[UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing concerns

Dusan Stojicevic dusan at dukes.in.rs
Wed Apr 26 15:25:06 UTC 2017


Answers inline

 

From: Vittorio Bertola [mailto:vittorio.bertola at open-xchange.com] 
Sent: Wednesday, April 26, 2017 2:37 PM
To: Dusan Stojicevic <dusan at dukes.in.rs>
Cc: ua-discuss at icann.org
Subject: Re: [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing concerns

 

Il 26 aprile 2017 alle 11.50 Dusan Stojicevic <dusan at dukes.in.rs <mailto:dusan at dukes.in.rs> > ha scritto:

If you want to change agreement with cc’s, in order to address their rules for registration, is not going to be easy task for ICANN, because of the nature of agreements. Some of them are just in the form of „exchange of letters“ and zou know which level of agreement is that.  

I really think that we are spending lots of energies on a non-problem here. If ICANN develops some good best practices/rules and pushes them to the gTLD registries, over which it has full regulatory powers, then these practices will naturally become the reference for everyone and I am sure that most ccTLDs which are affected by the problem will just voluntarily adopt them as well. 

Also, most if not all of the potential phishing attempts will be focused on .com domains, because that is where most global businesses and paid services are, so fixing the .com namespace is the first and foremost issue and would already prevent the majority of the risks.

This idea of good practice for gTLDs usually wasn’t seen as good practice for ccTLDs. A lot of examples, like emoji…

But I would state that I can be wrong, and I would agree that ICANN need to solve .com, build best practices and we will see. Anyhow, we need that.

Other big ccTLDs will just follow, and anyway often they disallow the Cyrillic script altogether, as Cyrillic is not used in their country; and the ccTLDs for countries where Cyrillic is a national script have already been dealing with this issue for a long time anyway, so they're possibly well prepared already.

As I said, scripts in ccTLD’s tables may be subject of domestic law, and it’s not that simple to disallow the whole script. Also, except .рф (Russian IDN) most of IDN ccTLDs on Cyrillic have little number of registered domain names, and this problem is not that often. Because of that, they are not fully aware of this problem. On the other hand, you are right,  the money and brands are mostly under .com and there is no need to overheat this topic.

Dusan

Regards,

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Vittorio Bertola
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