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| **Power: Reconsider/reject budget or strategy/operating plans**  *Question 8: Do you agree that the power for the community to reject a budget or strategic plan would enhance ICANN's accountability? Do you agree with the list of requirements for this recommendation? If not, please detail how you would recommend amending these requirements.*  There were **twenty-two** comments in this section.  17 comments suggested **agreement;** 11 comments noted **concerns**.  There were no **confusion** rated comments.  There were three **divergent** rated comments.  There was **broad agreement that this power would enhance ICANN accountability**, but **significant concern** that this power would have to be implemented in a way that does not compromise ICANN’s effectiveness.  The **main issue/s or concerns:**   * Impact on ICANN’s operational effectiveness arising from this power * Desire for more incorporation of all relevant community input in the planning process, so as to make rejection less likely   **Specific** concerns or suggestions for further follow up and WP1/CCWG discussion:   * Greater transparency earlier in the process & more complete reporting (270) * Planning process must deal with all input on a fair and equal basis (271) * Better quality staff/board/community interactions before plans are approved (272) * Limit rejection of a plan to once per cycle (273) * Limit rejection of a plan to twice per cycle (281) * Concern for impact of sustained rejection, some limit (275, 277, 283, 286, 289) * Improved engagement and dialogue to prevent matters coming to the point of rejection (276, 282, 283, 285) * Need greater IANA budget transparency (288) * Clarify that aim is not to re-write a budget in the community mechanism, but to return to Board for adjustment (288)   **Divergent comments:**   * Doubtful of value or effectiveness, opposed to strengthening this power (278)   **Proposed CCWG response/approach to resolution**   * WS2 will look at the planning process to improve quality of engagement & inclusion of input between Board, staff and community, and lead to a lower likelihood of plan rejection * CCWG will consider limit to number of times a plan/budget can be rejected * CCWG will elaborate on caretaker approach where a plan/budget is rejected to minimise operational impact | | | |
| **#** | Contributor | Comment | CCWG Response/Action |
| **295** | [RH](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00000.html) | Question: Yes. Membership should have full powers. | “Agreement”  **Summary / Impression:**  Reviewing/revoking budget and strategic / operating plans is desirable.  **Actions suggested:**  None  **CCWG Response:**  The CCWG thanks you for your comment. |
| **296** | [DBA](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00003.html) | In particular, we would like to emphasize the following: Empowering the community with regard to i.e., spilling the Board, reviewing/revoking the budget and strategic/operating plans and amending the Fundamental Bylaws. | “Agreement”  **Summary / Impression:**  Reviewing/revoking budget and strategic / operating plans is emphasized.  **Actions suggested:**  None  **CCWG Response:**  The CCWG thanks you for your comment. |
| **297** | [CRG](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00008.html) | -In principle yes, but don ́t think is efficient with the present structure of the budget presentations.  - The Budget Veto mechanism should be developed to make transparent to the community how resources are being assigned not only to programs and priorities, but the different parts of the ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE, like the full budget assignments between the major areas of (a) policy development, (b) compliance and (c) operational functions, separate from the corporate overhead which is not the case today. | “Agreement”  “Concerns”  **Summary / Impression:**  More transparency in budget process and earlier and more complete reporting requirements to community.  **Actions suggested:** See above. **CCWG Response**:  Thank you for your comments. The CCWG attempted to address your efficiency concerns in three ways: first there must be consensus concerns to activate this power. Second those concerns must have come up during the public comment period for the budget or strat plan and third there is a time limit to initiate a veto. The CCWG agrees with your second point and have specified that a review of the budget development process will be part of WS2. |
| **298** | [DCA-T](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00010.html) | YES  - Moreover, the community should also have the power to veto or approve any plans to scrap an on-going strategic planning process.  - The community should be allowed to be fully included in any discussions especially regarding the regions they come from, in the past, ICANN leadership has been seen to side with some stakeholders while alienating others yet they come from the same region and share interests.  - ICANN must maintain impartiality and promote inclusivity in all budget or strategy/operating plans proposals | “Agreement”  “Concerns”  **Summary / Impression:**  More inclusivity and impartiality need in budget strat plans.  Community should be fully included in the budget development process.  **Actions suggested:**  None.  **CCWG Response**:  Thank you for your comments. Under the proposed framework, the community can veto any budget or proposed strat plan. The CCWG agrees with your suggestion to improve the process from the start and a review of the budget and strat plan development processes has been recommended for WS2 |
