days to file an action. The rules require that
>> the action be filed in a court in the Mutual Jurisdiction (selected by the
>> complainant).  More often than not the courts in the MJ do not recognize the
>> possibility of the claim.  There is no time for the respondent to file for
>> an injunction in any other court and thus the UDRP decision is acted upon
>> and the domain transferred.  The respondent is thus denied this basic right.
>> This can be corrected.
>>
>>
>>
>> For example, we could allow the respondent to file in any court and placing
>> the burden upon the complainant (defendant) to challenge jurisdiction.  This
>> requires only a minor change of language changing the reference from a court
>> in the “Mutual Jurisdiction” to a court of “competent jurisdiction”. – It is
>> unclear to me how ICANN could confer jurisdiction where insufficient ties
>> were found by the court itself. For example, even if ICANN adopted the
>> “competent jurisdiction” standard you propose, why would a US Court ever
>> hear an ACPA challenge brought, e.g., by a Swiss national who had used a
>> French registrar?
>>
>>
>>
>> PRK:  I am not attempting to force courts to accept a jurisdictional
>> selection clause included in a Contract.  That remains up to the court.
>> Again, I am merely expanding the potential jurisdictions where a respondent
>> may go to seek relief while the domain remains locked and under registration
>> in the name of the respondent.
>>
>>
>>
>> Now that we are considering the issues, it is important that this
>> foundational assumption be corrected so that it actually does what everyone
>> thought and desired that it do. – The proposed “correction” might lay the
>> groundwork for new problems. If ICANN were to adopt a policy that a URS (or
>> UDRP) could only be brought against a registrant who had effective access to
>> judicial appeal, wouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that some
>> individuals/organizations seeking to profit from large-scale cybersquatting
>> would establish a domain-acquiring entity, and utilize a registrar located
>> within, a nation which provided no adequate law or right of action for
>> redress of domain registrants; and that also had an inefficient and corrupt
>> judicial system? Such a bad actor could thereby make itself immune from the
>> available ICANN DRPs and also know that a trademark owner would face
>> significant obstacles to judicial redress.
>>
>>
>>
>> PRK:       I think you are creating a strawman.  If you really examine what
>> you stated and check back in history you will find that that exact attempt
>> was made with respect to India and a certain Indian registrar.  At least as
>> to non .IN domains that effort collapsed after the complainants sought
>> redress in courts willing to act in a proper and legitimate manner.
>> Further, if a complainant were concerned with such activity they could bring
>> their own legal claim and not rely upon the UDRP/URS.
>>
>>
>>
>> And of course, it is entirely improper IMHO to use such a fear mongering set
>> of facts to deprive the many other legitimate registrants of their rights.
>>
>>
>>
>> In a world where criminal organizations thrive on IP infringement, and shady
>> governments share in the gains, raising this concern cannot fairly be
>> characterized as fear mongering. And the Indian example you cite is not on
>> point because we are now discussing a hypothetical where UDRP policy would
>> be altered to explicitly provide immunity from that DRP for a domain
>> registrant who structured his business to take advantage of that new
>> loophole.
>>
>>
>>
>> Summing up, I have no personal objection to efforts to assure that domain
>> registrants have appropriate legal rights and causes of action. But the
>> proposal at issue does nothing to advance that cause, and is designed to
>> lessen the ability of rights holders to utilize an effective and expeditious
>> means of addressing clear-cut cybersquatting, based upon a  mythical
>> “bargain” that I do not believe ever existed or was intended.
>>
>>
>>
>> I see no logical reason behind the movement to make this correction.
>>
>>
>>
>> Hope this helps.
