[tech-whois] A follow up session in San Francisco?

[Michael Young]

Specifically, having the ability to enforce data usage policies above the
IP level.

One example of this:

 Many whois providers restrict the use of Whois for systematic wholesale
data mining purposes. They discourage use of the service for this purpose
by applying controls through IP based rating limiting approaches.  With
the advent of IPv6 this type of control becomes much less effective, some
might even say it becomes ineffective.

Michael

-----Original Message-----
From: Smith, Bill [mailto:bill.smith at paypal-inc.com]
Sent: March-08-11 4:02 PM
To: Michael Young
Cc: Dave Piscitello; Smith, Bill; tech-whois at icann.org
Subject: Re: [tech-whois] A follow up session in San Francisco?

Exactly what problem are we trying to solve by requiring authentication
for access to WHOIS data?

On Mar 8, 2011, at 11:51 AM, Michael Young wrote:

> Absolutely, a user ID accessing a whois system does not have to be
> tied to known identity if the overall policy supports anonymity.  The
> elements of usage enforcement can be applied against the user ID just
> the same.  Of course you would want some control heuristics preventing
> the automated creation of those anonymous user ID's in any sort of
> scale, but that's a well understood problem with many existing tools
that can help with that.
>
> Best Regards,
>
> Michael Young
> M:+1-647-289-1220
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Dave Piscitello [mailto:dave.piscitello at icann.org]
> Sent: March-08-11 2:49 PM
> To: Michael Young; 'Smith, Bill'
> Cc: tech-whois at icann.org
> Subject: Re: [tech-whois] A follow up session in San Francisco?
>
> Michael you raise an excellent point re: IPv6.
>
> I also think you touch on important benefits of "knowing the source":
> accountability and auditing. Anonymity is very different from
> accountability but the Internet fails to make this distinction and thus
abuse flourishes.
>
> There are several forms of authentication that can provide auditing or
> a basis for rate limiting that do not require disclosure of personal
> information or creation of an identity, e.g., guest accounts that can
> be bound to sessions, connections, validated origin IP addresses.
> There's a lot of room between "unknown origin, unknown querying party"
> to "non-reputiable originator of a request".
>
>
> On 3/8/11 2:20 PM, "Michael Young" <michael at mwyoung.ca> wrote:
>
>> "- access control, which most WHOIS providers have implemented at the
>> TCP/IP level
>>
>> Without source address validation, IP level access control is not
>> sufficient. Even with IP level access control, the granularity of
>> access control is arguably less than one might want in a future
>> incarnation of a Whois service. For example, an IP level access
>> control does not accommodate a future policy that might block a user
>> of group X from accessing to a subset of registration data elements
>> {b} while allowing a user of group Y access to those elements. A
>> robust directory service protocol ought to accommodate this."
>>
>> First of all I agree with this point but let me reinforce/add that
>> the current rate limiting methodologies based on traffic from source
>> IPs becomes much trickier with IPv6.  I don't see any practical
>> reason why every user of a whois service shouldn't have to
>> authenticate to get a response. Just because its a free public
>> service doesn't mean someone seeking the data can't sign up for a
>> user ID.  Sign up systems can be automated and protected from machine
>> based registration, subsequent whois lookups would always be tied to
>> User ID and usage policy enforcement can be made against individuals
instead of IP addresses.
>> You can also create classes of users with different traffic policy
>> expectations (provided you were still in compliance with any
>> contractual
> obligations).
>>
>> I know this is a fundamental change from today, but the more I think
>> about it, the more I see the practicality and operational sensibility
>> in going that route.
>>
>> Best Regards,
>>
>> Michael Young
>> M:+1-647-289-1220
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: tech-whois-bounces at icann.org
>> [mailto:tech-whois-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of Smith, Bill
>> Sent: March-08-11 1:22 PM
>> To: Dave Piscitello
>> Cc: tech-whois at icann.org
>> Subject: Re: [tech-whois] A follow up session in San Francisco?
>>
>>
>> On Mar 7, 2011, at 12:13 PM, Dave Piscitello wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 3/7/11 2:45 PM, "Jay Daley"
>> <jay at nzrs.net.nz<mailto:jay at nzrs.net.nz>>
>> wrote:
>> [snipped]
>>
>> The only two that cannot be addressed this way are:
>>
>> - authentication, which is the feature where I think we are talking
>> about a very different protocol from WHOIS
>>
>> Agree.
>>
>> Why would we consider requiring authentication when accurate WHOIS
>> information is available to the public?
>>
>>
>> - access control, which most WHOIS providers have implemented at the
>> TCP/IP level
>>
>> Without source address validation, IP level access control is not
>> sufficient. Even with IP level access control, the granularity of
>> access control is arguably less than one might want in a future
>> incarnation of a Whois service. For example, an IP level access
>> control does not accommodate a future policy that might block a user
>> of group X from accessing to a subset of registration data elements
>> {b} while allowing a user of group Y access to those elements. A
>> robust directory service protocol ought to accommodate this.
>>
>>
>>
>> With respect, I trust we aren't talking about a directory service for
>> the Internet public.
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> tech-whois mailing list
>> tech-whois at icann.org<mailto:tech-whois at icann.org>
>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/tech-whois
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> tech-whois mailing list
>> tech-whois at icann.org
>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/tech-whois
>>
>
>