Comm enter		which	Comment	Discussion points - Response
ALAC	1.01	Comment	The ALAC commends the subgroup and entire CCWG on ICANN Accountability for their work in producing this draft. The ALAC supports the draft as currently presented.	

		Overall	The Ombuds Office procedures should be set through consultation with the	
			community.	
CNICO				
GNSO- NCSG	1.02			
INCSG				

		Overall Comment	The NCSG is not satisfied that the independence of the Ombuds Office has been sufficiently addressed. The NCSG does not believe that the problem of independence of the Ombuds persons can be solved with 5-year fixed-term contracts. If the meaning of this recommendation is that the Ombuds office, as an external entity, should be given a fixed-term contract, the NCSG supports this suggestion. However, if this refers to individual Ombudspersons, the issue of independence will remain. Since the Ombudsperson directly receives her/his	[SBT] Both recommendations 8 & 9 stengthen the Independance of the ICANN Ombuds Office. The idea and this is underline in recommandation 7 is that the IOO is not just a single person. Not sure that we need to
CNICO			revenue from ICANN, the fixed-term contract does not eliminate economic incentives that can potentially hamper the ombuds' independence. It also does not preclude the Ombudsperson from taking up employment after their fixed-term contract ends with a stakeholder in the domain name industry.	preclude the possibility to people working in hte IOO to join after the contract (but sure not during) to join DNIas the IOO didn't developpe policy.
GNSO- NCSG	1.03			

GNSO- NCSG	1.04	Overall Comment	We think that the accountability and independence of the Ombuds could only be maintained if it is an office and not a person. At present, the Ombuds is an ombudsperson. We suggest that to ensure and maintain the independence of the office, the best way would be to use an external organization that provides ombuds services and does not have ICANN as its sole source of revenue.	[SBT] See previous comments

		Overall	The NCSG believes that the report is missing one very important point about	[SBT] This was discuss and was
		Comment	independence and accountability of Ombuds office. We think that under no	not included in the report as it
		Common	circumstances should the Ombudspersons socialise and befriend community	was not supported by the other
			members. This is a very obvious independence element which, unfortunately, has	participants and not made
				through the comments.
			the decision maker of someone's case at a social event is talking and smiling at the	9
			party, which has a complaint filed against them. Independence is seriously affected	
			by social encounters and interactions. We believe that the final report should include	
			a recommendation for the Ombudsman's office to consult the community to	
			establish appropriate rules around socialization and interactions so/as not to	
			compromise their official role as an oversight mechanism.	
GNSO-	1.05			
NCSG	1.00			

IC B	CANN	1.06	Overall Comment	other aspects of the external evaluator's report still stand. For example, the CCWG-Accountability's recommendations state that no changes are needed to the Bylaws	[SBT] This report is to be consider as the one to be taken into account by ICANN (as a whole). One of the big difference was to avoid bylaw changes (as pointed by the Board) to allow a quicker implementation. When time permit change to the bylaws and to the ombuds framework wil be welcome.

		Overall	To the extent that the CCWG-Accountability is focused on the speed of	[SBT]
		Comment	implementation and hopes to avoid any Bylaws modifications or changes to the Ombudsman Framework, the ultimate focus should be on the proper implementation of recommendations in order to hold ICANN accountable to meeting their intent.	Agree
			While a majority of the recommendations appear to be reasonable and productive enhancements to strengthen the office of the Ombuds, a few recommendations would benefit from additional clarification noted below. Specifically, recommendations on the notion of diversity of staff available to the Ombuds office (Recommendation 7), the proposal for an Advisory Panel (Recommendation 8), and the term of the Ombuds contract (Recommendation 9) raise important concerns for consideration.	Yes live continus when we are working in WS2;)
ICANN Board	1.07		Based on inputs from the Ombuds, we understand that the current Office of the Ombuds already has activities in place that might address some part of the recommendations as issued. In addition, the Ombuds has already started considering how some of the recommendations could be reached. For example, one way to deepen the understanding of the role and work of the Ombuds could be achieved through more regular communications, such as blog postings and other informative communications. Similarly, there are already reporting mechanisms in place, though those might be able to be better publicized or refined.	