>>
>>
>>
>> Paul Keating
>>
>>
>>
>> From: GNSO-RPM-WG <gnso-rpm-wg-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of Griffin
>> Barnett <Griffin at Winterfeldt.law>
>> Date: Friday, October 12, 2018 at 8:00 PM
>> To: "Tushnet, Rebecca" <rtushnet at law.harvard.edu>, Georges Nahitchevansky
>> <ghn at kilpatricktownsend.com>, Scott Austin <SAustin at vlplawgroup.com>, Nat
>> Cohen <ncohen at telepathy.com>, George Kirikos <icann at leap.com>
>> Cc: "gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org" <gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org>
>> Subject: Re: [GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of action" followup
>> (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi all,
>>
>>
>>
>> Just a quick point regarding the proposals aimed at addressing a purported
>> lack of recourse through judicial review of URS cases: let’s not forget that
>> jurisdiction (and whether there will ultimately be recourse through a
>> particular court) is often dictated by the registrant itself in its choice
>> of registrar or other ISP.
>>
>>
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Griffin
>>
>>
>>
>> From: GNSO-RPM-WG [mailto:gnso-rpm-wg-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of
>> Tushnet, Rebecca
>> Sent: Friday, October 12, 2018 1:53 PM
>> To: Nahitchevansky, Georges <ghn at kilpatricktownsend.com>; Scott Austin
>> <SAustin at vlplawgroup.com>; Nat Cohen <ncohen at telepathy.com>; George Kirikos
>> <icann at leap.com>
>> Cc: gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>> Subject: Re: [GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of action" followup
>> (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> My expectations about reactions to receipt of a notice are based on my
>> experience with many small content creators over the years, not being a
>> professor; more to the point, the proposal to reaffirm the ability to get
>> judicial review is one based on the goals of (1) adhering to what ICANN
>> intended for the URS and (2) avoiding arbitrary distinctions between
>> registrants. You appear to agree that (2) doesn't need changing, unless
>> you're proposing removing judicial review entirely.  I disagree.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Rebecca Tushnet
>>
>> Frank Stanton Professor of First Amendment Law, Harvard Law School
>> 703 593 6759
>>
>> ________________________________
>>
>> From: Nahitchevansky, Georges <ghn at kilpatricktownsend.com>
>> Sent: Friday, October 12, 2018 1:45:40 PM
>> To: Tushnet, Rebecca; Scott Austin; Nat Cohen; George Kirikos
>> Cc: gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>> Subject: RE: [GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of action" followup
>> (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> Rebecca;
>>
>>
>>
>> Your extensive spreadsheet had issues as I noted based on some of the coding
>> done by your student research assistants.  But putting that aside, you have
>> two sets of standards:  you want surveys done to prove that bogus suits are
>> filed but want us to accept that people default because complaints are scary
>> or they caught in spam filters based on you saying so as a professor.
>> Simply put, where is your survey?  My point is that what you are proposing
>> is not a balanced system, so if you want to push that agenda then there is
>> need to amend the URS per the proposals I suggested in prior emails to
>> create a balance for parties who are the subject of appeals
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From: Tushnet, Rebecca <rtushnet at law.harvard.edu>
>> Sent: Friday, October 12, 2018 1:37 PM
>> To: Scott Austin <SAustin at vlplawgroup.com>; Nahitchevansky, Georges
>> <ghn at kilpatricktownsend.com>; Nat Cohen <ncohen at telepathy.com>; George
>> Kirikos <icann at leap.com>
>> Cc: gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>> Subject: Re: [GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of action" followup
>> (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> You're welcome to consult the extensively coded spreadsheet we produced; of
>> the things you mentioned, phishing is mentioned in a small subset of cases
>> but I refer you to that spreadsheet.  The justification for the proposed
>> clarification is one founded in procedural justice and original intent: the
>> intent was not to make the URS the last resort if someone wanted a judicial
>> determination; the procedural justice aspect is that it is wrong that one's
>> access to courts varies depending on which court system one has access to.
