[rssac-caucus] FOR REVIEW: Elements of Potential Root Operators

[Terry Manderson]

Hi Duane,

Here is some text I would be comfortable with.

'The candidate operator’s address space SHOULD be registered in one of the Regional Internet Registry (RIR) public databases. The candidate SHOULD have entries in relevant public routing registries. It is RECOMMENDED that the candidate maintain a watching brief on the use of Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI).'

Slightly different topic, and I guess I'll be in the rough here - using RFC2119 language seems an easy step for 'us', but is it suitable to communicate the message to non-technical and other folks who simply aren't accustomed to reading RFCs?

Cheers
Terry

> On 9 Sep 2016, at 7:16 AM, Wessels, Duane <dwessels at verisign.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Sep 7, 2016, at 5:26 PM, Terry Manderson <terry at terrym.net> wrote:
>> 
>> Caucus,
>> 
>> Speaking as just a caucus member,
>> 
>> I am very concerned about section 3.3.7
>> 
>> =-=-=-=-=-=-=
>> 3.3.7 Address Registries
>> 
>> The candidate operator’s address space SHOULD be registered in one of the Regional Internet Registry (RIR) public databases. The candidate SHOULD have entries in relevant public routing registries, and if possible Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects in relevant Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) registries for their IPv4 and IPv6 address space.
>> =-=-=-=-=-=-=
>> 
>> I fully understand what RPKI (and BGPSEC) are meant to do, and I applaud that effort. However in this context My concern comes from two directions:
>> 
>> 1) Looking at the diversity principle, any thus by extension, we have currently exactly 5 regional internet registries (and no more on the horizon) for currently 12 operators. So in effect if all operators adopt the SHOULD we are reducing the attack vector diversity for a key component of operating a root server.
>> 
>> 2) The RPKI and BGPSEC is fairly well thought out, however I don't believe there is depth of experience there yet. 
>> 
>> For both of these reasons, I believe it is premature for RSSAC to make RPKI an element of a potential root operator without a deeper investigation into the benefits and risks (and scenarios of attack) of RPKI in the context of the root server system and the resiliency expected.
> 
> Terry,
> 
> Would you propose to just strike that second sentence altogether then?
> 
> DW
> 
> 
>