[WP1] WP1 Work to Do - Now to July - Please Read

Jordan Carter jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Mon Jul 6 13:01:49 UTC 2015


hi all

I indeed find this discussion a bit confusing, but offer this in the hope
it might help - earlier discussions of the "number" of votes discussed the
possibility that in the GNSO it would be 1.25 votes for each of the four
SGs.  It was not to say only five of the seven parts of the GNSO should
have a say.

5 rather than 4 was preferred to be flexible for those who wanted to have
one "vote" per region where organised like that, as I recall.

Cheers
Jordan

On 6 July 2015 at 18:17, Edward Morris <egmorris1 at toast.net> wrote:

> Greg,
>
> I have no desire to take away the "seat at the table" of the IPC or any
> other group. What I do desire is to prevent the IPC or any other group from
> using the transition to increase the size of their seat at the table
> relative to other groups. Your proposal to base the participation of the
> GNSO in wider governing units on the basis of constituencies, which the
> number 7 represents, does exactly that and in light of Westlake
> Governance's call for more constituencies is unwise and unsustainable.
>
> The house structure of the GNSO was designed to ensure a certain power
> balance between contracted parties and non contracted parties, registers
> and registrars, commercial interests and noncommercial interests. Ignoring
> that structure while empowering individual organisational units within the
> houses does change the nature of the GNSO, empowering member units of the
> CSG at the expense of the registrars, registries and noncommercial
> interests.
>
> If we were to select a number of representational units on the basis of
> the GNSO structure that number would be neither 5 or 7 but 4: one each for
> the noncommercial, commercial, registrar and registry sectors, 2 for each
> of the houses.
>
>
>> I have no interest in empowering the Intellectual Property Constituency
>> (or any other constituency in the Commercial Stakeholders Group or the
>> Noncommercial Stakeholders Group) "at the expense of others."  (I have no
>> idea where that idea came from.)
>>
>
> Your proposal does exactly that and I have too much respect for your
> intellectual capabilities to believe that you do not understand that.
>
>
>
>> I did not have any specific solution to this problem, so it is rather
>> bizarre to start doing any math.
>>
>
> The math was done on the basis of your suggestion that the GNSO would best
> be served by 7 voting units rather than the 4 we are currently organised
> under.
>
> You make a factual misstatement: "Simply put, the GNSO has more than 5
> separate, discrete and formally chartered stakeholder groups; it has 7" and
> build your argument from there.
>
> There are four stakeholder groups, Greg, not seven: the NCSG, the CSG
> (note that the S in each of these groupings represents the word
> Stakeholder), the Registrars and Registers. Constituencies represent
> distinct subgroups within the broader stakeholder groups that are the basis
> for GNSO organisation.
>
>
>
>
>
>> As Mark Twain is supposed to have said: "There are three kinds of lies:
>> lies, damned lies, and statistics."  Your math falls squarely in the third
>> category.  The math you did was based on a series of extreme assumptions of
>> your own design and choice.  It is an absurdist and alarmist fantasy that
>> perhaps serves some purpose as propaganda, but serves no purpose as
>> analysis and only serves to stifle rational discussion and to obfuscate the
>> issue at hand.  The issue is simple: all I'm asking for is a seat at the
>> table.  How we get there is a different question.
>>
>
>
> I find it interesting that the person who began by proposing that
> representation be structured on the basis of the number seven (a number
> that represents each constituency) does not appear to like an analysis done
> on the basis of that proposal. The ISP has a seat at the table within the
> CSG, the stakeholder group that should be the basis of the IPC's
> representation within whatever structure we devise.
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> Similarly lacking in any relationship to reality is the idea that the
>> "power balances" at ICANN have been "carefully negotiated over the past
>> decade and a half."  This fails on several levels.  First, overall power
>> balances at ICANN take place almost entirely at the SO/AC level, so the
>> issue of power balances within the GNSO has generally been almost
>> irrelevant outside the GNSO.  With the recent rise in cross-community
>> working groups and other efforts, that is only now changing.  Second, the
>> current "power balance" in the GNSO only dates back to 2010.  Third, the
>> current "power balance" in the GNSO was an attempt to deal with governance
>> issues at the GNSO Council; it was not intended to provide a template for
>> "power balances" across ICANN as a whole.  (Whether it was a successful
>> attempt should have been part of the GNSO review, but that's another
>> story....)  (Whether the recent shift in GNSO "power balances" was
>> "carefully negotiated" and whether the goals of that shift (which I believe
