Scott: the group should come to an agreement on what term to use for "supplicant", it could be considered pejorative. It appears that EPDP is using the term.

Steve: supplicant is a strong word that imply someone of lesser status that is asking for a favor.

Steve: applicant, requester are two terms that could be used instead of supplicant.

Gavin: happy with applicant or requester, but important to be consistent with EPDP.

Steve: another term that could be used is querier, agreed to ask EPDP where the term supplicant came from.

Scott: explained his feature list. The proposal will need to define what response should be sent to a querier with valid credentials but not authorized.

Gavin: explains his feature list. Ask for thoughts about using draft-loffredo-regext-rdap-partial-response and minimization principles. Andy explained that this may be overcomplicating the protocol, because the servers knows which data fields the querier is authorized for. Andy suggests to always provide all data the querier is authorized for. Steve explains that having the querier signaling the fields that he/she wants to obtain could be useful. Gavin the purpose of the query could be used to decide which data fields to provide.

Andy: does not believe there is a difference from a legal perspective between providing certain PII versus other PII. In other words, if PII is provided, the legal risks/challenge are the same regardless of the kind (e.g. name, phone, etc) of PII that was provided.

Jody: has concerns about the pre-authorized, machine to machine queries. All queries should be vetted. Registrars are liable if PII goes out. Registrar wants to know the purpose to validate if PII should be exposed or not. Steve asks about the scalability of validating all queries, and how to pay the cost for such endeavor. One possibility is charging per query of registration data. Gavin explains that the previous agreement is that pre-authorized queries should be supported, policy makers are to decide if pre-authorized should be offered, and the group should focus on technical aspects.

Andy: queries from ICANN to CPs should use a unique anonymized identifier for traceability and auditing purposes.

Adobe connect issues.

Andy: LEOs want confidentiality regarding their investigations. ICANN could provide the public with high level statistics to provide confidence to the public that the system is working. Non-repudiation should be built into the system by using digital signatures in the query by the querier.

Scott ask about distribution of end-user identity proposed by Andy. Andy explains that contracted parties should not see the role of the querier, but ICANN should pass the anonymized id of the querier for CPs for audit purposes.

Scott: what to do with the different feature list?

Andy suggests that the lists should be consolidated.

Jody ask the participants to review the lists and send any feature list that may be missing.

Scott ask for ICANN's guidance on a perceived misalignment between the guidance provided to the TSG and the EPDP.

Andy clarification is needed regarding the misalignment.

Eleeza ask the group to provide feedback if the notes from the face to face meeting are accurate.