[WP1] WP1 Work to Do - Now to July - Please Read

[Greg Shatan]

Edward,

I have no interest in empowering the Intellectual Property Constituency (or
any other constituency in the Commercial Stakeholders Group or the
Noncommercial Stakeholders Group) "at the expense of others."  (I have no
idea where that idea came from.)  I am interested in preventing the
disenfranchisement and exclusion of these constituencies.  (However, I will
confine my remarks to the constituencies placed in the Commercial
Stakeholder Group, since there are issues peculiar to the separation and
subsidiarity (or lack thereof) of the NCSG, NCUC and NPOC that are beyond
scope here.)

I did not have any specific solution to this problem, so it is rather
bizarre to start doing any math.  As Mark Twain is supposed to have said:
"There are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics."  Your
math falls squarely in the third category.  The math you did was based on a
series of extreme assumptions of your own design and choice.  It is an
absurdist and alarmist fantasy that perhaps serves some purpose as
propaganda, but serves no purpose as analysis and only serves to stifle
rational discussion and to obfuscate the issue at hand.  The issue is
simple: all I'm asking for is a seat at the table.  How we get there is a
different question.

Similarly lacking in any relationship to reality is the idea that the
"power balances" at ICANN have been "carefully negotiated over the past
decade and a half."  This fails on several levels.  First, overall power
balances at ICANN take place almost entirely at the SO/AC level, so the
issue of power balances within the GNSO has generally been almost
irrelevant outside the GNSO.  With the recent rise in cross-community
working groups and other efforts, that is only now changing.  Second, the
current "power balance" in the GNSO only dates back to 2010.  Third, the
current "power balance" in the GNSO was an attempt to deal with governance
issues at the GNSO Council; it was not intended to provide a template for
"power balances" across ICANN as a whole.  (Whether it was a successful
attempt should have been part of the GNSO review, but that's another
story....)  (Whether the recent shift in GNSO "power balances" was
"carefully negotiated" and whether the goals of that shift (which I believe
included increasing diversity in the non-commercial interests) have been
achieved, I'll leave to others or another time; I don't think it's either
constructive or relevant to explore them in this forum.)  Fourth, under the
current "power balance" in the GNSO, the IPC still gets "a seat at the
table" (two seats at the GNSO Council table, actually), and the ability to
participate freely in any GNSO Working Group.  These fundamental tenets of
the current GNSO "power balance" need to be honored in any attempt to
"borrow" the GNSO current allocation and apply it in larger circumstances.
Doing otherwise unacceptably distorts and perverts the GNSO "power
balance."  Using it to deny the IPC (or any other single constituency) a
seat, a voice, and a vote in any larger governance mechanism smacks of
"voter suppression" and a denial of fundamental rights to participate in
ICANN governance, rather than any attempt to reflect a legitimate balance
of power.

I also reject the implication that examining this issue will any way
"derail" the transition.  This is precisely the kind of issue that we need
to get right in order to have a transition.  How can we purport to be
turning over stewardship or accountability to the global multistakeholder
community if we put forth a proposal that freezes out two out of the three
constituencies that were placed in the Commercial Stakeholder Group,
leaving them with their noses pressed against the glass?

When a suggestion is finally made, it is inoperably vague:  "porting" the
"current ATRT organizational representation".  This seems odd, since this
is was hardly created through a bottom-up process, nor is it used in a
bottom-up fashion.  Also, the ATRT composition is only generally described
in the Affirmation of Commitments, and gives broad discretion to the GAC
Chair and the ICANN Board Chair as to the size and composition of the ATRT.
As a result, it has been executed differently in ATRT1 and ATRT2, neither
of which seem to match the percentages supplied in the suggestion.  The AoC
simply provides:

The review will be performed by volunteer community members and the review
> team will be constituted and published for public comment, and will include
> the following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the GAC, the
> Chair of the Board of
> ​ ​
> ICANN, the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of the
> DOC, representatives of the relevant ICANN Advisory Committees and Supporting
> Organizations and independent experts. Composition of the review team
> will be agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with GACmembers)
> and the Chair of the Board of ICANN.


