[UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing concerns

Wed Apr 26 22:20:02 UTC 2017

To Lars' point, let's focus on the article and getting it out.

One of the things that will hurt our efforts in UA is ignoring market
impacts of scaring people inappropriately or discouraging them from support
or use of IDN.

We could benefit from a stronger message that matches more of what edmon
and rod have identified with respect to the molecule-sized scale of the
issue.  Using real statistical data from trusted sources, if we can
indicate that this issue does exist but is quite small in scale, and
contrast it to other phishing techniques that are prevalent in non-IDN, we
can hopefully reduce the fear appropriately.

I am not suggesting we tell people to ignore the homograph confusability
potential, but rather to put the matter into an appropriate contextual
scale and not be used as a justification not to explore reaching a wider,
global audience with IDN, where they might be hobbling growth of their
goods or services having wider international consumers.

See if my redline helps - and treat it like a buffet - just put the stuff
on your tray that works for you...

-Jothan

Jothan Frakes
Tel: +1.206-355-0230

On Wed, Apr 26, 2017 at 11:47 AM, <icann at rodrasmussen.com> wrote:

> Resending from my mailing list “approved” address.
>
> ===============================
>
> Edmon,
>
> Greg Aaron and I will be publishing a long-overdue catch-up on these APWG
> studies within the next couple weeks.  In it we will cover 2015 and 2016.
> In it we will cover the fact that the described homograph attack problem is
> virtually non-existent in real-world phishing attacks.  In all of 2015, the
> various organizations contributing data to the APWG saw ONE true
> homographic attack, and in 2016, TWO.  There were other uses of IDNs and
> mixed scripts that we’ll discuss, but there were just a handful.  Phishers
> don’t need to mount homographic attacks to be successful, and I’d say that
> most of them don’t have the skills and/or motivation to do so.  Ironically,
> the “buzz” about it that this article and coverage has created may actually
> get a few bad guys interested in exploring the concept. :-(  That said,
> just like any other vulnerability or exploit that has low use but high
> potential for harm, being prudent about putting measures in place to limit
> risk and building understanding of those risks are still well worth
> pursuing, but this certainly isn’t an emergency that needs the
> “overheating” Andrei so appropriately mentioned.  I’ll send a link to the
> paper once we get it published via the APWG.
>
> Cheers,
>
> Rod
>
> On Apr 26, 2017, at 5:07 AM, Edmon Chung <edmon at registry.asia> wrote:
>
> Should consider including reference to:
>
> https://www.apwg.org/reports/APWG_GlobalPhishingSurvey_2H2010.pdf
> Only 10 of the 42,624 domain names we studied were IDNs, and only one was
> a homographic attack.
>
> https://docs.apwg.org/reports/APWG_GlobalPhishingSurvey_2H2013.pdf
> Eighty-two of the 82,163 domain names were internationalized domain names
> (IDNs), and none were homographic attacks.
>
> https://docs.apwg.org/reports/APWG_GlobalPhishingSurvey_1H2013.pdf
> Seventy-eight of the 53,685 domain names were internationalized domain
> names (IDNs), and three of them were homographic attacks.
>
> And this is certainly not a new issue:
>
> https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&
> cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0ahUKEwjwwqzBhcLTAhWIVbwKHShHA
> 9kQFggtMAE&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.symantec.com%2Fcontent%
> 2Fdam%2Fsymantec%2Fdocs%2Fsecurity-center%2Farchives%
> 2Fintelligence-quarterly-oct-09-en.pdf&usg=AFQjCNGu8162_