>> included increasing diversity in the non-commercial interests) have been
>> achieved, I'll leave to others or another time; I don't think it's either
>> constructive or relevant to explore them in this forum.)  Fourth, under the
>> current "power balance" in the GNSO, the IPC still gets "a seat at the
>> table" (two seats at the GNSO Council table, actually), and the ability to
>> participate freely in any GNSO Working Group.  These fundamental tenets of
>> the current GNSO "power balance" need to be honored in any attempt to
>> "borrow" the GNSO current allocation and apply it in larger circumstances.
>> Doing otherwise unacceptably distorts and perverts the GNSO "power
>> balance."  Using it to deny the IPC (or any other single constituency) a
>> seat, a voice, and a vote in any larger governance mechanism smacks of
>> "voter suppression" and a denial of fundamental rights to participate in
>> ICANN governance, rather than any attempt to reflect a legitimate balance
>> of power.
>>
>
>
>
> Wow. Voter suppression: rich coming from an entity that arguably has been
> the most represented and successful in terms of policy of any within ICANN.
> That statement, of course, is arguable, like many you've made in the
> preceding paragraph. You appear  to want to restructure the GNSO into an
> entity based upon small constituency units, rather than the larger
> stakeholder groups it is now organised under.  At the very least you want
> to configure GNSO representation into the larger ICANN on this basis.
> Effective reorganisation of the GNSO should not be the remit of this CCWG.
> Rather, it belongs to the ongoing GNSO review process.
>
> No one is attempting to deny the IPC a voice. It has one situated as it is
> in the CSG. That needs to be the basis of it;s representation in the larger
> ICANN world until such time as the GNSO itself is changed.
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> I also reject the implication that examining this issue will any way
>> "derail" the transition.  This is precisely the kind of issue that we need
>> to get right in order to have a transition.  How can we purport to be
>> turning over stewardship or accountability to the global multistakeholder
>> community if we put forth a proposal that freezes out two out of the three
>> constituencies that were placed in the Commercial Stakeholder Group,
>> leaving them with their noses pressed against the glass?
>>
>
>
> This is absolute hyperbole of the worse kind. If the IPC has problems
> within the CSG you need to solve them there, in the GNSO review or
> elsewhere. The CCWG on accountability is not the place to do so.
>
> This conversation is a good example of why the exact means of
> representation needs to be determined by the SOAC's themselves rather than
> the CCWG. I doubt our colleagues in other groups really care very much
> about this conversation. As a member of the GNSO Council I look forward to
> further dialogue on these issues with the IPC representatives and the
> elected or appointed members of all other groups on that body.
>
> As to the issue that started this conversation - numbers of
> representatives on review boards - I believe the number 4, not 7, would
> best fit the GNSO. I understand why those groups whose organization is
> based upon geography would prefer 5 and I have no strong opposition to that
> proposal although do have some concern that a larger grouping might be a
> bit less effective than desirable.
>
> Best,
>
> Ed
>
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>> When a suggestion is finally made, it is inoperably vague:  "porting" the
>> "current ATRT organizational representation".  This seems odd, since this
>> is was hardly created through a bottom-up process, nor is it used in a
>> bottom-up fashion.  Also, the ATRT composition is only generally described
>> in the Affirmation of Commitments, and gives broad discretion to the GAC
>> Chair and the ICANN Board Chair as to the size and composition of the ATRT.
>> As a result, it has been executed differently in ATRT1 and ATRT2, neither
>> of which seem to match the percentages supplied in the suggestion.  The AoC
>> simply provides:
>>
>> The review will be performed by volunteer community members and the
>>> review team will be constituted and published for public comment, and will
>>> include the following (or their designated nominees): the Chair of the
>>> GAC, the Chair of the Board of
>>> ​ ​
>>> ICANN, the Assistant Secretary for Communications and Information of
>>> the DOC, representatives of the relevant ICANN Advisory Committees and Supporting
>>> Organizations and independent experts. Composition of the review team
>>> will be agreed jointly by the Chair of the GAC (in consultation with GACmembers)
>>> and the Chair of the Board of ICANN.
>>
>>
>> ATRT1 was composed of 4 GNSO reps, 2 ccNSO reps, 4 government reps (GAC
>> Chair, US rep and 2 GAC members), 1 ASO member and 1 ALAC member.
>> ATRT2 was composed of 2 GNSO reps, 2 ccNSO reps, 5 government reps (as
>> above, plus 1 additional GAC member as an independent expert), 1 ASO
>> member, 2 ALAC members and 1 SSAC member.  (Neither of these match the