>> The evidence for those two things has been provided by George K. and I found
>> both parts persuasive.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Rebecca Tushnet
>>
>> Frank Stanton Professor of First Amendment Law, Harvard Law School
>> 703 593 6759
>>
>> ________________________________
>>
>> From: Scott Austin <SAustin at vlplawgroup.com>
>> Sent: Friday, October 12, 2018 1:31:04 PM
>> To: Tushnet, Rebecca; Nahitchevansky, Georges; Nat Cohen; George Kirikos
>> Cc: gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>> Subject: Re: [GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of action" followup
>> (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> Rebecca:
>>
>> Surely you're not inferring that only Georges and rightsholders need to
>> provide evidence. Where is the evidence of cases supporting your suggestion
>> of respondent defaults because the URS is scary or a URS notice was screened
>> out as spam. More importantly, beyond gaming, has your research uncovered
>> any domains suspended under URS that were owned by serial cybersquatters,
>> criminals or intended to support sites for more malicious abuses such as
>> human trafficking, spear phishing, identity theft schemes, etc.
>>
>> And where is the cost-benefit analysis to show that the errors in URS
>> decisions to date have been so great to warrant nullifying the
>> extraterritorial benefits of the URS and force small businesses to litigate
>> all over the world.
>>
>>
>>
>> Scott
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Sent from my T-Mobile 4G LTE Device
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -------- Original message --------
>>
>> From: "Tushnet, Rebecca" <rtushnet at law.harvard.edu>
>>
>> Date: 10/12/18 12:06 PM (GMT-05:00)
>>
>> To: "Nahitchevansky, Georges" <ghn at kilpatricktownsend.com>, Nat Cohen
>> <ncohen at telepathy.com>, George Kirikos <icann at leap.com>
>>
>> Cc: gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>>
>> Subject: Re: [GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of action" followup
>> (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> The fact that the URS is streamlined is precisely why there needs to be a
>> robust review mechanism for errors (or even legitimate misunderstandings
>> because of the extremely limited record).  We all have our priors about what
>> makes default likely (I believe that often it's because the URS claim is
>> legitimate, but sometimes it's because the URS claim is scary or even just
>> screened out as spam/some other incomprehensible message).
>>
>>
>>
>> What needs evidence, however, is a claim that many defaulters would take
>> steps to initiate court proceedings if there were a provision making
>> clear--as ICANN intended--that court proceedings are a backstop to the URS.
>> I haven't seen that evidence, even though there are countries that do allow
>> URS (and UDRP) losers to go to court. And I don't see any connection between
>> cutting off URS review and allowing a court challenge; again, many countries
>> do allow this and I've seen no evidence that there is gaming behavior in
>> those countries, though perhaps Georges can provide some.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Rebecca Tushnet
>>
>> Frank Stanton Professor of First Amendment Law, Harvard Law School
>> 703 593 6759
>>
>> ________________________________
>>
>> From: GNSO-RPM-WG <gnso-rpm-wg-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of
>> Nahitchevansky, Georges <ghn at kilpatricktownsend.com>
>> Sent: Friday, October 12, 2018 11:22:49 AM
>> To: Nat Cohen; George Kirikos
>> Cc: gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>> Subject: Re: [GNSO-RPM-WG] [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of action" followup
>> (URS proposals #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> Nat:
>>
>>
>>
>> Just a few comments.  The case you refer to was not a fully litigated case,
>> but was a settlement.  As you likely know, people and companies often settle
>> because they do not want the extensive cost of a US litigation , which can
>> be in the hundreds of thousands of dollars (and even in the millions
>> depending on the matter).  So absent a litigated court decision, what you
>> have are parties transacting a resolution – albeit in this case apparently
>> favorable to the Respondent.  It is not a decided case and has no
>> precedential value.
>>
>>
>>
>> The court review proposal for the URS is actually something that is frought
>> with issues.  You have to begin that the URS is a streamlined/expedited
>> procedure that is meant to address a very specific group of domain names
>> being abused.  The URS has a higher burden proof than the UDRP (clear and
>> convincing versus preponderance of the evidence standard) and only results
>> in suspension of the domain name for a short period as opposed to a full
>> transfer of the domain name to the complainant, as is the case in the UDRP.
