The IDN Variant Issues Project:   
A Study of Issues Related to the Management of IDN Variant TLDs

23 December 2011

Contents

[Executive Summary ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………5](#_Toc312418780)

[1 Overview of this Report ………………………………………………………………………………………………..8](#_Toc312418781)

[1.1 Fundamental Assumptions ……………………………………………………………………………………9](#_Toc312418782)

[1.2 Variants and the Current Environment ………………………………………………………………..11](#_Toc312418783)

[2 Project Overview …………………………………………………………………………………………………………15](#_Toc312418784)

[2.1 The Variant Issues Project ……………………………………………………………………………………15](#_Toc312418785)

[2.2 Objectives of the Integrated Issues Report …………………………………………………………16](#_Toc312418786)

[2.3 Scope of the Integrated Issues Report ………………………………………………………………..17](#_Toc312418787)

[3 Range of Possible Variant Cases Identified ………………………………………………………………….18](#_Toc312418788)

[3.1 Classification of Variants as Discovered ………………………………………………………………18](#_Toc312418789)

[3.1.1 Code Point Variants …………………………………………………………………………………….19](#_Toc312418790)

[3.1.2 Whole-String Variants …………………………………………………………………………………19](#_Toc312418791)

[3.2 Taxonomy of Identified Variant Cases ………………………………………………………………….20](#_Toc312418792)

[3.3 Discussion of Variant Classes ……………………………………………………………………………….27](#_Toc312418793)

[3.4 Visual Similarity Cases …………………………………………………………………………………………32](#_Toc312418794)

[3.4.1 Treatment of Visual Similarity Cases …………………………………………………………….32](#_Toc312418795)

[3.4.2 Cross-Script Visual Similarity ………………………………………………………………………..33](#_Toc312418796)

[3.4.3 Terminology concerning Visual Similarity …………………………………………………….33](#_Toc312418797)

[3.5 Whole-String Issues ……………………………………………………………………………………………..34](#_Toc312418798)

[3.6 Synopsis of Issues ………………………………………………………………………………………………..38](#_Toc312418799)

[4 Discussion of Issues: Establishing Variant Labels ……………………………………………………….39](#_Toc312418800)

[4.1 Establishing the Label Generation Rules ………………………………………………………………40](#_Toc312418801)

[4.2 Sample Options for Establishing Label Generation Rules …………………………………….42](#_Toc312418802)

[4.3 Synopsis of Issues ………………………………………………………………………………………………..47](#_Toc312418803)

[5 Discussion of Issues: Treatment of Variant Labels ………………………………………………………48](#_Toc312418804)

[5.1 Possible States for Variant Labels ………………………………………………………………………..49](#_Toc312418805)

[5.2 User Experience with Variant Labels …………………………………………………………………..50](#_Toc312418806)

[5.2.1 IDNA2003 to IDNA2008 migration issues ……………………………………………………..51](#_Toc312418807)

[5.2.2 Types of users ………………………………………………………………………………………………52](#_Toc312418808)

[5.2.3 User capabilities …………………………………………………………………………………………..53](#_Toc312418809)

[5.2.4 What users expect and what they get………………………………………………………… 54](#_Toc312418810)

[5.2.5 Consistency………………………………………………………………………………………………… 62](#_Toc312418811)

[5.2.6 Chains of actors and distributed systems…………………………………………………… 63](#_Toc312418812)

[5.3 ICANN Operations and Variant TLDs………………………………………………………………….. 63](#_Toc312418813)

[5.3.1 Evaluation ……………………………………………………………………………………………………63](#_Toc312418814)

[5.3.2 Management of Established Variant TLD Labels………………………………………….. 67](#_Toc312418815)

[5.3.3 Delegation of Variant TLDs …………………………………………………………………………..67](#_Toc312418816)

[5.3.4 Contractual Provisioning ………………………………………………………………………………67](#_Toc312418817)

[5.3.5 Security and Stability of the DNS ………………………………………………………………….68](#_Toc312418818)

[5.4 Registry / Registrar Operations …………………………………………………………………………..68](#_Toc312418819)

[5.4.1 DNS Resolution ……………………………………………………………………………………………69](#_Toc312418820)

[5.4.2 Registration Process ……………………………………………………………………………………69](#_Toc312418821)

[5.4.3 Whois (Domain Name Registration Data Directory Service) …………………………71](#_Toc312418822)

[5.4.4 Data Escrow …………………………………………………………………………………………………73](#_Toc312418823)

[5.4.5 Rights Protection Mechanisms …………………………………………………………………….73](#_Toc312418824)

[5.4.6 Security/Stability Considerations for TLD Registries/Registrars …………………..75](#_Toc312418825)

[5.5 Synopsis of Issues ………………………………………………………………………………………………..75](#_Toc312418826)

[6 Other Related Issues: Code points currently not permitted in the root zone ……………76](#_Toc312418827)

[7 Discussion of Potential Additional Work …………………………………………………………………….78](#_Toc312418828)

[7.1 Developing a Label Generation Ruleset specification …………………………………………..78](#_Toc312418829)

[7.2 Developing a process for label generation …………………………………………………………..78](#_Toc312418830)

[7.3 Examining the feasibility of whole-string variants ……………………………………………….79](#_Toc312418831)

[7.4 Enhancing visual similarity processes …………………………………………………………………..79](#_Toc312418832)

[7.5 Examining the feasibility of mirroring …………………………………………………………………79](#_Toc312418833)

[7.6 Examining the feasibility of variant management without mirroring …………………80](#_Toc312418834)

[7.7 Assessing impacts on existing gTLD and Fast Track operations …………………………….80](#_Toc312418835)

[7.8 Assessing impacts on ICANN and IANA processes ………………………………………………..80](#_Toc312418836)

[Appendix 1: The Case Study Team Reports ……………………………………………………………………….82](#_Toc312418837)

[Appendix 2: Terminology ……………………………………………………………………………………………………84](#_Toc312418838)

[Appendix 3: Overview of the Script Case Studies ……………………………………………………………….93](#_Toc312418842)

[Appendix 4: Salient Characteristics of 6 scripts …………………………………………………………………..98](#_Toc312418851)

[Appendix 5: IDN Variant Handling in the New gTLD Program…………………………………………… 105](#_Toc312418858)

[Appendix 6: Survey of IDN Practices………………………………………………………………………………. 107](#_Toc312418859)

[Appendix 7: Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………………….. 108](#_Toc312418860)

# Executive Summary

This integrated issues report describes the issues associated with the possible inclusion in the DNS root zone of IDN variant TLDs. It builds on the work of six case study teams who examined the range of variant issues associated with particular scripts (Arabic, Chinese, Cyrillic, Devanagari, Greek, and Latin).

This issues report is intended to describe each of the general and script-specific issues to be resolved for the cases studied. Therefore, the following objectives have been established for this issues report:

* Identify the sets of issues relevant to all the studied scripts.
* Identify any sets of issues that are script specific.
* Provide a brief analysis of the issues, including the benefits and risks of possible approaches identified.
* Identify areas where further study or work could be pursued.

Defining Variant TLDs

“Variant” is a term that has been used in multiple ways, to indicate some sort of relationship between two or more labels or names. It has been used variously to refer to, for example, a particular relationship between specific characters or code points in a particular script, or a set of alternate labels where some linkage relationship is articulated, or a desired procedure whereby names are registered in multiples, or a desired functionality causing shared behavior by some set of identifiers. There is today no fully accepted definition for what may constitute a variant relationship between top-level labels.

Implementing Variant TLDs

The current DNS environment does not contain a “variant management” mechanism for the top level, i.e., a mechanism to support a workable implementation of variant TLDs and promote a good user experience. A variety of potential variant management mechanisms have been raised in the various communities as means to facilitate solutions to particular problems. Several communities have indicated a need for workable mechanisms in the area of IDN variants, to support deployment of the full range of products and services made possible by bringing IDN capabilities to the namespace.

In the discussion of these issues, the report reveals a tension between the interest in creating greater functionality to address a range of potential variant cases (i.e., implementing variant TLDs), and the difficulties of using the DNS to meet those objectives (i.e., ensuring that such implementation happens in a stable and secure way that promotes a good user experience). In constructing a classification of variant types, and outlining what cases appear most appropriate for development of solutions, the report describes the need for cost-benefit analysis for each potential mechanism to balance risks, costs, and benefits.

Using Classification as a Tool *(see section 3)*

A classification of the potential variant types identified by the case study teams is proposed in the report to create a framework for understanding the issues, as well as to suggest common features that may cause a variant case to occur. This, in turn, may inform consideration of how such a case could be incorporated in a variant management mechanism.

Many of the issues are complex, and it is clear that the cases in the script studies vary widely. The classification demonstrates that there is not a single “variant problem” to which a solution may be developed, but an array of unique characteristics and considerations to be taken into account when considering any type of implementation model.

Creation of Label Generation Rules *(see section 4)*

The term “Label Generation Rules” is used in this report to describe the set of rules that determine what labels may be allowed in a zone. In the case discussed here, the label generation rules would govern what labels are to be allowed in the DNS root zone. An established set of label generation rules would cover, for example, the identification of variant characters and the rules associated with use of those characters in labels. Such rules would represent an established methodology for the identification of variant labels.

Based on extensive discussion, the report indicates the need for a comprehensive set of label generation rules for the root zone as a prerequisite for implementation of IDN variant TLDs. A detailed proposal for the label generation rules is beyond the scope of this report, but the report does outline the parameters by which these rules might be determined.

Once variant labels can be identified, a range of possible states and corresponding actions may be taken on those labels. Thus, a variant management mechanism could encompass both active use of labels in the DNS, and prevention of labels from use in the DNS.

The report contains *(see section 6)* a brief discussion of variant issues that might be raised by certain changes to rules with regard to permissible code points for the root zone (cases such as U+200C, ZERO-WIDTH NON-JOINER, and U+200D, ZERO-WIDTH JOINER, and digits).

Impacts on users and the DNS *(see section 5)*

Maintaining a secure and stable DNS and promoting a good user experience are paramount, and linked, objectives. A detailed discussion of the potential user experience outcomes caused by the existence of IDN variant TLD labels in particular states (e.g., active, blocked, mirrored) is included in the report. These issues are considered from many user perspectives: system administrators, other network operators, domain name registrants, registration service providers (i.e., registries and registrars), software developers, law enforcement and security investigators, and end users.

The impact of implementing IDN variant TLDs on existing operations in the DNS ecosystem is also considered. There are a number of complex issues in the operational area that registries, registrars, and other providers should be aware of to facilitate a successful operation of variant TLDs. The usability of variant TLDs is dependent on implementation by registries and registrars, and any proposed implementation will require broad stakeholder participation to ensure that registries and registrars provide stable, secure, consistent, and unambiguous DNS operations. This includes the greatest possible clarity in communication and understanding of variant TLDs, to enhance the IDN end user experience in a secure way and to limit confusion for all types of users.

Next Steps (*see section 7*)

There should be no assumption that acceptable solutions are available or can be developed to address the wide range of issues identified in this report, or that can satisfy the wide range of community expectations regarding which IDN variant TLDs may be delegated.

In analyzing the issues presented in the report, several areas concerning IDN variant TLDs have been identified where steps could be taken toward identifying potential solutions to the management of variant TLDs. Any potential solutions identified would require additional analysis to establish whether they satisfactorily address the sets of issues considered here, and measured on their viability from policy, technical, security, user experience, and operational perspectives.

# 1 Overview of this Report

This integrated issues report considers the issues associated with the possible inclusion in the DNS root zone of IDN variant TLDs. It builds on the work of six case study teams who examined the range of variant issues associated with particular scripts. See Appendix 1 for references to the case study issues reports.

In developing this integrated issues report, ICANN has used the work of the case studies as background to create a common framework for consideration of these issues.

The introductory sections (1 & 2) provide a context for the subject matter and the scope of the project undertaken by ICANN. The identified issues discussed in the report are organized under three broad headings:

* Issues concerning how to classify the range of potential variant cases identified in the script case study team reports. These are discussed in section 3 of the report.
* Issues concerning how variant TLDs are established. These are discussed in section 4 of the report.
* Issues concerning how variant TLDs are treated once established. These are discussed in section 5 of the report.

Additional related issues, such as those associated with the use of **code points** not currently permitted in the root zone, are discussed in section 6.

Possible considerations for next steps are discussed in section 7.

A guide to the terminology used in the report is contained in Appendix 2.

The sets of issues in this report are analyzed in light of certain overriding considerations: the security and stability of the DNS, and user experience. Maintaining the security and stability of the DNS is central to ICANN’s core mission. It is of the utmost importance that the actual operation and maintenance of the DNS, on which many services rely, are not adversely impacted by the introduction of IDN variant TLDs. Where relevant, issues specifically impacting the stability of the DNS are discussed. Secondly, user experience considerations are a key theme throughout the discussion, with an extended examination of these issues in section 5. These issues concern avoidance of including variant TLDs in the DNS root zone in a manner that creates user vulnerabilities or a probability of confusion, as well as an interest in functionality and efficiency for the user experience.

ICANN has been assisted in the creation of this report by a coordination team comprised of representatives from the case study teams. Where specific case studies are cited in the report, the reader should refer to the relevant case study team report (see references in Appendix 1) for the complete account of that team’s work.

A draft version of this report was circulated to the coordination team and efforts have been made to capture all review and feedback provided as of this writing. An extended review may not have been possible by all coordination team members due to time constraints, however, and thus members may be providing additional feedback on the report during the public comment period.

## Fundamental Assumptions

The mission of ICANN is to coordinate, at the overall level, the global Internet's systems of unique identifiers, and in particular to ensure the stable and secure operation of the Internet's unique identifier systems. When considering the possible **delegation** of IDN variant TLDs, ICANN has the responsibility to undertake these activities in a manner that will not adversely affect the security or stability of the DNS.

At the current time, a variant management mechanism for the top level does not exist. In considering the issues associated with developing such a mechanism, certain existing references are used as an underlying foundation. The Unicode standard[[1]](#footnote-2) (currently version 6.0) provides a repertoire of code points used in world scripts, including various classifications of character properties, and normalization rules. The Internationalizing Domain Names in Applications (IDNA) protocol (RFCs 5890-4)[[2]](#footnote-3) specifies rules for determining whether a code point, considered in isolation or in context, is a candidate for inclusion in a **domain name**.

It is assumed that these reference points will continue to be applicable to the DNS. In addition to the assumption of stable references, ICANN has also distilled from the case study team reports and the mission and core values of ICANN a set of fundamental assumptions, articulated below, which have been used in the development of this report.

1. The root zone is a shared resource, and the management of the root zone should accommodate, to the maximum extent possible, the needs of users of multiple global scripts. Taking into account as far as possible the unique needs of each script, principles of fair and equitable treatment should be adhered to, avoiding undue consideration for users of particular languages and scripts in a space that is used by all. In addition, both gTLDs and ccTLDs co-exist in the root zone and are relied upon by Internet users around the world. While gTLDs and ccTLDs may involve different operating environments, it is critical that a reliable user experience is produced across the TLD space. As a result, any **label generation rules** for TLDs will need to be adhered to by both ccTLDs and gTLDs. (See section 4 for a discussion of label generation rules.)
2. In the early stages of developing a variant management mechanism, a cautious approach should be adopted; if necessary, a more liberal approach may be adopted later. A principle of incrementalism appears well-suited to actions in this arena. Given that experience in this area is limited, and actions taken will create precedents and outcomes that cannot be undone, variant TLD labels should be narrowly defined, and restrictive rules for active use of **variant labels** in the DNS should be adopted. Wherever possible, instead of adding a new type of variant TLD label, an alternative approach should be used – for example, using an existing ICANN evaluation or objection process that delivers an appropriate way of **blocking** undesired TLD strings. If there is a process already in existence that delivers a similar result to what is desired, that process should be used rather than establishing a new type of variant label. The goal should be to maximize efforts toward the prevention of future problems, and to minimize active entries in the DNS to those where an explicit need has been established, the user experience implications have been fully studied, and no negative impacts to security or stability have been identified.
3. The root zone is a special case, and the approach taken to variant management in the root need not prescribe that taken by individual TLD registries. ICANN must adopt and maintain a consistent policy for consideration of requests for IDN variant TLDs, and this may entail specific criteria and rules applicable for variant labels to be allowed at the top level. However, formulation of TLD registry policy often takes into account the specific user context, and there may be corresponding reasons for different criteria or rules relating to variant label generation and use, subject to certain minimum requirements necessary for security or stability reasons. Accordingly, TLD registry operators should not have an automatic obligation to abide by all of the same variant tables and policies used at the top level.
4. Users dealing with technology learn very quickly and can accommodate to a wide variety of behaviors, provided that they can build some model of the behavior, and provided that the behavior is consistent and predictable once learned. Recognizing the need for usability of multiple scripts in the DNS, and the desirability of reasonable approximations of natural language usage, it is also assumed that users are not dependent on the ability to use the full natural language without restrictions, and will be able to accommodate certain limitations to the full natural language where necessary. To create the consistency required for logical user adaptation, variant management mechanisms should be based on known and predictable rules and procedures, fully available to all users.

## Variants and the Current Environment

“Variant” is a term that has been used in multiple ways, to indicate some sort of relationship between two or more labels or names. It has been used variably to refer to, for example, a particular relationship between specific characters or code points in a particular script, or a set of alternate labels where some linkage relationship is articulated, or a desired procedure whereby names are registered in multiples, or a desired functionality causing shared behavior by some set of identifiers.

In the DNS environment today, there is no accepted definition for what may constitute a variant relationship between top-level labels, nor is there a “variant management” mechanism for the top level, although such has often been proposed as a way to facilitate solutions to a particular problem. Several communities have indicated an urgent need for solutions in this area, to support deployment of the full range of products and services made possible by bringing IDN capabilities to the namespace.

In the discussion of issues, the report reveals a tension between the unmistakable interest in creating greater functionality to address a range of potential variant cases, and the difficulties of using the DNS to meet these objectives. In proposing a classification of “variant” cases and outlining what cases appear most appropriate for development of solutions, the report attempts to highlight the cost-benefit analysis that needs to be done before undertaking any implementation.

The notion of variants is extremely compelling. The most aggressive sort of variant proposals require some idea of using what are strictly speaking different names in the DNS as though they are the same, or treating a pair of separate names in a way that accesses separate, but closely related, content. The basic problem is that, owing to the vagaries of the encoding of characters, the rendering of **fonts**, and various other historical facts, strings that do not match one another as far as a computer is concerned are “the same” or “exactly equivalent” to a user of some natural languages. Such user expectations of linkage where none occurs exist in the current space, with the result that users are surprised. Many discussions of variant issues appear to be based on a commonly-held assumption that making the user experience as intuitive as possible can be easily accomplished via certain adjustments to the operation of the DNS, with the outcome that users will not be surprised.

Regardless of how tempting, however, the assumption that this type of expectation can be fulfilled by way of DNS configuration conceals three important problems. One is that “users” are not a single group. This issue is discussed in detail later in the report (see section 5). The other two problems are more fundamental, and must be considered before proceeding.

The DNS is designed as a known-item search system, and it works by exact match (with the single exception of a wildcard label, which matches everything). Many of the proposals commonly referred to as “variants” are attempts, however well-meaning, to make the DNS appear to match any number of different items as though they were the same item. But the DNS is extremely badly adapted to that sort of use. First, while there are ways of **aliasing** one name to another (CNAME and DNAME), they are not reversible and therefore do not capture the sort of relationship that is needed in many cases. The DNS is only loosely coherent in its design, so making names “be the same” by provisioning them equivalently is error-prone, and in any case, is guaranteed sometimes to be inconsistent and therefore surprising. Finally, since the DNS has distributed management, the desired consistent user experience cannot actually be assured (except, perhaps, by very heavy-handed administrative or contractual procedures) because a **zone** lower in the tree might adopt different conventions. This leads to more uncertainty on the part of users, and not less. All of the above suggests that trying to avoid user surprise and achieve the desired user experience using the DNS (or at least the DNS as it stands today) is an ill-suited strategy to achieve the optimal outcomes.

Another problem lies in supposing that, by using aliasing or some sort of parallel provisioning techniques in the DNS, one will have solved all or even a substantial number of the surprises that users will face. Even if it is possible to make two names somehow be the same in the DNS, that sameness is invisible to other applications on the Internet. Those applications often need to know what names they themselves are known by to others.

For example, if an email is sent to [localpart@dname.example.com](mailto:localpart@dname.example.com) and that name has a DNAME that resolves to realname.example.com, the mail transport agent is not going to rewrite the server-part of the address. It is going to send the mail to the MX for realname.example.com. If the mail exchange server for realname.example.com does not know it has to handle email for dname.example.com, the mail will be rejected (or, worse, just disappear)[[3]](#footnote-4). HTTP servers are similarly ignorant about all the names pointing at them; indeed, if they weren’t, modern virtual hosting would be impossible.

Internet protocols can be divided roughly into two types: those that need to know their own name or that can take advantage of knowing it, and those that do not. In FTP, for instance, it (usually) does not matter what domain name you used when you connected: once you have connected and are authenticated, the name of the server you used makes no difference. Many other protocols (including HTTP and SMTP) are designed to be sensitive to the name with which they were contacted; in other cases (such as IMAP), one mode of operation is sensitive to the server’s name, and another is not. Whenever a server is sensitive to the name by which it is known, that sensitivity means that the server needs to know all its own names when they start service. Without support for lookup of the aliases of a host (in the DNS such support does not today exist), this operation has to be supported by direct configuration of the server software.