		lo "	les a sur a	ron=11 ':
		Overall	The implications on resources is an important overarching consideration that should	
		Comment	be considered for these and all recommendations. As a general observation, ICANN	
				whole ccwg-accountability as an
			·	overarching issue to be taken
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	into account with the full report?
			programs or services. Such policies, without considering the impact on resources,	
			may lead to a situation where the organization is unable to effectively meet	
			community expectations with either the new recommendations or existing	
			obligations.	
			The CCWG-Accountability should consider these factors and provide guidance in its	
			final report regarding the priority, importance, and extent these recommendations	
			(and all the CCWG's recommendations) should be implemented, and in what	
			timeframe.	
			unonamo.	
ICANN	1.08			
Board				

INTA	1.09	Overall Comment	While we generally support the recommendations, we do have specific comments regarding the efficiency and transparency of the IOO. Our concerns focus on the response times proposed in recommendation 4 and to a general question of enforcement mechanisms available to the IOO.	[SBT] There is no enforcement mechanisms as the ombuds function is to investigate complaints and attempt to resolve them, usually through not binding recommendations or mediation.
------	------	--------------------	--	---

		Recommendat	Agree	thank you
		ion 1 - The		
		Ombuds		
		Office should		
		have a more		
		strategic		
GNSO-	2.01	focus.		
вс	2.01			

GNSO- IPC	ion 1 - Ti Ombuds Office sh have a n strategic focus.	recommendations. A more strategic focus for the Ombuds Office should mean that in its enhanced role, it has comprehensive understanding of ICANN's unique structure and its role in supporting ICANN's goals and viability.	[SBT] The report of the subgroup and the external reviw include some details. Not sure that havig a "comprehensive understanding of ICANN's unique structure and its role in supporting ICANN's goals and viability." will help with strategic focus. But the need to be explain to anyone willig to join an IOO.
--------------	--	---	---

	1	Recommendat	While the concept of having a more strategic focus is sound, there is not a lot of	[SBT] The report of the
				subgroup and the external reviw
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	include some details. In the
				implementation process more
				deail (if needed) could be
		strategic	·	provided.
		focus.		If 30 days work well maybe 90
		10000.		and 120 days will work too?
			information to fully understand the nature of the dispute and status and resolution.	
			How would these deadlines work in practice with the rest of the community? What is	
			the outcome if a deadline is not met? The current Ombuds has also informed the	
			Board that the 30-day response timeframe currently in place for the ICANN	
			organization's inputs into reports has worked well.	
ICANN				
ICANN Board	2.03			
Board				

	1	-		
		Recommendat	Agreed	
		ion 2 - The		
		Ombudsman		
		office should		
		include		
		procedures for		
		handling		
		different types		
		of complaints,		
		clarifying		
		ciallyllig		
		scope of role,		
		and deepening		
		understanding		
		of Ombuds		
GNSO-		approach.		
GNSO- BC	3.01			

		ion 2 - The	The IPC supports Recommendation 2 and agrees that the Ombuds Office should have procedures in place to categorize complaints and how each category should	SB ask the Ombuds office to produce examples for the users
		office should	be handled; should set out which matters the Ombuds Office will not intervene in; and should provide illustrative examples that cover the most common controversies the Ombuds Office deals with.	CLO continuation of current HW - Herb Waye Ombuds 2: this is not an issue with my office
		handling different types of complaints,		Herb Waye Ombuds 2: I have a CMS that deals with this
		clarifying scope of role, and deepening		
01100		understanding of Ombuds approach.		
GNSO- IPC	3.02			

		Recommendat	Fully agreed.	
		ion 3 - soft re-		
		launch of the		
		function to all		
		relevant parts		
		of ICANN.		
GNSO-	<i>1</i> 01			
вс	4.01			

GNSO- IPC	4.02	ion 3 - soft re-	The IPC supports the "soft launch" of the enhanced Ombuds Office across ICANN's structure (Recommendation 3). The IPC commits to assist in educating its members when appropriate.	