> PXXqnhfHjAQfSUAqYaEXw
>
>
> www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/
> b-intelligence_report_08-2011.en-us.pdf
>
> Edmon
>
>
>
> *From:* ua-discuss-bounces at icann.org [mailto:ua-discuss-bounces at icann.org
> <ua-discuss-bounces at icann.org>] *On Behalf Of *Lars Steffen
> *Sent:* Wednesday, 26 April 2017 18:15 PM
> *To:* Andrei Kolesnikov <andrei at rol.ru>; Don Hollander <
> don.hollander at icann.org>
> *Cc:* Dr. AJAY D A T A <ajay at data.in>; tan tanakadennis via ua-discuss <
> ua-discuss at icann.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing
> concerns
>
> Hi all,
> A general reply to this thread: Can we agree on the current version of the
> blog post to be published asap before we continue the discussion…?
> Thank you,
> Lars
>
> *Von:* ua-discuss-bounces at icann.org [mailto:ua-discuss-bounces at icann.org
> <ua-discuss-bounces at icann.org>] *Im Auftrag von *Andrei Kolesnikov
> *Gesendet:* Mittwoch, 26. April 2017 12:06
> *An:* Don Hollander <don.hollander at icann.org>
> *Cc:* Dr. AJAY D A T A <ajay at data.in>; tan tanakadennis via ua-discuss <
> ua-discuss at icann.org>
> *Betreff:* Re: [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing
> concerns
>
> Dusan gave us great overview of different ccTLD which ICANN has very
> little control. However most of the cc registries carry the mitigation
> process to bring down malicious domain names used explicitly for bad
> purposes.
>
> I definitely don't support  overheating the problem. If cross-script
> attack reaches the level of Kaminsky attack hysteria, we are in deep
> trouble :)
> --andrei
>
> 2017-04-26 12:50 GMT+03:00 Don Hollander <don.hollander at icann.org>:
>
> I would expect a fair number of ccTLDs where it could be an issue as well.
>
> Andrei:  What about ccTLDs in other Cyrillic script communities?  Have
> they taken the same precautions as .ru?
>
>
> D
>
>
> On 26/04/2017, at 9:40 PM, Dr. AJAY D A T A <ajay at data.in> wrote:
>
> Exactly Andrie. Thank you for confirming the same.
>
> I confirmed with .pyc registry (we enabled EAI on почта.рус) also and they
> are not allowed (as per agreement) to use any other script other than
> Cyrillic.
>
>
> So basically it looks like .com problem. Any other examples other than
> .com ?  It narrows down the problem to solve.
>
> Thanks.
> *Dr. Ajay DATA* * | Founder & CEO *
> Get email id like *अजय@डाटा.भारत
> <%E0%A4%85%E0%A4%9C%E0%A4%AF at xn--c2bd1gb.xn--h2brj9c>* in your own
> language,
> visit www.xgenplus.com
>
> ------------------------------
>
> *From:* Andrei Kolesnikov <andrei at rol.ru>  MailId : [68484721]
> *To:* Don Hollander <don.hollander at icann.org>
> *Cc:* "Dr. AJAY D A T A" <ajay at data.in>,tan tanakadennis via ua-discuss <
> ua-discuss at icann.org>
> *Subject: *Re: [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing
> concerns
> *Date:* 26 Apr 2017 02:16:05 PM
> Don,
> there is no such thing as IDN at .RU - only ascii allowed - we understood
> the problem long time ago due to similarity of many Cyrillic letters with
> Latin.
>
> In IDN .РФ in Russia only Cyrillic allowed.
> This definitely must be the rule for registries. Or some kind of immediate
> mitigation service to bring down dangerous domains.
> --andrei
>
> 2017-04-26 11:34 GMT+03:00 Don Hollander <don.hollander at icann.org>:
>
> Hi Andrei:
>
> What about at the ccTLD?  idn.ru?   Does .ru also allow ASCII?
>
> Does the .ru registry, for example, do anything to address homoglyphs
> between ascii and cyrillic?
>
> D
>
>
> On 26/04/2017, at 8:30 PM, Andrei Kolesnikov <andrei at rol.ru> wrote:
>
> most use of idn.ascii gTLD as far as I know is .com for example
> http://путин.com/[xn--h1akeme.com]