>> That means there needs to be fairly compelling proof of abuse just to get a
>> temporary suspension.  Second the URS has already built in procedural
>> measures that allow a Respondent to challenge a decision – namely, a
>> defaulting Respondent has a time period after a decision is rendered to
>> challenge the decision and there is an appeal mechanism in place.  Third,
>> the statistics prove that very few Respondents actually challenge the
>> decisions rendered through the existing mechanisms.  Now some argue with no
>> evidence that the default rate is somehow based on a lack of notice, but
>> quite frankly that is absurd.  Domain name registrants at the very least
>> have a provided a valid address to the registrars for their domain names
>> (they have an obligation to do so).  So they get an email that there is an
>> action involving their domain name.  There is no evidence that respondents
>> are not receiving emails from providers.  Moreover, perhaps the reason
>> Respondents default in so many instances is the fact that their cases are
>> indefensible and they know it.  I would venture that a number of Respondents
>> simply do not bother defending cases that they are likely going to lose.
>> Simply look at the list of domains subject of the URS and it is fairly clear
>> that the vast majority involve known brands either alone or with terms that
>> relate to the businesses under the marks.  Lastly, adding on a court review
>> over a short term suspension (the relief currently in place) is likely to
>> create a windfall to Respondents that will allow bad actors to easily defeat
>> the entire URS process.  I am not sure if you have ever litigated cases in
>> countries around the world, but in some countries court proceedings can last
>> for years (up to ten years in some instances).  If a court proceeding can
>> simply prevent the suspension, then I can see a situation where a Respondent
>> falsely uses an address in a country where proceedings take forever and
>> where they can be filed cheaply and essentially defeat the entire suspension
>> period.
>>
>>
>>
>> So in all, if you want to pursue court proceedings post URS, then I think
>> there needs to be procedural safeguards put in place for Complainants, such
>> as (1) a shorter time frame for a Respondent to challenge a decision on a
>> default, or the removal of such a procedure, (2) a shortened appeal period
>> (20 to 30 days), (3) a transfer of the domain name post URS as opposed to a
>> suspension and/or a lock preventing use of the domain name during
>> proceedings, and (4) some form of bond being posted by a challenging
>> respondent or complainant that wants to ultimately proceed in court.  On the
>> last point, the challenging party would need to file the appeal first and if
>> the party lost the appeal it could then proceed to court, but would have to
>> post a bond with the provider to cover costs if the appeal is deemed
>> frivolous by a court.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From: gnso-rpm-wg <gnso-rpm-wg-bounces at icann.org> On Behalf Of Nat Cohen
>> Sent: Thursday, October 11, 2018 10:28 AM
>> To: George Kirikos <icann at leap.com>
>> Cc: gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>> Subject: Re: [gnso-rpm-wg] "Lack of cause of action" followup (URS proposals
>> #18, #19, #20)
>>
>>
>>
>> George,
>>
>>
>>
>> Thanks for providing this background.
>>
>>
>>
>> Speaking for myself, and I believe many other domain registrants, the
>> ability to have judicial review of any URS/UDRP decision is an important
>> safeguard.  Even unanimous 3-member panel UDRP transfer orders have been
>> overturned in court, as with the austinpain.com dispute
>> (http://kellywarnerlaw.com/udrp-law-ruling-overturned/).
>>
>>
>>
>> The IGO/INGO WG just spent years wrestling with the issue of whether a
>> variant of the UDRP could be devised specifically for IGOs that would indeed
>> be the "final word".  The strongly held view of many participants in that WG
>> was that access to the courts for a final determination of any issues in
>> dispute was a fundamental right, and could not be conceded.
>>
>>
>>
>> I support the effort to ensure that a respondent, wherever they may be in
>> the world, has access to judicial review of a URS decision.
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>>
>>
>> Nat Cohen
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 12:02 AM George Kirikos <icann at leap.com> wrote:
>>
>> Hi Claudio,
>>
>> David Maher gave a history in the context of the UDRP, when discussing
>> this various issue of access to the courts, see:
>>
>> http://www.circleid.com/posts/20180103_the_udrp_and_judicial_review/
>>
>> which goes back to the very early WIPO Recommendations:
>>
>> ""140. It is recommended that any dispute-resolution system, which is
>> alternative to litigation and to which domain name applicants are
>> required to submit, should not deny the parties to the dispute access
>> to court litigation."