In addition to the above, it is worth remembering that a very significant portion of Internet users may not rely on DNS names to find what they are looking for, but instead type whatever they want to find into a search engine. Search engines do not treat sites as being related to one another on the basis of their IP addresses, or most other things obtainable from the DNS. Instead, sites with different http server names are grouped together depending on various http response codes (generally, http redirects). It is an http redirect that causes two otherwise-unrelated DNS names to be treated as “the same” web server. Adding any sort of support to the DNS to link the http servers together will have little or no effect on their relationship to each other in search engine results, at least until the search engines start using such features.

It is conceivable that the DNS could be altered to support a way to look up variants (of whatever type and however they might be supported) for a name. This would permit server software to do some auto-configuration of itself at start up time. At the moment, however, such support does not exist and it is not clear how long it would take to fully understand the issues, including whether this could be done without causing security or operational problems, and then standardize on a representation in the DNS; much less to add such support to server software and deploy it widely enough across the network to make it useful.

This issue is extremely significant to the aimed-for benefit from adding variants: it might be that the cost of adding this support (whatever such support turns out to be) outweighs the benefit in some cases, because of the far greater chance that applications are not configured correctly and the great difficulty in troubleshooting such conditions given the limited tools that are available. This consideration does not mean that all types of variants are impossible, or that trying to have multiple, related, names is wrong in every case. But it does mean that in most cases the costs and risks involved are significant and would require demonstrating a high level of user benefit to undertake development of such functionality via the DNS.

# Project Overview

Historically, the DNS root zone has been limited to a subset of the characters in the US-ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange) character set. This is changing with the introduction of **Internationalized Domain Names** (IDNs), including the introduction of new top-level domains (TLDs) in multiple scripts, enabling Internet users to access domain names using writing systems familiar to them.

The opening of the IDN country code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD) Fast Track Process[[4]](#footnote-5) by ICANN in October 2009 enabled countries and territories to submit requests to ICANN for a limited number of IDN ccTLDs representing their respective country or territory names in scripts other than US-ASCII characters.

The new generic Top-Level Domain (gTLD) Program[[5]](#footnote-6), approved in June 2011 and opening for applications in January 2012, will allow for the first time the addition of IDN gTLDs into the root zone.

## 2.1 The Variant Issues Project

IDNs can serve as powerful tools for broadening the Internet's capacity and accessibility; however, for a good user experience they also raise unique issues. One important issue concerns the use of "variants," which, according to one technical definition, occur when a single conceptual character can be identified with two or more different Unicode Code Points.[[6]](#footnote-7) TLDs containing one or more such characters might be considered “variant TLDs,” and unless carefully implemented, might result in user confusion or a poor user experience. While the concept of “variants” is raised in a number of contexts, and in some cases is regarded as critical for the successful adoption of IDN TLDs to meet user needs, there is no single definition or rule for determining whether TLDs can be considered variants of one another.

In an effort to develop potential solutions for the delegation of IDN variant top-level domains (TLDs), the ICANN Board in 2010 passed a resolution directing the development of a preliminary report on the viability, sustainability and delegation of IDN variants.[[7]](#footnote-8)

The IDN Variant Issues Project plan was published in April 2011[[8]](#footnote-9), along with a call for volunteers, and work commenced shortly thereafter. Six script case study teams (Arabic, Chinese, Cyrillic, Devanagari, Greek, and Latin) worked to identify the set of issues that, if resolved, could enable the delegation of IDN variant TLDs for the benefit of the respective user communities. The case study teams comprised a total of 66 experts from 29 countries and territories, and offered expertise in the areas of DNS, IDNA, linguistics, security & scalability, policy, registry/registrar operations, and community representation. The case study team reports were produced on schedule and published for public comment in October 2011.[[9]](#footnote-10) (An overview of the script case studies, and a brief description of some of the characteristics of these scripts, are provided in Appendices 3 and 4, respectively).

ICANN, assisted by a coordination team comprised of representatives from the case study teams, has worked to build on these team reports to develop this integrated issues report, to cover both common issues germane across the cases studied and issues particular to specific cases. An integrated analysis of the issues associated with IDN variant TLDs will be an important milestone toward considering subsequent work in this area.

## Objectives of the Integrated Issues Report

As detailed in the project plan, this issues report is intended to describe each of the general and case-specific issues to be resolved for the cases studied.

In accordance with the scope defined for the project, the following objectives have been established for this issues report:

* Identify the set of issues relevant to all the studied scripts.
* Identify any sets of issues relevant to only some of studied scripts.
* Provide a brief analysis of the issues, including the benefits and risks of possible approaches identified.
* Identify areas where further study or work could be pursued.

## Scope of the Integrated Issues Report

As noted above, this report is designed to provide a review of issues concerning the delegation of IDN variant TLDs. Other related issues are discussed in the report to the extent they are relevant.

It is important to note that there are a number of scripts not represented by the six case studies. In addition, as noted by several of the teams in their reports, some of the scripts studied are used to represent a number of languages, and not all of those languages were represented on the case study teams. Similarly, none of the teams specifically included experts on typography or on human cognition, even though those topics might be important for this subject matter. Accordingly, all possible cases have not been analyzed, and this work is not being represented as comprehensive of all potential issues. However, it is expected that this project’s gathering of DNS, operations, and language expertise for these scripts is relevant to a significant percentage of the world’s Internet users, and will be an important milestone in the work in this area.

Devising variant rules and proposing variant management solutions are not within the scope of this report. In some instances, a range of possible solutions are considered and analyzed with a view toward informing potential later phases of the project that would be focused on solutions.

# Range of Possible Variant Cases Identified

One of the central concerns of this report is to identify possible variant issues that have been raised within the six script case studies. In the light of concrete knowledge of the scripts, the case study teams have been able to provide in-depth exploration of the relevant problems presented by each script. These can be understood most effectively if they are brought under a system of classification which draws attention to their similarities, but also to their specific differences.

## 3.1 Classification of Variants as Discovered

A classification is here proposed to create a framework for understanding of the issues, as well as to suggest common features that may cause a variant case to occur, and which may inform consideration of how such a case could be incorporated in a variant management mechanism.

This classification is fundamentally semiotic: that is to say, it is based on the formal details of the notations employed by the different scripts, and the rules governing their use. The policy justification for interest in these cases lies elsewhere, in the use made by various communities of the scripts, and particular dangers (e.g., of user confusion) that may attend this use. These communities, however, are extremely diverse, not only in their existing capabilities and experiences, but also in the diverse relationships of national and dialectal groups to use of their own scripts. Making a semiotic classification is the only way to be sure of addressing the common properties of all the scripts.

For the purposes of this section, although “variant” has not been defined, a working definition of “exhibiting some relationship such that one of the variants may, under some circumstances, somehow be conflated with another” is used. Although imprecise, it captures the central sense common to all the ways the term appears to be used with respect to DNS names.

Fundamental to the classification are some basic distinctions. First of all is a distinction between **code point variants**, where a single character is in some way closely related to – or likely to be confused with – an alternative, from **whole-string variants**, where the token at issue is longer than a character, and may be a morpheme, a full word, or even a phrase, some meaningful element in a language that uses the script.

In Nenets, the letter ӈ EN WITH HOOK (U+04C8) may vary with the digraph нг EN + GHE (U+043D + U+0433): this is a code point variant. In Greek, Πειραιάς and Πειραιεύς refer to the same city, Piraeus: these are whole-string variants.

### 3.1.1 Code Point Variants

We treat as code point variants those cases where a single character is at variance with another character or a short sequence, such as a digraph or a trigraph. The essential element is that the variance is at character level, i.e. within the writing system, rather than in the relations of particular words.

Within the code point variants, it is important to distinguish the exchangeable from the visually similar. An **exchangeable** variant is a case where two or more characters or code points are seen by a user as so closely related that they may fill the same role in a domain name label. The user, in some or all cases of their use, is indifferent between them, and so the system must recognize that they are – on occasion at least – non-distinct. A **visually-similar** variant is a case where two or more **glyphs** are so much alike that one may be mistaken for the other. The vagaries of font choice, point size and rendering mean that these cases are not entirely foreseeable, but in general it can be identified where caution is required.


It is entirely possible that a variant character may be both exchangeable and visually similar with another character. Since these two types of cases are likely to be supported differently, for these cases, attention must be given to overlap and precedence of policies.

### 3.1.2 Whole-String Variants

It would also be possible to identify whole-string variants which are purely syntactic, having to do with strings of characters and their order, perhaps re-ordering them or transforming them in some other way, but without bearing on meaningful linguistic elements (for example, Pig Latin 🡪 Igpay Atinlay). These would be classed, in principle, as whole-string variants.

Note the case of code points like tónos in Greek, or zero-width non joiner (ZWNJ U+200C), a control character that is used in the spelling of Devanagari or some Arabic script-based languages such as Farsi and Urdu. These have effects on the rendering of a string as a whole -- either (as with tónos) because there can only be one of them in a word, or (as with ZWNJ) because they might be invisible in their effects on the word’s rendering, except in one crucial locus. Nevertheless, they are not classed here as creating whole-string variants. Instead, it is envisaged that such elements would stand in alternation to the absence of those elements: a TLD containing such an element would trigger a variant label which would be the same string but without the tónos or ZWNJ.

**Linguistic variants** make up the most significant part of whole-string variants: this is where the variant relationship would hold between elements of particular languages (e.g., prefixes, suffixes, words, or phrases). In principle these could hold within a given language, or as relations between the words of different languages (as translations, or historical etymologies). It will be seen that the main concrete case which has arisen in the case studies concerns linkage of elements of different dialects (or registers) of a single language (specifically Greek) as variants. Hence the particular note of **dialectal** variants within linguistic variants.



**Figure 1: Graphical representation of variant cases identified in the case studies**

## 3.2 Taxonomy of Identified Variant Cases

The broad types of cases described above can be further organized into a taxonomy of specified classes.

This taxonomy relies on the concept of **abstract characters** that may entail some difficulties of interpretation. The Unicode standard represents a compendium of code points that can be used to represent abstract characters. Along with each code point is a textual description that refers to the superficial graphical features of each code point, as well as an illustrative depiction that indicates how the code points could be rendered. One code point may be used to represent more than one abstract character, and one or more code points may be used to represent the same abstract character.[[10]](#footnote-11) The glyphs that are used to render abstract characters will result from a combination of the code points used, and rendering rules that are outside the scope of the Unicode standard, typically contained in the instructions within individual font files.

Recognition of abstract characters is often implicit based on the resulting rendering from the combination of code points, a font’s glyphs, and the rendering rules applied. An application of the linguistic understanding is required to discern contrast in these abstract characters, based on analysis of the language in question.

A term which comes closer to the linguistic understanding of “character representing a single phone within a language” is the **conceptual character**. In RFC 3743 (often called “the JET Guidelines”), "variants" are said to be the situation “wherein one conceptual character can be identified with several different Code Points in character sets for computer use.”[[11]](#footnote-12) It is not, however, further defined.  
  
The presumption is that, within a language, every abstract character corresponds to a single phoneme or grapheme (or in UniHan a single sememe, i.e., an interpretable meaning, usually with determinate phonic pronunciations). However, although a single character may be consistent within a language, as between languages it may represent very different phonemes, graphemes and sememes. Consider, e.g., “a” in English and Spanish spelling, which are pronounced very differently; standard and swash kaf in Sindhi and Arabic languages, which marks a linguistic contrast in one language but is stylistic in the other; and as a representative Chinese character, 人 (U+4EBA) has a basic meaning ‘human being’, but in Chinese is pronounced rén and in Japanese jin, nin, hito etc.; each language then uses it with different (but overlapping) combinatory properties.

Nevertheless, the Unicode doctrine is that abstract characters are what is encoded. “When an abstract character is mapped or assigned to a particular code point in the codespace, it is then referred to as an encoded character.”[[12]](#footnote-13) And in practice, “abstract character” is a concept that is needed and is reasonably clear within a given language, giving a sense of an underlying unity in cases where code points seem to have been multiplied beyond necessity, in the process of defining Unicode.

The classes described are identified using the cases of 1, 2, and 3 based on Figure 1 above, and references used in the examples are to the corresponding sections in that team’s case study report.

| **Arabic** | **Chinese** | | | | **Cyrillic** | | **Devanagari** | | | **Greek** | | | **Latin** | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **1. Exchangeable but not Visually Similar** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **1(a). Compatibility mappings** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  | | |  | Rarely used character/sequence of characters, e.g., EN WITH HOOK (U+04C7 / U+04C8); EN + GHE (U+043D U+0433) (3.5); C WITH ACUTE (U+0107) / C + J in Montenegrin (U+0441 U+0301) (9.1) | | Homophonous spellings (4.2) | |  | | | (Discussed for Swedish and German umlaut in 6.3) | | |
| **1(b). Join-control characters** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Discussion of ZWNJ issues (5.21) | |  | |  | | EYELASH RA in Nepali represents a different phoneme from RA, and is currently only rep’d by combination of RA with VIRAMA and ZWJ (U+0930 U+094D U+200D) (4.3.1). Correct spelling of inflected forms in Nepali requires use of ZWNJ (4.3.2) | | |  | | |  | | |
| **1(c). Upper/lower case and underspecified information** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Optional diacritics (notably vowels) (6.4) | Instances where one SC corresponds to one or the other of many TC, often context dependent (2.1 final para.) | | | | IE/IO in Russian (3.1); SMALL LETTER I WITH GRAVE (3.3); | |  | | | TONOS may be absent (11) | | | Case folding (6.3) | |
| **1(d). Positional Variants** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| (Discussed in 7) |  | | | |  | |  | | | SIGMA and FINAL SIGMA (5, 12) | | |  | |
| **1\*2. Exchangeable and Visually Similar** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **1\*2(a). Same abstract character with more than one encoding** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Identical: decomposables, esp. if not normalized (6.1)  6.1 Appendix A.2 (A.2.1 – A.2.2) | Non-identical: Generic variant characters (5) | | | | Identical: decomposables, esp. if not normalized (3.8) | |  | | |  | | | SMALLER TURNED E (U+01DD), SMALL LETTER SCHWA (U+0259) (6.2)  (Discussed at 6.5: Precomposed characters)  (Discussed at 6.4: decorative and contrastive variants) | |
| **1\*2(b). Same abstract character differently rendered in some contexts** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| KAF Group, HEH Group, and YEH Group (6.1.abc), MARBUTA Group (6.1g) HEH with HAMZA Group (6.1h) NOON Group (6.1j); KAF Group, YEH Group, YEH with HAMZA Group; variants of dot orientation (all in 6.2)  6.1 a thru k – Appendix A.1 |  | | | |  | |  | | |  | | |  | |
| **1\*2(c). Different abstract characters, but exchangeable for users** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 6.3 a thru d  vowels with/without HAMZA (U+0621), All forms of ALEF (e.g., U+0627) with/without composed form (6.3ab); TEH MARBUTA (U+0629) and HEH (U+0647) (6.3c); Arabic-Indic and extended Arabic-Indic digits (6.3d) | Simplified characters (SC) / Traditional characters (TC) (5) | | | | GHE/GHE WITH UPTURN (U+0433, U+0491) in Ukrainian (3.2); | |  | | |  | | |  | |
| **1\*2(d). Special characters** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | APOSTROPHE (U+02BC) in Ukrainian (3.6) | | MODIFIER LETTER APOSTROPHE (U+02BC) / zero in Boro/Dogri/ Maithili languages (3.4) | | |  | | | (Discussed at 6.7: Punctuation: Latin characters incorrectly substituted for APOSTROPHE) | |
| **2. Visually Similar, but not Exchangeable** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| **2(a). Simple Visual Similarity** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Non-identical: GHAIN/FEH Group, QAF/AIN with 2 DOTS ABOVE Group, AIN/FEH/QAF with 3 DOTS ABOVE Group (6.2)  6.2 Appendix B2 and B3 |  | | | | Old Letters, e.g., YAT/SEMISOFT SIGN (U+048C / U+048D) (3.4); ZE (U+0437) / DIGIT THREE (U+0033) (3.7); various forms of GHE, KA and EN (e.g., U+0433, 0491, 0493, U+043A,049B, 049D, 04A3, 04A5) (3.9); Appx I passim | | GHA (U+0918) / DHA (U+0927); BHA (U+092D) / MA (U+092E) etc (3.2.1 + Appx III); composite characters DGA/DNA/DRA etc. (3.2.2 + Appx IV); Potential mistaken characters due to rendering errors, environmental restrictions (3.3.1) | | |  | | | (Discussed at 6.6: combining marks)  (Discussed at 6.7: Punctuation: Latin characters confusable with APOSTROPHE) | |
| **2(b). Inter-script** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | Especially of concern for WHOLE-SCRIPT CONFUSABLE strings with Greek and Latin (4) | | Especially of concern for WHOLE-SCRIPT CONFUSABLE strings with other Brahmi scripts, e.g. Gujarati (3.5, 4.1) | | | Especially of concern for WHOLE-SCRIPT CONFUSABLE strings with Cyrillic and Latin | | | (Discussed at 6.1, 7)  Especially of concern for WHOLE-SCRIPT CONFUSABLE strings with Greek and Cyrillic | |
| **3. Linguistic variants** | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | |  | |  | | | Equivalence between corresponding words in Dimotiki and Katharevousa dialects (13) | | |  | |

**Table 1: Range of Variant Cases Identified in Case Study Team Reports**

## 3.3 Discussion of Variant Classes

Unicode typically assigns a unique code point to what it recognizes as an “abstract character” (i.e., a unit of information used for the organization, control, or representation of textual data). (In practice, the glyph is whatever is rendered, being sensitive to fonts, resolution, or other issues.) This classification considers cases where this one-to-one correspondence fails for some reason.

**Class 1. Exchangeable but not Visually Similar**

**Class 1(a). Compatibility mappings**

By this is meant cases where, within a particular language’s spelling system, a digraph or trigraph (sequence of two or three letters) is taken as a conventional equivalent for another letter (usually with a rather rare and distinctive form). The compatibility referred to here is backwards-compatibility, as when a new (more exact) representation is explicitly kept equivalent to an old make-do representation.

An example would be the homorganic syllable-final nasal (anusvara) in Hindi representing a nasal consonant before a following syllable-initial consonant (e.g., writing ambā, hindī gaɳgā as “ãbā, hĩdī, gãgā,” as is normal in Devanagari). These are the “homophonous spellings.”

If any of these equivalences are directly represented in the root, the effect will be to impose this equivalence on all languages which use the given script, because a single rule for processing them all will be necessary. See section 4 for a discussion of this issue.

**Class 1(b). Join-control characters**

There are certain code points (notably ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER, U+200C, “ZWNJ”; and ZERO WIDTH JOINER, U+200D, “ZWJ”) which, under the rules of the IDNA Protocol, may only be inserted in positions in a label that should trigger a particular effect on rendering.

For Arabic script, this is instantiated at length in 5.21 of the Case Study.

In Nepali, the “eyelash ra,” a separate character from “ra,” but not represented by a separate code point is rendered through the insertion of VIRAMA (U+094D) and ZWJ (U+200D). Showing the presence of a morpheme-boundary in a noun may be rendered through the insertion of ZWNJ (U+200C).

**Class 1(c). Upper/lower case and underspecified information**

While DNS labels are comprised of octets and can hold any octet desired, they are defined in RFCs 1034[[13]](#footnote-14) and 1035[[14]](#footnote-15) such that they treat ASCII in a special way. While the DNS preserves ASCII case differences, the difference is not considered in the matching rules. For instance, the label “example” in the DNS is supposed to be preserved just as entered in the authoritative zone file during transmission and caching, and also the label “ExAmple” is also supposed to be so preserved. These two labels, however, could not both be in the same zone for the same resource record, because for the purposes of matching they are the same.

The IDNA Protocol uses a different rule: a code point must be stable under both Normalization Form KC (“NFKC”)[[15]](#footnote-16) and case folding operations to be a **protocol-permitted code point** (see RFCs 5892[[16]](#footnote-17) and 5894[[17]](#footnote-18)). Therefore, upper-case characters in scripts that use them (Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic) are not allowed in **U-labels** – even if the character would have the difference preserved in a traditional LDH label (to use an artificial example from above, the string “ExAmplé” is not a valid U-label, because of the two upper-case characters E and A. This means that a case distinction that is present in usual Latin/Greek/Cyrillic text is routinely neutralized in U-labels and hence IDN TLDs.

**Class 1(d). Positional variants**

.

This case is a

clear example that many composite characters (e.g., vowels and consonant signs that carry diacritic marks, such as <é>, <ā>, < ç>) have more than one representation as code points, namely, as pre-composed wholes, and as the simple letter with a separate combining diacritic. This occurs in Arabic, Cyrillic and Latin. Many of these cases (including some that were raised in the case study reports) do not bear on IDNs, because they do not qualify as valid U-labels according to the IDNA standard. Where there are different standard ways of encoding the same abstract character as precomposed and decomposed forms, IDNA will allow only one form, and thus user interfaces and preprocessors are free to map all other forms into the preferred form. For example, the letter “o” with a circumflex accent can be written in more than one way: by using LATIN SMALL LETTER O, U+600F and COMBINING CIRCUMFLEX ACCENT, U+0302; or by using LATIN SMALL LETTER O WITH CIRCUMFLEX, U+00F4. After normalization, the string is the same code points (in this case, the latter, precomposed form). There are nevertheless some cases where normalization does not completely cover the range of potential inputs. Extensive examples are in the Arabic script case study report, Appendix A.2.1 wherever it says “not defined;” the failure of normalization also contributes to the example of Eyelash Ra outlined in the Devanagari report, section 4.3.1. See the discussion of ZWJ as well.