| **299** | [Afnic](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00011.html) | - Afnic strongly support this proposal. Not only it is necessary for the empowered community to be able to review the IANA functions budget (as clearly stated by the CWG-Stewardship) but also this will allow better quality interactions between staff, board and community on the budget and strategy BEFORE it’s approved by the Board.  - The limitation of powers such as not rewriting the budget or the super-majority needed to reject the budget twice seems reasonable. | “Agreement”  **Summary / Impression:**  Better quality interactions between staff, board and community on budget and strategy BEFORE approval by board.  **Actions suggested:**  None.  **CCWG Response**:  Thanks for your comments. As a part of this proposed framework the community would separate veto budget over the ICANN general and IANA specific budgets. The vetos would, however, only come after a board approval. Your recommendation for greater participation in the budget and strat plan development process are duly noted and proposed to be a part of WS2. |
| **300** | [IA](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00017.html) | - Allowing the community to veto the budget or the strategic plan raises questions of efficiency and effectiveness. These are key operational documents, and holding them up for multiple cycles of back-and-forth between the Board and the community could be highly detrimental to ICANN's operational effectiveness.  - IA suggests a workable solution may be to allow the SO/AC Members to place a one-time veto per cycle for these two powers, which the Board could override by providing an explanatory statement explaining why rejection of the veto was consistent with ICANN's mission and the public interest. | “Concerns”  **Summary / Impression:**  Concern for operational efficiency and effectiveness from community veto of budget or strategic plan.  Suggest limiting veto to once per cycle.  **Actions suggested:**  Consider limiting veto to once per cycle.  **CCWG Response**:  Thank you for your comments. The CCWG attempted to address your efficiency concerns in four ways: first there must be consensus concerns to activate this power. Second those concerns must have come up during the public comment period for the budget or strat plan and third there is a time limit to initiate a veto. Finally fourth, the organization would be able to continue to operate on the prior year’s budget so there would be no paralysis. |
| **301** | [RySG](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00022.html) | - RySG agrees that enabling the community to reject a budget or strategic plan would help to enhance ICANN’s accountability. The ability to control the budget is essential as it would have the most direct impact on Board and management actions and activity.  - RySG agrees with the list of requirements for this recommendation | “Agreement”  **Summary / Impression:** Ability to control budget is essential and has most direct impact on board and management.  **Actions suggested:**  None  **CCWG Response:**  The CCWG thanks you for your comment. |
| **302** | [BC](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00024.html) | - BC supports the proposed community power to reject ICANN’s draft budget and strategic plans. It seems appropriate to require 2/3 majority in the first vote and 3/4 majority in subsequent votes.  - BC is concerned that a sustained rejection of ICANN budgets and strategic plans could result in the corporation having to operate under prior approved budgets and strategic plans for multiple years. This is not an efficient or effective way to operate an organization like ICANN, and the BC believes CCWG should consider at what point the budget and strategic plan vetoes would be truncated after multiple votes to block the Board’s proposal.  - BC notes that enforcing this power may require SO/ACs to adopt Member status under California Law, and encourages the CCWG to explain how Member status can be created and maintained without undue costs, complexity, or liability. | “Agreement”  “Concerns”  **Summary / Impression:**  General support but concern over protracted community veto process.  Requests explanation on how Member status can be created and maintained without undue costs, complexity, or liability.  **Actions suggested:**  Expand on how member status can be created and maintained. Consider at what point the budget and strategic plan vetoes would be truncated after multiple votes to block the Board’s proposal  **CCWG Response**:  Thank you for your comments. The CCWG attempted to address your efficiency concerns in four ways: first there must be consensus concerns to activate this power. Second those concerns must have come up during the public comment period for the budget or strat plan and third there is a time limit to initiate a veto. Finally, the community would eventually consider the notion of board member removal to break the deadlock. The simplified member structure is explained under the structural proposal. |