>>
>> One can also look to section 4(k) of the UDRP policy, and sections
>> 3(b)(xii) and 18 of the UDRP Rules to see that UDRP was never intended
>> to be the final word.
>>
>> https://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/policy
>> https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/udrp-rules-2015-03-11-en
>>
>> For the history of the URS, you can go back to the reports that
>> preceded its adoption, such as the STI:
>>
>> https://gnso.icann.org/sites/default/files/filefield_8000/sti-wt-recommendations-11dec09-en.pdf
>>
>> Section 8.3 at the bottom of page 21 (and continuing to page 22),
>> unanimous consensus, stated:
>>
>> "A URS decision should not preclude any other remedies available to
>> the appellant, such as UDRP (if appellant is the complainant), or
>> other remedies as may be available in a court of competent
>> jurisdiction. A finding in URS for or against a party should not
>> prejudice the party in UDRP."
>>
>> or look to the text of the URS Policy (e.g. section 13) and section
>> 3(b)(ix) of the URS Rules to see that the URS was never intended to be
>> the final word.
>>
>> http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/urs/procedure-01mar13-en.pdf
>> http://newgtlds.icann.org/en/applicants/urs/rules-28jun13-en.pdf
>>
>> I hope that answers your question sufficiently. Some of the people who
>> were on the teams that developed the UDRP and URS are members of this
>> PDP, so you can simply ask them (or consult the archived documents on
>> ICANN's website that led to the policies).
>>
>> If you're asserting that the UDRP/URS *were* intended to be the "final
>> word", that's a very bold claim to make (unlike mine, which was
>> non-controversial), and I think the onus is on you to back that claim.
>> And, even if that claim could be backed (which I doubt), I think that
>> would be a scary thought, and reinforce the need to properly review
>> the policies to eliminate such errors in policymaking.
>>
>> In other words, I've been trying to correct what I (and many others)
>> feel are *unintended consequences* of poor drafting of the UDRP/URS.
>> If you're asserting that those are the *intended outcomes* (i.e.
>> inability to have one's day in court, to challenge the outcome of a
>> UDRP/URS), that's a bold claim.
>>
>> Sincerely,
>>
>> George Kirikos
>> 416-588-0269
>> http://www.leap.com/
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Oct 10, 2018 at 9:47 PM, claudio di gangi <ipcdigangi at gmail.com>
>> wrote:
>>> George,
>>>
>>> I’m getting the sense that we are going to start talking past each other
>>> soon, if not already.
>>>
>>> Since this concerns your proposal, my recommendation is that you supply
>>> reference materials, e.g. a link, a citation, quoted language, etc. to the
>>> following clause:
>>>
>>> “That means the URS violating the principles upon which these policies
>>> were
>>> adopted, namely that they *wouldn't* be the final word, that both side
>>> would
>>> have recourse to the courts to challenge the outcome, if they disagreed
>>> with
>>> it.”
>>>
>>> This language does not appear in the UDRP or URS policy, rules and/or
>>> implementation documents.
>>>
>>> Once we have this language to review, we can examine and analyze the
>>> material to see if we can obtain a shared understanding of the relevant
>>> issues and facts to help steer the discussion in a positive manner.
>>>
>>> Thank you.
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>> Claudio
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wednesday, October 10, 2018, George Kirikos <icann at leap.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi Kristine,
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Oct 10, 2018 at 7:11 PM, Dorrain, Kristine <dorraink at amazon.com>
>>>> wrote:
>>>> > I am still trying to understand what specific language you could insert
>>>> > into the URS (or UDRP) that would obligate a UK national court to
>>>> > decide to
>>>> > take jurisdiction or accept a cause of action.  Those are issues of
>>>> > sovereignty for individual countries.  The URS has no authority over
>>>> > national courts.  They alone decide what they will and won't hear.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks for your post. In reviewing the call again this evening, the
>>>> proposals seem to be misunderstood, I'm hopeful I can provider greater
>>>> clarity in this email.
