[ksk-rollover] Future rollover planning opportunities

[Matt Larson]

Please note that the text Paul quotes is from Michael Richardson, not Russ Housley.

> On Feb 20, 2019, at 2:09 PM, Paul Wouters <paul at nohats.ca> wrote:
> 
> On Wed, 20 Feb 2019, Russ Housley wrote:
> 
>> I think that there is very little incremental cost to including a multitude
>> of keys in a software release.  i.e. rather than 1 or 3 for the next 3-4
>> years,  I'd like to around a dozen.  With a variety of algorithms, keysizes,
>> and with the private keys escrowed in a variety of ways.
> 
> That makes monitoring and transparency recoding of private key usage
> much harder.  It also raises the possibly abuse of any DNSSEC key to the
> weakest key escrow method, and will surely raise lots of red flags with
> people who already don't trust this system.
> 
> One of our arguments now is that if Verisign or ICANN abuses its key
> holding power, they will go down (commercially or non-commercially) and
> so they have a strong incentive not to blindly accept NSLs. When we have
> multiple escrow parties, its easy to sacrifice one. So this is
> detrimental to the security of the system as a whole.
> 
>> I'd like for this to include a hash-based signature system, but I'm not sure
>> we have the standards specifications for this nailed down sufficiently.
> 
> Please experiment locally, not globally. Kthanks :)
> 
> Paul
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