A rarer case is where the rendering assigned to distinct code points turn out to be indiscernible. It is unclear in these cases whether there is more than one abstract character involved: in any case, the variants do not contrast with one another, and it is a matter of indifference, in ordinary use, which one is intended. There is, however, a security danger in code points which are distinct, but invisibly so, because two strings that differ only in the substitution of the invisibly-different code point are completely indistinguishable to a human (competent with the script in question) but are nevertheless different labels and so lead to different DNS names.

This is the case of Chinese generic variant characters (often resulting from the unification of sources to create UniHan), but also of the two ways of expressing ‘turned e’ or ‘schwa’ in Latin script (U+01DD and U+0259).

The decorated characters in Latin provide many examples of distinct (sets of) code points which represent the same characters, although the Latin report (with one exception) recommends banning them all from use in TLD labels.

**Class 1\*2(b). Same abstract character differently rendered in some contexts**

These are like the cases in 1\*2(a), but differ in that the contrasting code points only have differing forms in some contexts. “Context” here can mean either a linguistic context (the letter’s position next to others in a string), or else regional context, where the way that users treat the writing system differs between languages. For use of such code points in a TLD label, however, a common set of rules on such variant characters must be maintained.

This case frequently occurs in the language written in Arabic script, where the different positional forms may represent what are historically different ways of writing a single given character (but have been given varying code points in Unicode). For example, the letter YEH is represented with U+064A in Arabic language, but U+066C in Iranian languages such as Persian, causing a different incidence of the letter’s distinctive two dots.

Conversely, different forms of a character in Arabic script are displayed depending on where they appear in the word (initial, medial, final and isolated), but all are generated by renderings of the same character (i.e., using a single code point). Given that the separate codings for the positional variants (U+FB50-FBFF), which were once available, are disallowed by the IDNA 2008 protocol, it will be impossible to make them variant characters, since they have no identity as separate characters.

**Class 1\*2(c). Different abstract characters, but exchangeable for users**

The classic case is the Chinese equivalence between Simplified and Traditional characters. These are defined as quite separate code points and hence (prima facie) separate characters. Yet in terms of their contribution to writing particular words, there is no difference between the members of a corresponding Simplified-Traditional pair of characters. The only way to make them contrast is to talk about the actual form or identity of the characters themselves, rather than what they mean or how they sound.

In Arabic script, many combinations of ALEF with and without HAMZA above and below are assigned their own separate code points: they are distinct from each other, but the conventions of the Arabic language (and some other languages’) spellings allow the forms of ALEF with and without HAMZA above and below to be equivalent. In other languages that use Arabic script, this equivalence is not present.

**Class 1\*2(d). Special characters**

There is a requirement expressed across languages for characters which are in a block of code points distinct from those reserved for the relevant scripts: e.g., the apostrophe character used in Cyrillic for Ukrainian and Belarusian (U+02BC); the apostrophe character used in Devanagari for Boro, Dogri and Maithili (likewise U+02BC).

The presence or absence of such characters in the spelling of specific names and words is not straightforward. Because of the characters' status outside the regular code block for the script, the prospects for their routine use are unclear. If both presence and absence of these characters are ruled as acceptable spellings in TLD labels, names and words where these characters are used will become thereby open to use as variant labels.

A further problem is that many of these characters (e.g., the various “apostrophes” – U+0027 APOSTROPHE, U+02BC MODIFIER LETTER APOSTROPHE, many others in the codeblock 02A0-036F, as well as U+A78B LATIN CAPITAL LETTER SALTILLO and U+A78C LATIN SMALL LETTER SALTILLO etc.) all have very similar small forms, and are visually confusable. Some of these characters, such as U+0027 APOSTROPHE, are not permitted at all in U-labels.

**Class 2. Visually Similar, but not Exchangeable**

**Class 2(a). Simple Visual Similarity**

These cases are self-explanatory. Glyphs are not sufficiently distinct to represent reliably their associated code points (nor abstract characters).

For discussion of their treatment within a variant framework, see section3.4.

**Class 2(b). Inter-script**

If labels are to be restricted to a single script, the only case of this is the whole-script confusable case. It is expected that there will be mechanisms to detect these, and block them where necessary. There is a bigger issue to consider if labels are to be constructed out of sets of code points not restricted to those sharing a single script property; see the discussion in section 4.1 for some alternatives.

For discussion of their treatment within a variant framework, see section3.4.

**Class 3. Linguistic variants**

This raises a different set of issues from the character substitutability cases just considered. Potential variants are whole strings (usually words) rather than single characters within a string.

For discussion of their treatment within a variant framework, see section3.5.

## 3.4 Visual Similarity Cases

The cases described in class 2 (and possibly 1\*2) above concern visual similarity of characters. Issues concerning these cases are considered in this section.

### 3.4.1 Treatment of Visual Similarity Cases

As discussed in section 3.2, there are certain cases where the *only* factor creating a possible variant relationship is that a character is visually confusable[[18]](#footnote-19) with another.

No unified user expectation on how to handle such cases emerges from the case study reports. Some highlight the need to delegate a visually confusable variant label along with the applied-for label; others advocate that such variant labels should only be blocked.

Since visual similarity is not only limited to variant cases, in the new gTLD Applicant Guidebook, a string similarity review process is established with the objective of preventing user confusion and loss of confidence in the DNS resulting from delegation of many similar strings. As used in the Guidebook, “similar” refers to strings (labels) so similar that they create a probability of user confusion if more than one of the strings is delegated into the root zone.

To consider how to treat cases of pure visual similarity, it is useful to recall the assumption stated in section 1.1:

*Given that experience in this area is limited, and actions taken will create precedents and outcomes that cannot be undone, variant TLD labels should be narrowly defined, and restrictive rules for active use of variant labels in the DNS should be adopted. Wherever possible, instead of adding a new type of variant TLD label, an alternative approach should be used – for example, using an existing ICANN evaluation or objection process that delivers an appropriate way of blocking undesired TLD strings. If there is a process already in existence that delivers a similar result to what is desired, that process should be used rather than establishing a new type of variant label.*

Building on this assumption, it follows that variant cases where the only determining factor is visual confusability with another label should be subject to blocking, at least in the initial stages. The existing visual similarity processes should be able to address these cases. It is noted that a desired outcome, as expressed by different communities, is predictability in the handling of visual similarity assessments. It seems that for some script communities, it is possible to produce a table that would be able to generate these visually similar variants deterministically. Thus, existing visual similarity processes could potentially be improved by incorporating these tables from the script communities. It may also be possible to modify or extend the zone generation rules suggested by this report to support determinations of visual similarity; see section 4.1 for further discussion.

### 3.4.2 Cross-Script Visual Similarity

The cases discussed in Class 2(b) above concern the similarity of characters across scripts. Cross-script visual similarity is possible, especially among Cyrillic, Greek and Latin scripts (e.g., *peace* (Cyrillic: U+440, U+435, U+430, U+441, U+0435) and *peace* (Latin: U+0070, U+0065, U+0061, U+0063, U+0065) but also as between Devanagari and closely related Brahmi scripts (e.g. Bangla, Gurmukhi). It is possible for two candidate U-labels to appear to be the same in different scripts. Even excluding Unicode properties like Common and Inherited, it is possible to create two IDNA-valid strings in two different scripts where competent users of each script are likely to regard the two strings as the same one. This issue is highlighted in some team reports as "whole-script confusables,” which is also what a similar phenomenon is called by Unicode.

As discussed in section 3.3, this can be treated as a straightforward matter of string similarity. Note that, because this is an issue of component code points being confusable with one another, it is distinguished from the whole string issues discussed in section 3.5 below. The Greek case study team report recommended that a joint effort considering similarities in Cyrillic, Greek, and Latin characters could be pursued.

### 3.4.3 Terminology concerning Visual Similarity

This section focuses on issues related to the acceptability and use of Unicode characters for TLDs; hence we do not seek to adopt terms that are more generally relevant to the relation between symbols and meanings.

One such term is **homograph**, which means an “entity sharing a written form with another entity.” This term is ambiguous as to the level of the entity, referring to distinct characters which happen to have a similar written form just as much as it refers to distinct words written in the same way (e.g., *lead*, *rose* in English).

If so used, *homograph* makes a false analogy between the relation of glyph to the character it represents and the relation of a character-string to the label, name or word it may represent. It is to be avoided for that reason.

*Homograph* is, in fact, usually applied at the word level. The term has a well-established definition as being a relation of words within a language. In this use, it does not extend across language/script boundaries.

By contrast with *homograph*, a **homoglyph** refers only to the situation where multiple abstract or conceptual characters (and usually their multiple associated code points) are represented with the same glyph. This term is independent of language and/or script. It can be applied to similar glyphs within the same language or script. However, it can also be applied to two elements that cause confusion between languages or scripts. Hence, the glyphs with the shapes “a, e, c, p, x” (and in some italic fonts “*g, u, m, n*” too) are homoglyphs, as between Latin and Cyrillic.

The value of using the term *homoglyph* within the variant discussion is dubious. It focuses on the possible multiplicity of interpretations of a single glyph (or set of similar glyphs) without considering the actual danger of confusion this causes, or the degree to which users are indifferent to the difference between the interpretations, leading them to exchange them freely.

For this reason, the report uses the terminology “visual similarity,” which is not specifically restricted as to length of string of glyphs (one or many), or degree of similarity between glyphs in view (absolute or approximate).

## 3.5 Whole-String Issues

The cases described in Class 3 above concern a variant relationship between two or more whole strings of characters. As opposed to code-point level variants (in which the locus of difference lies in individual code points within a string), whole-string level variants would set whole strings (including potential DNS labels) in contrast. This section considers cases of this kind and the likely impacts of their implementation in the root of the DNS.

From the types of whole-string variants, the linguistic variants subtype would seem interesting to some users given that it appeals to some part of the rule-set of a language, whether its orthography, its phonology, its grammar or its lexicon.

However, linguistic variants present a difficulty, in that the rules that define them cannot be represented as well-defined automata, since generalizations within and between languages are subject to arbitrary exceptions, as well as being hard to define formally, at any level of abstractness.

Examples of what might be considered linguistic variants include:

1. Transcriptions (e.g. Ευαγγελία (Greek) and *Evangelia*; 网络 (Simplified Chinese) and *wang luo* (Pinyin transcription), which means *network* in English), which involve constructive use of another language’s phonology and orthography to reconstruct the effect of an expression’s pronunciation in a given language.
2. Homophonic strings within a language’s spelling system (e.g., in English *too* and *two*); this will include different spellings of the same word (lexeme) in the same language and script (e.g., in English: *color* and *colour*); in the extreme case, this may extend to strings representing the same word in the scripts of a multi-script language (e.g., in Japanese: ほんだ (Hiragana), ホンダ (Katakana), 本田 (Kanji), *Honda* (Latin).
3. Corresponding terms in different dialects of the same language, e.g., Ευάγγελος and Βαγγέλης, which are accepted forms of what was (historically) the same name (in Katharevousa and Dimotiki respectively); *diaper* (US English) and *nappy* (UK/AU English).
4. Synonyms within a language (e.g., in English: *buy* and *purchase*).
5. Different identifying expressions within a language (often dependent for their interpretation on conventions, or other shared information): these may be personal (e.g. *Elizabeth II, The Queen, the present queen, the Queen of England, the Head of the Commonwealth* etc.), geographic (e.g., in English: *New York City*, *NYC*, *New York New York*, *the Big Apple* etc.), or in any other field.
6. Translated strings and inter-linguistic correspondences: representations of the same concept/notion in two languages (e.g., *green* (English) and *vert* (French)).

In this breakdown, it becomes clear that linguistic variant rules are never exhaustively and formally predictable, being dependent on equivalences made at various levels (from orthography through grammar and meaning to irony) by users of a given language.

Given the analysis of linguistic variants above, it is clear that some people might want (some of) these cases to be considered variant labels. Writing system and spelling reforms have also had implications for languages that have at times been written in Cyrillic and sometimes also either Arabic or Latin script. Even English has undergone significant spelling reforms, such that some words can be spelled more than one way (e.g., *color* and *colour*) as described above.

One of these types of cases, "Corresponding terms in different dialects of the same language," (3), was recommended for consideration by the Greek case study report, such that Katharevousa and Dimotiki strings should be treated as variants to one another: the registration of one such string would cause the corresponding string in the other dialect to be blocked.

The Greek case study team report noted:

*Alternative, same[-]meaning words, if the domain consists of words[,] are to be disallowed. This rule is especially put in place to deal with words in “Katharevousa” and “Dimotiki.” Dimotiki is the contemporary Greek language, where Katharevousa was in use before 1976. However, many word types from Katharevousa are still in use in Dimotiki and the user should be protected of confusability issues between these same meaning words. For example “Πειραιάς” and “Πειραιεύς” are two names of the same city in Greece, respectively in Dimotiki and Katharevousa – The applicant will only choose to register one of these and the other one should be excluded of registration. The team recognizes the difficulties this procedure presents for automated systems, however, since TLD registrations are not expected to be of great volume this rule could be implemented with relatively low cost for ICANN. (p.14)*

The first sentence of this text suggests that the Greek case study group has not made a distinction between the requested inter-dialectal equivalence of words from a more general synonymy (Cf. 3 vs. 4 in the list above), which would be highly subjective in detailed application. Since the recommendation is only for the inter-dialectal equivalence, this may not matter. However, even if check-lists of all the relevant words and names are available, the relationship may be less neat than is assumed. Although Katharevousa and Dimotiki are largely related formally, this is overall a complex and sometimes unruly linguistic relationship.

A further problem stems from the need to agree a specific fixed list, not only of names, but also of every word in the Greek language (onomasticon), and specifically one, which specified the Dimotiki and Katharevousa equivalent for each headword (lexicon). Besides the need to maintain both of these, there is the further complication that Greek is a highly inflected language, and policies would need to be defined on which precise parts of each word’s alternations would be recognized.

The aforementioned paragraph from the Greek team report recommends an outcome which would “exclude from registration” the second variant string, i.e., blocking it. The gTLD Applicant Guidebook defines two processes that could address this issue in a similar way. The String Similarity review described in Module 2[[19]](#footnote-20) compares any two applied-for gTLD strings for visual similarity. If the strings were found to be confusingly similar, they would be placed in contention sets for later evaluation and resolution. Additionally, the review compares each applied-for gTLD string against existing TLDs. If an applied-for gTLD string failed the String Similarity review due to similarity to an existing TLD it would not pass the Initial Evaluation.

Secondly, Module 3 describes the public objection process in which string confusion is one possible ground for a formal objection to be filed to a gTLD application. String confusion in this context is not limited to visual similarity of characters; but may be based on any type of similarity (including visual, aural, or similarity of meaning). The use of any of these two processes could yield the outcome requested by the Greek case study report for the Dimotiki/Katharevousa issue.

As noted above, linguistic variants are not amenable to algorithmic treatment, because the linguistic principles that cause them do not usually exhibit complete regularity. To produce a general solution to any general case of linguistic variants (even in a single language), it would be necessary to generate (in advance) a dictionary or set of dictionaries that would govern the handling of submitted strings; this would require the engagement of relevant expertise for each language with linguistic variants. Presumably, the dictionaries would need to be reconciled with one another, to ensure that any possible conflicts would be dealt with. Since there is no requirement that DNS labels actually be words, submitted candidate labels would need to be checked to see whether they matched anything in the relevant dictionary or dictionaries, probably including checking for substrings in the dictionaries and substrings in the submitted candidate label. In the event a match was detected, then zone policy would apply as to what to do with the resulting matching label (e.g. to block it, withhold it, or activate it).

It would be necessary to develop a policy for maintaining the dictionaries. It is not clear how ICANN could make effective exclusion rules permitting one type of linguistic relationship to be treated as a variant case, but another not to be. It is also not clear that the system would be subject to practical automation, given the very large number of potential combinations and the likely requirement to perform substring matching. It would be necessary to formulate a policy that could accommodate future changes to dictionaries, and to formulate a policy that accommodated such changes as to avoid a conflict between then-existing root zone entries. Additionally, it seems it would be necessary to have a dispute resolution procedure to handle cases where different applicants’ desires went unmet.

The Greek case study does not recommend that dialectal variants be placed in the root; but once one has begun to treat them in a way analogous to code-point variants, it seems likely that someone will ask that some whole-string variants be placed in the root. Placing any such variants in the root would create indeterminacy in the system, and uncertainty for users. If a user knows that linguistic variants (with all their intrinsic unpredictability) are part of the system, it spreads the sense that what is typed (or seen on the screen) is not necessarily what others get. This will cause difficulties for users. And it may create even greater difficulty than the convenience that others would derive in having a facility of linguistic variants. Such a facility will inevitably be limited, and we do not yet know how its limits could be set.

Ultimately, a decision would have to be made as to whether the cases of linguistic variants are better addressed via variant management processes to be created, or via existing policies and procedures. The case studies have revealed differing points of view on how these issues should best be resolved.

## 3.6 Synopsis of Issues

The case studies have enabled a common classification of variant types, subject to updates from findings concerning other writing systems not covered by the case studies. This adds specificity and clarity to considering the variety of potential variant cases and how significant they are to particular writing systems. To create a variant management mechanism, the first issue to be solved is how to define and delineate the variant cases that may exist. That is, to create a set of rules for addressing various cases, it must be possible to constrain the space such that the problems to be solved are known.

Many of the issues highlighted here are complex, and it is clear that the cases in the script studies vary widely. The classification exercise undertaken here demonstrates that there is not a single “variant problem” to which a solution may be developed, but an array of unique characteristics and considerations to be kept in mind in further discussions.

# Discussion of Issues: Establishing Variant Labels

Every DNS zone has, either implicitly or explicitly, a set of rules that governs what labels are permitted in the zone. This often goes by the general rubric “registry policy.” Some of these policies are related to various conditions that must be met before a registration is permitted. Some of the policies are rules that govern labels: whether they are permitted, and what effects they might have on other candidate labels for the zone. We call this set of rules the label generation rules.

The label generation rules for the operation of an IDNA-enabled[[20]](#footnote-21) zone must, at the very least, include the rules constraining which code points are permitted in a U-label in that zone. (Even “everything permitted by IDNA2008” is such a rule; it is not possible to permit U-labels without implicitly adopting some rule.) We call this list the **code point repertoire for the zone** and, more informally, the **zone repertoire**. (It is important not to use “repertoire” on its own in order to avoid confusion with the meaning of that bare word in the Unicode standards.) In addition, whenever there are variant relationships among code points, the label generation rules must include the specification of which code points may be used as alternatives for other code points (the **alternative code points**), the status of the label that results from the alternation of the code point in question (the **code point variant status**), and any degrees of freedom with respect to the status values.[[21]](#footnote-22) We call the set of these last three items the **code point variant rules**. The alternative code points may need a way to specify “substitute by removal”: code points such as ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER (U+200C) and MODIFIER LETTER APOSTROPHE (U+02BC) seem at least sometimes to need a variant label that does not contain those code points, to permit practical entry under some current user input methods.

The root is a shared resource, and that means that, all else being equal, ICANN should not privilege one group of script or language users over another in the administration of the root zone. Accommodating every desire that everyone might have is a practical impossibility, and even ensuring equitable treatment is complicated. However, it is necessary to have an agreed and accepted mechanism for defining zone repertoires and code point variant rules for the root that could take into account the needs of every language community that can be supported by IDNA.  
  
ICANN must have a way to validate potential IDN variant TLD labels when submitted, and to validate all IDN TLDs requested for variant labels and variant conflicts. By the same token, because the root is a single, shared zone, it is necessary to adopt a single, internally consistent set of label generation rules that governs the operation of this single zone. It is worth observing that, while IDNA2008 determines whether a code point is permitted merely by examining Unicode properties (and not by considering code points one at a time), the protocol was designed with the explicit assumption[[22]](#footnote-23) that registries would add restrictions to the protocol for the purposes of registration. The most natural restriction is to refuse to register code points except those needed to write a supported language. But unlike many other zones, the root might need to support any language; that need may entail careful linguistic study of a large portion of the PVALID code points in IDNA2008.

Identification of an appropriate authority for the code point repertoire for the root zone is a difficult undertaking.  To the maximum extent possible, the relevant language communities need to agree on a shared set of code points for the zone repertoire.  It is not clear on what authority ICANN would rest its claim to being able to decide among different candidate zone repertoires in the event of a dispute. If, on the other hand, no dispute exists, then it does not seem that there would be different candidates for the zone repertoire.

## Establishing the Label Generation Rules

A detailed proposal for the label generation rules is beyond the scope of the present document. Such a proposal would properly belong in a proposal for implementation. This section outlines the parameters by which the rules might be determined.

There are three independent factors that need to be considered to build a process to generate label generation rules. These can be thought of as three parameters to be set in the process.