| **303** | [.UK](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00025.html) | Again this section shows a significant lack of trust in ICANN and its processes. This needs to be addressed. That the complex processes that ICANN goes through in developing strategy, operating plans and budgets, with open consultation, could lead to proposals being rejected by the community suggests something is seriously wrong. Some form of intermediary process – promoting dialogue between the executive and/or Board and the community – is needed to avoid disruptive processes. | “Divergence”  **Summary / Impression:** An intermediary process - promoting dialogue between board and ICANN is needed to avoid disruptive [veto] processes.  **Actions suggested:**  Consider intermediary process.  **CCWG Response**:  The CCWG feels this is less a matter of trust and more of addressing a structural deficiency in the budget and strat plan process. The CCWG agrees with your suggestion to improve the process from the start and a review of the budget and strat plan development processes has been recommended for WS2 |
| **304** | [USCIB](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00027.html) | - Para 199: We strongly support the power for the community to reject a budget or strategic plan. In many instances, the power of the purse provides the ultimate check on an institution’s. Further clarification also is needed regarding what constitutes when the Board has “failed to properly consider community input.”  - However, USCIB shares the concerns of the ICANN’s Business Constituency (BC) that a sustained rejection of ICANN budgets could result in the corporation having to operate under prior-approved budgets for multiple years, comparable to the U.S. Government’s practice of operating under a “continuing resolution” based on the budgets of prior fiscal years. This is not an efficient or effective way to operate an organization like ICANN, and USCIB concurs with BC recommendation that the CCWG consider at what point the budget veto would be truncated after multiple votes to block the Board’s proposal. | “Agreement” “Concerns”  **Summary / Impression:**  Strongly support power. It provides ultimate check on an institution’s. Concerns that sustained rejection could lead to corporation having to operate under prior-approved budgets.  **Actions suggested:**  Clarify what constitutes when the Board has “failed to properly consider community input”. Consider at what point the budget veto would be truncated after multiple votes  **CCWG Response:**  Thank you for your comments. The CCWG attempted to address your efficiency concerns in four ways: first there must be consensus concerns to activate this power. Second those concerns must have come up during the public comment period for the budget or strat plan and third there is a time limit to initiate a veto. Finally, the community would eventually consider the notion of board member removal to break the deadlock. The simplified member structure is explained under the structural proposal. |
| **305** | [LINX](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00028.html) | We are doubtful of the value or effectiveness of the power to reconsider/reject the Budget and Strategic/Operating Plans, but we are not strongly opposed to this power as designed. We would be opposed to greatly strengthening it. | “Concerns” “Divergence”  **Summary / Impression:** Doubtful of value of this power and would be opposed to strengthening it.  **Actions suggested:**  None.  **CCWG Response:**  The CCWG thanks you for your comments. |
| **306** | [JPNIC](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00030.html) | It is a common practice for stakeholders who appoint Board members within an non-profit organization, to have the powers over key decisions made for the organization. We also recognize this as the power identified as required by the CWG-Stewardship. | “Agreement”  **Summary / Impression:** It is a common practice for stakeholders to make decisions.  This power is identified as required by CWG-Stewardship.  **Actions suggested:**  None.  **CCWG Response:**  The CCWG thanks you for your comments. |
| **307** | [CWG-St](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00033.html) | Including the ability for the community to have more rights regarding the development and consideration of the ICANN budget. | “Agreement”  **Summary / Impression:** Request “more rights” regarding budget (but not necessarily primary authority).  **Actions suggested:**  None.  **CCWG Response:**  The CCWG agrees with your suggestion to improve the process from the start and a review of the budget and strat plan development processes has been recommended for WS2 |