>>>>
>>>> When you said " The URS has no authority over national courts.  They
>>>> alone decide what they will and won't hear." I agree! that's the
>>>> proper identification of the underlying *problem*. i.e. in some
>>>> jurisdictions, they won't permit a registrant (who loses a URS/UDRP
>>>> and wants to challenge the outcome in court) to bring a case in the
>>>> court. That means the URS outcome would be the "final word", violating
>>>> the principles upon which these policies were adopted, namely that
>>>> they *wouldn't* be the final word, that both side would have recourse
>>>> to the courts to challenge the outcome, if they disagreed with it.
>>>>
>>>> So, I agree with you 100%, we *cannot* tell the courts what to do. We
>>>> cannot force them to permit a registrant to have a cause of action.
>>>> But, what we can do is make the URS (and UDRP later) policy not get
>>>> into that situation in the first place. We know the underlying problem
>>>> is caused by the role reversal (i.e. the registrant, as things stands
>>>> now, would be forced to become the complainant in court, if they want
>>>> to challenge an adverse URS/UDRP; but the natural role of the
>>>> registrant, had these procedures never existed, is to be the
>>>> *defendant*, and have the TM holder be the plaintiff in court.
>>>>
>>>> How do we accomplish this? Proposal #18 does this by allowing the
>>>> losing registrant to simply file a "Notice of Objection" after losing
>>>> and paying the fee (and accepting that if a court action happens and
>>>> they don't do any better, they'll be on the hook for additional legal
>>>> costs at the discretion of the courts) -- just like in that British
>>>> Columbia Civil Resolution Tribunal system. So, under Proposal #18, the
>>>> registrant is *not* the complainant in court anymore. It's the TM
>>>> holder who would file a TM infringement case/cybersquatting claim in
>>>> court. The registrant makes a defense to that cybersquatting claim,
>>>> and the case proceeds in court de novo without the interference of the
>>>> prior URS/UDRP outcome. This is what we **wanted** all along, the
>>>> underlying dispute in the courts, with a fresh slate, and both sides
>>>> in their "natural" roles (TM holder as complainant, registrant as
>>>> defendant).
>>>>
>>>> Proposal #19 also fixes the role reversal problem, albeit in a more
>>>> circuitous and inelegant manner. In proposal #19, the losing
>>>> registrant who wants to challenge the outcome of the URS/UDRP
>>>> initially files a court case, like today. If there's a cause of
>>>> action, it proceeds as normal, just like today. But, if this "lack of
>>>> cause of action" issue is encountered (e.g in the UK), denying the
>>>> registrant a de novo hearing of the dispute on the merits but instead
>>>> dismissing the action on a "technicality", then that would trigger
>>>> something "new", namely that the URS/UDRP outcome would be completely
>>>> set aside (vitiated). i.e. it's saying that the right to access the
>>>> courts is so important that we're going to fix the problem (lack of
>>>> court access in this scenario) by undoing the URS/UDRP, and letting
>>>> the parties go back to court with the TM holder as the plaintiff in
>>>> court (assuming they still want to pursue the matter), and with the
>>>> domain registrant as the defendant.
>>>>
>>>> Proposal #20 doesn't address the problem in the same manner, but
>>>> instead says "Registrant can file a court case in the USA, where we
>>>> know a cause of action exists.
>>>>
>>>> So, let me make it clear, since the proposals seem to be misunderstood
>>>> --- I am not proposing any language at all to obligate any courts to
>>>> decide to take jurisdiction of a case, or accept a cause of action.
>>>> That's entirely up to them.
>>>>
>>>> But, we do know that trademark holders will have a cause of action as
>>>> plaintiff in the courts (for cybersquatting, TM infringement, etc.),
>>>> and courts will always allow registrants to put up a defense!
