<div dir="ltr">Hi,<br><br>I think that Michael Graham brings up a salient point in terms of falling too far down the rabbit hole on background matters, but I should address a few issues in response to questions that were directly asked of me. <br><br>First off, while Greg is correct to point out that the UDHR is not formally legally binding as a UNGA resolution, it is (quite literally) the textbook example of customary international law. I realize that can be a fuzzy concept to rely on, but luckily I don't have to rely on it because the freedom of expression protections in the UDHR are substantially identical to those found in the ICCPR, which IS a formally binding treaty.<br><br>Also, while I appreciate Greg's caution against "cherrypicking" by viewing Article 19 in isolation, in this context that argument is just a smokescreen. Of course the UDHR and ICCPR need to be viewed holistically - that understanding in no way supports an argument that domains are not speech. There's no conflict between believing in personal privacy as protected by the ICCPR (as I do), and believing in the need to combat hate speech as spelled out in the ICCPR (as I do), and believing in freedom of expression. Human rights are fundamentally about balance (more on that in a second).<br><br>With regard to Ballantyne, Davidson & McIntyre, I probably should have been more specific in my original post. Of course, as Greg notes, the case is not specifically about domain names - which would be a pretty niche area for the Human Rights Committee to dig into. But the decision contains the clearest statement of the extent of what constitutes "speech" under the ICCPR, namely that Article 19: "must be interpreted as encompassing every form of subjective ideas and opinions capable of transmission to others". It's an incredibly broad formulation - to cover virtually anything that conveys meaning. I, personally, can't see an interpretation of that that doesn't include domain names.<br><br>With regard to Gibson v. Texas - I don't want to dig too deeply into this because, honestly, US law is not my specialisation. But I think that part of the disconnect between our positions is due to a particular aspect of the American understanding of free speech, that's sort of different to how it's understood virtually everywhere else. Under most systems, including the international example I just cited, virtually everything is classed as "speech", and then there's a balancing as to whether particular restrictions are justified. But because of the absolutist way the US Constitution is phrased ("Congress shall make <b><u>no law</u></b>"), the Courts have had to go through some unusual legal gymnastics to find that speech that they feel justified restricting isn't actually speech. <br><br>So, without trying to belabour these issues, my point in the above is not to try and invalidate the trademark protection system - indeed, Greg's quite right to point out that trademarks are also speech. My point here is simply to try and demonstrate that <u>there are free speech issues at play</u>. To me, that's not a controversial point - and if we can agree on that, then that is relevant to the transparency question, since in my mind it bolsters arguments for why openness in the system is important.<div><br></div><div>Best,</div><div><br></div><div>Michael</div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 2:19 AM, Greg Shatan <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com" target="_blank">gregshatanipc@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex"><div dir="ltr"><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif">It's important to keep in mind that the rights set forth in the UDHR are interrelated and interdependent, so understanding the applicability of any one Article also requires understanding the applicability of the other rights in the UDHR, including some which may be countervailing to others. Looking at Article 19 in isolation is "cherrypicking." A recent CircleID article by John Levine is quite enlightening on this very point: </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><a href="http://www.circleid.com/posts/20170401_human_rights_and_regular_internet_users/" target="_blank">http://www.circleid.com/posts/<wbr>20170401_human_rights_and_<wbr>regular_internet_users/</a> </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif">The article is short, but for those who don't get there, this quote goes to the heart of the matter: "<span style="color:rgb(0,0,0);font-family:helvetica,arial,sans-serif;font-size:15.002px">it devalues the whole topic of human rights to pay attention only to a few fashionable rights, while ignoring ones that are at least as important in people's daily lives."</span></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif">(It should also be noted that the UDHR, while adopted by the United Nations and widely used, does not constitute some form of "universal law" nor is it universally accepted.)