| **308** | [IPC](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00034.html) | The IPC generally supports some form of community oversight and “veto” over budgets and strategic plans, beyond the current public comment exercise. The IPC agrees that this power should be relatively narrowly focused and rely on inconsistency with ICANN’s mission and role. A horse-trading line-item-veto process would be unwieldy and put too much power in the hands of the members. In that vein, there should not be an endless loop of feedback. The IPC is concerned by the reference to “subsequent rejection/s” and does not believe there should be more than two bites at the apple, at most. Rather there should be an appropriate consultation process to work through any issues that caused rejection in the first place. | Agreement”  “Concerns”  **Summary / Impression:**   * General support but concern over community veto process resulting in endless feedback loop. * Power should be narrowly focused. * Better approach: appropriate consultation process to work through issues prior to community / board rejection. * Community veto should be limited to two bites at the apple.   **Actions suggested:**  None.  **CCWG Response:**  While the CCWG considered and rejected the notion of limiting the number of bites at the apple, it is believed that a kind of continuing resolution based on the prior year’s budget would act a disincentive for both the Board and the community to engage in an extended back and forth. Its is also noted that the community has an escalation path at its disposal in the form of board member removal under the proposed framework. |
| **309** | [USCC](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00038.html) | Allowing the community to reject a budget or strategic plan would enhance ICANN’s accountability. The list of requirements for this recommendation is satisfactory. However, the CCWG should create a proposal that guards against a situation where the Board and community could go back and forth submitting and rejecting several iterations of a budget, and avoid stalemate. | “Agreement”  “Concerns”  **Summary / Impression:** General support but concern over protracted community veto process resulting in stalemate.  **Actions suggested:**  Include safeguards.  **CCWG Response:**  While the CCWG considered and rejected the notion of limiting the number of bites at the apple, it is believed that a kind of continuing resolution based on the prior year’s budget would act a disincentive for both the Board and the community to engage in an extended back and forth. Its is also noted that the community has an escalation path at its disposal in the form of board member removal under the proposed framework. |
| **310** | [INTA](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00040.html) | - Agree that giving the Community the power to reject a budget or strategic plan would enhance ICANN’s accountability. However, as presented, we have concerns with the potential for this new power to lead to an impasse or budget crisis. In that regard, it is recommended that the feedback and amendment process not be unlimited.  - Rather than the Community having a limited number of opportunities for rejection, the Community and Board could be required to participate in mediation or some other form of consultation to resolve the matter. We believe that this type of dispute resolution should be clearly defined and set forth so that all the Community members understand how dispute resolution related to the budget would be handled. | “Agreement”  “Concerns”  **Summary / Impression:** General support but concern over potential for impasse or budget crisis. Mediation or other consultative process should be used to resolve disputes between board and community.  **Actions suggested:**  Consider Board-community mediation. Define dispute resolutions  **CCWG Response:**  While the CCWG considered and rejected the notion of limiting the number of bites at the apple, it is believed that a kind of continuing resolution based on the prior year’s budget would act a disincentive for both the Board and the community to engage in an extended back and forth. Its is also noted that the community has an escalation path at its disposal in the form of board member removal under the proposed framework. The notion of mediation was addressed and it was determined that it should be included as part of an overall review of the budget development process in WS2. |
| **311** | [.NZ](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00041.html) | - Supports this power as an enhancement to ICANN’s accountability. We are in support of the requirements set out. We note that the annual budgeting process will need to be adjusted to make provision for this power, and consider that that falls naturally into a broader improvement in the budget process that could be part of Work Stream 2. | “Agreement”  **Summary / Impression:** Support this power.  Annual budget process’ adjustment for this power falls into workstream 2 with broader improvement to budget process.  **Actions suggested:**  None.  **CCWG Response:**  Thank you for your comment. |