>> apparent suggestion of 2 GNSO, 2 ALAC, 2 ccNSO, 1 ASO, 1 GAC and 1 SSAC.)
>>  If one of these is the suggestion, at least proportionately, it should be
>> clarified.
>>
>> As far as the suggestion that current arrangements must be respected, I
>> might be able to support that if current voting arrangements within the
>> GNSO were truly respected, where each of the IPC, BC and ISPCP has seats at
>> the table and a vote.  As noted above, any suggestion that excludes two of
>> these groups in no way respects current arrangements or apportions
>> participants according to the GNSO's internal voting arrangements.  Two
>> separate and long-standing constituencies cannot be eliminated as a
>> "rounding error."
>>
>> Finally, there is nothing "top down" about my general suggestion.  It's
>> being made right here from the bottom in a bottom-up process.  And clearly
>> there is nothing "micro-managed" about my suggestion, since I supplied no
>> detail.  Once again, it appears that words are being used for their
>> propaganda value, rather than their meaning.  As for the desire to reflect
>> the status quo -- at the risk of being redundant, any status quo has to
>> respect the existence of the IPC, BC and ISPCP.  Within that broad concept
>> there are many possibilities, which do not in any way have to disrupt the
>> "balance of power" in ICANN (whatever that actually may be).  I would be
>> happy to explore these options in a rational and substantive manner.
>>
>> Greg
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Jul 4, 2015 at 5:49 AM, Edward Morris <egmorris1 at toast.net>
>> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Simply put, the GNSO has more than 5 separate, discrete and formally
>>> chartered stakeholder groups; it has 7.  Each of these groups operate
>>> separately and self-sufficiently, and each deserves a seat at the table.
>>> If any two or more of these groups chooses to be viewed as a combination
>>> and/or to operate primarily as a combined organization, and share a single
>>> seat, that should be their prerogative.  However, unless such a choice is
>>> made, the reality that these groups are separate must be honored.
>>>
>>>
>>> Which is the position I would take were I a leader of a GNSO NCPH
>>> commercial constituency interested in empowering my entity at the expense
>>> of others. Under Greg's proposal, NCPH commercial interests would receive
>>> 42.8% of the seats allocated to the GNSO, a far greater percentage than
>>> they would receive under the weighted voting procedure currently used in
>>> the GNSO. Indeed, this proposal would see the Commercial Stakehokder Group
>>> alone receive more seats than the entire Contracted Party House and would
>>> give them 60% of the seats awarded to the NCPH ratter than 50% of NCPH
>>> power sharing in the current arrangement.
>>>
>>> This is not acceptable. The transition should not be used to alter power
>>> balances within ICANN that have been carefully negotiated over the past
>>> decade and one half. Indeed, if diversity were the value to be promoted the
>>> noncommercial interests, the largest in number and most diverse in origin
>>> in all of ICANN, should be tapped for greater representation in the new
>>> model. I am not suggesting this at this time in recognition that the entire
>>> transition could be derailed if we attempt to rearrange power balances
>>> within ICANN.
>>>
>>> Rather I would suggest that the current ATRT organizational
>>> representation balance be ported into the new model. Although the actual
>>> numbers involved may, of course, be increased the proportional balance (
>>> under which the GNSO, ALAC and ccNSO receive about 22% of the seats and the
>>> ASO, GAC and SSAC about 11%) should not be changed as envisioned in the
>>> initial post. I write this as one who believes that the GNSO is seriously
>>> underrepresented in this arrangement. The CCWG ACCT should also not get
>>> involved in apportioning the seats between groups within the SOAC's. Rather
>>> current arrangements must be respected and seats and participants
>>> apportioned according to internal voting arrangements within the SOAC's.
>>> This is truly bottom up status quo rather than the top down micromanaged
>>> power rearrangement by the CCWG ACCT suggested in Greg's  post or the
>>> numerical rearrangement suggested in the initial post.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Jul 3, 2015 at 11:06 PM, Steve DelBianco <
>>> sdelbianco at netchoice.org> wrote:
>>>
>>>>   Avri and I recommend this text  on creation of review teams for AoC
>>>> reviews being brought into the bylaws.  We picked-up in the community
>>>> voting weights that will be used for AC/SOs exercising their “community
>>>> powers” here:
>>>>
>>>>  All reviews will be conducted by a volunteer community review team comprised
>>>> of representatives of the relevant Advisory Committees, Supporting
>>>> Organizations, and the chair of the ICANN Board.
>>>>
>>>>  Up to 5 volunteers are welcomed from each AC/SO, to accommodate representatives
>>>> of individual stakeholder groups.  If a review team conducts a
>>>> consensus call on its report and recommendations, voting will be
>>>> equalized among the participating AC/SOs.
>>>>