</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif">The case mentioned, <u>Gibson v. Texas</u>, has portions that are directly applicable to the discussion at hand. However, the Gibson decision actually distinguishes cases involving trademarks from the situation in that case. As a matter of fact, the Gibson case tells us that <b>there are at least two types of domain names that do not constitute speech protected by the First Amendment: domain names that infringe trademarks, and domain names that do not constitute "expressive speech."</b> </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif">(In other words, there can be no "freedom of expression" issue when the speech is not expressive.)</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif">Before getting to an excerpt from the case, it's important to note that the court did not find that domain names are speech, much less find that domain names are speech protected by the First Amendment. The court made no findings about all domain names. Rather, the court assumed, for the purpose of considering a motion to dismiss, that the domain name in question (<a href="http://texasworkerscomplaw.com" target="_blank">texasworkerscomplaw.com</a>) constituted commercial speech. It's also important to note that the case involved the Constitutionality of a law that broadly prohibited the use of the terms "Texas" and "workers comp," and not a trademark infringement matter. </div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><br></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif">The excerpt is quite instructive:</div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif"><br></span></div><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif"><span style="font-family:arial,sans-serif"><br></span></div><div class="gmail_default"><font face="times new roman, serif">In order for speech to fall outside of the First Amendment’s
protection, the speech must either be “inherently likely to deceive,” or “the
record [must] indicate[] that a particular form or method of advertising has in
fact been deceptive.” <i>R.M.J.</i>, 455 U.S. at 202.</font></div><p class="MsoNormal"><font face="times new roman, serif"><span></span></font></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><font face="times new roman, serif"><br></font></p><p class="MsoNormal"><font face="times new roman, serif">Appellees primarily argue that the Texas statute is
constitutional because Gibson’s domain name amounts to inherently misleading
speech. In support of this proposition, they cite to a series of cases in which
<b>courts have held that domain names that use trademarks to misidentify the
source of a product are outside the reach of the First Amendment.</b> The case law
cited by Appellees, however, is unique to the field of trademark infringement,
see, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Purdy, 382 F.3d 774 (8th Cir. 2004), and does not
necessarily extend to a case such as this one, where Texas is prohibiting
Gibson from using words that are otherwise in the public domain.<a href="#m_3120687686914692157__ftn1" name="m_3120687686914692157__ftnref1" title=""><span class="m_3120687686914692157gmail-MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="m_3120687686914692157gmail-MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size:11pt;line-height:115%">[1]</span></span></span></a><b>
Cases involving trademark infringement involve inherently deceptive speech
because they contain a significant risk that an infringing party will freeload
on the goodwill that has been created by the original trademark.</b> See Friedman,
440 U.S. at 11-16. No such risk is present here. Texas has made no showing that
its own talents and energy contributed to the creation of any goodwill in the
name “texasworkerscomplaw.com.” See San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 533-34 (1987). Instead the regulation at
issue is forward-thinking; intended to prohibit confusion for individuals
seeking information from the government agency. It is not retrospective in the
same way as most trademark litigation, which is generally intended to preserve
the reputation that has been built upon a trade name. See Friedman, 440 U.S. at
11-16. Accordingly, the case law cited by Appellees is inapposite. <span></span></font></p>
<div><font face="times new roman, serif"><br clear="all">
</font><hr align="left" size="1" width="33%">
<div id="m_3120687686914692157gmail-ftn1">
<p class="m_3120687686914692157gmail-MsoFootnoteText"><font face="times new roman, serif"><a href="#m_3120687686914692157__ftnref1" name="m_3120687686914692157__ftn1" title=""><span class="m_3120687686914692157gmail-MsoFootnoteReference"><span class="m_3120687686914692157gmail-MsoFootnoteReference"><span style="font-size:10pt;line-height:115%">[1]</span></span></span></a> <b>In
most of the cases cited by Appellees the domain name was actually held not to
be protected speech because it was not expressive, not because it was
misleading. </b>See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Bucci, No.