*Comprehensiveness*. The first parameter is that of relative comprehensiveness (henceforth, “comprehensiveness”). This parameter establishes the degree to which the whole of Unicode (or some relevant Unicode subset) needs to be considered. The maximal setting of this parameter would require that the entire Unicode code space be considered in preparing the label generation rules; the minimal setting of this parameter would require that a rule be developed for any code point actually requested in any U-label in the root zone, but that other code points might be ignored. The maximal setting has the conspicuous advantage that it likely makes for the most stable rules: because the only additions to the zone repertoire could ever come from Unicode additions. The disadvantage is that Unicode encodes some characters that are extremely obscure, and so it might be difficult if not impossible to find relevant experts. Also, considerable work would be undertaken that might never prove useful (it seems very unlikely that anyone will want a TLD spelled using Linear B, for example). A slightly more relaxed approach would be to allow some **script tables** to be passed over. The minimal setting has the advantage that effort is not wasted on code points nobody wants. A middle-range approach might generate rules for those code points that seem likely candidates for requests.

*Expertise*. The second parameter is that of expert authority involvement (henceforth, “expertise”). The maximal setting would require expert development of the rules for the set of code points in question, and by a fairly large body of experts with relevant knowledge of IDNA and DNS, the scripts and languages in question, writing systems, or all of these. The minimal setting would permit anyone to establish any set of rules they liked (with the only constraint being that conflicts would not be permitted, and would be resolved in favor of the most cautious action). The maximal setting has the advantage that the rules are more likely to be stable, because the expert study is likely to expose important issues and set rules to deal with them. However, it is not clear how ICANN might determine expertise, and a situation where someone was dissatisfied with a given result could result in disputes about the legitimacy of one or more experts. It is also possible that governments would desire to participate in the process of setting rules for a particular language or script. In addition, many of the Variant Issues Project case study reports acknowledged that they were missing relevant expertise on some languages using the scripts, and it is not clear how subsequent efforts along these lines could attract more expertise. The advantage of the minimal setting is that it gets ICANN completely out of the role of evaluating people’s claims about how their language works, but it would appear to invite attacks where someone sets rules designed to prevent someone else’s TLD label from being permitted. It also seems likely to cause overall instability of the rules. A middle-range setting in this case might empanel experts to review proposals for rules that were previously solicited, but not require them to do all the development themselves.

*Qualification*. The third parameter is that of code point property qualification (henceforth, “qualification”). This determines what would be required for a code point to be considered for inclusion in the zone repertoire in the first place. The maximal setting of this parameter requires that a zone repertoire consist only of code points all having the same Unicode script property. The minimal setting of this parameter permits completely arbitrary combinations of code points to make up a zone repertoire. The maximal setting has the advantage that it relies entirely on a property already defined by Unicode, but one should keep in mind that even LDH labels do not all come from the same script (HYPHEN-MINUS U+002D, and all the digits have the script property COMMON). The minimal setting avoids any problems having to do with multi-script writing systems by permitting arbitrary sets of code points; it also allows a script that needs but one or two code points from Common or Inherited to use them without requiring looking at the entire Common and Inherited ranges. But this flexibility might entail confusing or conflicting rules when more than one language community wants to use the same code point in different ways. Medium-range settings for this parameter might include treating Common and Inherited script properties as somehow being part of any script under consideration, or else starting with the Unicode script tables and then allowing arbitrary build-up of the zone repertoire by restricting the other ranges permitted to be considered.

## 4.2 Sample Options for Establishing Label Generation Rules

With these parameters in mind, it might be useful to consider some ways the parameters could be set in order to illustrate the range of options that they make available. These examples are not exhaustive; they’re also only sketches, offered to provide an intuition about how the label generation rules might get established, rather than complete analyses of the different approaches.

Note that in what follows, “zone repertoire” and “label generation rules” are sometimes used informally to refer to the *subset* of the eventual zone repertoire and label generation rules. By definition, it is impossible to have more than one zone repertoire in a zone at one time, because the zone repertoire is just a list of the code points permitted in the zone. For practical reasons (as noted above) it is not possible to permit inconsistent rules about the handling of code points into the root zone.

1. Complete generation for every script table to be used, by an expert panel

This scenario sets the comprehensiveness parameter nearly to its maximal value, the expertise parameter to the maximal value, and the qualification parameter to its maximal value. In this scenario, ICANN would select some number of scripts (from those already defined by Unicode) it wants to support. It would convene one expert panel per script, and instruct them to build a completely comprehensive set of label generation rules for all the code points in the script. The zone repertoire for the root would thereby be established as the set of all and only the code points in all those script tables to be studied (except those DISALLOWED by IDNA2008). Each panel would develop the list of alternative code points and associated code point variant rules for the relevant script. Label generation rules would only be needed for scripts to be supported in the root zone, though of course it would be necessary to establish additional rules on the introduction of a new script. In the end, a single set of label generation rules would be merged from the collective output of the different script expert panels.

Using this method, code points that are needed by some language, but that are not included in the script table used by that language, would not be permitted. Dealing with languages written in more than one script (e.g., Japanese) could be extremely tricky. Since the deliberation is at the level of a script, it would seem necessary to require that every code point in a U-label have the same script property as every other code point in the U-label. U-labels in the root zone would not need to have any identifying tag, because the script of the label could be derived from the script property of any code point in it (and any labels of mixed scripts would not be permitted).

It is not clear what one might do if a script expert panel were unable to come to consensus on the necessary rules for every code point in that script. If consensus were required, it would permit a single individual to block registrations for everyone. While we do not have examples of such fractiousness in our work so far, how a language is written is often an intensely (politically) fraught question.

In the event Unicode added or removed a code point from a script already included in the label generation rules, it would be necessary immediately to convene a new script expert panel to decide what to do about the new code point. It would be critical to prevent any registration with that code point until the panel had ruled, and probably necessary to have grandfathering rules for handling already-registered labels using code points implicated in new variant rules. If a code point changed scripts -- unlikely but not impossible under the Unicode rules -- then a similar immediate convention of the expert script panel would be needed. (It is worth noting that the most common code points available under IDNA2008 have been stable for a very long time, and are extremely unlikely to change in this way; all the examples are likely to be very rare characters. To all but eliminate this risk, it might be worth adopting a stability criterion so that a code point is ineligible for inclusion in the Label Generation Rules unless it has been completely stable in several Unicode iterations. Under this scenario, that would require restriction of the entire script; but other scenarios described below might permit restriction of just one code point.)

1. Assemble an expert panel for scripts likely to be desired, and include code points on a “best efforts” basis

This approach lowers the setting of the comprehensiveness parameter, and leaves everything else the same. In this scenario, the scripts are again selected in advance by ICANN, and ICANN assembles the relevant panels to develop the rules for the script. The panel, however, need only rule on code points with which it is familiar. Code points that the panel does not feel qualified to address would be left out of the eventual zone repertoire delivered.

This scenario has similar properties to the previous scenario, but differs in interesting ways. The zone repertoire for the root cannot be determined in advance, and can be derived only after all the expert panels have reported. Failure to reach consensus on some code point does not completely block progress: the panel could leave such a code point out on the grounds that consensus was not achieved.

This scenario also means that applicants for root zone U-labels would need to ensure that the code points they intended to use were actually in the zone repertoire. If not, such a potential applicant would need to engage whatever process was in place to try to alter the zone repertoire. During application evaluation, ICANN would need to add a step to ensure not only that the script in question was one of the permitted ones and that all code points in the U-label were in the same script, but also that all the code points were in the zone repertoire.

This scenario seems likely to reduce the chances of serious issues arising from changes in Unicode, because code points that are likely to have any changes are also the ones most likely not to be well-understood (and therefore to be excluded from the zone repertoire). The set of label generation rules is slightly more likely to experience some instability under this approach than under the first, because a new participant might ask for changes to the zone repertoire in order to add a code point from a script table that has already been studied.

Because this scenario is likely to require maintenance of the label generation rules that is more complicated than simply dealing with new Unicode versions, it might be necessary to create some sort of standing expert review panel. The details for this are something to be undertaken in the event of implementation. ICANN has other standing panels designed to ensure expert review of various technical and policy matters, and the composition of the label generation rule maintenance panels would presumably be determined along similar lines. The panel, however, would need to include expertise in all the relevant languages and scripts, as well as in the DNS and IDNA.

1. Create policies for script-relative lists of code points

This scenario keeps the comprehensiveness and expert parameters the same as in the previous scenario, but lowers the qualification parameter so that zone repertoires may be built to extend the Unicode Script Tables. Because of the possible difficulties with “one Script Table” policies, it might be desirable instead to permit language communities to specify the code points they want to use to write their language. In this scenario, ICANN would assemble and direct the various expert panels for scripts as above, but explicitly permit the panels to extend the script table defined by Unicode with code points from other scripts. The panel would select some group of code points, which we call a **representation repertoire**, as the list of code points to be included in the zone repertoire. Similarly, the panel would determine **representation variant rules** that would be intended to be part of the code point variant rules. The combination of the repertoire and variant rules is called here the **representation label rules**, and all of these are to be identified by a **representation identifier**.

This scenario has many of the properties of the previous one, but it does not restrict the experts to predefined subsets of the Unicode code space. Instead, they are free to build the representation repertoire from the whole of Unicode. The expert panels might be organized around broad script categories (as the Variant Issues Project case study teams were), around a specific language or multiple languages, or even across linguistic lines in the event that seemed desirable (e.g., to address cross-script Latin/Greek/Cyrillic issues). Panels would work on code points with which they were familiar, and would usually need expertise from all the relevant language communities as well as experts in DNS and IDNA.

Different representation repertoires might include the same code point without harm, but it would run against the spirit of this scenario for broad swaths of different representation repertoires to include the same code points or be intended to be used with the same languages. The basic goal in this scenario is to produce something like the Unicode script tables while still allowing a small number of code points to be allowed across scripts; a subsidiary goal is to avoid having to deal with the entire Common and Inherited ranges in Unicode. When the different representation repertoires are combined to make a unified zone repertoire, it is necessary to include, in that zone repertoire, the representation identifier. This way, when a candidate U-label is submitted for inclusion in the root zone, it can be identified which representation repertoire the label is supposed to conform to, and it can be checked to ensure that all the code points in the label are indeed covered in the representation repertoire. (A label that did not conform to some such representation repertoire would be rejected.)

It is not clear what one might do if two panels were to set conflicting representation variant rules for the same code point. Some dispute mechanism would undoubtedly be necessary; the likeliest approach would be to block any potentially-conflicting variant characters across the representation label rules.

If a suitable existing repertoire were not available for a label someone desired, then those wishing to adjust an existing repertoire, or to create a new one, would need to request a new panel to create a suitable repertoire. Label generation maintenance panels, as outlined in the previous scenario, would likely be needed. As suggested above, it would be important to create a process that tended to discourage the creation of new repertoires or many modifications to existing repertoires. The reason for this is the same as the reasoning offered for variant labels in the first place: the “principle of least surprise.” If the goal is to ensure that users are not surprised, then rules that are different depending on when a label was added to the root zone would violate that principle of least surprise. Once a label generation policy permits a code point or establishes a variant rule, it should be difficult (although not impossible) to change that.

A notable advantage of this scenario is that it avoids the somewhat artificial link between the Unicode script properties and any given language. In addition, because it does not require any treatment of code points for which there is no demand until that demand appears, it avoids having to address code points for which the expertise is not available. A significant disadvantage to this approach is that it relies less on existing attributes (such as Unicode script properties) and relies more on expert groups to make findings about the code points. It also has the potential for “deadlock” and competing repertoires where different groups of users cannot come to agreement about how to deal with a subset of code points.

1. Evaluate community proposals for label generation rules

This scenario would keep the comprehensiveness and qualification parameters the same as the previous one, but lower the “expertise” parameter so that the expert panel would merely review submitted proposals from the community instead of developing the representation label rules itself. Because this scenario relies on the interest of the community to develop the representation repertoires and associated variant rules, this approach would minimize the amount of work expended on code points that nobody wants. On the other hand, it seems possible that experts would recognize interactions and issues that might not be included in volunteer submissions. This could lead to considerably greater instability in the label generation rules, as problems were identified (presumably sometimes after the fact of **activation** in the root) and then addressed. Much stronger conflict-resolution mechanisms would be needed for this scenario, but it appears that the experts would act as a filter that would perform most such conflict resolution.

1. Build up zone repertoires *ad hoc*

This scenario sets the comprehensiveness, qualification, and expert parameters all to the minimum. In this case, interested parties of any sort could submit representation label rules they desire. All of them would be accepted in an additive way to govern the root. Instead of ICANN selecting an expert group, representation repertoires and associated variant rules could be created by interested parties, organized according to whatever principle they liked. The combination of these representation label rules into a single label generation policy would still need a meta-rule in order to deal with conflicts; in general, such a rule should always pick the most reversible action (i.e., blocking), to avoid controversial or possibly harmful entries in the root zone. (So in many cases, conflicting rules would cause potential variants to be covered by the rules all to be blocked.)

The principal advantage of this approach is that it would take ICANN completely out of the role of deciding whose expertise counts with respect to a language or script. A significant disadvantage of this approach would be that it is subject to denial of service: someone who is opposed to variants in principle (or in some specific case) could always create a conflicting rule for any representation label rule, and the conflict-resolution mechanism (in order to do the safest thing) would therefore tend to prevent any variant labels from being activated. Moreover, because this approach tends to encourage more innovative repertoires and associated rules (as there is little cost to adding one), it is more likely to lead to instability in the label generation policy.

## 4.3 Synopsis of Issues

Establishment of label generation rules is a crucial step toward developing a variant management mechanism for the root zone, and the methodology used in this regard will significantly impact consideration of the other issues in this report. Determining the best methodology to achieve the desired goals of consistency and reliability will require a balancing of factors including definition of the scope and identification of the necessary parties to be involved in establishing the label generation rules.

# 5 Discussion of Issues: Treatment of Variant Labels

Once variant labels are identified, a range of possible states and corresponding actions may be taken on those labels. Thus, a variant management mechanism could encompass both active use of labels in the DNS, and prevention of labels from use in the DNS. The possible states that apply to a name are as follows:

**Blocked:** A status of some label with respect to a zone, according to which the label is unavailable for allocation to anyone. The term “to block” denotes the registry (the zone operator) taking this action.

**Withheld:** A status of some label with respect to a zone, whereby the label is set aside for possible allocation to some entity. In this strict sense, a withheld name is not actually allocated. The term “to withhold” denotes the registry (the zone operator) performing the setting aside.

**Allocated:** A status of some label with respect to a zone, whereby the label is associated administratively to some entity that has requested the label. This term, and its cognates “allocation” and “to allocate”, represents the first step on the way to delegation in the DNS. When the registry (zone operator) allocates the label, it is effectively making a label a candidate for activation. Allocation does not, however, affect the DNS at all.

**Activated/Active:** A status of some label with respect to a zone, indicating that there are DNS resource records at that node name; or else that there are subordinate names to that name, even though there are no resource records at that node name. In the case where there are resource records at the node name, any resource record will do. In the case where there are subordinate names but no resource records (except those to support DNSSEC), the label names an empty non-terminal. A registry (zone operator) setting the active status activates the name, or performs activation.

**Delegated:** A status of some label with respect to a zone, indicating that in that zone there are NS resource records at the label. The NS resource records create a zone cut, and correspond to an SOA record in the subordinate domain. The act of entering the NS records in the zone is delegation, and to do that is to delegate. This definition is largely based on RFC 1034[[23]](#footnote-24); the reader should consult RFC 1034 for detailed discussion of how the DNS is broken into zones.

**Mirrored:** A status of some active label with respect to a zone, indicating the isomorphism of the namespace beginning with that label, and at least one other namespace beginning with another active label in the zone. If two domain names are mirrored, then for a namespace starting with one, the namespace starting with the other is isomorphic to the first, subject to the usual DNS loose consistency strictures. The act of setting two or more labels to be mirrored *and maintaining the namespace correctly* is mirroring. Currently, there are two different techniques for this. The first is aliasing: CNAME, DNAME, and other such techniques that redirect a name or a tree, effectively substituting one label for another during DNS lookup. The second is by using provisioning constraints, such that an underlying provisioning system always effects a change in all of the names whenever that change is effected in one of the names. The set of domain names (not labels) that are supposed to be the beginning of isomorphism are mirrors. Mirrors whose namespaces have not been maintained to preserve isomorphism are broken mirrors.

The state values blocked, withheld, and allocated are mutually exclusive. The active (which includes but is not limited to delegated and mirrored) state usually implies that allocation has occurred.

These states may result in a different user experience, as well as having an impact on the operations of ICANN, the TLD registry operator, and other stakeholders that are part of the Internet ecosystem. This section discusses the issues that arise in this area as a result of IDN variant TLD labels.

## 5.1 Possible States for Variant Labels

The states associated with the actions described above are of the predictable forms: blocked, withheld, allocated, activated, delegated, and mirrored.

Since blocked means that nobody may have the allocation, it follows that nobody could request such a state (for that would imply some sort of proto-allocation over the domain); therefore, blocked is a pure matter of registry policy (in the context of this report, an action taken by the registry for the root zone, i.e., ICANN). Blocking could be the consequence of the combination of a registry policy and some state of the registry. For example, the rule for a code-point could be such that, if a label containing that code point is allocated, then a label containing some other code point must be blocked.

Because blocking is a matter of registry policy, the change of a label from blocked to any other state is either a consequence of a change in registry policy, or else a change in state in the registry such that the blocking condition (e.g., the allocation of a label with a block-generating code point) is removed.

A withheld status results from the combination of policy and the requests of applicants. For example, suppose a registry policy permits (but does not require) a TLD label and its variant TLD label to be delegated. In the event the applicant chooses not to delegate the variant TLD label, registry policy may require that the variant TLD label be withheld from all others but the applicant throughout the registration lifetime of the **fundamental label**. In accordance with an applicant request, the variant TLD label could move from being withheld to being allocated (and then anything that can be done with an allocated label would apply).

In principle, a change in registry policy (but not a change in registry state) could cause a label to move from withheld to blocked. If a change in registry state were to cause this, it would be an indication that the registry policy was inadequate in the first place, because it had not addressed potential conflicts well enough. However, since both states imply the label is not active in the DNS, the implications for users seem negligible, if any.  
  
An allocated status would result from any case where an application containing a variant TLD label is approved, and it is not blocked or withheld. An allocated status could also result when a variant TLD label associated with a fundamental label is either also requested to be activated, or required by registry policy to be activated (see below). By request, the status of an allocated label could be changed to withheld. Allocated labels may normally be activated, subject to usual registry policies, at the initiative of the registrant of that label (i.e., in the context of the root zone, usually the TLD operator). A change of state from allocated to either withheld or blocked should have negligible implications for users other than the registry to which the label was allocated.

An activated status results from placing some sort of DNS record into the parent zone such that it is possible to perform a DNS lookup on the name and receive an answer. It is possible for the registry to require the simultaneous activation of a group of names, denying all of them if any of them cannot be activated. Delegation and mirroring are just species of activation. A domain can be de-activated by removing the relevant records from the DNS (for technical reasons, when there is a delegation the name often has to be removed from both the parent side and child side name servers in order that it stop resolving, but the details of how to ensure a name has stopped operating completely in the DNS are beyond the scope of the present report).

De-activating a TLD in the root could have grave consequences on users if such TLD has itself active names under it. Removing a TLD from the root zone is by no means a simple operation, and the few cases that have happened in the past took in the order of years to complete.

## 5.2 User Experience with Variant Labels

The case study reports discussed issues to be considered from the user’s perspective, such as input methods like keyboards, and software issues. While many of these issues are directly relevant to user experience of IDNs, they are not a result of variant labels as such (although input methods may drive some calls for variants). The use or expectation of IDN variant TLDs, however, affects user experience and this section explores those issues. On top of these issues, it is important to keep in mind the limitations in the overall Internet operating environment described in section 1.

### 5.2.1 IDNA2003 to IDNA2008 migration issues

Despite the definition of domain name labels as octets (which means, in principle, that there are no character set-specific rules about the handling of those labels), RFC 1034 defines a Preferred Name Syntax[[24]](#footnote-25). This is the source of two features of the DNS that cause trouble for internationalization. The first is the “LDH” convention: conforming labels are made up of letters, digits, and the hyphen. The second is the issue of case.

The DNS is often said to be “case insensitive”, but that does not quite capture how it behaves. For LDH names, it is case-insensitive, but case-preserving.[[25]](#footnote-26) This means that, while the domain name labels “example” and “ExAmple” match one another for the purposes of lookup, they may be displayed differently to users. This facility is at least sometimes used to make names easier to remember (or pronounce correctly).

This feature of LDH naming may have established a user expectation that extends to other scripts that use case, such as Cyrillic, Greek, and Latin. Unfortunately, IDNA does not work similarly with respect to case. IDNA2003 folds the case of upper-case code points to lower-case[[26]](#footnote-27) on the Unicode form of the label it receives. This step often causes diacritics to be lost, which means that the case-folded name may not match the name stored in the DNS. By contrast, under IDNA2008 all upper case code points are disallowed. Application software may or may not do something with upper case code points (though there are recommendations that applications perform a case fold operation prior to putting the string into NFC form to be used as a U-label; see RFC 5895[[27]](#footnote-28)); but even after the application has performed some mapping, the results may be surprising to the user. To give an example: to many French speakers, the upper case of LATIN SMALL LETTER E WITH ACUTE, U+00E9 (é) is LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E, U+0045 (E) rather than LATIN CAPITAL LETTER E WITH ACUTE, U+00C9 (É). But the case-folded form of E is e, so someone who tries to use the label “ECOLE” will not manage to reach the label “école”.

