[registration-issues-wg] New Zealand's .Nz namespace gets preliminary injuction against DomainTools - Domain Name Wire | Domain Name News & Website Stuff
derek at aa419.org
Thu Sep 13 19:59:49 UTC 2018
But then again there is an obligation for banks to know their clients
(KYC) and ensure accurate details of the client is obtained
(Ironically also mentioned in the GDPR). International anti-money
laundering policies exists in a system that seeks to regulate
illegitimate abuse of the banking system. This system is even
supported by countries where we see zero real cyber consumer
protection policy. The system does not seek to protect it's own to the
detriment of all other, instead we see massive fines.
So trying to compare ICANN to the Financial Action Task Force, Banks
to Registrars, and registrants to bank clients is not even remotely
But it would be. Then we'd have less "Inno Cent" registrants (PA
registrant name which is an alias for "Bar Clay" in a case Compliance
self blinded to, now at Complaints).
Incidentally, in the abuse we fight, linked to domain abuse, much
money laundering info goes into the Financial Action Task Force system
- enough said.
Artists Against 419
On 2018/09/13 21:29, Roberto Gaetano wrote:
> Hi all.
> The ability to search bank accounts would allow finding answers to the following questions:
> - is the bank account holder real or is somebody hiding behind a false identity or a third party (let’s call it “proxy” for short)?
> - is the bank account used for illegal transactions?
> And once understood that the “real" bank account holder is hiding behind proxies it allows answering the following question:
> - does he/she/it own other bank accounts hiding behind other proxies?
> - is there a network of proxies covering a centrally managed criminal activity?
> Public information about all bank accounts will allow self-appointed vigilantes to detect a lot of frauds and criminal networks!
> Have a nice weekend,
> PS: this is not a made-up case, this is the way the anti-mafia police in Italy proceeds to discover mafia networks. The difference is that nobody screams hell to have bank account information public.
>> On 13.09.2018, at 23:56, Derek Smythe <derek at aa419.org> wrote:
>> The ability to search for a registrant and find answers to the questions:
>> - Is this a proxy?
>> - Is the website hacked?
>> ... and once understood to be a malicious registrant, answers the
>> - which other malicious domains might the malicious registrant have
>> Example: atsprojects.co.za in this case. From there into a mess of
>> similar long ongoing fraud, much published about.
>> It allows us to join the dots and turn a fraud incident into consumer
>> It also avoids situations where the abuse report goes to a domain
>> reseller facilitating. Example
>> This is well worth a read, it simply illustrates one of many "insider
>> threats" in DNS which is ignored. Never a word was said about Heihachi
>> despite me asking it be used for a case study. Opportunities lost.
>> Derek Smythe
>> Artists Against 419
>> On 2018/09/13 20:30, Michele Neylon - Blacknight wrote:
>>> Sorry but what on earth has that got to do with Domain Tools making a shadow copy of the registry's whois?
>>> Mr Michele Neylon
>>> Blacknight Solutions
>>> Hosting, Colocation & Domains
>>> https://blacknight.blog /
>>> Intl. +353 (0) 59 9183072
>>> Direct Dial: +353 (0)59 9183090
>>> Blacknight Internet Solutions Ltd, Unit 12A,Barrowside Business Park,Sleaty
>>> Road,Graiguecullen,Carlow, R93 X265
>>> ,Ireland Company No.: 370845
>>> On 13/09/2018, 18:17, "registration-issues-wg on behalf of Derek Smythe" <registration-issues-wg-bounces at atlarge-lists.icann.org on behalf of derek at aa419.org> wrote:
>>> There are always two sides to a story with the truth somewhere in
>>> The irony: In a recent fraud case domain grandlin.co.nz was registered
>>> via a German registrar with fake registration data, belonging to a
>>> real NZ business (in the motor trade). Then content was stolen from a
>>> Greek manufacturer of boots to create a fake NZ business. In turn
>>> another domain was registered to spoof the Army. The fake army domain
>>> then sent out tender requests to businesses. Take a guess what - all
>>> of them won the tender. Once the companies had prepaid for the orders
>>> ... then nothing.
>>> In at least one case reported to law enforcement (the typical panacea
>>> for domain abuse) a woman not only lost her business leaving her deep
>>> in debt, but with all her personal details supplied to criminals, also
>>> forcing her to lay off staff.
>>> Sad fact: there will never be justice or restitution for her or her
>>> employees. At least seven other small business are known about that
>>> came to collect their orders at a fake address of a business not
>>> involved (also in the motor trade).
>>> This is also not the only .co.nz domain we are aware of begin abused
>>> That is why, when I see these cases and knowing what is REALLY
>>> happening, when privacy is touted in an unbalanced way, I get sick:
>>> Club registrant/registrar/ICANN trumps law and order, also human rights.
>>> Derek Smythe
>>> Artists Against 419
>>> On 2018/09/13 13:31, Carlton Samuels wrote:
>>>> registration-issues-wg mailing list
>>>> registration-issues-wg at atlarge-lists.icann.org
>>> registration-issues-wg mailing list
>>> registration-issues-wg at atlarge-lists.icann.org
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