97-cv-0629, 1997 WL 133313, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997); Morrison &
Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F.Supp. 2d 1125, 1135 (D. Colo. 2000); Jews for Jesus
v. Brodsky, 993 F.Supp. 282, 286 n.1 (D.N.J. 1998). Here, in contrast, Gibson’s
domain name is expressive because it does more than simply mimic the state
agency’s website or identify a source of Texas Workers’ Compensation Law. See
Planned Parenthood, 1997 WL 133313, at *11. The domain name is intended to
direct visitors to a forum for discussing workers’ compensation laws and their
potential reform, as well as to convey to visitors the message of Gibson’s
website as a whole. Accordingly, in the context of this case, the domain name
is “‘sufficiently imbued with the elements of communication’” to place it in
the realm of expressive speech. Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc.,
202 F.3d 573, 585 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
409-10 (1974)). </font><span></span></p><p class="m_3120687686914692157gmail-MsoFootnoteText"></p><div class="gmail_default" style="font-family:verdana,sans-serif;display:inline">Greg Shatan </div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br><p></p>
</font></span></div><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888">
</font></span></div></div><div class="gmail_extra"><span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br clear="all"><div><div class="m_3120687686914692157gmail_signature" data-smartmail="gmail_signature"><div dir="ltr"><div><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><div dir="ltr"><p style="margin:0in 0in 0.0001pt;font-size:11pt;font-family:Calibri,sans-serif"></p><div><p style="text-indent:0in"><span style="font-size:12.8px"><a name="m_3120687686914692157_UNIQUE_ID_SafeHtmlFilter_UNIQUE_ID_SafeHtmlFilter__GoBack"></a></span><b style="font-size:12.8px"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif";color:#002e62">Greg
Shatan<br>
</span></b><span style="font-size:10pt;font-family:Arial,sans-serif;color:black">C: <a href="tel:8%20(917)%20816-64-28" value="+79178166428" target="_blank">917-816-6428</a><br>
S: gsshatan<br>Phone-to-Skype: </span><font color="#000000" face="Arial, sans-serif"><span style="font-size:13.3333px">646-845-9428<br></span></font><a href="mailto:gregshatanipc@gmail.com" style="font-family:Arial,sans-serif;font-size:10pt;text-indent:0in" target="_blank"><span style="color:#1155cc">gregshatanipc@gmail.com</span></a></p><p style="font-size:12.8px;text-indent:0in"><span style="font-size:10.0pt;font-family:"Arial","sans-serif""></span></p></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></div></font></span><div><div class="h5">
<br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 10:58 PM, Michael Karanicolas <span dir="ltr"><<a href="mailto:mkaranicolas@gmail.com" target="_blank">mkaranicolas@gmail.com</a>></span> wrote:<br><blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">It's an interesting question. Different national courts have handled<br>
the issue in different ways. In the US, for example, the Fifth Circuit<br>
Court of Appeals found in Gibson v. Texas that domain names are<br>
protected as speech under the 1st amendment. But freedom of expression<br>
in the US context tends to be understood differently than elsewhere,<br>
since the way it's protected under the US constitution is a bit<br>
different from how most constitutions frame their equivalent<br>
protections.<br>
<br>
That said - when you're asking about Article 19, the discussion comes<br>
at the international level where, as far as I know, there's no single<br>
authoritative treatment to point to. Generally, discussions of Article<br>
19 by standard setting bodies tend to focus on the sharper and more<br>
controversial issues: hate speech, defamation, national security<br>
restrictions, etc.<br>
<br>
However - there's a clear and well developed test for restrictions on<br>
freedom of expression that's built right into the ICCPR, and which<br>
applies equally to all restrictions, namely that they should be: (1)<br>
provided by Law (which includes a requirement for clarity and<br>