>>>>  The group must be as diverse as possible.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Thoughts on that?
>>>>
>>>>   From: Jordan Carter
>>>> Date: Wednesday, July 1, 2015 at 11:29 PM
>>>> To: "wp1 at icann.org"
>>>> Subject: [WP1] WP1 Work to Do - Now to July - Please Read
>>>>
>>>>   Dear all
>>>>
>>>>  Thanks for the contributions on our work planning call for Work Party
>>>> 1 today. *Please read this email carefully and add your thoughts. *
>>>>
>>>>  A separate note later today or early tomorrow will outline the WP1
>>>> meetings we need to have between now and 14 July.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  We have three pieces of work to do by the end of the month. They are
>>>> listed below, and then some detail fleshed out in the rest of this email,
>>>> along with the *call for volunteers...*
>>>>
>>>>  Three things need to be done:
>>>>
>>>>  *1. Prepare draft content for our Second Public Comment report, for
>>>> discussion at Paris & finalising by end month*
>>>>
>>>>  *2. Start the bylaws-preparation process, using the AOC reviews as a
>>>> test case*
>>>>
>>>>  *3. Prepare responses to all the public comments from PC1*
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  *On 1:* the chunks of work we need to do are to prepare updated
>>>> content that takes account of:
>>>>
>>>>  - the feedback received in PC1
>>>> - the discussions with the community and in our group at Buenos Aires
>>>> - further analysis and refinement we make as WP1
>>>>
>>>>  This draft material should be done in time for the Paris meeting, and
>>>> so has to respect the document freeze on 14 July.
>>>>
>>>>  We need to do this for the following areas, and we need a Lead
>>>> Volunteer for each area:
>>>>
>>>>  Community Mechanism - balance of power / votes / influence
>>>> Community Mechanism - whether there is a Council, or just a vote
>>>> counting mechanism
>>>>
>>>>  Community Power - Budget/Strat Plan / Operating Plan
>>>> Community Power - Blocking ordinary bylaws changes
>>>> Community Power - Approving Fundamental Bylaws changes
>>>> Community Power - Removal of individual Directors
>>>> Community Power - Recall of the whole ICANN Board
>>>>
>>>>  Affirmation of Commitments - inclusion of AOC reviews in bylaws
>>>> Affirmation of Commitments - other matters (what happens to AOC, etc)
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Not on this list is the Model itself (empowered designators,
>>>> empowered SO/AC) - my understanding is that the lawyers are being asked to
>>>> develop material on this, and that it will be central to our meeting in
>>>> Paris.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  *If there are areas of work omitted above, please raise them ASAP*.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  *:: Call for Volunteers ::*
>>>>
>>>>  If you would like to *volunteer* to lead any particular piece of work
>>>> for the above, *please do so ASAP* - by email to me, or to this email
>>>> list.
>>>>
>>>>  Ideally, there will be one volunteer for each of the lines above. I
>>>> have some people who have agreed to be "voluntold" - Avri and Matt Shears
>>>> are in this category. But for the start, free choice!
>>>>
>>>>  The task will be to be lead writer on a tracked changes version of
>>>> the PC1 content, showing what you propose to change for the Second report.
>>>>
>>>>  The approach asked is to:
>>>>
>>>>  a) analyse the public comments and the discussions in BA
>>>> b) propose draft text changes that take this into account
>>>>
>>>>  The example Steve delBianco circulated earlier today is a way to do
>>>> it.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  Your drafting will lead to discussion of your proposed content in
>>>> WP1. We will do as much as we can to improve the drafts and get consensus,
>>>> but we will debate all the material through in Paris is my current
>>>> knowledge.
>>>>
>>>>  On *item 2 - bylaws drafting - *Steve has started this process with
>>>> the AOC and we will discuss this content on our next WP1 call.
>>>>
>>>>  On *item 3 - public comments replies -* I propose that people take
>>>> some account of this as they do the drafting work, and be prepared to spend
>>>> some time on completing this task (responses to the comments we got in PC1)
>>>> *after* the Paris meeting.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  I look forward to your thoughts as to any gaps in the proposed work,
>>>> and to your volunteering excellence.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>  cheers
>>>> Jordan
>>>>
>>>>  --
>>>>   Jordan Carter
>>>>
>>>> Chief Executive
>>>> *InternetNZ*
>>>>
>>>> 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
>>>> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>>>> Skype: jordancarter
>>>>
>>>> *A better world through a better Internet *
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
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>>>
>>
>
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-- 
Jordan Carter

Chief Executive
*InternetNZ*

04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter

*A better world through a better Internet *
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