This issue is not directly related to variants, but it is rather a general issue of IDNA support. It might, however, be one important type of variant-inspiring behavior, because most of the deployed code today supports IDNA2003 and not IDNA2008. As a result, one class of desirable variants might be those that cause the loss of information due to case folding not to be apparent to users. The Latin case study report rejected variants of this (and every other) sort because they are not generalizable in the Latin script.[[28]](#footnote-29) The issue is nevertheless much (if not all) of the basis for the Greek case study report’s recommendations with respect to tonos and final form sigma.[[29]](#footnote-30)

### 5.2.2 Types of users

The users of the DNS are varied in respect of what they expect, what they want, and what they need. The deployment of any variant strategy will affect the different types of users differently. There are two basic categories of affected user. One category includes those who are directly involved in some way in the registration or operation of the name in question. The other category includes only those who are in no way involved in the operation, but interact with the name somehow. Some people can fall into both categories, but only these two groups are relevant. They can be described as follows:

* + - * System administrator of the affected systems: One who has to configure the variant domain names to work on the target systems;
      * Other network operators not involved in operating the target name: People who need to deal with network traffic from multiple names that are somehow supposed to be the same;
      * Registrants: The primary contact for registration of a name;
      * Registrars: The service providers who perform actions on the names during registration (registration privacy vendors and resellers would be special cases of these);
      * Registry operators: The service providers who provide the authoritative repository where a name (and its variants) might be registered;
      * Software developers: The developers of software such as hosting management systems that need to be able to treat multiple names as somehow being variants of one another, as well as end-user software like web browsers that will need to be able to cope with cases where variants are exposed to them;
      * Law enforcement and other security investigators: Those who may need to interact with a domain and any of its variants due to legal or network security reasons;
      * End users: the average Internet user exposed to the domain name and any variants. This is the user “reading the label on the side of a bus,” but it extends to anyone who is exposed to variant labels on the Internet.

The effects on registry operators and registrars are covered in section 5.4. The rest of the affected parties are considered below.

It is important to recognize that some parties who might be affected are not affected in every case. For instance, while a registrant is affected no matter what the status of variants labels, other network operators experience traffic (and therefore possible cost) only when a name and its variants are actually in the DNS and originating traffic.

### 5.2.3 User capabilities

Any user of any of the types listed will have some capabilities with respect to any given internationalized label. There are three broad categories of capability.

The first is competence in the script or language relevant to the label. A user with this capability can understand the label (or, anyway, find it intuitive enough to use – there is no reason to assume the label will be a word), has the ability to type and otherwise use the label, and so on. A native user of simplified Chinese encountering a simplified Chinese label while using his or her own computer might be an example of this category.

The second category is of limited competence with the script or language relevant to the label. A user with this capability might be able (for instance) to read the script well enough to recognize roughly what the label is, but not read the intended language of the label well enough to use it easily (consider an English speaker confronted with two labels, one intended for a Swedish audience and one for a Norwegian audience). On the other hand, the user may simply be faced with technical limitations that cause difficulty in the use of the label (imagine someone at a public-terminal keyboard in Iran attempting to write a label that includes ARABIC LETTER YEH, U+064A, ي).

The third category is of no familiarity with the relevant script or language. Users in this category can at best cut and paste unfamiliar symbols, and may not even be in a position to do that, owing to display limitations or other issues. They cannot understand the label's intended meaning, and the **A-label** form of the label is exactly as useful (or useless) to such a user as the U-label form.

### 5.2.4 What users expect and what they get

For each category of users, it is useful to think of the user experience in terms of what the user might expect. Imagine a base string X and another string Y. X is a U-label that makes a top-level domain. There are four possible experiences a user might have:

E1: The user expects Y to work as a substitute for X, and it does.

E2: The user expects Y to work as a substitute for X, but it does only partially or unreliably.

E3: The user expects Y to work as a substitute for X, and it does not.

E4: The user does not expect Y to work as a substitute for X, and it does.

E5: The user does not expect Y to work as a substitute for X, but it sometimes does.

E6: The user does not expect Y to work as a substitute for X, and it does not.

For the present purposes, E6 is not that interesting: without any variant effort, this expectation and experience would be met by the traditional operation of the DNS. Therefore, we will concentrate on cases E1-E5. For the following discussion, imagine two candidate fully qualified domain names: example.X and example.Y.

Before proceeding, it is necessary to expand on this very simplistic notion of “work.” We have here distinguished between “not working at all” and “working partly.”[[30]](#footnote-31) Given the loose consistency requirements in the DNS, most services on the Internet do not work or fail to work all at once: with the exception of cases where a service is simply not configured or activated (not working at all), most cases of “not working” are intermittent. Failures related to DNS resolution or inconsistent resolution results take time to propagate, and an observation made by one person from one position on the network may not be repeatable elsewhere. Experience with deployed systems suggests that configuration is likely to have frequent minor inconsistencies, with some system or some part of some system incorrectly configured instead of being completely broken. These considerations, and the general principle of robustness for Internet servers, mean that inconsistent behavior or intermittent failures are more likely than complete failure. In the following discussion, “does not work” merely means “the support is not available or it is somehow disabled”; every other type of failure is a partial failure. But it should be remembered that in many ways this sort of partial failure (or inconsistency) is worse, because users cannot discern a reliable pattern.

Moreover, the example that we are using is itself artificially constrained: in the case where there are variant TLDs, there is every reason to believe that there would be variants at the second level as well; so the two names example.X and example.Y would in practice likely be a list of several names instead. The number of fully-qualified names would be the number of TLD variants times the number of second-level label variants. In general, the number of fully-qualified names in the entire set of names to be managed is determined by multiplying the number of variants in each label of any one of the fully qualified names in the set by the number of labels in that member of the set. So, If there were three levels (e.g. ‘www.example.X’ and variants of all those levels of label) then the number of variant names is the number of variant TLD labels times the number of second level variant labels times the number of third level variant labels.

System administrators

The system administrator has a practical problem to address whenever performing any administrative functions in an environment where mirrored variants exist. As of this writing, there are very few tools that already support administration of IDNA labels using the U-label form. This means that administrators need mostly to work with names in A-label form: “xn--sample-punycode-output-here.” Moreover, tools mostly do not have direct support for linking various names together, so as far as the tools are concerned these variants are all just separate names from one another. For instance, apart from adding parallel configuration for different names to a mail server, many mail servers have no way of telling that the same local-part at example.X and example.Y are really the same mailboxes.

In the case of E1 (user expected a variant and such is implemented), the system administrator for the affected domain has to configure all the services at example.X also to respond to example.Y (so that, for example, the web server responds to web page requests on http://example.X and also http://example.Y; mail to user@example.X and mail to user@example.Y both get directed to the same mailbox; and any other service that is aware of the name with which it was contacted works in parallel as well). If the system administrator does this, then each such service will work the same way for example.X and example.Y. There is, of course, a maintenance cost, in that services for example.Y need to be reconfigured whenever services for example.X are. Similarly, any site renumbering and so on will require twice the effort (and additional effort for each additional working variant). If the system administrator fails to maintain the services in a coordinated fashion, then there will be inconsistent results and possibly service outages.

It is difficult to know how case E2 (user expected a variant and it works unreliably) could happen here, unless the TLD operator of X and Y were having problems with Y. For the system administrator, such a case would mean service outages and surprises that would be difficult to diagnose.

In the case of E3 (user expected a variant which is not implemented), the system administrator configures all the services for example.X also to respond to example.Y, just as in the case of E1. The effects of this, however, are either negligible or mildly dangerous, depending on how the parent domain is administered. If Y is not active because it is allocated-only, blocked or withheld as a possible variant, then there is little harm: the system administrator’s systems respond to a name that will never be looked up on the Internet, so no damage occurs. Matters are different, however, if a system administrator configures the systems to respond to example.Y, but Y is in fact a completely separate domain delegated to a different registry operator than X. In this case, the system administrator has configured the systems to operate using a name that the system administrator does not actually control. In principle queries for example.Y should not arrive to the servers for example.X (since the parent name does not consider them variants), but they could if the servers are also recursive. In effect, the system administrator will have accidentally hijacked example.Y, from the point of view of those querying the servers configured by said system administrator.

In the case of E4 (user does not expect a variant but such exists), the system administrator does not configure anything to respond to example.Y, but it turns out that Y is in fact an activated variant of X. In this case, the service will receive connection attempts on example.Y, even though the services believe example.Y is not one of their names (for services that are aware of the name with which they were contacted). The registrant of that name might in this case lose web hits, emails, messages, etc. This case might be something that would cause others to have E2- or E3-type experiences.

The case of E5 (user does not expect a variant, but it works sometimes) is, for the system administrator, just like E4 only with the addition of intermittency. The intermittency could be only in time: because the failure would have to result from DNS failures in Y (or its children), it is unlikely that the failures would be restricted only to some services.

Other network operators

Similar to the system administrator, the network operator user will mainly be affected by active variants and particularly mirrored variants. Network operators who are not directly related to the operation of example.X may nevertheless encounter example.X (and example.Y), because the network operators are intermediaries between the operator of example.X and other end users. The effects on these operators are mostly subtle and not that serious; on the other hand, if they happen they will contribute to a general failure of reliability of variant names. Moreover, for very large network operators, even relatively small numbers of failures can result in significant increases in logging and troubleshooting costs. Additionally, given the state of the DNS today, there will be no ways inside the DNS for a network operator to tell that example.X and example.Y are related to one another; and because the network operator has no existing relationship to these names, he or she would have no reason to suppose they are related to one another. The operator would have to resort to tools like WHOIS, which are poorly adapted to use in automated systems.

In the case of E1 (user expected a variant and such is implemented), the network operator sees no effect, but logs will be less compressible than they otherwise would be. Even at large sites, the additional compression overhead is unlikely to be a really significant cost, but because this is an effect it is included here for completeness.

In the case of E2 (user expected a variant which works sometimes), the network operator occasionally experiences the same problems as in E3. This “sometimes” might be over time, or it might be consistent but related to a single service. For instance, if the system administrator discussed above failed to keep the configuration for the mail server up to date, mail to example.X might work while mail to example.Y failed; if the mail was coming from the network operator’s site, then the network operator may experience increased support and troubleshooting costs.

In the case of E3 (user expected a variant which is not implemented), the network operator may experience increased customer support costs, as customers of said network operator find that example.Y does not work. In addition, for mediated services (like email, where the network operator likely runs the outbound mail server) there will be additional load due to failed transmissions.

In the case of E4 (user does not expect a variant but such exists), the network operator may experience traffic from an unexpected source. This could cause the network operator to react to the traffic as abuse, or just to reject it, particularly if the network operator is expecting the reverse DNS tree and the forward DNS tree to match exactly. If the system administrator for example.X and example.Y is doing a good job, however, this case is not very likely.

A similar effect, rather more likely, would happen in case of E5 (user does not expect a variant, and one works sometimes). Suppose that the system administrator of example.X and example.Y has done an indifferent job, and so example.Y is incorrectly configured in the DNS (such that it has no mail exchange). Users of example.X, however, sometimes use the example.Y form when sending their email. Inbound email to the network operator’s mail server might be checked for proper configuration, in order to ensure that mail from [user@example.Y](mailto:user@example.Y) is legitimate. Because example.Y could not possibly get mail back, the network operator might reject the mail (probably discarding it), and might begin to treat the source of the mail as a source of spam. This treatment might even affect mail from example.X, because many spam handling systems work by identifying the IP address (of the source mail server) rather than domain name.

Registrants

A registrant is in some sense in the best position to refine his or her expectations of what will happen with a name, but is also constrained by registry policies and the available registry and (where they are involved) registrar systems in what the registrant receives. In particular, in our example we are supposing a registrant of example.X, so the variant relationship is at the parent. If the parent operates by doing automatic mirroring (by, for instance, using a DNAME record to point Y to X), then the user might not be aware that he or she is in fact registrant of two different DNS names. (Compare also to the system administrator discussion, above.)

Before consideration of the cases, it is important to note that registrants need to have an understanding of the various possible states of variant labels whenever they have options for managing the variants. For instance, in a case where a registry automatically withholds variants but does not allocate them without some action on the part of a registrant, the registrant needs to know to look for this action. Similarly, if there are restrictions on how a variant name may be operated (like a restriction to mirroring, for instance), the registrant needs to understand these rules. This may be more information about the domain name life cycle than a registrant is usually prepared for.

Case E1 (user expected a variant and such is implemented) is of course the ideal for the registrant, as long as the registrant actually knows that the support is there.

Case E2 (user expected a variant but it only sometimes works) might happen if the chain of systems between the registrant and the registry had missing or buggy features: the management of a variant label, for instance, might not work correctly. This is likely to cause apparent service failures.

Case E3 (user expected a variant which is not implemented) is the one that is most difficult for the registrant, because the registrant expects certain things to work that do not. This leads to unexpected failures (e.g., a web site that does not serve all the visitors that were expected, or mail that cannot be received from some people). This failure case is also likely to be a surprising one – that is, the registrant likely does not know to look for a failure in the first place, and therefore is not aware that the problem exists. (If the registrant knows about the problem, of course, he or she could simply register the additional name, assuming the Y TLD also existed. But the primary motivator for variants is for the case where humans do not detect a difference even though machines do.)

Case E4 (user does not expect a variant but such exists) is possibly a pleasant surprise for the registrant of example.X. There is also the case of a potential registrant (not to be confused with that of example.X) that tries to register example.Y, which may result in some confusion for a non-Active variant. However, this case is no worse than when a user expects to register a name and finds that it is already registered in a scenario with no variant TLDs.

Case E5 (user does not expect a variant but it works sometimes) is not much different from case E4.

Software developers

Similar to the network operator, software developer users will mainly be affected by active variants, and particularly mirrored variants. The software development communities that are affected by variants are quite different from one another. On the one hand are those who are developing systems and support tools for system administrators and others (we can call these “systems programmers”). This group will need to be able to expose as much information as possible about variants, because the administrators of the systems need to be able to manage in small increments. On the other hand are those who develop software aimed at end users (we can call these “application programmers”). This group needs to make the variant experience as smooth as possible for users, hiding the details of differences in the DNS so that the user’s experience is as though there were no variants at all. The good news for all of these cases is that, if a developer makes an effort to support the scenario well one time, that effort is completely reusable for any other such cases. In both cases, the programmers have to build for a completely generic situation and therefore cannot take into consideration hints about the likely situation of the user (except in very unusual circumstances such as custom software development).

For case E1 (user expected a variant and such is implemented), the systems programmer needs to be able to link together example.X and example.Y so that the names function as one; at the same time, the systems programmer needs to be able to detect the differences so that configuration can happen correctly for variant-unaware utilities. The support tools will not be able to do everything they need to do via the DNS (at least initially), because there is no way in the DNS to signal reliably the link between two names. (When using aliasing like DNAME, the link is one way; so if Y has a DNAME pointing to X, you have no way of knowing that there is such a DNAME record when you look up example.X.) Because X.509 certificates (which underlie security protocols like TLS, which is the current standard for, e.g., commercial transactions on the Internet) are tightly linked to the domain name with which they are used, application programmers will probably need to be able to recover from TLS failures relating to variant names. Such behavior is today unspecified, and so will need to be specified if it is ever to work. (Such specification, and the subsequent deployment, should be expected to take several years even if they happen.)

In case E2 (user expected a variant that only works sometimes), the systems programmer’s situation is just like E1. Poor tools are likely to cause E2-type experiences for systems administrators, however. E2 cases present a problem for application programmers, who will have a difficult job knowing how to support their users.

For case E3 (user expected a variant which is not implemented), the situation is essentially similar to Case E2.

In case E4 (user does not expect a variant but such exists), if the programmer does not know about variants, he/she will not include support for variants in the tools used by others. Therefore, this case would have a negative impact on other users, e.g., system administrators, network operators, or end users.

Case E5 (user does not expect a variant, but one works sometimes) is similar to case E4.

Law enforcement and security

This type of user is predominantly affected by mirrored variants, but also by active variants in general. The user could also be interested in other states, e.g., allocated variants. Those performing law enforcement or security investigations may be a special class of user in that their needs lie somewhere between those of the end user and those of the (other) network administrator. They have in principle no special relationship with the operator of the domain name in question, but encounter the names in question as part of some other activity (like an enforcement action or a security breach investigation), and not as part of an effort to obtain some resource or direct some traffic towards the domain.

Case E1 (user expected a variant and such is implemented) is desirable: the user gets exactly what he or she expects, and can discover all the links among (in the example) example.Y and example.X.

Case E2 (user expected a variant but it works only partially) might be troublesome. If the problem is intermittent functioning, then the user might interpret that intermittency as part of the problem and be led astray in the investigation. If the problem is only partial or inconsistent support, then the user might have a more difficult time undertaking the sort of investigation he or she desires. For instance, if WHOIS support is incomplete and fails to reveal all the links one might need, then the user may not realize that the different names are somehow to be treated as related to one another.

Case E3 (user expected a variant but it does not work) is unlikely to cause any troubles, because this sort of user is going to be interested in things that are (or were) actually working.

Case E4 (user did not expect a variant and it does work) is quite bad for this type of user, because the user will not realize that the name he or she is investigating is not the only name under investigation. It might be that the array of support tools available to the user will reveal the links among the different names, in which case there is merely confusion rather than failure to complete an investigation. If, however, the investigation relies primarily on the DNS and aliasing techniques such as DNAME are in use, it may be practically impossible to discover the variant relationship.

Case E5 (user did not expect a variant, but it works sometimes) is similar to case E4, with the added complication of intermittent or inconsistent behavior.

End users

Similar to the law enforcement and security users, end users will mainly be affected by active variants, and particularly mirrored variants. However, inactive variants could also cause difficulties for this user. The end user is in a position not dissimilar to the network operator, in that the end user does not in principle have any special relationship with the operation of the domain name in question and so does not have any information that might lead to the belief that a variant ought to work. End users are the primary target of support for variants: the naïve user who types a string expecting it to function as a domain name, or who clicks on a link seeing it as connecting to a familiar web site, is at bottom what motivates any type of variant. Therefore, case E1 (user expected a variant and such is implemented) is the ideal one: the end user got exactly what he or she expected, without having to worry about how a name was actually made out of Unicode code points.

Case E2 (user expected a variant, and it works inconsistently) is a frustrating experience for users. With a name that works under some circumstances and not others – either over time, or in some services and not others – the user cannot easily learn a new pattern of behavior with respect to the DNS. This inconsistency is also one that will be problematic across domains. In the absence of consistent and predictable variant behavior that corresponds to users’ practical model of how naming works on the Internet, any variant strategy will quickly fall away as users start to treat domain names as unreliable. Given the inconsistency of conventions for relating various names to one another in the DNS today (and all of the system administration problems such related names would bring), users are today experiencing E2 cases.

Case E3 (user expected a variant which is not implemented) is the worst case for end users, and it has two failure modes. The first is denial of service: the user attempts to visit http://example.Y, reading it as being the same URI as the http://example.X that he or she saw in an advertisement, but the connection does not work because A is either blocked, withheld, or allocated-only; or has no variant at all, and example.Y is not registered. In this case, the user is frustrated but no serious harm has arisen. The second mode is a false connection: the user attempts to visit http://example.Y, reading it as being the same URI as the http://example.X that he or she saw in an advertisement, but arrives at a site controlled by a registrant different to that of example.X. Even if this effect is not the result of malicious work on the part of A’s operator or example.Y registrant, it is bad. It is extremely unlikely that phishers and other malefactors will go to the trouble and expense of registering a TLD when there are much cheaper alternatives already available and which are just as effective. But even an accidental connection of this sort to a perfectly legitimate site operating at example.Y presents issues of possible credential leakage, accidental disclosure of information, and user confusion and frustration.

Cases E4 and E5 (user does not expect a variant but such exists or works sometimes) is an uninteresting case since the end user is not affected in any way either for good or bad.

### 5.2.5 Consistency

As noted above, from an end user’s point of view, there are two kinds of inconsistency that could be observed in the face of variant labels, i.e., vertically and horizontally. The first is inconsistency with respect to a given name or service (i.e., vertically): a name and its variant might work for one service but not for another, or the variant name might work some days and not others. But there is another type of inconsistency, at least as bad, and which is already deployed today.

Consistency of behavior of a system (i.e., horizontally) – its predictability – is a critical feature for that system to be relied upon. In the absence of consistent and predictable variant behavior that corresponds to users’ practical model of how naming works on the Internet, any variant strategy will quickly fall away as users start to treat domain names as unpredictable. Given the inconsistency of conventions for relating various names to one another in the DNS today (and all of the system administration problems such related names would bring), users are today experiencing E2 cases. A model of variants that expands their use at the expense of the predictability of Internet naming systems would be harmful.

One example of such system-wide inconsistency issues is related to the manner in which variant names are identified and treated across different TLDs. The issue is not directly in scope for this project, since it was chartered to study IDN variant issues at the root level. However, there may be value in studying this issue and considering potential approaches to mitigate its consequences to the user experience.

### 5.2.6 Chains of actors and distributed systems

The Internet is mostly made up of distributed systems, and with a few exceptions it is rare that systems dependent on a large number of people all doing the same thing at the same time get deployed. The practical difficulty of getting everyone to change naming systems at the same time on the Internet, for instance, is part of the reason that IDNA avoids actually changing the DNS protocols themselves, even though that decision means that several desirable features cannot reasonably be accommodated. But as we see from the example scenarios above, a suitably invisible end user experience in the presence of variant names is difficult to predict. It seems to depend on several independent actors all acting well at the same time, with failures at one point in the system cascading through until visible to the user. Because of the distributed nature of the Internet, and the protocol layering that is one of the Internet’s chief strengths, the technical problems raised by variants are not amenable to a simple technical solution.