transparency), (2) fulfill a legitimate purpose, and (3) be necessary<br>
and proportionate to the achievement of that goal. If we establish<br>
that domain names qualify as speech under Article 19 (which, according<br>
to UN Human Rights Committee in Ballantyne, Davidson & McIntyre v.<br>
Canada, is a fairly sure interpretation), then understanding the<br>
applicability of Article 19 just means understanding that three part<br>
test.<br>
<br>
If you want more info, I'd recommend this briefing note as a useful<br>
(and concise!) introduction to restrictions on freedom of expression<br>
under Article 19:<br>
<a href="http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/foe-briefingnotes-2.pdf" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.law-democracy.org/l<wbr>ive/wp-content/uploads/2015/02<wbr>/foe-briefingnotes-2.pdf</a><br>
<br>
Or if you want to go into a little more depth, you can check out this<br>
one: <a href="http://www.law-democracy.org/live/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/Paper-on-Restrictions.10.03.22.rev_.pdf" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.law-democracy.org/l<wbr>ive/wp-content/uploads/2012/08<wbr>/Paper-on-Restrictions.10.03.<wbr>22.rev_.pdf</a><br>
<br>
Unfortunately - neither is specifically about domain names, but the<br>
discussion is basically analogous to how we understand other kinds of<br>
restrictions and protections.<br>
<div class="m_3120687686914692157HOEnZb"><div class="m_3120687686914692157h5"><br>
On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 6:50 PM, Michael Graham (ELCA)<br>
<<a href="mailto:migraham@expedia.com" target="_blank">migraham@expedia.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> Michael:<br>
><br>
> Where can I find a discussion how Article 19 and similar "Freedom of Expression" requirements relate to or impact the registration of domain names?<br>
><br>
><br>
> Michael R.<br>
><br>
> Article 19.<br>
> Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.<br>
><br>
> -----Original Message-----<br>
> From: <a href="mailto:gnso-rpm-wg-bounces@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rpm-wg-bounces@icann.org</a> [mailto:<a href="mailto:gnso-rpm-wg-bounces@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rpm-wg-bounces@ic<wbr>ann.org</a>] On Behalf Of Michael Karanicolas<br>
> Sent: Thursday, April 06, 2017 5:53 AM<br>
> To: J. Scott Evans <<a href="mailto:jsevans@adobe.com" target="_blank">jsevans@adobe.com</a>><br>
> Cc: <a href="mailto:gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org</a><br>
> Subject: Re: [gnso-rpm-wg] Action Items, Slides and Notes from the Working Group call held earlier today<br>
><br>
> Once again - I have to jump in. Freedom of expression is very much a universal concept:<br>
><br>
> <a href="http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.un.org/en/universal<wbr>-declaration-human-rights/</a><br>
> <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Profes<wbr>sionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx</a><br>
><br>
> That's why we call them "human" rights. Not "American" rights.<br>
><br>
><br>
> On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 9:49 AM, J. Scott Evans via gnso-rpm-wg <<a href="mailto:gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org</a>> wrote:<br>
>> The law is clear: an exact match isn't free speech. It is trademark infringement. A domain that coveys a message (e.g., hotels <a href="http://suck.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">suck.com</a>) is free speech and protected accordingly. Also, "free speech" is a US constitutional concept adopted by some countries, but it is not a universal legal concept. Perhaps universal free speech is aspirational, but it is not reality.<br>
>><br>
>> Sent from my iPhone<br>
>><br>
>>> On Apr 6, 2017, at 5:44 AM, George Kirikos <<a href="mailto:icann@leap.com" target="_blank">icann@leap.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>>><br>
>>> I'm not sure where J. Scott is getting his "facts", but my company<br>
>>> doesn't "arbitrage" nor has it registered *any* new gTLD domain names<br>
>>> (and I have no desire for any), nor is it a "bad actor." If you have<br>
