[registration-issues-wg] New Zealand's .Nz namespace gets preliminary injuction against DomainTools - Domain Name Wire | Domain Name News & Website Stuff

Michele Neylon - Blacknight michele at blacknight.com
Thu Sep 13 20:11:03 UTC 2018


Roberto’s example is a nice one
Law enforcement access to data in a legally compliant fashion


Mr Michele Neylon
https://www.blacknight.com/
https://michele.blog
Intl. +353 (0)59 9183072
Sent from mobile so usual disclaimers about typos etc apply

On 13 Sep 2018, at 21:00, Derek Smythe <derek at aa419.org<mailto:derek at aa419.org>> wrote:

But then again there is an obligation for banks to know their clients
(KYC) and ensure accurate details of the client is obtained
(Ironically also mentioned in the GDPR). International anti-money
laundering policies exists in a system that seeks to regulate
illegitimate abuse of the banking system. This system is even
supported by countries where we see zero real cyber consumer
protection policy. The system does not seek to protect it's own to the
detriment of all other, instead we see massive fines.

So trying to compare ICANN to the Financial Action Task Force, Banks
to Registrars, and registrants to bank clients is not even remotely
appropriate.

But it would be. Then we'd have less "Inno Cent" registrants (PA
registrant name which is an alias for "Bar Clay" in a case Compliance
self blinded to, now at Complaints).

Incidentally, in the abuse we fight, linked to domain abuse, much
money laundering info goes into the Financial Action Task Force system
- enough said.

Derek Smythe
Artists Against 419
http://www.aa419.org



On 2018/09/13 21:29, Roberto Gaetano wrote:
Hi all.
The ability to search bank accounts would allow finding answers to the following questions:
- is the bank account holder real or is somebody hiding behind a false identity or a third party (let’s call it “proxy” for short)?
- is the bank account used for illegal transactions?
And once understood that the “real" bank account holder is hiding behind proxies it allows answering the following question:
- does he/she/it own other bank accounts hiding behind other proxies?
- is there a network of proxies covering a centrally managed criminal activity?
Public information about all bank accounts will allow self-appointed vigilantes to detect a lot of frauds and criminal networks!
Have a nice weekend,
Roberto

PS: this is not a made-up case, this is the way the anti-mafia police in Italy proceeds to discover mafia networks. The difference is that nobody screams hell to have bank account information public.


On 13.09.2018, at 23:56, Derek Smythe <derek at aa419.org<mailto:derek at aa419.org>> wrote:

The ability to search for a registrant and find answers to the questions:
- Is this a proxy?
- Is the website hacked?

... and once understood to be a malicious registrant, answers the
question:
- which other malicious domains might the malicious registrant have
registered?

Example: atsprojects.co.za<http://atsprojects.co.za> in this case. From there into a mess of
similar long ongoing fraud, much published about.

It allows us to join the dots and turn a fraud incident into consumer
protection.

It also avoids situations where the abuse report goes to a domain
reseller facilitating. Example
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/latvian-national-sentenced-prison-scareware-hacking-scheme-targeted-minneapolis-star-tribune

This is well worth a read, it simply illustrates one of many "insider
threats" in DNS which is ignored. Never a word was said about Heihachi
despite me asking it be used for a case study. Opportunities lost.

Derek Smythe
Artists Against 419
http://www.aa419.org


On 2018/09/13 20:30, Michele Neylon - Blacknight wrote:
Derek

Sorry but what on earth has that got to do with Domain Tools making a shadow copy of the registry's whois?

Regards

Michele


--
Mr Michele Neylon

Blacknight Solutions

Hosting, Colocation & Domains

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https://blacknight.blog /

http://ceo.hosting/

Intl. +353 (0) 59  9183072

Direct Dial: +353 (0)59 9183090

-------------------------------

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Road,Graiguecullen,Carlow, R93 X265
,Ireland  Company No.: 370845

On 13/09/2018, 18:17, "registration-issues-wg on behalf of Derek Smythe" <registration-issues-wg-bounces at atlarge-lists.icann.org<mailto:registration-issues-wg-bounces at atlarge-lists.icann.org> on behalf of derek at aa419.org<mailto:derek at aa419.org>> wrote:

  There are always two sides to a story with the truth somewhere in
  between.

  The irony: In a recent fraud case domain grandlin.co.nz<http://grandlin.co.nz> was registered
  via a German registrar with fake registration data, belonging to a
  real NZ business (in the motor trade). Then content was stolen from a
  Greek manufacturer of boots to create a fake NZ business. In turn
  another domain was registered to spoof the Army. The fake army domain
  then sent out tender requests to businesses. Take a guess what - all
  of them won the tender. Once the companies had prepaid for the orders
  ... then nothing.

  In at least one case reported to law enforcement (the typical panacea
  for domain abuse) a woman not only lost her business leaving her deep
  in debt, but with all her personal details supplied to criminals, also
  forcing her to lay off staff.

  Sad fact: there will never be justice or restitution for her or her
  employees. At least seven other small business are known about that
  came to collect their orders at a fake address of a business not
  involved (also in the motor trade).

  This is also not the only .co.nz<http://co.nz> domain we are aware of begin abused
  similarly.

  That is why, when I see these cases and knowing what is REALLY
  happening, when privacy is touted in an unbalanced way, I get sick:
  Club registrant/registrar/ICANN trumps law and order, also human rights.

  Derek Smythe
  Artists Against 419
  http://www.aa419.org

  On 2018/09/13 13:31, Carlton Samuels wrote:
https://domainnamewire.com/2018/09/12/new-zealands-nz-namespace-gets-preliminary-injuction-against-domaintools/


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