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__xn-2D-2Dh1akeme.com_&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=YI0XKyKCabKQi3GVWLvuoyCWjH9WBgEBxLbMnmhSRwo&m=b2_5n2l3R5eXR7olCx9BY0h-_Kk-odvJXTKIexpQvuM&s=Aumtm9oLaw_1FAQZ4MvKpmNHj3khbV5zlM_VGiARFFQ&e=>
>
> Basically most of the confusing cases discussed above are from .com
> --andrei
>
> 2017-04-26 10:35 GMT+03:00 Dr. AJAY D A T A <ajay at data.in>:
>
> Hello Don,
>
> Which all registries are allowed to register mix of scripts domain while
> registering an IDN. I checked .pyc (Cyrillic) and .भारत (Devanagiri) do
> not allow mix of scripts.  I think we address those registries through
> ICANN by modifying the registry agreement, major problem can be solved.
>
> Thanks.
>
> *Dr. Ajay DATA* * | Founder & CEO *
> Get email id like *अजय@डाटा.भारत
> <%E0%A4%85%E0%A4%9C%E0%A4%AF at xn--c2bd1gb.xn--h2brj9c>* in your own
> language,
> visit www.xgenplus.com[xgenplus.com]
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__www.xgenplus.com_&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=YI0XKyKCabKQi3GVWLvuoyCWjH9WBgEBxLbMnmhSRwo&m=b2_5n2l3R5eXR7olCx9BY0h-_Kk-odvJXTKIexpQvuM&s=-y6ACRLtO7BC6nXjQGKJQgFQOCdSIe6PZqjZMKRTGXc&e=>
>
>
> ------------------------------
> *From:* "Tan Tanaka,Dennis via UA-discuss" <ua-discuss at icann.org>  MailId
> : [68456683]
> *To:* Don Hollander <don.hollander at icann.org>,"ua-discuss at icann.org" <
> ua-discuss at icann.org>
> *Subject: *Re: [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN Phishing
> concerns
> *Date:* 25 Apr 2017 06:28:22 PM
>
> Don, my comments enclosed
>
> Thanks
> -Dennis
>
> *From: *<ua-discuss-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of Don Hollander <
> don.hollander at icann.org>
> *Date: *Monday, April 24, 2017 at 5:40 PM
> *To: *"UA-discuss at icann.org" <ua-discuss at icann.org>
> *Subject: *[EXTERNAL] [UA-discuss] UASG Response to WordFence IDN
> Phishing concerns
>
> Further to recent discussion on this list, we have drafted a document that
> we plan on posting as a Blog Post to the UASG Web site that can be
> referenced by others.
>
> We want to get feedback from the community on this document by Thursday
> UTC.
>
> So, here it is – pasted below and as a word document in case you want to
> enable tracking and make amendments.   If you have comments or suggestions,
> please share them to this group.
>
> Don
>
>
>
> *IDNs and Phishing: What You Need to Know*
> By TBD at UASG
>
> Internationalized Domain Names[icann.org]
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__www.icann.org_resources_pages_idn-2D2012-2D02-2D25-2Den&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=YI0XKyKCabKQi3GVWLvuoyCWjH9WBgEBxLbMnmhSRwo&m=b2_5n2l3R5eXR7olCx9BY0h-_Kk-odvJXTKIexpQvuM&s=JGHMSOqc_3GaqYY6Sf8m9MBfj3dj9vTRIsoi3E_9KRc&e=>
>  (IDNs) are growing in popularity, a testament to their role in the
> expansion of the global Internet and the value they provide in connecting
> non-English speakers to the Web. However, you may have noticed a renewed
> focus over the past week of a script mixing technique that phishing
> scammers could potentially use to trick Internet users into visiting
> malicious websites. This phishing method takes advantage of the fact that
> characters from various languages and scripts are sometimes visually
> similar to each other. For example, the Cyrillic “а” and the
> ASCII[en.wikipedia.org]
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__en.wikipedia.org_wiki_ASCII&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=YI0XKyKCabKQi3GVWLvuoyCWjH9WBgEBxLbMnmhSRwo&m=b2_5n2l3R5eXR7olCx9BY0h-_Kk-odvJXTKIexpQvuM&s=yfwSeTzAiHcLTq4jEae3TOx116_t2m_mn8vT4UOo7Go&e=>
>  “a” look virtually identical. This technique is known as a homograph
> attack.
>
> Homographic phishing efforts associated with IDNs are not new. In fact,