>>> proof that my company is a "bad actor", put it forward, rather than<br>
>>> sling unsupported innuendo.<br>
>>><br>
>>> The whole point is that the "barriers" are put forth as *required* to<br>
>>> deal with so-called "bad actors", but are instead used to advantage<br>
>>> certain groups, far beyond the "damage" that is claimed to be caused<br>
>>> by the "bad actors."<br>
>>><br>
>>> I don't want to delve into politics, but some might see parallels to<br>
>>> certain government measures in some countries, where a "problem" is<br>
>>> claimed, but a Draconian solution is applied to deal with it.<br>
>>><br>
>>> When it comes to the sunrise periods for new gTLDs, the "problem" is<br>
>>> claimed to be cybersquatting, but instead of relying on curative<br>
>>> rights, the Sunrise policy went too far and gave too many advantages<br>
>>> to TM holders, essentially creating an unlevel playing field between<br>
>>> *good actors* and TM holders.<br>
>>><br>
>>> Free speech means *no prior restraints* (with very rare exceptions),<br>
>>> but harsh penalties for unlawful speech (curative rights).<br>
>>><br>
>>> <a href="https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://na01.safelinks.protect<wbr>ion.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%<wbr>2F%2Fwww</a>.<br>
>>> <a href="http://law.cornell.edu" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">law.cornell.edu</a>%2Fwex%2Fprior_<wbr>restraint&data=02%7C01%7C%7C81<wbr>1dc6e8437<br>
>>> 245583fce08d47cea9d30%7Cfa7b1b<wbr>5a7b34438794aed2c178decee1%<wbr>7C0%7C0%7C63<br>
>>> 6270794483518369&sdata=IyEiG%2<wbr>FsY%2BTgJkYPGzDiGtCEbfBWA4SVgJ<wbr>4g%2FOWfC<br>
>>> H7s%3D&reserved=0<br>
>>><br>
>>> Sincerely,<br>
>>><br>
>>> George Kirikos<br>
>>> <a href="tel:8%20(416)%20588-02-69" value="+74165880269" target="_blank">416-588-0269</a><br>
>>> <a href="https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.l" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://na01.safelinks.protect<wbr>ion.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%<wbr>2F%2Fwww.l</a><br>
>>> <a href="http://eap.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">eap.com</a>%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7C8<wbr>11dc6e8437245583fce08d47cea9d3<wbr>0%7Cfa7b1<br>
>>> b5a7b34438794aed2c178decee1%7C<wbr>0%7C0%7C636270794483518369&sda<wbr>ta=6BJPNx<br>
>>> olmCYrJK3jZ5%2B7ZFJhorIvFPrA11<wbr>%2FRit4QYdY%3D&reserved=0<br>
>>><br>
>>><br>
>>>> On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 8:08 AM, J. Scott Evans <<a href="mailto:jsevans@adobe.com" target="_blank">jsevans@adobe.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>>>> The same logic applies to you and other domaines, cybersquatters, speculators and small businesses. The fact that you want to arbitrage in terms that are also trademarks is your choice and you have to deal with the barriers put in place to deal with the bad actors.<br>
>>>><br>
>>>> Sent from my iPhone<br>
>>>><br>
>>>>> On Apr 6, 2017, at 4:59 AM, George Kirikos <<a href="mailto:icann@leap.com" target="_blank">icann@leap.com</a>> wrote:<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> Hi folks,<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>>> On Thu, Apr 6, 2017 at 4:19 AM, Beckham, Brian <<a href="mailto:brian.beckham@wipo.int" target="_blank">brian.beckham@wipo.int</a>> wrote:<br>
>>>>>> Finally, since the chart references the EFF letter, it is worth<br>
>>>>>> mentioning here that the fact that a trademark owner may pay<br>
>>>>>> (sometimes extremely high<br>
>>>>>> amounts) to defensively register a domain name exactly matching<br>
>>>>>> its trademark in a Sunrise process (and thereby taking it “off the<br>
>>>>>> market”) does not prevent free expression, which may be undertaken<br>
>>>>>> in countless other ways. The number of terms that may be appended<br>
>>>>>> to a trademark (not to mention typos) to engage in all manner of<br>
>>>>>> speech – fair or otherwise – is, practically-speaking, all but limitless.<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> By that "logic", the number of terms that may be appended to a<br>
