<html><head><meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8"></head><body style="word-wrap: break-word; -webkit-nbsp-mode: space; line-break: after-white-space;" class=""><br class=""><div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class="">On 9 Feb 2020, at 13:06, Patrik Fältström <<a href="mailto:paf@frobbit.se" class="">paf@frobbit.se</a>> wrote:</div><br class="Apple-interchange-newline"><div class=""><div class="">On 9 Feb 2020, at 7:06, Rubens Kuhl wrote:<br class=""><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class="">Where can I find (regardless of author) well-thought analysis supporting the claim that the delegation of new TLDs could make people die ?<br class=""></blockquote><br class="">The only claim of people dying I know of is coming from a blogger:<br class=""><br class=""><<a href="http://domainincite.com/13221-verisign-says-people-might-die-if-new-gtlds-are-delegated" class="">http://domainincite.com/13221-verisign-says-people-might-die-if-new-gtlds-are-delegated</a>><br class=""><br class="">I have not seen many statements by bloggers like this author which are based on analysis and because of that I do not think we have to go down that path and investigate it further.<br class=""></div></div></blockquote><div><br class=""></div>Actually, this made into the new gTLD program, and included the following mitigation mechanism:</div><div><a href="https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/name-collision-framework-30jul14-en.pdf" class="">https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/name-collision-framework-30jul14-en.pdf</a></div><div><br class=""></div><div>"7. EMERGENCY RESPONSE
ICANN will limit emergency response for name collision reports to situations where there is a
reasonable belief that the name collision presents a clear and present danger to human life."</div><div><br class=""></div><div>So, this already found its way into current in-force policy. </div><div><br class=""><blockquote type="cite" class=""><div class=""><div class=""><br class="">Also note that the link in this blog post to Verisigns actual response is wrong. You can find Verisigns response here:<br class=""><br class=""><<a href="https://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-gac-safeguard-advice-23apr13/pdfzz0VhyFkZw.pdf" class="">https://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-gac-safeguard-advice-23apr13/pdfzz0VhyFkZw.pdf</a>></div></div></blockquote><br class=""></div><div>And the actual words from Pat Kane and Danny Mcpherson are:</div><div>"These "outlier" strings with very low query rates may actually pose the most risks because they could support critical devices including emergency communications systems or other life-supporting networked devices."</div><div><br class=""></div><div>But besides that response, no other published document has ever went to describe how this could be a reasonable line of thinking. Pink fish could turn into white fish too, but that never happened. And having the data to support that risk analysis could make all of us propose a different set of mitigations, so if it's somewhere to be found, it would be very interesting material for the NCAP project. </div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div>Rubens</div><div><br class=""></div><div><br class=""></div><div> </div></body></html>