>>>>
>>>> Now, if someone wants to raise the issue of "Well, what if courts
>>>> don't allow a Trademark holder to bring an action as plaintiff?" My
>>>> response would be "Too bad for you!" The URS/UDRP wasn't designed to
>>>> give TM holders *greater* rights or superior outcomes than those that
>>>> exist in the courts. If it turns out that TM holders don't have a
>>>> cause of action in a court for their dispute, then that's the PROPER
>>>> OUTCOME.
>>>>
>>>> If it turns out that registrants don't have a cause of action, because
>>>> of this role reversal created by the URS/UDRP, then the solution is to
>>>> eliminate that role reversal in the current policies themselves (which
>>>> proposals #18 and #19 accomplish, albeit in different manners; #18 is
>>>> more elegant, and matches how it's actually done by an existing
>>>> tribunal in BC).
>>>>
>>>> > If you allow a losing respondent (who has lost a case because the use
>>>> > of
>>>> > the domain name was so transparently infringing to a jurist that they
>>>> > found
>>>> > against the respondent in their absence or despite their participation)
>>>> > to
>>>> > strip a complainant of their URS win in order to force them to court,
>>>> > it has
>>>> > the effect of nullifying the URS...why bother?  I realize that you have
>>>> > a
>>>> > proposal in to remove the URS entirely, so perhaps this is just another
>>>> > way
>>>> > to achieve the same goal, but I'm merely trying to address practicality
>>>> > here.
>>>>
>>>> Frankly, I'm shocked by the above statement. This is suggesting that
>>>> the URS/UDRP outcome is always correct, and should never be appealed.
>>>> But, we know that's not the case. We've seen reversals in the courts,
>>>> the various cases brought up on this mailing list repeatedly (the ones
>>>> that WIPO won't post to their website, for example!). Why bother to
>>>> have courts of appeal? Why bother to have a Supreme Court? It's
>>>> because lower courts can get it wrong! In the URS/UDRP especially,
>>>> there's no cross examination, no discovery, nor all the other due
>>>> process protections of a court. The URS/UDRP can and do get it wrong
>>>> from time to time. Even judges make mistakes.
>>>>
>>>> This isn't attempting to deprive the TM holder of anything. The
>>>> expectation of all sides has been that the matter can go to the
>>>> courts. If it requires, procedurally, that the only way to get to that
>>>> proper state is to undo the URS/UDRP outcome, then that's how it has
>>>> to be done. The domain name registrant wants the matter decided by a
>>>> court. They have that right (unless the TM side wants to eliminate
>>>> that right --- be transparent about that if that's the case; i.e. not
>>>> fixing the problem achieves that outcome). If the domain name
>>>> registrant can't have their day in court as plaintiff, then make them
>>>> be the defendant instead, and force the TM holder to return to their
>>>> natural role as Plaintiff. The domain name owner isn't trying to "pull
>>>> a fast one" --- under Proposal #18, the domain name registrant would
>>>> make a good faith payment to file that Notice of Objection, and also
>>>> suffer cost consequences if they do no better in the courts. Under
>>>> proposal #19, the domain name registrant *already* went to court, but
>>>> the case got tossed on a technicality, and wasn't able to be heard on
>>>> the merits.
>>>>
>>>> So, I'm not trying to "remove the URS" via these two proposals (#18
>>>> and #19). I'm instead trying to ensure that the URS/UDRP are not the
>>>> final word, and that there's real recourse (on the merits, de novo) to
>>>> the courts. If either side *insists* that the courts be the final
>>>> arbiter, then that is a *right*. They shouldn't lose that right to
>>>> have the court be the final arbiter, just because the URS/UDRP weren't
>>>> drafted properly, or made assumptions that are incorrect. Losing that
>>>> right to court access means that ICANN has implicitly created NEW LAW,
>>>> eliminating rights for registrants that they had prior to the adoption
>>>> of the policies, namely the right to have their disputes decided in
>>>> court.
>>>>
>>>> Sincerely,
>>>>
>>>> George Kirikos
>>>> 416-588-0269
>>>> http://www.leap.com/
>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>> gnso-rpm-wg mailing list
>>>> gnso-rpm-wg at icann.org
>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rpm-wg
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