>>>>> common dictionary word (not to mention typos) to create a<br>
>>>>> trademarkable brand is, practically-speaking, all but limitless.<br>
>>>>> :-)<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> In other words, those creating a new brand/trademark certainly had<br>
>>>>> the opportunity to create a longer (and thus inferior) alternative<br>
>>>>> to a commonly used dictionary word or other common term. The fact<br>
>>>>> that they decided instead to choose a common term that is widely<br>
>>>>> used by the public shouldn't give them any priority access in a<br>
>>>>> launch of a new gTLD.<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> "I created a problem for myself, and I want ICANN to fix it" is the<br>
>>>>> essence of the sunrise argument for commonly used terms, like<br>
>>>>> dictionary words and short acronyms.<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> Sincerely,<br>
>>>>><br>
>>>>> George Kirikos<br>
>>>>> <a href="tel:416-588-0269" value="+14165880269" target="_blank">416-588-0269</a><br>
>>>>> <a href="https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://na01.safelinks.protect<wbr>ion.outlook.com/?url=http%3A%<wbr>2F%2Fwww</a><br>
>>>>> .<a href="http://leap.com" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">leap.com</a>%2F&data=02%7C01%7C%7<wbr>C2b7c1e08334543cacbff08d47ce46<wbr>e63%7Cf<br>
>>>>> a7b1b5a7b34438794aed2c178decee<wbr>1%7C0%7C0%7C636270767931993418<wbr>&sdata=<br>
>>>>> 6px9twhTFpg2YYaKWPoClt%2FQGQKn<wbr>akm1jerYcSj%2F2w0%3D&reserved=<wbr>0<br>
>>>>> ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>>>>> gnso-rpm-wg mailing list<br>
>>>>> <a href="mailto:gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>>>>> <a href="https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fmm" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://na01.safelinks.protect<wbr>ion.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%<wbr>2F%2Fmm</a><br>
>>>>> .<a href="http://icann.org" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">icann.org</a>%2Fmailman%2Flistinf<wbr>o%2Fgnso-rpm-wg&data=02%7C01%<wbr>7C%7C2b7<br>
>>>>> c1e08334543cacbff08d47ce46e63%<wbr>7Cfa7b1b5a7b34438794aed2c178de<wbr>cee1%7C<br>
>>>>> 0%7C0%7C636270767931993418&sda<wbr>ta=jZh3dzb5ycHMZLxsR4ZLmQdR%2B<wbr>2kWcBkF<br>
>>>>> D%2Fj6BAXDjiI%3D&reserved=0<br>
>>> ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>>> gnso-rpm-wg mailing list<br>
>>> <a href="mailto:gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>>> <a href="https://na01.safelinks.protection.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%2F%2Fmm.i" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://na01.safelinks.protect<wbr>ion.outlook.com/?url=https%3A%<wbr>2F%2Fmm.i</a><br>
>>> <a href="http://cann.org" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">cann.org</a>%2Fmailman%2Flistinfo%<wbr>2Fgnso-rpm-wg&data=02%7C01%7C%<wbr>7C811dc6e<br>
>>> 8437245583fce08d47cea9d30%7Cfa<wbr>7b1b5a7b34438794aed2c178decee1<wbr>%7C0%7C0%<br>
>>> 7C636270794483518369&sdata=mJr<wbr>IOSHwtTJCADlJ8m6UiUx7baKNfoXhI<wbr>pZQh1s99f<br>
>>> s%3D&reserved=0<br>
>> ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
>> gnso-rpm-wg mailing list<br>
>> <a href="mailto:gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org</a><br>
>> <a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rpm-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rpm-wg</a><br>
> ______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
> gnso-rpm-wg mailing list<br>
> <a href="mailto:gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org</a><br>
> <a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rpm-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rpm-wg</a><br>
______________________________<wbr>_________________<br>
gnso-rpm-wg mailing list<br>
<a href="mailto:gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org" target="_blank">gnso-rpm-wg@icann.org</a><br>
<a href="https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/gnso-rpm-wg" rel="noreferrer" target="_blank">https://mm.icann.org/mailman/l<wbr>istinfo/gnso-rpm-wg</a></div></div></blockquote></div><br></div></div></div>
</blockquote></div><br></div>