## 5.3 ICANN Operations and Variant TLDs

In applying a variant management mechanism for the root, ICANN would incur a number of operational issues, discussed in this section.

### 5.3.1 Evaluation

The evaluation processes for gTLD applications are documented in the gTLD Applicant Guidebook.[[31]](#footnote-32) IDN ccTLDs may currently be requested via the IDN ccTLD Fast Track process, in accordance with the procedures in the Final Implementation Plan.[[32]](#footnote-33) The Fast Track was intended to enable the introduction of a limited number of non-contentious IDN ccTLDs, associated with the ISO 3166-1 two-letter codes, to meet near-term demand while the overall policy is being developed. The ccNSO is undertaking a policy development process[[33]](#footnote-34) concerning the introduction of IDN ccTLDs.

These current processes do not allow for the delegation of IDN variant TLDs until such time as a variant management mechanism for the top level is in place. (For a discussion of how potential variant cases are expected to be handled in the initial round of gTLD applications, see Appendix 5.) This section describes the various evaluation activities that could be required in a scenario where variant TLDs were able to be requested, i.e., assuming some type of variant management mechanism has been put in place. The activities described here can be considered according to two types of evaluation: 1) evaluation activities relating to the variant request itself, and 2) resulting variant considerations in other evaluation activities.

#### Evaluation of Variant TLD Requests

These activities could be covered by the Label Generation Rules, and the issues involved depend significantly on the approach taken to establishing these rules, as discussed in section 4.1 above. If, at the time it is evaluating specific requests, ICANN can refer to an existing authoritative source that will produce a definitive result on whether two strings can be considered variant TLD labels, the impact would largely consist of new sub-processes to take the variant labels into account within existing evaluation steps. In the ad hoc approach discussed in section 4.2 above, ICANN would not perform any evaluation except to determine whether any label generation rules were conflicting.

If label generation rules are not pre-existing at the time ICANN is considering requests, then this work could occur in parallel with specific requests, resulting in possibly extended timelines and, depending on the approach adopted, additional review steps for ICANN.

The relevant costs incurred by ICANN in performing evaluation processes would also vary depending on the approach taken to establishing label generation rules. The level of case-by case-review required, the areas of expertise required, and the number of determinations required on requests would have a significant impact on both the resources needed to execute such reviews and the risks to be anticipated in such a process. To the extent that additional costs are incurred by ICANN in connection with the evaluation of requests for variant TLD labels, an additional aspect of the set of evaluation issues concerns whether there should be additional fees instituted to cover any relevant costs.

The issues associated with treatment of variant TLD labels (i.e., possible states which may apply to a label) are discussed in section 5.1 above. If label generation rules are in place to determine how each type of variant label can be treated, the evaluation ICANN must perform is limited to confirmation that a request does not conflict with these requirements. In the absence of established rules, the desired states for each of the labels would also need to be reviewed in evaluation. Issues in such a case, in addition to those mentioned above, would include whether a certain variant TLD label in a requested state would create either a) a security or stability issue, or b) a user confusion or user experience issue. State changes could require a specialized evaluation process in some cases.

These issues would seem to be consistent across scripts. While the sources and standards used by evaluators would vary according to the relevant script, the evaluation steps themselves would not differ.

#### Variant Considerations in Existing Evaluation Processes

In the event that requests for variant TLDs could be submitted, application processes would need to account for different types of construction of variant sets depending on the script or language involved. In some cases, there might be a “base label” with variant labels associated, while in other cases, a set of variant TLD labels would be essentially equivalent in status. Could one or more common formats for characterizing a requested set of TLD labels be developed, or would there need to be flexibility for each case to use a specific type of notation? Another issue would concern whether there was a maximum size to a variant set, and what conditions might apply depending on the number of labels involved.

If a set of variant TLD labels has been requested through the designated channel and validated through the established label generation rules, it would be expected that any other relevant TLD evaluation steps would proceed as usual. This could include reviews for:

1. String similarity – This review determines whether an applied-for TLD is so similar to an existing TLD or other applied-for TLD that it creates a probability of user confusion. The string similarity review takes place in the interest of avoiding user confusion through the delegation of many similar TLD strings. Issues to be considered in the case where variant TLD labels are part of an application include:
   1. The methodology for considering the set of variant TLD labels in an application in the string similarity review against existing TLDs or other applied-for TLDs.
   2. Whether this review would differ based on the requested status (e.g., delegated, withheld) for any of the variant TLD labels in the application.
2. DNS stability – This review determines whether an applied-for TLD meets the technical string requirements. An issue to be considered in the case where variant TLD labels are part of an application is whether all variant TLD labels included, whether intended for active operation in the DNS or not, would need to pass this review.
3. Geographic names – The IDN ccTLD Fast Track process contains a meaningfulness requirement: string(s) must be a meaningful representation of the name of the corresponding country or territory. The gTLD evaluation process contains a review to determine whether evidence of government approval is provided where required. In the case where variant TLD labels are part of an application, it would need to be determined whether such requirements would necessarily apply to every label contained in the application, including the variant TLD labels, or whether the requirements could be differentiated within the set.
4. Technical/Operational/Financial capability – These reviews take place in the gTLD evaluation process and test whether the applicant has the requisite technical, operational, and financial capability to operate a TLD registry. An issue to be considered here is whether there are additional reviews that ICANN should undertake concerning the variant management mechanism itself, i.e., to ensure that any guidelines or requirements concerning the applicant’s operation and management of the variant TLDs are anticipated and understood by the applicant, and taken into account in its plans.
5. Registry services – This review takes place in the gTLD evaluation process and determines whether the registry services offered by the applicant might adversely affect DNS security or stability.

As an additional consideration, the gTLD evaluation process contains a mechanism for formal objections to be filed to an application on certain limited grounds. A formal objection by a party with standing will trigger a dispute resolution proceeding with an expert panel rendering a determination. Objections can be filed on the grounds of: (i) String Confusion, (ii) Legal Rights, (iii) Limited Public Interest, or (iv) Community. In the case of an application containing variant TLD labels, an issue to be addressed is whether the set of labels in the application would always be maintained as a set for purpose of the objection and dispute resolution proceedings, or whether they could be split, so that only one of the labels within the set was at issue. For instance, a withheld variant label that is added to the variant set by a mechanical rule might not be a basis for a valid objection to the original application, while an activatable label would be. The outcome of a dispute resolution proceeding on an application containing variant TLDs could be a determination either to: a) uphold the objection (i.e., the objector prevails), b) deny the objection (i.e., the applicant prevails) or c) create a split result where the objection was upheld only for certain TLD labels within the set, meaning that the label generation rules could be subject to an exception based on this determination. If label generation rules are subject to exception, however, they no longer provide an algorithmic way to determine whether a variant arises from a given candidate label.

### 5.3.2 Management of Established Variant TLD Labels

When variant TLD labels are assigned to particular states, it will additionally be ICANN’s responsibility to maintain records concerning the set of names in these various states. The database of delegated top-level domains (i.e., the root zone database) is maintained and made publicly available via the IANA function. To the extent that variant TLD labels are “blocked,” “withheld,” “allocated,” etc., lists of such labels would need to be maintained and updated, along with clearly documented procedures for the circumstances, if any, where states for these names may be changed.

### 5.3.3 Delegation of Variant TLDs

To the extent that requests for delegation of variant TLDs are approved, this would take place following the existing IANA delegation procedures. This would include maintaining and publishing registration data for new TLDs, and distribution of updated zone file data according to current procedures. Delegation requirements might need to be adjusted to, for example, synchronize changes to TLD records such that variant TLDs are updated at the same time, or ensure that re-delegation occurs at the same time. There may need to be an updated record format or new fields in the database to account for the association of one or more TLDs as variant TLDs.

### 5.3.4 Contractual Provisioning

Where a request including variant TLD labels is approved, ICANN may enter into an agreement with the relevant registry operator. Certain frameworks are available for ccTLD operators, while gTLD operators are expected to enter into a standard registry agreement with ICANN. These mechanisms can continue to be used for cases where there are variant TLD labels. A set of issues to be resolved, however, concerns the requirements to be followed by operators of variant TLDs. These could include:

* 1. Whether there should be specific reporting requirements concerning the variant TLDs, and if so, what data should be reported.
  2. Whether specialized technical requirements for the management of the variant TLDs are necessary to support the security and stability of the DNS, and if so, how these requirements are specified
  3. Whether specialized policy requirements for the variant TLDs are necessary to support a good user experience, and if so, how these requirements are specified.
  4. Whether specific service-level requirements for performance of the variant TLDs should be instituted, and if so, how these requirements are specified.
  5. Whether the registry fee structure should be adjusted to take into account the existence of the variant TLDs, and if so, how this should occur.

The ability of the registry to require and enforce parallel registration operations further down the tree could be of concern.

### 5.3.5 Security and Stability of the DNS

Security considerations are relevant in making the determination of which code points are valid and should be used in top-level labels, as well as the criteria for considering requests for IDN variant TLD labels. Similarly, such considerations are relevant in the determination of rules for assigning variant labels to particular states, and for the management of IDN variant TLD labels. These have been discussed in the relevant sections above.

Additionally, there has been significant study, consultation, and analysis in connection with expansion of the root zone to include new top-level domains. Modeling, monitoring, and reporting will continue during, and after, the first application round of the New gTLD Program, so that root-scaling discussions can continue and the delegation rates can be managed. To the extent that variant TLDs are delegated, these would be incorporated in this modeling, monitoring and reporting.

Delegation of any new top-level domains is conditional on the continued absence of significant negative impact on the security and stability of the DNS and the root zone system (including the process for delegating TLDs in the root zone).

## 5.4 Registry / Registrar Operations

Should a variant management mechanism for the top level be adopted by ICANN, this would entail a number of operational issues for registry operators as well as for registrars operating for the relevant TLDs. Although not necessarily tied to ICANN’s management of the root zone, these are issues that would be expected to be resolved within the ICANN community. These issues are discussed in this section.

### 5.4.1 DNS Resolution

Depending on the variant management mechanism implemented, delegation of variant TLDs may mean the TLD operator is required to invest more resources in zone file generation and management of registrations in the variant TLDs. This could also propagate to secondary name services and therefore increase the cost of running the DNS services for the registry. The maximum investment is possible to describe by imagining that the variant management mechanism is implemented via mirroring without any sort of aliasing. In this case, the TLD operator must in effect operate exactly as many zones as variants delegated, with a combinatorial number of labels in each such zone.

To the extent that an aliasing behavior is desired or implemented in TLD registries, this will have an effect on TLD registry operations. However, policies regarding DNS behavior could be difficult to enforce beyond the level in the DNS hierarchy at which the policy is defined. Specifically, a registry may choose to establish a policy wherein all possible variant labels will behave the same (return the same response in the DNS) at the TLD level of the DNS hierarchy. Although this can work in many cases at the TLD level, the DNS cannot enforce this policy on the delegated second-level domain names in the TLD. This can have a dramatic effect on the user experience.

In the event some sort of active variants were to be supported in the root zone by using DNAME, the root name servers would need to be able to support the additional load represented by CNAME synthesis due to requests from DNAME-incapable DNS clients. Given the current provisioning and traffic mix in the DNS, and laboratory tests, this additional load does not appear to be a concern compared to some of the other effects of supporting variants in the root. This belief has not been (as far as can be determined) verified empirically on the Internet. Adding a DNAME to the root would undoubtedly be an innovation, akin to the decision to sign the root using DNSSEC (though with perhaps fewer risks).

### 5.4.2 Registration Process

The shared registration system (SRS) is a critical registry function enabling multiple registrars to provide domain name registration services in the TLD. This in many cases includes the EPP (Extensible Provisioning Protocol) interface between the registry and the registrars. Extensions to EPP may be required to enable registration of second-level domain names under the applied-for TLD and the variant TLDs. Without a standard implementation of such extensions, registrars may face complexities in interfacing with these registries implementing different extensions.

Although not a variant issue per se but a general IDN issue, indications of the relevant script(s) and language(s) for registered domain names may need to be incorporated by the TLD registry. As noted in the Devanagari case study report, it may be sufficient in some cases to tag a domain name with either its script or its language; however, a script may support a number of languages and in some cases, a language uses more than one script. Moreover, as section 4.1 describes, it is possible to construct a system in which neither language nor script is the identifier needed. The technical issue is that there is no uniform way to do this in the standard EPP protocol used.

This issue also affects registrars in two ways. To the extent there is no standard, a registrar will have to implement all EPP extensions that various registries may choose to specify to resolve this issue. For those ccTLDs that do not use EPP, registrars will have to implement whatever is required in order to support that ccTLD.

In addition, when registrars are present they are the interface to the registrant. Registrars that choose to support multiple scripts and languages will need to develop user interfaces that facilitate and simplify the identification of the script and language in use by a registrant, and permit the registrant to understand its choices with respect to the names it is actually contracting to operate when registering a name subject to variants.

Accordingly, it appears that a successful registration process in IDN variant TLDs will require significant coordination, perhaps including an additional OT&E process, with registrars.

It will be the task of the registry operator to formulate policies on how domain names are managed in the variant TLDs. For example, policies could cover whether the same domain name under the variant TLDs must be associated with the same registrant. Consideration would also need to be given to registry policies on expiration, deletion, and transfer of registered names. It will also be for the registry operator to determine the appropriate pricing models for such registration offerings. The relevant policies concerning registrations in the variant TLDs, as well as the relevant IDN tables or other reference documents used for domain name registration at the second or lower levels, should be made available to the public. A failure of consistency in these policies across registries could have disastrous effects on user experience; see section 5.2.5 for more discussion.

Careful attention to registration policies for IDN variant TLDs is essential to minimize user confusion and opportunities for abusive registrations. It is expected that the IDN Implementation Guidelines[[34]](#footnote-35) will be followed in this regard. The Guidelines are a list of general standards for IDN registration policies and practices that are designed to minimize the risk of cybersquatting and consumer confusion, and respect the interests of local languages and character sets. Registries seeking to deploy IDNs under their agreements with ICANN have been authorized to do so on the basis of the Guidelines. The Guidelines are, as of this writing, silent on the practice of the management of variants.

### 5.4.3 Whois (Domain Name Registration Data Directory Service)

As discussed in several case study reports, there are two sets of issues related to IDN variant TLDs and Whois: the first set of Whois issues are caused by the introduction of IDNs in general, the second set of issues are caused specifically by variants. Both sets of issues need to be addressed to ensure a good and consistent user experience for querying domain name registration data.

#### 5.4.3.1 Issues that IDN introduces to Whois services in general

As noted in several reports (Arabic, Chinese, Devanagari), the critical Whois issue facing the deployment of IDNs is the fact that the standard WHOIS protocol (as defined by RFC 3912[[35]](#footnote-36)) has not been internationalized, which means there is no standard way to indicate the character encoding in use.

The WHOIS protocol is a simple request and response transaction: a domain name is submitted to a server and output is returned. A consequence of the lack of a standardized approach to internationalization is an increasing number of local, regional, and proprietary solutions that attempt to address the issue. This variability has a dramatically adverse effect on the user experience.

As the adoption of IDNs becomes more prevalent, Internet users will expect to be able to register domain names as well as registrant names and addresses in their native languages, using familiar scripts (character sets). This adoption is already well underway, increasing the priority to address this issue.

These issues are noted in recent reports from ICANN’s Security and Stability Advisory Committee (such as SSAC 051[[36]](#footnote-37)), in reports of other ICANN supporting organizations and advisory committees, and most recently by the WHOIS review team.[[37]](#footnote-38) As the adoption of IDNs becomes more prevalent, this issue needs to be addressed as a priority.

#### 5.3.4.2 Issues that IDN variants introduce to domain name registration directory services specifically

Also noted in several reports (Arabic, Chinese, Devanagari), the introduction of variant TLDs may cause a paradigm shift for some Whois users. Where currently there is typically a one-to-one lookup for a Whois record against a domain name, this might no longer be true in the case of variant TLDs. To illustrate this point further, consider the following domain label3.label2.label1., where each label also has p, q, and r variants respectively, thus the total number of variants for this domain is p\*q\*r, and each possible variant domain could have different statuses (e.g. withheld, allocated, delegated, blocked, etc.).

The key issue here is to determine the correct response to a Whois query for a domain name lLabel3i.label2j.label1k. (request to information for label1k in the case of the root).

These issues require careful examination to determine to what extent data elements should be separated in the Whois database, and to what extent certain elements must always be subject to a joined relationship. Specific issues to be worked out include:

1. For a Whois query for a domain name with variant labels, should the variant labels be included in the response? What if the language or script of the variants cannot be understood or displayed by the user making the request? How could this be determined, since the WHOIS protocol does not have a mechanism to signal encoding?
2. If a variant U-label is withheld-only (i.e., not active) in the registry database, should a Whois request for the domain name return a referral indicating the name is a variant of another name or return the response for the other name? or should the response indicate that the name does not exist?
3. Is there a need for an additional query/service, which returns the Label Variant Set against a requested domain name? Should such a service also return the status of each label in the set?
4. Would the response against a blocked variant label be different from responses to labels with other status (withheld, allocated, etc.)?
5. Will the creation and expiration dates of the Variant Label Set be inherited from the fundamental label, as suggested? If yes, then if a variant label is either added or changes its state, how will this information be part of the Domain Name Registration Data? Would history be maintained and communicated for such changes?

### 5.4.4 Data Escrow

As noted by the Chinese case study team, a specific data format has been specified in the gTLD Applicant Guidebook for registries to submit the registration data to the data escrow service provider. The data escrow format currently supports variants; however modifications may be needed in light of the issues detailed in this report to support variant TLDs.

### 5.4.5 Rights Protection Mechanisms

The use of variant TLD labels (and variant domain names in these TLDs) may have an impact on existing rights protection mechanisms such as the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP).[[38]](#footnote-39) The UDRP is a policy for resolving disputes arising from alleged abusive registrations of domain names (for example, cybersquatting), allowing expedited administrative proceedings that a trademark rights holder initiates by filing a complaint with an approved dispute resolution service provider. Typically, a UDRP complaint will concern only the name registered at the second level. In the case where domain names exist in variant TLDs, an issue to be resolved concerns whether corresponding names in all TLDs in a variant set are considered together in a UDRP proceeding, or whether and under what circumstances there could be separate considerations or determinations on some names in the set. Where certain names have different statuses (e.g., blocked, allocated), this could also have an impact on such a case. The applicable fees in UDRP proceedings might also be adjusted to take into account the existence of registrations in variant TLDs.

A policy whereby a set of variant names is always maintained may force registrants into dispute resolution proceedings as a result of registry variant practice (such as automated generation of a variant label set). However, a practice of splitting and making separate determinations within the set runs counter to the interest in maintaining a straightforward and predictable process, particularly since the existence of variant labels suggests that the contents of the set are equivalent in some way.

Note also that a UDRP complainant will generally present trademark or rights data that might not necessarily follow the same label generation rules used for the root zone or by the registry. A complainant must prove that the domain name in question is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the complainant has rights. Although a panel might make use of existing variant rule references in considering a case, it is more likely that a panel would refer to standards related to trademark law for determining what is “identical or confusingly similar,” and such standards would be an important consideration relating to issues in this area.

A determination in a UDRP case may result in cancellation or transfer of a domain name, or no action if the complainant does not prevail. Issues to be resolved in this context concern whether a determination would also need to apply to the entire variant set, or whether could there be a split decision concerning the treatment of names (e.g., a decision that of the set example.X, example.Y, and example.Z, only labels example.X and example.Y infringe the complainant’s rights while example.Z does not).[[39]](#footnote-40) There are implications here similar to those discussed concerning the objection process for gTLD applications, in that given that a determination of this type (as well as a court decision) could create an exception to the established label generation rules

In addition, the existence of variant TLDs may have an impact on rights protection mechanisms being instituted as part of the New gTLD Program. New gTLD registries are required to introduce certain rights protection mechanisms during their startup phases. These services concern second-level registrations, and include a sunrise period and a trademark claims service to provide notice to a potential registrant where a domain name matches a trademark that has been recorded in the Trademark Clearinghouse. These services use a specified definition of identical match. To the extent that registrations take place in variant TLDs according to the registry policy, these rights protection processes should take into account the existence of variant TLD labels. For example, if a trademark holder is eligible to register example.X in the sunrise period, they could also be eligible to register example.Y (or ineligible, if registry policy blocks such registrations). Consideration would need to be given to the definition of identical match and the possible incorporation of variant labels into the criteria for triggering a Sunrise or Trademark Claims notice.

The Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) system is a complement to the UDRP, to be used when suspension of a domain name is the desired outcome. Accordingly, the issues discussed above also apply here.

The (Trademark) Post-Delegate Dispute Resolution Policy (PDDRP) addresses infringing uses of a TLD post-delegation. However, outcomes under this policy would take the form of, for example, remedial measures to protect against future infringing registrations, suspension of new domain name registrations, or, in extraordinary circumstances, termination of the Registry Agreement. Since domain name registrants are not a party to the action, a recommended remedy would typically not take the form of deleting, transferring, or suspending domain name registrations. In the case of variant TLDs, the issues to be considered here would concern whether the penalties could apply to just one of the variant TLDs, or would necessarily apply to all.