| **312** | [NCSG](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00052.html) | Some NCSG members believe the ability of the community to intervene in the budget process is a mechanism which is extremely important. A strong ability to ensure that the security and stability of the DNS is not impacted by unwise budgeting or financial planning is at the core of the community's responsibility to their stakeholders and the internet as a complete whole.  Other NCSG members would like to see internal mechanisms put in place at ICANN to more closely align the board and the community at various stages in the process including the extent to which agreements between the two can be required before such decisions can be finalized. While the board may have the final say, processes can be put in place to direct the board to work more closely with the community in reaching the ultimate decision. For some NCSG members, that requirement would be sufficient on this issue. | “Agreement”  “Concerns”  “Divergence”  **Summary / Impression:**  Split in view of members:  Some believe this power is extremely important and at the core of accountability.  Other members prefer internal engagement mechanisms put in place to more closely align the board and the community at earlier and subsequent stages in the process including a requirement for community agreement before budgets can be finalized for approval.  **Actions suggested:**  Include internal mechanisms.  **CCWG Response:**  Thank you for your comments. The CCWG agrees with your suggestion to improve the process from the start and a review of the budget and strat plan development processes has been recommended for WS2. However, there was consensus that putting the final say in the hands of the community in WS1 created the essential leverage to obtain the WS2 reforms. |
| **313** | [GG](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00045.html) | The community’s power to recall the ICANN Board and veto ICANN’s strategic plan and budget should be reasonably limited. We applaud the CCWG-Accountability’s efforts to identify potential accountability measures to protect ICANN’s key operations in a crisis. However, we believe that one proposed accountability measure – the ability of the community to veto ICANN’s strategic plan and budget – should be limited. Put simply, we do not believe that the community mechanism 14 should be able to veto the strategic plan and budget over multiple iterations. We have seen this play out in multiple global governing institutions and while it does provide an opportunity for checks and balances it also can render an organization unable to carry out its mission. We need to make sure we are striking the balance between accountability and organization paralysis. The community should be able to submit an initial veto, but if the ICANN Board chooses to override that veto, it should be able to do so provided it submits a detailed report that summarizes its reasons for doing so. If the community remained unsatisfied with the Board’s explanation, it could invoke the Independent Review process or seek to recall individual Board members to change ICANN’s direction. A process in which the community and Board could go back and forth for months at a time would unnecessarily and significantly degrade ICANN’s operational efficiency. | “Divergence”  **Summary / Impression:**  Community veto can cause operational crisis. Any veto must be limited to avoid operational paralysis.  **Actions suggested:**  Add limits.  **CCWG Response:**  Thanks for your comment. After much debate the CCWG concluded that it was essential to give the last word to the community. The CCWG attempted to address your efficiency concerns in four ways: first there must be consensus concerns to activate this power. Second those concerns must have come up during the public comment period for the budget or strat plan and third there is a time limit to initiate a veto. Finally, the community would eventually consider the notion of board member removal to break the deadlock. However, improvement to the development process is desired by all and is therefore a critical part of WS2. |
| **314** | [Board](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00049.html) | We recognize the importance of affording the ICANN community a voice in assuring that the Strategic Plans of ICANN are within ICANN’s mission, that budgets support the mission. | No color category  **Summary / Impression:** Recognizes importance of affording community a voice in assuring budget’s and strat plans are within ICANN’s mission.  **Actions suggested:**  None. **CCWG Response:**  Thank you for your comment! |
| **315** | [CENTR](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00051.html) | We support the ability of the community to reject strategic and operating plans/budgets which have already been approved by the Board if they are believed to be inconsistent with the purpose, mission and ICANN’s role as set out in the Bylaws. To this respect, we strongly reiterate the request that ICANN should be more transparent in terms of IANA’s function costs and their itemisation. We believe that the community power should consist in inviting the Board to review the plans, but not in re-writing them. A better enhancement of ICANN accountability would occur if certain recommendations made unanimously by various stakeholder groups are taken on board at the time of their submission. That would avoid time consuming iterations like the Board approval of a plan and its possible, subsequent rejection by the community membership body. | “Agreement”  **Summary / Impression:**  ICANN should be more transparent about IANA function costs and their itemization.  **Actions suggested:**  None.  **CCWG Response:**  The CCWG attempted to address your efficiency concerns in three ways: first there must be consensus concerns to activate this power. Second those concerns must have come up during the public comment period for the budget or strat plan and third there is a time limit to initiate a veto. |