> they date back to the early 2000s. Registries have since implemented
> policies that preclude mixing scripts[1] within a domain name label.
>
> While this issue should be taken seriously and serves as an important
> reminder of consumer safety, various IDN and anti-abuse groups are actively
> working to mitigate potential threats, and there are already certain
> browser-set protections in place. In the meantime, Internet users should
> practice the same basic security hygiene that is always recommended: avoid
> clicking suspicious links, and use a good password manager that will only
> enter login credentials on trusted sites.
>
> Equally important is to recognize the benefits of IDNs and avoid disabling
> them, which could lead to an unpredictable user experience and eventually a
> decrease in adoption. IDNs are essential in bringing non-English speakers –
> the majority of the world’s population – online, and allowing those users
> to create their own highly relevant online identities as well as navigate
> the Internet in their native languages. In addition to the social and
> cultural benefits of IDNs, they also represent a significant economic
> opportunity; a recent report[uasg.tech]
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__uasg.tech_whitepaper_&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=YI0XKyKCabKQi3GVWLvuoyCWjH9WBgEBxLbMnmhSRwo&m=b2_5n2l3R5eXR7olCx9BY0h-_Kk-odvJXTKIexpQvuM&s=VMxJkqVb1W-ZyIEhQREIQRg3LsygAashMrgpllm7Qs4&e=>
> commissioned by the Universal Acceptance Steering Group (UASG) found that
> online spending from new IDN users could start at USD 6.2 billion per year.
>
>
> The UASG’s mission is to help software developers and website owners keep
> pace with the evolving Domain Name System (DNS) – and this includes issues
> around the adoption and acceptance of IDNs. If you’d like to get involved
> in helping work toward a solution to this and other IDN-related issues,
> please visit https://uasg.tech/[uasg.tech]
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__uasg.tech_&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=YI0XKyKCabKQi3GVWLvuoyCWjH9WBgEBxLbMnmhSRwo&m=b2_5n2l3R5eXR7olCx9BY0h-_Kk-odvJXTKIexpQvuM&s=fHMruCNtXCtlHyAJqUQ0xMY3bJLSKhk8h77uH_2ctvk&e=>
>  or get in touch[uasg.tech]
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=https-3A__uasg.tech_contact_&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=YI0XKyKCabKQi3GVWLvuoyCWjH9WBgEBxLbMnmhSRwo&m=b2_5n2l3R5eXR7olCx9BY0h-_Kk-odvJXTKIexpQvuM&s=YqvahA1bKLAZn3Ywt6hgEEjSlYv9iV1zX3u3qDUzvXE&e=>
>  to learn more.
>
>
>
> ------------------------------
>
> ------------------------------
>
> [1] Exceptions are practiced for languages with established orthographies
> and conventions that require the commingled use of multiple scripts, e.g.
> the Japanese writing system.
> Do not Remove:
> [HID]20170425182821379[-HID]<~WRD039.jpg> <~WRD039.jpg>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Andrey Kolesnikov
> RIPN.NET[RIPN.NET]
> <https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__RIPN.NET&d=DwMFaQ&c=FmY1u3PJp6wrcrwll3mSVzgfkbPSS6sJms7xcl4I5cM&r=YI0XKyKCabKQi3GVWLvuoyCWjH9WBgEBxLbMnmhSRwo&m=b2_5n2l3R5eXR7olCx9BY0h-_Kk-odvJXTKIexpQvuM&s=bzXSVwk1DZEFet4B2d2K-x7-PI4e37O64WojUXqaNCM&e=>
>
>
>
> Don Hollander
> Universal Acceptance Steering Group
> Skype: don_hollander
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Andrey Kolesnikov
> RIPN.NET <http://ripn.net/>
>
> <~WRD039.jpg><~WRD039.jpg>
>
>
> Don Hollander
> Universal Acceptance Steering Group
> Skype: don_hollander
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --
> Andrey Kolesnikov
> RIPN.NET <http://ripn.net/>
>
>
>
>
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