### 5.4.6 Security/Stability Considerations for TLD Registries/Registrars

Security and stability considerations should also be relevant to registry operators, registrars, data escrow agents, or other service providers. As noted in the Devanagari case study report, a suggestion for evaluating variant policies and their implementation is to log, review, and analyze DNS query traffic. Specifically, the behavior of applications and services, and sometimes the users that use them, can be inferred from traffic patterns found in sequences of DNS queries and responses. For example, registries could review DNS traffic of the TLD for queries of non-existent domains (i.e., in DNS terms reviewing the NXDOMAIN responses). An analysis of these transactions may indicate that language tables are incomplete or that variant usage is not as expected. Conversely, an analysis of the queries that indicated that certain type of variant is not being queried (while the fundamental label or other type of variant is) could indicate a superfluous variant category.

Providing a consistent, uniform, and non-surprising (i.e., user expected) experience to the user is an essential component of stability. DNS transaction logs could provide some insight into user expectations and thus some ability to confirm that the needs of a user community are being met.

Some TLD registries may wish to consider partnerships with second-level domain holders to continue the analysis at lower levels in the DNS hierarchy.

## 5.5 Synopsis of Issues

As is clear from this section, there are a number of complex issues in the operational area that registries, registrars, and other providers should be aware of to facilitate successful operation of variant TLDs. As noted by the Latin case study team and others, the impact of variant TLDs on registries and registrars may be highly dependent upon differing implementation methods, and any proposed implementation will require broad stakeholder participation to ensure that registries and registrars provide stable, secure, consistent, and unambiguous DNS operations. This includes the greatest possible clarity in communication and understanding of variant TLDs, to limit IDN end user, registrant, registrar, and registry confusion.

Areas of application behavior, resolution and registration services, WHOIS service, and business logic all need to be examined in order to determine if these objectives are achievable.

# 6 Other Related Issues: Code points currently not permitted in the root zone

The gTLD Applicant Guidebook currently restricts U-labels for inclusion in the root zone to those in Unicode General Categories Ll, Lo, Lm, or Mn; this is anticipated to be expanded to include Mc, in order to support a number of letters that are necessary to permit Devanagari strings. In any case, the general principle for inclusion in the root zone is that only letters be permitted; this principle is an attempt to stick to the spirit of RFC 1123, which says that labels in the root zone “will be alphabetic”. At the time of writing of RFC 1123, “alphabetic” really just meant the letters a-z and A-Z, because nothing outside the US-ASCII character set was contemplated.

The current restrictions prohibit a number of code points that are (in at least some circumstances) permitted under IDNA2008, and might be desirable for writing strings in some languages. Prominent among these are U+200C, ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER, and U+200D, ZERO WIDTH JOINER (both of which are in General Category Cf). Also prohibited are all digits, including digits used with scripts other than Latin (at the very least, those code points in General Category Nd). It is beyond the scope of the present report to evaluate whether the root zone ought to permit U-labels with these code points, but each of these categories raises issues with respect to variants. This section provides a very brief discussion of the issues that might be raised by changing these rules. The discussion here is incomplete because the prohibitions remain in place; but if those prohibitions were lifted, it would entail a great deal of work to explore these issues completely and to understand the potential side effects.

The zero-width joiners are two special controls that are used to indicate connections or disconnections within a string when the string is rendered; they are normally used only in scripts that require complex text layout (such as Arabic and Indic scripts). They are called “zero-width” because they take no space when displayed, and cannot be seen under normal conditions. Their effects, however, can sometimes be observed in the shape of characters that follow them. (In some contexts, however, like in a Latin string, the effect of the zero-width joiners is entirely invisible.)

ZERO WIDTH NON-JOINER, U+200C (“ZWNJ”) is used to prevent rendering of a connection between two characters (usually letters) that otherwise would be joined. It is often used in Arabic-script writing in order to prevent two letters from joining to one another (and thus using the medial form) when they should not be so joined (for instance, because there is a word break at that location). ZWNJ is already constrained in its use in U-labels by a CONTEXTJ rule in IDNA2008; the Arabic case study report, however notes, “The ZWNJ in a few cases is still not visible to all users (e.g., U+0637, U+0638, U+069F, U+06BE, and U+06FF). A comprehensive analysis of Unicode Arabic Script Code Charts is needed to find any additional cases. This process should be repeated as the Unicode gets updated.” (item 21.b.iii, p7) One can glean from this that Label Generation Rules permitting ZWNJ in TLD labels would probably need a fairly complicated contextual rule constraining ZWNJ to very specific cases, and likely generating variant labels that also excluded the ZWNJ, in order to ensure that a collision could not happen with such a ZWNJ-free label. Note that the Devanagari case study (4.3.2, p 23) makes it clear that generating such rules could be extremely difficult, because the limits do not appear to be bounded.

ZERO WIDTH JOINER, U+200D (“ZWJ”) is used in the opposite case as ZWNJ: it makes two characters join together when normally they would *not*. The Devanagari case study report provides an example (section 4.3.1, p 22) of how ZWJ might be used. It is worth noting that Unicode NFC does not normalize these two different ways of entering the same abstract character, so U-labels containing these two different sets of code points would not be equivalent to one another. It is entirely possible that every use of ZWJ in a U-label would produce variants of this sort, and it would require a great deal of language-specific study for those languages using ZWJ to specify what variant relationships should be included in any Label Generation Rules. Just as in the case of ZWNJ, it is likely that variants excluding the ZWJ would probably also be necessary, in order to prevent collisions with a label that could be typed only by omitting an invisible character.

The digit cases are also somewhat problematic. To begin with, there are two sets of Arabic-Indic Digits (known as Arabic-Indic Digits and Extended Arabic-Indic Digits). Because of the ways these appear, they are prohibited (by an IDNA2008 CONTEXTO rule) from appearing in the same label; apart from that, any type of digit could be combined with any other type in a label. In this case, the issue is that applications will sometimes, in a locale-sensitive way, convert localized forms of digits to their standard “ASCII range” counterparts (i.e.U+0030..0039) for storage, and back to localized versions for the purposes of display. This ensures that arithmetic operations always work consistently (among other advantages); the principle sometimes goes by the slogan “a digit is a digit.” If the prohibition against code points in General Category Nd were to be lifted, then a large number of variants could result across all the scripts permitted in the root zone.

# 7 Discussion of Potential Additional Work

Additional work concerning IDN variant TLDs could focus on taking the issues identified in this issues report and identifying potential solutions to these problems. Any potential solutions identified would need to be analyzed to establish whether they satisfactorily address the sets of issues identified here, and measured on their viability from policy, technical, security, user experience, and operational perspectives.

It should be emphasized that there should be no assumption that acceptable solutions are available or can be developed to address the wide range of issues identified in this report, or that can satisfy the wide range of community expectations regarding which variant IDN TLDs may be delegated.

In analyzing the issues presented above, the team identified several areas where additional work could occur toward developing solutions. The immediate follow-on phase to this report could be a short phase involving review of these items and development of a plan (including a proposed timeline and budget) for each element. Some possible actions in the various areas are identified here for consideration.

## 7.1 Developing a Label Generation Ruleset specification

Based on the analysis, a general requirement for all approaches considered is the need to use a tool to machine-generate sets of variants in accordance with formal label generation rules.

ICANN currently manages a voluntary repository of "IDN Tables," of which some contain instructions on computing variants. While some language communities have formalized the formatting of their tables, there is no single established format that can accommodate the various rulesets in existence today.

Recognizing that deployable solutions will require such tables, it is clear that the effort would benefit from the standardization of a table format that would allow software implementers to easily and predictably generate variants. Such a table format should be developed with input from potential implementers and other interested parties, possibly through a technical standards body such as the IETF. In conjunction with this work, ICANN could facilitate a reference implementation of software that demonstrates how the table format could be utilized. Such work could be used internally within ICANN for its processes when handling variants for the root zone.

## 7.2 Developing a process for label generation

Considering the potential options and considerations presented in Section 4 (Options for the Establishing Label Generation Rules), an analysis of how labels could be generated for the root zone (including variant label generation) needs to be conducted to arrive at a suitable approach. This needs to be developed in a way that accords with ICANN’s established processes.

## 7.3 Examining the feasibility of whole-string variants

While the focus of the work reported here was on character-level variants, for some languages, there may be deterministic approaches available to calculating and deriving sets of whole string variants. The report has identified significant challenges to dealing with whole-string variants, but there is more work to be done to analyze potential approaches in this area if whole-string variants are to be considered for implementation in the root.

## 7.4 Enhancing visual similarity processes

For some communities, it appears possible to identify variants that are considered visually similar. This could include development of resources for addressing visual similarity within a particular script, or in cross-script cases, as recommended by the Greek case study team report. This would potentially serve as valuable input into existing visual similarity processes, which would benefit from predictable and repeatable processes that are transparent to a user of the process.

## 7.5 Examining the feasibility of mirroring

Section 5 identified a number of potential treatments (states) of particular variant labels. One potential treatment is the use of "mirroring," whereby two or more labels use some technology (currently a choice between CNAME and DNAME DNS aliasing records) to ensure they provide the same result in the Domain Name System.

Another alternative to using specialized DNS records is to use “parallel provisioning,” whereby regular delegations are made using NS records, and the manager of the zone is obligated via contractual or other means to ensure the contents of those zones are synchronized.

Due to the distributed nature of the DNS, using these approaches is a complex challenge, as it seems difficult to ensure consistency (both vertically and horizontally) throughout the DNS tree. Even if the DNS issues could be solved, application protocols that use the DNS (e.g., the Web, e-mail) would not know of this special relation between the names, making them fail to deliver the expected result. Additionally, it appears challenging to ensure appropriate software support for products which rely on the DNS but do not have proper understanding of the many-to-one domain name relationship that mirroring creates. Finally, it seems mirroring requires a number of actors (some of which are not in direct relation with the registrant/registrar/registry) to act appropriately and with knowledge of the variant relation of the names to obtain the expected result.

The team recommends studying the feasibility of mirroring, in cooperation with technical bodies as necessary.

## 7.6 Examining the feasibility of variant management without mirroring

Another potential treatment described in section 5 is to consider two or more labels, with their management conducted by the same party (i.e. a single registry); but with no requirement that the contents of the zones and the delegations therein be strictly mirrored. This treatment recognizes potential legitimate reasons for the contents of the various zones to diverge, while still ensuring that the risk of user confusion is minimized by having one party manage eligibility and delegation policy between these multiple zones. This allows contextual rules to be established that address local requirements concerning confusability, e.g., allowing a website for one name and another different website for the variant.

This approach could be studied to identify the feasibility and user experience implications as an option to activating variant labels in the root.

## 7.7 Assessing impacts on existing gTLD and Fast Track operations

Recognizing that one desired output of this project is to provide a means for variants to be introduced into the root zone, the impact of proposed variant solutions would need to be considered with respect to the evaluation processes established in the Fast Track and New gTLD programs.

Specifically, the label generation rules discussed above would need to be implemented into the new gTLD questions, criteria and evaluation process. A new variant evaluation process could be necessary to address variant requests and to address pending (declared) variant strings from the first round of applications. Review steps would need to be specified for handling requests for IDN variant labels, e.g., a review for any negative impact on DNS security or stability.

For the IDN Fast Track process, additional policy work might make variant TLDs available in accordance with label generation rules. The IDN Fast Track Implementation Plan would be modified to accommodate the new policy.

## 7.8 Assessing impacts on ICANN and IANA processes

As manager of the contents of the DNS Root Zone, ICANN would need appropriate processes to implement the requirements of any variant solutions to be adopted. This would include adaptation of the relevant IANA processes to incorporate the concept of variants, and ensuring the equivalence is reflected in its operations. This could involve ensuring the root zone changes are executed in tandem when variants are involved, and ensuring that labels are assigned to the same manager as appropriate. The IANA WHOIS and website would also likely need to be updated to demonstrate any linked relationship between multiple labels, and the status of various labels that have been generated through the application of the Label Generation Rules. Similar considerations apply to examining the impact on other (non-IANA related) ICANN processes that currently deal with TLDs, particularly gTLDs.

# Appendix 1: The Case Study Team Reports

**Arabic**

Case Study Team Issues Report:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/arabic-vip-issues-report-07oct11-en.pdf>

Public Comments:   
<http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-vip-arabic/>

Summary and Analysis of Comments:   
<http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-vip-arabic/>

**Chinese**

Case Study Team Issues Report:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/chinese-vip-issues-report-03oct11-en.pdf>

Public Comments:   
<http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-vip-chinese/>

Summary and Analysis of Comments:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/public-comment/report-comments-idn-vip-chinese-29nov11-en.pdf>

**Cyrillic**

Case Study Team Issues Report:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/public-comment/idn-vip-cyrillic-06oct11-en.htm>

Public Comments:   
<http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-vip-cyrillic/>

Summary and Analysis of Comments:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/public-comment/report-comments-idn-vip-cyrillic-29nov11-en.pdf>

**Devanagari**

Case Study Team Issues Report:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/devanagari-vip-issues-report-03oct11-en.pdf>

Public Comments:   
<http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-vip-devanagari/>

Summary and Analysis of Comments:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/public-comment/report-comments-idn-vip-devanagari-29nov11-en.pdf>

**Greek**

Case Study Team Issues Report:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/greek-vip-issues-report-07oct11-en.pdf>

Public Comments:   
<http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-vip-greek/>

Summary and Analysis of Comments:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/public-comment/report-comments-idn-vip-greek-29nov11-en.pdf>

**Latin**

Case Study Team Issues Report:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/latin-vip-issues-report-07oct11-en.pdf>

Public Comments:   
<http://forum.icann.org/lists/idn-vip-latin/>

Summary and Analysis of Comments:   
<http://www.icann.org/en/public-comment/report-comments-idn-vip-latin-29nov11-en.pdf>

# Appendix 2

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# : Terminology

## Purpose

This section includes newly-introduced terms from this report, and terms that may be unfamiliar to the casual reader.

To the extent possible, we have tried to rely on documents that have been developed outside ICANN. The primary documents used are:

* Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework (RFC 5890);
* Terminology Used in Internationalization in the IETF (RFC 6365);
* The Unicode standard including the standard annexes (Unicode 6.0.0; a new release of Unicode, 6.1.0, is slated for release in February 2012. Definitions here are based on 6.0, but do not appear to be different from the beta 6.1 release as of this writing);
* Each of the six Variant Issues Project case study reports (available from <http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-4-03oct11-en.htm>).

If there are script-specific terms, they are copied directly from their respective reports, and contain cross-references and discussion that makes sense only in the context of those reports. They are included here for convenience, and copied verbatim (with the exception of the introduction of the report name) in order to avoid the accidental introduction of any errors in meaning.

## Methodology

In this section, we describe our proposed methodology for synthesizing these definitions.

1. If a term is defined in RFC 5890, RFC 6365, the Unicode Standard, we copy the relevant definitions from those documents and also refer to those documents. The reader is strongly advised to read the text in the original, because the sense of the term may be obscured by being taken out of its context.
2. For case study specific terms, we copy directly from the definition in the relevant case study report.
3. Where terms are defined differently by different teams, the terms have been harmonized and, if need be, expanded upon to weld them into a single term useful for the unified report.
4. If a term is defined in one case study report but is generally useful, it has been taken over by this document. We have made no effort to remain consistent with the use of that term in the original report on the grounds that this approach is really just a variation of (3), above.

It is important to note that these terms are sometimes inspired by, but do not apply to, the specific script team reports; if those reports needed special terminology, they used it, as well as the common set of definitions originally proffered for their use. Some terms will not be useful for every script.

## Format of the Definitions in this Document

In the body of this document, the source for the definition is indicated with a footnote, at the end of the definition itself. Many definitions do not have such a footnote, which means that the definitions were crafted originally for this document or are merged from more than one source as noted above. For case study specific teams, they are noted with a short form for the team report (e.g. “Arabic-VIP”).

There may be commentary and examples after the definitions, delimited by the presence of the footnote. In those cases, the part before the footnote is the definition that comes from the original source, and the part after is commentary that is not a definition (such as an example or further exposition). Terms created for this document have such discussion demarcated by the label “Discussion:”

When terms appear for the first time in the body of the report, they are set in bold type. Thereafter, they are used as normal.

Abstract Character: A unit of information used for the organization, control, or representation of textual data.[[40]](#footnote-44)

Activation: An action taken on a given label with respect to a zone, indicating that there are DNS resource records at that node name; or else that there are subordinate names to that name, even though there are no resource records at that node name.

A-label: An ASCII-Compatible Encoding form of an IDNA-valid string.[[41]](#footnote-45) The full definition for A-label is in RFC 5890, together with the definition of U-label and some ancillary definitions. The reader is urged strongly to see that document; most of the following discussion and more is in RFC 5890, and trying to talk about IDNA without understanding that document is likely to fail to use certain terms correctly. A-labels must be complete labels: IDNA is defined for labels, not for parts of them and not for complete domain names. By definition, every A-label begins with the IDNA ACE prefix, "xn--", followed by a string that is a valid output of the Punycode algorithm (RFC 3492) and hence a maximum of 59 ASCII characters in length. The prefix and string together must conform to all requirements for a label that can be stored in the DNS including conformance to the rules for LDH labels. Apart from all the other requirements, a string can only be an A-label if it can be decoded into a U-label using the Punycode algorithm, which U-label can be decoded back into the same original string using the same algorithm.

Alias: An action performed on a given label with respect to a zone, using techniques that redirect a name or a tree, effectively substituting one label for another during DNS lookup.

Allocation: An action taken on a label with respect to a zone, whereby the label is associated administratively to some entity that has requested the label.

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| Alternative code  points: | Code points that may be used as alternatives for code points in the zone repertoire. For full discussion, see section 4 of the report. |

Assigned Code Point: A mapping from an Abstract Character to a particular Code Point in the code space.[[42]](#footnote-46)

Blocking: An action taken on a given label with respect to a zone, according to which the label is unavailable for allocation to anyone.

Character Variant: In a Language Variant Table, a “Character Variant” is an entry on the second list of code points corresponding to each Valid Code Point and providing possible substitutions for it. Unlike the **Preferred Variants**, substitutions based on Character Variants are normally withheld but not actually registered (or “activated”). Character Variants appear in column 3 of the Language Variant Table. The term “Code Point Variant” is used interchangeably with this term.[[43]](#footnote-47) This term should be used only when discussing implementations of RFC 3743.

Code Point: A value in the Unicode code space.[[44]](#footnote-48) The meaning here is restricted to meaning D10 in the Unicode Standard, section 3.4.

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| Code Point  Repertoire for  the Zone: | Also known informally as a zone repertoire. A set of code points permitted in U-labels in a zone. |

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| Code Point Variant  Rules: | The rules containing the alternative code points, the code point variant status, and any flags indicating degrees of freedom in the code point variant rules. See section 4 of the report for a full discussion. | |
| Code Point Variant  Status: | | The status of a label that results from the alternation of the alternative code point for a given code point in the zone repertoire. See section 4 of the report for a full discussion. |

Delegation: An action taken on a given label with respect to a zone, indicating that in that zone there are NS resource records at the label.

Domain: A domain is identified by a domain name, and consists of that part of the domain name space that is at or below the domain name which specifies the domain.[[45]](#footnote-49) The Domain Name System (DNS) name space is a tree structure, with each node and leaf on the tree corresponding to a resource set. These nodes are identified by their names, and the portion that is so named (including everything underneath) is called a “domain”. For example, the domain “example.com.” is inside the “com.” domain, which is inside the zero-length root domain (“.”). The names “two.one.example.com” and “one.example.com” are both in the “example.com” domain, with “two.one.example.com” also being inside “one.example.com”. Not every domain is a zone.

**Exchangeable:** A relationship between two or more code points such that a user may treat them as though they fill the same role in a U-label. See section 3 for discussion of the classification of variant relationships.

Font: A collection of glyphs used for the visual depiction of character data. A font is often associated with a set of parameters (for example, size, posture, weight, and serifness), which, when set to particular values, generate a collection of imageable glyphs.[[46]](#footnote-50) For discussion of IDNs, it is important to remember that the font is *not* a property of a code point, and is not something that can be evaluated at registration or lookup of an IDN.

Fundamental Label: The U-label used as the basis for producing the Variant Label Set. Discussion: In many cases, this will be the label received as a request for allocation by the registry for the zone. In cases where the Label Generation Rules are implemented using a Language Variant Table, the Fundamental Label must be constructed entirely from Valid Code Points (and might not be the label received in a request for allocation).

Glyph: (1) An abstract form that represents one or more glyph images. (2) A synonym for glyph image. In displaying Unicode character data, one or more glyphs may be selected to depict a particular character. These glyphs are selected by a rendering engine during composition and layout processing.[[47]](#footnote-51) Note that RFC 6365 uses, roughly, the second of these: A glyph is an image of a character that can be displayed after being imaged onto a display surface.[[48]](#footnote-52)

Glyph Image: The actual concrete image of a glyph representation having been rasterized or otherwise imaged onto some display surface.[[49]](#footnote-53)

**Homoglyph:** An abstract character or a conceptual character that is represented with the same glyph as another abstract character or conceptual character.

**Homograph:** Entity sharing a written form with another entity. This term is sometimes used to refer to characters written the same way, but it has a well-established meaning with respect to words within a language. It is better to use homoglyph instead. See section 3.4.3.

