

# 5A Community Mechanism as a Sole Member Model

## 5A.2 Influence in the Community Mechanism

The CCWG-Accountability considered the decision weights of the various parts of the community. The following table sets out the voting distribution proposed by the CCWG-Accountability.

| COMMUNITY SEGMENT  | COMMUNITY MECHANISM “VOTES” |
|--------------------|-----------------------------|
| ASO                | 5                           |
| ccNSO              | 5                           |
| GNSO               | 5                           |
| At-Large           | 5                           |
| GAC <sup>1</sup>   | 5                           |
| SSAC <sup>2</sup>  | <del>5</del> <sub>2</sub>   |
| RSSAC <sup>3</sup> | <del>5</del> <sub>2</sub>   |

This proposed voting weight is unchanged from the proposal made in our first Public Comment Report, and attracted the most support from CCWG-Accountability participants during the last meetings finalizing this Report.

A [minority] view among the CCWG-Accountability is that there should be a distinction in voting authority between SOs and ACs, with SOs having greater voting influence (e.g. 5 votes for SOs, 2 votes for ACs).

Another [minority] view is that there should be five votes allocated to each of the SOs and ACs.

A third [minority] view is that there should be two votes each for the ASO, ccNSO, and GNSO, one vote for ALAC and liaison roles only for the GAC, and two votes allocated to each of the SSAC and RSSAC.

Although each SO/AC has a specific number of votes, those votes may be subdivided however the SO/AC decided and, in particular, fractional votes (e.g. allocating 0.75 of a vote or 1.25 votes) are allowed. This allows voting capability to be allocated within the SO/AC. Such allotment would be done through a formal decision of the SO/AC. The SO/AC or the appropriate sub-group must designate the individuals who officially communicate its decisions regarding

<sup>1</sup> At the time of publication, the GAC had not yet determined whether or not to participate in the Community Mechanism.

<sup>2</sup> At the time of publication, the SSAC had not yet determined whether or not to participate in the Community Mechanism.

<sup>3</sup> At the time of publication, the RSSAC had not yet determined whether or not to participate in the Community Mechanism.

votes. If no other decision is made, the Chair of the SO or AC is assumed to be the person who can communicate its votes.

At the time of drafting, it is anticipated that the first four SOs and ACs listed above will be initial participants with voting rights in the Community Mechanism. The Bylaws that establish the Community Mechanism as Sole Member model will provide for the voting rights set out above, even for those ACs that are not planning to participate at this stage.

If such an AC was to decide in future to participate, it would formally resolve to do so by means of its usual processes and give notice publicly to the ICANN community of this decision. Three months following such announcement (the “notice period”), that AC would “join” the Community Mechanism (that is, on that date it obtain the right to participate on the same basis as the other voting SOs/ACs). Such an incoming AC would not be able to cast votes on any decision that where the Decision Period (see Section 5B for a description of the various phases in the exercise of community powers) had begun on the date it “joined”, but would be eligible to do so for decisions that had not yet reached that point.

If an SO or AC at some future point decided it no longer wished to participate in the Community Mechanism as Sole Member on a voting basis, it could resolve to leave the mechanism through its usual processes. Such a decision would take effect **immediately** after notice was publicly given to the ICANN community.

Where an SO or an AC joins or leaves the community mechanism, it cannot reverse this decision until at least **one year** has passed from the end of the relevant notice period.

This proposal gives influence on an equal basis between the existing Support Organizations and Advisory Committees. If a new SO or AC is formed in future, inclusion of that SO or AC in the Community Mechanism would require changes to the Fundamental Bylaws where the Community Mechanism as Sole Member is established.

The logic for ~~5~~**multiple** “votes” per participant in the community mechanism among the five SOs and ACs allocated this number is to allow for greater diversity of views, including the ability to represent all the ICANN regions in each participating group.

CCWG-Accountability anticipates that the votes each SO and AC casts will be a reflection of the balance of views within that SO or AC (or where possible of that sub-division, where votes have been allocated to sub-divisions). That is, block voting (casting all votes in favour or against the use of a power, even where there are diverse views) is not encouraged.

As noted in Section 5B (Community Powers), no votes are exercised until after petitioning and discussion phases.

### Quorums and vote counting

The CCWG-Accountability proposes that for the purposes of the simplest possible administration of the voting system that the thresholds expressed for each community power should be **absolute thresholds**.

This means that if a threshold is 66%, then 66%+ of the votes that could be cast by participants in the CMSM at that time need to be 'yes' votes for the threshold to be met. No votes, abstentions or non-participation would all be treated the same way.

An alternative approach that adjusted the thresholds based on the number of yes/no votes compared with the number of abstentions or non-votes was considered, but adds significant complexity and so is not the CCWG's preference at this time.