| **316** | [NIRA](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00056.html) | Yes, however, further safeguard should be provided against abuse, e.g. number of times the budget can be rejected by the community, and what options the Board may have in such situations. | “Agreement” “Concerns”  **Summary / Impression:** Concern for abuse and number of times budgets can be rejected.  **Actions suggested:**  Provide safeguards.  **CCWG Response:**  The CCWG attempted to address your abuse concerns in two ways: first there must be consensus concerns to activate this power. Second those concerns must have come up during the public comment period for the budget or strat plan. The board can initiate an IRP process if they feel strongly the community is in the wrong. |
| **317** | [SB](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00063.html) | a. My only comment regarding this power is that it must be compatible with the development plan for the budget (or of the strategic and operating plans.) I would prefer a solution where consensus is built during the development of these documents, prior to the discussions and decisions of the Board of Directors.  b. We must avoid adding rigidity to the operation of ICANN.  c. A solution to improve the involvement of the community in  discussions regarding the budget (and accounts) would be, for  example, to publish all of the organization's financial data in **open**  **data**. | “Concerns” New idea  **Summary / Impression:**   * It must be compatible with development plan for budget. * Prefer a solution where consensus in built during development * Avoid rigidity * Publish financial data in open data   **Actions suggested:**  Consider publishing organization’s financial data in open data. **CCWG Response:**  Thanks for your comments. The CCWG agrees with your suggestion to improve the process from the start and a review of the budget and strat plan development processes has been recommended for WS2. |
| **318** | [RIR](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00065.html) | While the RIR community has expressed interest in fully understanding the costs related to the IANA registry services, there has been no expressing of interest in the RIR community regarding the need to have approval over ICANN s annual budget. The potential of having the annual budget to be delayed as a result of the proposed could prevent necessary and required spending e.g. additional personal, security measures beyond those in the previous year) and thus lead to unforeseen impacts to ICANN s stability. | “Concerns”  **Summary / Impression:**   * No expressing of interest in the RIR community regarding the need to have approval over ICANN s annual budget * Potential of having the annual budget to be delayed as a result of the proposed could prevent necessary and required spending and lead to unforeseen impacts to ICANN s stability   **Actions suggested:**  None.  **CCWG Response:**  Thank you for your comments. The CCWG attempted to address your efficiency concerns in three ways: first there must be consensus concerns to activate this power. Second those concerns must have come up during the public comment period for the budget or strat plan and third there is a time limit to initiate a veto. |
| **319** | [Siva](http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-ccwg-accountability-draft-proposal-04may15/msg00068.html) | - Community could have the powers to reject a budget or strategic plan, but the entire organization could work in such a way that the community would not take recourse to such a course of action as to stall or reject a good budget or a good strategic plan. Such Community powers could remain unused in a system wherein the community participates and offers supportive inputs to the process of formulating a budget or strategic plan with a willingness to accept some differences of opinion that the Board may have.  - Such powers become relevant only when there is a misappointed Board superciliously acting in a manner that is harmful to the mission of ICANN, and even in such situations the exercise of such powers by a Community that is not short-sighted, misguided by narrower motives or altogether captured. | “Concerns” New idea  **Summary / Impression:**   * It must be compatible with development plan for budget. * Prefer a solution where consensus in built during development * Avoid rigidity * Publish financial data in open data   **Actions suggested:**  None.  **CCWG Response:**  Thank you for your comments. The CCWG attempted to address your efficiency concerns in three ways: first there must be consensus concerns to activate this power. Second those concerns must have come up during the public comment period for the budget or strat plan and third there is a time limit to initiate a veto. The CCWG agrees with your second point and have specified that a review of the budget development process will be part of WS2. |