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| Internationalized Domain  Label (IDL): | The term “Internationalized Domain Label” or “IDL” will be used instead of the more general term “IDN” or its equivalents.[[50]](#footnote-54) This term is used in RFC 3743 to talk about individual labels that make up IDNs. It identifies the label that is under consideration under the Language Table. For the purposes of the present discussion, it is better to use the term U-label. |

IDL Package: A collection of IDLs as determined by [the guidelines in RFC 3743]. All labels in the package are "reserved", meaning they cannot be registered by anyone other than the holder of the Package. These reserved IDLs may be "activated", meaning they are actually entered into a zone file as a "Zone Variant". The IDL Package also contains identification of the language(s) associated with the registration process. The IDL and its variant labels form a single, atomic unit.[[51]](#footnote-55) This term should be restricted to use conformant to RFC 3743. For a term appropriate to this report, use “IDL set” instead.

IDL set: A label whose code points are all included in the zone repertoire, along with all of the labels arising from the application of the code point variant rules on that first label.

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| Internationalized Domain Name (IDN): | Domain names containing characters not included in the traditional DNS preferred form (“LDH”). IDNs under discussion are implemented using IDNA; see RFCs 5890, 5891, 5892, 5893, and (for discussion) 5894 and 5895. |

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| Label Generation **Rules:** | A set of rules that govern what labels are allowed in a zone. This is not a complete definition: the discussion of this term, and its related terms, is found in section 4 of the report. |

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| Language Variant  Table: | The key mechanisms of [RFC 3743] utilize a three-column table, called a Language Variant Table, for each language permitted to be registered in the zone. Those columns are known, respectively, as “Valid Code Point,” “Preferred Variant,” and “Character Variant,” and are defined separately …. [[52]](#footnote-56) Language Variant Tables are one type of label generation rules. The original RFC 3743 definition has been expanded upon considerably in various deployed systems, and not every deployed table has exactly three columns. In order to reduce confusion, this document will use Language Variant Table only to refer to such tables as conform to the specification in RFC 3743. |

Mirrored: A status of an active label with respect to a zone, indicating the isomorphism of the namespace beginning with that label, and at least one other namespace beginning with another active label in the zone.

Preferred Variant: In a Language Variant Table, a list of Code Points corresponding to each Valid Code Point and providing possible substitutions for it. These substitutions are "preferred" in the sense that the variant labels generated using them are normally registered in the zone file, or "activated." The Preferred Code Points appear in column 2 of the Language Variant Table. "Preferred Code Point" is used interchangeably with this term.[[53]](#footnote-57) This term should be used only when discussing implementations conforming to RFC 3743.

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| **Protocol-Permitted**  **Code Point:** | A code point that is not DISALLOWED under IDNA2008. |

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| Representation  Identifier: | | A tag or other mechanism used to group together a representation repertoire and its representation label rules. See the discussion in section 4 of the report. |
| Representation  Label Rules: | The subset of code point variant rules proper to a representation repertoire. See the discussion in section 4 of the report. | |

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| Representation Repertoire: | A set of code points arbitrarily selected for use in the representation of some language or group of languages. See section 4 of the report for a discussion of how the set is established. |
| Representation  Variant Rules: | A subset of code point variant rules that apply to the code points of the representation repertoire. | |

Script Table: A Script Table is a table of Unicode Code Points all having the same script property value.[[54]](#footnote-58)

U-label: An IDNA-valid string of Unicode Code Points, in Normalization Form C (NFC) and including at least one non-ASCII character, expressed in a standard Unicode Encoding Form (such as UTF-8).[[55]](#footnote-59) The full definition for U-label is in RFC 5890, together with the definition of A-label and some ancillary definitions. The reader is urged strongly to see that document, because without an understanding of it the present report will not make much sense. A candidate string, to be a U-label, is subject to the constraints about permitted characters that are specified in section 4.2 of RFC 5891 and the rules in sections 2 and 3 of RFC 5892, and the Bidi constraints in RFC 5893 if it contains any character from scripts that are written right to left. Apart from all other requirements, a string can only be a U-label if it can be decoded into an A-label using the Punycode algorithm, which A-label can be decoded back into the same original string using the same algorithm.

Valid Code Point: In a Language Variant Table, the list of code points that is permitted to be registered for that language. Any other code points, or any string containing them, will be rejected. The Valid Code Point list appears as the first column of the Language Variant Table.[[56]](#footnote-60) The term Valid Code Point is deprecated in this report, because it can be confusing depending on the context. Use “Label Valid Code Point” instead.

Variant: A term widely and somewhat carelessly used denoting some sort of relationship between two U-labels or candidate U-labels, or two DNS names or candidate names. A full discussion of what the term means and some more specific types of behavior desired is discussed at length in sections 3 and 4. The term without qualification is also almost without meaning, and the reader is urged to consult that section in order to ensure greater precision in use.

Variant Label: An informal term for labels that arise as the result of application of the alternative code point rules, as outlined in section 4. See that section for discussion. Note that labels that do *not* arise from the application of the code point variant rules are not variant labels for the purposes of this discussion, even if someone asks that they be treated as variant labels.

**Withheld:** An action taken on a given label with respect to a zone, whereby the label is set aside for possible allocation to some entity.

Zone: A[[57]](#footnote-61) division of the data in the DNS, defined by the boundaries of all the cuts in the database relative to its domain. Note that the foregoing text is not taken verbatim from RFC 1034. In particular, RFC 1034 describes the zones only after all the cuts are made in the database; but for the practical purposes of identifying the zones for a given domain name, it is enough to know where all the parent-side and child-side zone cuts are for that name. The cuts are identified by SOA (Start of Authority) Resource Records. For a complete understanding of zones, zone cuts, classes, and domains, the reader is directed to RFC 1034.

Zone-permitted label: A label which is valid under the label generation rules for the zone. Discussion: For practical purposes, the test of validity under the policy will likely be performed on the U-label form.

Zone repertoire: see Code Point Repertoire for the Zone.

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Most of the reports include an exhaustive listing of the Unicode code points (with character names and representative glyphs) which make up their script (though not Chinese with over 5000 characters to organize) and which they recommend for use in TLD labels. There is then a review of the kinds of relations between characters (and, in a very few cases, words) which might be modeled with the mechanism of variants.

(Arabic 4, Latin 2)

5892.[[58]](#footnote-63)

3 of this report.

# Appendix 4

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letters.letters.

However, every character has up to four shapes whose use is dependent on the character’s position in a word (initial, medial, final or isolated). (Recommended use of Unicode is to employ a single code point to represent each character, and leave the selection of glyphs to the rendering engine; however, Unicode does retain deprecated code points (U+FB50-FBFF) which represent many such shapes directly with representative glyphs.)shapes as distinct code points.

One characteristic of Arabic script is that many of the letter-forms representing one character are identical, or extremely similar, to forms representing another.

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There is one conjunct letterletter-forms, e.g.

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in Internet uses, like most European and Indian languages.

This script does not allow positional variants of characters’ written forms

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10th century AD, with some additional letter-forms drawn from Hebrew, and the Glagolitic alphabet, which had previously been used for Slavonic.For modern use, it was reformed on 1708-10 under Peter I, and again in 1917-18 during the Russian Revolution. This last led to its current use in the spelling of Russian and other modern Slavonic languages of Europe; by 1939 its repertoire of letters had been extended to represent many unrelated languages spoken within the Union and Mongolia. Some Turkic languages, spoken in independent states formerly within the Soviet Union, have switched their orthography to Latin in the early 21st century. Romanian, a neo-Latin language, was written in Cyrillic until the mid 19th century, and the closely related Moldavian until 1991.

Cyrillic has more letters than Latin, for most languages over 30: Russian uses 33, Ukrainian 34. Digraphs and trigraphs are not used, and although there is some use of diacritics (й, ё) (not usually decomposed in Unicode representation) they are less frequent in Cyrillic-using languages than in those that use Latin.

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Dēva-nāgarī (Sanskrit for “divine urbane”) is the most widely used exponent of the Brahmi family of scripts, first known to moderns from the emperor Ashoka’s inscriptions (dispersed about India) of the 3rd century BC. Nowadays, Devanagari itself is largely a script for northern India and Nepal, though also used in Goa and Maharashtra in western India.

The Brahmi scripts go beyond the abugida norm, in that the akshara can be extended with prefixed consonants, and also a coda nasal ṃ (anusvāra) or aspirate ḥ (visarga).

Devanagari has symbols for 14 vowels [a, ā, i, ī, u, ū, ṛ, ḷ, e, ai, o, au, ǎ and ǒ], 25 occlusive stop consonants [k, kh, g, gh, ŋ; c, ch, j, jh, ñ; ṭ, ṭh, ḍ, ḍh, ṇ; t, th, d, dh, n; p, ph, b, bh, m], four glides [y,r,l,v], three sibilants [s, ś, sh] , and a glottal fricative [h].There is also a nasalization mark ṃ and a syllable-final aspirate ḥ.Voiced za is indicated by adding a nukta to ja and uvular qa by adding a nukta to k. Nukta also converts the retroflex dentals ḍ and ḍh into flaps ṛ and ṛh. In general the nukta has been used to create new symbols to represent consonant sounds unforeseen in the basic scheme of Devanagari.

From the viewpoint of how they are written, the vowels may be considered to have positional variants: when they occur syllable-initially they are represented as independent aksharas; and when they occur after a consonant, they appear as diacritic signs (each called a mātrā) attached to that consonant’s akshara. However, from Unicode’s viewpoint, the syllable-initial vowels are not functionally related to those occurring within the syllable. Syllable-initial vowels are assigned code points distinct from their corresponding mātrās. Rendering rules should ensure the proper attachment of the vowel mātrās to their leading consonants.

If there is no consonant, the relevant vowel akshara is used; if there is only one consonant, the consonant akshara.

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letters.

form.analyzable as [ds]. In the 3rd century BCform of the letter – e.g.

written with a mark similar to the [´].

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In its modern form, it has two sets of 26 letters in one-one correspondence, lower-case and upper-case. As an alphabetic script, it has letters for consonants and vowels.Letters

Letters may also occur with diacritic marks, usually indicating different phonetic values for the letter.

letters do not vary with their position in the word or their surrounding letters.

represented by images of regular glyphs deformed in some way. Besides the pre-composed

# Appendix 5: IDN Variant Handling in the New gTLD Program

The new gTLD Applicant Guidebook notes as directed by the Board on its 25 September 2010 meeting ([http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-25sep10-en.htm#2.5](http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-25sep10-en.htm" \l "2.5)) that “*no variants of gTLDs will be delegated through the New gTLD Program until appropriate variant management solutions are developed.*” The same resolution further adds: “*The indicated variant strings are noted for future reference, and these variant strings will not be delegated to the applicant; the applicant has no rights or claim to those strings*.”

To preclude inadvertent allocation or delegation of IDN variant TLDs, and avoid outcomes in the gTLD evaluation process that set up later conflicts, ICANN will perform a set of checks to detect potential variant TLD strings during the evaluation of the first round of gTLD applications. The following procedure will be used to identify and handle potential IDN variant TLD strings during the first round of the new gTLD process:

1. ICANN will request a preferred format for the "top level tables" submitted by applicants, such as the model format described in Section 5 of RFC 4290, with the format used by RFC 3743 as an acceptable alternative. The applicant may use another format so long as a reference code for handling the tables is provided. Tables have to be machine-readable (text format, UTF-8 encoded). Guidance will appear in the supplemental notes for the Guidebook.
2. Once the application window closes, ICANN will combine all the "top level tables" submitted into one combined table (encompassing all scripts) – referred to as the “Baseline Table.” Any conflicting issues will be dealt with subject-matter expert involvement. These might include rare cases where applicants publish incorrect tables that affect the identification, blocking, and possible activation of strings identified as variants. (In reality, none are expected since the union of all proposed variant strings will be used.)
3. ICANN will use the Baseline Table to generate variant strings for all the applied-for IDN TLD strings. Generated variant strings will be checked for contention in addition to the list of variant strings declared by the applicants.
4. ICANN will check each variant string for exact matches (i.e., matching code point by code point) against the applied-for strings and variant strings included in other applications. Note that generated variant strings will not be added to an application.
5. In case an exact match is found, the relevant applied-for strings will be put in a contention set and reviewed on a case-by-case basis (the potential for such instances is small and can be handled manually).

At a later time, once mechanisms are in place permitting variant TLDs to be active in the DNS, the variant strings could go through remaining evaluation reviews if required as a prerequisite to allocation, delegation, or other actions.

# Appendix 6: Survey of IDN Practices

A survey was conducted in October 2011 of all top-level domain managers, in order to better understand the prevalence of variant usage within registrations conducted by existing domain registries. Respondents were asked to describe their existing IDN usage, and then for those that performed some kind of variant handling, to respond with details about how that work was conducted.

Of the 298 country-code or generic top-level domains in existence, responses were received from 109.

Approximately half of respondents from both categories responded that they had some form of support for IDN registration within their zone.

Of those, the majority responded they check registrations for validity against a code point repertoire of what they consider valid code points. Most of those allowable code points represented the set required to represent the language(s) served by the particular zone. Alternatively, script based approaches were also used that constrained code points to the script(s) used to represent the local language(s).

Respondents that allowed for IDN registrations were asked if they permitted mixing of code points from multiple different scripts in the same label. A small number of TLDs (12) responded that they did, although most of these responses were limited to mixing the script uses to represent the local language, with the Latin letters/digits/hyphens afforded by the conventional DNS.

Of the respondents allowing registrations of IDNs, 15 indicated they had provisions for maintaining variants. Essentially all of those respondents either used the variant approach for CJK espoused by the JET Guidelines, or along the lines of the communal approach to the Arabic language described in RFC 5564.

Finally, respondents that manage variants were asked if they coordinate such variants across two or more zones. Of the three that answered affirmatively, one managed the same contents between an ASCII and an IDN top-level domain; and the other two maintain a variant zone that is not listed in the DNS in anticipation that the variant label will be delegated in the root zone at a later date.

The primary aim in conducting the survey was to ensure there wasn’t a methodology used for variants under deployment that the team was not aware of. The responses indicated that no such novel approaches were undertaken beyond those of which the team was already familiar.

# Appendix 7: Acknowledgements

* 1. ICANN would like to acknowledge the work of the six case study teams: Arabic, Chinese, Cyrillic, Devanagari, Greek, and Latin for their careful and detailed study on these scripts, and the local host organizations that supported the work of the teams.

All case study team reports can be found at <http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-4-03oct11-en.htm>.

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The coordination team was comprised of experts from the case study teams, who advised ICANN in completing this integrated issues report.

The group's work in this capacity began in October at a working session during the ICANN public meeting in Dakar, Senegal, and members have participated regularly on conference calls and review and discussion of drafts of this report.

Mailing list archives for the team are at <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/integrated-vip/>. Materials for this project are also available at <https://community.icann.org/display/VIP/Home>.

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1. The Unicode Standard is a character coding system designed to support the worldwide interchange, processing, and display of the written texts of the diverse languages and technical disciplines of the modern world. See <http://unicode.org/standard/standard.html>. As of this writing, Unicode is at version 6.0, but a new version (6.1) is contemplated for publication in February of 2012. Various ancillary documents are being prepared for an update to align with Unicode 6.1. Public review and comment are invited on the drafts Issue #208: Proposed Update UTR #36: Unicode Security Considerations (see <http://www.unicode.org/review/pri208/>) and Issue #209: Proposed Update Unicode Technical Standard #39 Unicode Security Mechanisms (see [http://www.unicode.org/review/pri209/](http://www.unicode.org/review/pri209)). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
2. See <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890.txt>; <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5891.txt>, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5892.txt>; <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5893.txt>; <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5894.txt>, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5895.txt>. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
3. It has been noted that this may be seen as a desirable feature. The argument is that if by default a mail server is configured for all the variants of a domain, there could be a risk of denial of service attacks where third parties might redirect domains to the mailbox in question. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
4. <http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/> [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
5. <http://newgtlds.icann.org/> [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
6. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3743.txt> [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
7. The Board resolution provided that “The CEO is directed to develop (in consultation with the board ES-WG) an issues report identifying what needs to be done with the evaluation, possible delegation, allocation and operation of gTLDs containing variant characters IDNs as part of the new gTLD process in order to facilitate the development of workable approaches to the deployment of gTLDs containing variant characters IDNs. The analysis of needed work should identify the appropriate venues (e.g., ICANN, IETF, language community, etc.) for pursuing the necessary work. The report should be published for public review.” See <http://www.icann.org/en/minutes/resolutions-25sep10-en.htm#2.5> [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
8. <http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-20apr11-en.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
9. <http://www.icann.org/en/announcements/announcement-4-03oct11-en.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
10. It appears that the Unicode standard does not intend the same code point to correspond with more than one abstract character; but because the term ‘abstract character’ is itself not perfectly clear, some interpretations will regard two different abstract characters as being implemented with the same code point. An example might be the MODIFIER LETTER APOSTROPHE, U+02BC, in its use in very different languages. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
11. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3743.txt>   
     [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
12. See <http://www.unicode.org/versions/Unicode6.0.0/ch02.pdf>. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
13. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt> [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
14. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1035.txt> [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
15. Normalization is a mechanism for making different strings – in this case Unicode strings – match one another under the right circumstances. A complete outline of Unicode normalization is beyond the scope of this document, but it is a critical part of the way IDNA operates. A large number of potential problems in IDNA are solved because of the normalization rules. To understand Unicode normalization, see “UNICODE NORMALIZATION FORMS,” UAX15, <http://www.unicode.org/reports/tr15/>. For details of how Unicode normalization interacts with IDNA and U-labels, see RFC 5892, especially section 2.2 (<http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5892.txt>) and RFC 5890 (<http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890.txt>), especially the definition of U-label. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
16. <http://tools.rfc-editor.org/html/rfc5892> [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
17. <http://tools.rfc-editor.org/html/rfc5894> [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
18. In this context “visually confusable” refers to two different strings of Unicode characters whose appearance in common fonts in small sizes at typical screen resolutions is sufficiently close that people easily mistake one for the other. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
19. See <http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/rfp-clean-19sep11-en.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
20. In principle, this is true of non-IDNA zones, too, but as those cases are not directly relevant to the present concern, we will ignore them for the purposes of this discussion. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
21. There may be more than one way to represent the label generation rules. For instance, RFC 3743 defines the repertoire as the list of Valid Code Points. For a given code point, the alternatives are all listed in the Preferred Variant and Character Variant columns of the Language Variant Table. Those code points in the Preferred Variant column are the ones that normally result in a resulting label being activated (which means there is less freedom about the status). Those code points in the Character Variant column are ones that normally result in a resulting label *not* being activated. RFC 3743 does not provide a convenient mechanism to block a label. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
22. See <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5891.txt>, section 4.3 [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
23. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt> [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
24. RFC 1034, section 3.5 [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
25. Case insensitivity is specified in RFC 1034, sections 3.1 and 3.5. Section 3.1, however, says that case is to be preserved on receipt. [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
26. This is an oversimplification. More accurately, the Nameprep stage of IDNA2003 processing uses a Stringprep appendix that specifies case-fold mappings in many instances. See RFC 3454, Appendix B.2 for Stringprep, RFC 3491 section 3 for the specification of which mapping to use, and RFC 3490 for the specification of when to use Nameprep. [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
27. See <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5895.txt> [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
28. Latin case study, p.1 [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
29. Cf. Greek case study, sections 11 and 12, pp. 9 ff [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
30. Even understandings of “working” could differ based on how an operation occurs. A forwarding mechanism from one domain to another is a different type of “working” from two domains functioning as equals. What a user sees displayed in a browser bar, for example, might not be what is expected. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
31. <http://www.icann.org/en/topics/new-gtlds/rfp-clean-19sep11-en.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
32. <http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/fast-track/idn-cctld-implementation-plan-16nov09-en.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
33. <http://ccnso.icann.org/policy/cctld-idn> [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
34. <http://www.icann.org/en/topics/idn/implementation-guidelines.htm>  
     [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
35. <http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3912.txt> [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
36. <http://www.icann.org/en/committees/security/sac051.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
37. <http://www.icann.org/en/reviews/affirmation/whois-rt-draft-final-report-05dec11-en.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
38. <http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp.htm> [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
39. Though beyond the scope of issues related specifically to IDN variant TLDs, this scenario becomes more complex where registry policy provides for some relationship between the names example1.X, example2.X, example3.X which could also be the subject of dispute resolution proceedings. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
40. Unicode Standard, section 3.4, D7 [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
41. RFC 5890 [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
42. Unicode Standard, section 2.4 [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
43. RFC 3743, section 2.1.14 [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
44. Unicode Standard, section 3.4 [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
45. RFC 1034, section 3.1 [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
46. Unicode Glossary, <http://www.unicode.org/glossary/#F>. See also RFC 6365 [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
47. Unicode Glossary, <http://www.unicode.org/glossary/#G> [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
48. RFC 6365 [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
49. Unicode Glossary, <http://www.unicode.org/glossary/#G> [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
50. RFC 3743 [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
51. RFC 3743 section 2.1.18 [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
52. RFC 3743 [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
53. RFC 3743 section 2.1.13 [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
54. Unicode Standard Annex #24 [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
55. RFC 5890 [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
56. RFC 3743, section 2.1.12 [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
57. RFC 1034, section 4.2 [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
58. <http://tools.rfc-editor.org/html/rfc5892> [↑](#footnote-ref-63)