ATRT1 was composed of 4 GNSO reps, 2 ccNSO reps, 4 government reps (GAC
Chair, US rep and 2 GAC members), 1 ASO member and 1 ALAC member.
ATRT2 was composed of 2 GNSO reps, 2 ccNSO reps, 5 government reps (as
above, plus 1 additional GAC member as an independent expert), 1 ASO
member, 2 ALAC members and 1 SSAC member.  (Neither of these match the
apparent suggestion of 2 GNSO, 2 ALAC, 2 ccNSO, 1 ASO, 1 GAC and 1 SSAC.)
 If one of these is the suggestion, at least proportionately, it should be
clarified.

As far as the suggestion that current arrangements must be respected, I
might be able to support that if current voting arrangements within the
GNSO were truly respected, where each of the IPC, BC and ISPCP has seats at
the table and a vote.  As noted above, any suggestion that excludes two of
these groups in no way respects current arrangements or apportions
participants according to the GNSO's internal voting arrangements.  Two
separate and long-standing constituencies cannot be eliminated as a
"rounding error."

Finally, there is nothing "top down" about my general suggestion.  It's
being made right here from the bottom in a bottom-up process.  And clearly
there is nothing "micro-managed" about my suggestion, since I supplied no
detail.  Once again, it appears that words are being used for their
propaganda value, rather than their meaning.  As for the desire to reflect
the status quo -- at the risk of being redundant, any status quo has to
respect the existence of the IPC, BC and ISPCP.  Within that broad concept
there are many possibilities, which do not in any way have to disrupt the
"balance of power" in ICANN (whatever that actually may be).  I would be
happy to explore these options in a rational and substantive manner.

Greg


On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 5:49 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1 at toast.net> wrote:

>
>
> Simply put, the GNSO has more than 5 separate, discrete and formally
> chartered stakeholder groups; it has 7.  Each of these groups operate
> separately and self-sufficiently, and each deserves a seat at the table.
> If any two or more of these groups chooses to be viewed as a combination
> and/or to operate primarily as a combined organization, and share a single
> seat, that should be their prerogative.  However, unless such a choice is
> made, the reality that these groups are separate must be honored.
>
>
> Which is the position I would take were I a leader of a GNSO NCPH
> commercial constituency interested in empowering my entity at the expense
> of others. Under Greg's proposal, NCPH commercial interests would receive
> 42.8% of the seats allocated to the GNSO, a far greater percentage than
> they would receive under the weighted voting procedure currently used in
> the GNSO. Indeed, this proposal would see the Commercial Stakehokder Group
> alone receive more seats than the entire Contracted Party House and would
> give them 60% of the seats awarded to the NCPH ratter than 50% of NCPH
> power sharing in the current arrangement.
>
> This is not acceptable. The transition should not be used to alter power
> balances within ICANN that have been carefully negotiated over the past
> decade and one half. Indeed, if diversity were the value to be promoted the
> noncommercial interests, the largest in number and most diverse in origin
> in all of ICANN, should be tapped for greater representation in the new
> model. I am not suggesting this at this time in recognition that the entire
> transition could be derailed if we attempt to rearrange power balances
> within ICANN.
>
> Rather I would suggest that the current ATRT organizational representation
> balance be ported into the new model. Although the actual numbers involved
> may, of course, be increased the proportional balance ( under which the
> GNSO, ALAC and ccNSO receive about 22% of the seats and the ASO, GAC and
> SSAC about 11%) should not be changed as envisioned in the initial post. I
> write this as one who believes that the GNSO is seriously underrepresented
> in this arrangement. The CCWG ACCT should also not get involved in
> apportioning the seats between groups within the SOAC's. Rather current
> arrangements must be respected and seats and participants apportioned
> according to internal voting arrangements within the SOAC's. This is truly
> bottom up status quo rather than the top down micromanaged power
> rearrangement by the CCWG ACCT suggested in Greg's  post or the numerical
> rearrangement suggested in the initial post.
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Fri, Jul 3, 2015 at 11:06 PM, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org
> > wrote:
>
>>   Avri and I recommend this text  on creation of review teams for AoC
>> reviews being brought into the bylaws.  We picked-up in the community
>> voting weights that will be used for AC/SOs exercising their “community
>> powers” here:
>>
>>  All reviews will be conducted by a volunteer community review team comprised
>> of representatives of the relevant Advisory Committees, Supporting
>> Organizations, and the chair of the ICANN Board.
>>
>>  Up to 5 volunteers are welcomed from each AC/SO, to accommodate representatives
>> of individual stakeholder groups.  If a review team conducts a consensus
>> call on its report and recommendations, voting will be equalized among
>> the participating AC/SOs.
>>
>>  The group must be as diverse as possible.
>>
>>
>>  Thoughts on that?
>>
>>   From: Jordan Carter
>> Date: Wednesday, July 1, 2015 at 11:29 PM
>> To: "wp1 at icann.org"
>> Subject: [WP1] WP1 Work to Do - Now to July - Please Read
>>
>>   Dear all
>>
>>  Thanks for the contributions on our work planning call for Work Party 1
>> today. *Please read this email carefully and add your thoughts. *
>>
>>  A separate note later today or early tomorrow will outline the WP1
>> meetings we need to have between now and 14 July.
>>
>>
>>  We have three pieces of work to do by the end of the month. They are
>> listed below, and then some detail fleshed out in the rest of this email,
>> along with the *call for volunteers...*
>>
>>  Three things need to be done:
>>
>>  *1. Prepare draft content for our Second Public Comment report, for
>> discussion at Paris & finalising by end month*
>>
>>  *2. Start the bylaws-preparation process, using the AOC reviews as a
>> test case*
>>
>>  *3. Prepare responses to all the public comments from PC1*
>>
>>
>>  *On 1:* the chunks of work we need to do are to prepare updated content
>> that takes account of:
>>
>>  - the feedback received in PC1
>> - the discussions with the community and in our group at Buenos Aires
>> - further analysis and refinement we make as WP1
>>
>>  This draft material should be done in time for the Paris meeting, and
>> so has to respect the document freeze on 14 July.
>>
>>  We need to do this for the following areas, and we need a Lead
>> Volunteer for each area:
>>
>>  Community Mechanism - balance of power / votes / influence
>> Community Mechanism - whether there is a Council, or just a vote counting
>> mechanism
>>
>>  Community Power - Budget/Strat Plan / Operating Plan
>> Community Power - Blocking ordinary bylaws changes
>> Community Power - Approving Fundamental Bylaws changes
>> Community Power - Removal of individual Directors
>> Community Power - Recall of the whole ICANN Board
>>
>>  Affirmation of Commitments - inclusion of AOC reviews in bylaws
>> Affirmation of Commitments - other matters (what happens to AOC, etc)
>>
>>
>>  Not on this list is the Model itself (empowered designators, empowered
>> SO/AC) - my understanding is that the lawyers are being asked to develop
>> material on this, and that it will be central to our meeting in Paris.
>>
>>
>>  *If there are areas of work omitted above, please raise them ASAP*.
>>
>>
>>  *:: Call for Volunteers ::*
>>
>>  If you would like to *volunteer* to lead any particular piece of work
>> for the above, *please do so ASAP* - by email to me, or to this email
>> list.
>>
>>  Ideally, there will be one volunteer for each of the lines above. I
>> have some people who have agreed to be "voluntold" - Avri and Matt Shears
>> are in this category. But for the start, free choice!
>>
>>  The task will be to be lead writer on a tracked changes version of the
>> PC1 content, showing what you propose to change for the Second report.
>>
>>  The approach asked is to:
>>
>>  a) analyse the public comments and the discussions in BA
>> b) propose draft text changes that take this into account
>>
>>  The example Steve delBianco circulated earlier today is a way to do it.
>>
>>
>>  Your drafting will lead to discussion of your proposed content in WP1.
>> We will do as much as we can to improve the drafts and get consensus, but
>> we will debate all the material through in Paris is my current knowledge.
>>
>>  On *item 2 - bylaws drafting - *Steve has started this process with the
>> AOC and we will discuss this content on our next WP1 call.
>>
>>  On *item 3 - public comments replies -* I propose that people take some
>> account of this as they do the drafting work, and be prepared to spend some
>> time on completing this task (responses to the comments we got in PC1)
>> *after* the Paris meeting.
>>
>>
>>  I look forward to your thoughts as to any gaps in the proposed work,
>> and to your volunteering excellence.
>>
>>
>>
>>  cheers
>> Jordan
>>
>>  --
>>   Jordan Carter
>>
>> Chief Executive
>> *InternetNZ*
>>
>> 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
>> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>> Skype: jordancarter
>>
>> *A better world through a better Internet *
>>
>>
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