GNSO- BC	5.01	Recommendat ion 4 - Requirements for timely response to Ombuds requests.		
GNSO- IPC		Recommendation 4 - Requirements for timely response to Ombuds requests.	Supports	

	l	Pacammandat	In regards to recommendation 4, which requires the community to respond to the	[SBT] No divergence with the
			Ombuds office in due time with reasoning, we believe such a responsibility should	report?
			be mutual. The timeliness of the Ombuds Office actions should be preserved (as is	iepoit:
			indicated in recommendation 5) and the office must provide reasons for its decision.	
		response to Ombuds	Also, if the responding party requests for additional extension in case of exceptional	
			circumstances as mentioned in the Recommendation 4, the additional extension	
		requests.	granted by the Ombuds Office should not be more than 30 days.	
GNSO-	5.03			
NCSG	0.00			

		ion 4 -	The nature of the Ombuds office decisions are non-binding, but such nature has to be clarified. In recommendation 4 suggests, the community has to respond to	SB - we are simply talking about the time to reply and we do not
			Ombuds Office inquires. We agree that the community, and ICANN the organization, must respond to reasonable Ombuds Office inquiries, but not to be obliged to comply with the decisions of the Ombuds Office (as stated in the report).	change anything wrt implementation.Herb Waye Ombuds 2: this is addressed in
		Ombuds requests.	Moreover, the procedure for if a decision of the Ombudsman's office is not complied with should be clarified in the Ombuds Office procedures.	Framework partially
				Herb Waye Ombuds 2: 30 days is just fine I think
GNSO- NCSG	5.04			

Recommendation 4 - Requirements for timely response to Ombuds and records from IcANN staff and constituent bodies to enable an informed evaluation of complaints and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible. But while committed to ensuring the Ombudsman of complaints and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible. But while committed to ensuring the Ombudsman have access to necessary information and records from IcANN staff and constituent bodies to enable an informed evaluation of complaints and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible. But while committed to ensuring the Ombudsman has timely information, the RySG retains discretion to allocate its resources (including demands on volunteer time) as it deems best in balancing important calls on its input. Ombudsman-issued deadlines are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in what could be unreasonable time frames.					
Requirements for timely response to Ombuds ability to issue such 'orders' as drafted. The RySG is aware of the requirement under ICANN bylaws that the Ombudsman have access to necessary information and records from ICANN staff and constituent bodies to enable an informed evaluation of complaints and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible. But while committed to ensuring the Ombudsman has timely information, the RySG retains discretion to allocate its resources (including demands on volunteer time) as it deems best in balancing important calls on its input. Ombudsman-issued deadlines are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in		R	Recommendat	With respect to Recommendation #4 (requiring groups to respond to a formal	Cheryl Langdon-Orr (CLO): can
for timely response to Ombuds requests. ability to issue such 'orders' as drafted. The RySG is aware of the requirement under ICANN bylaws that the Ombudsman have access to necessary information and records from ICANN staff and constituent bodies to enable an informed evaluation of complaints and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible. But while committed to ensuring the Ombudsman has timely information, the RySG retains discretion to allocate its resources (including demands on volunteer time) as it deems best in balancing important calls on its input. Ombudsman-issued deadlines are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in		ic	on 4 -	request or report from the Ombudsman within 90 days, with the ability seek a 30-day	not compel or enforce SB- this
for timely response to Ombuds requests. ability to issue such 'orders' as drafted. The RySG is aware of the requirement under ICANN bylaws that the Ombudsman have access to necessary information and records from ICANN staff and constituent bodies to enable an informed evaluation of complaints and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible. But while committed to ensuring the Ombudsman has timely information, the RySG retains discretion to allocate its resources (including demands on volunteer time) as it deems best in balancing important calls on its input. Ombudsman-issued deadlines are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in		R	Requirements	extension from the Ombudsman), the RySG does not support the Ombudsman's	cannot be binding
response to Ombuds requests. under ICANN bylaws that the Ombudsman have access to necessary information and records from ICANN staff and constituent bodies to enable an informed evaluation of complaints and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible. But while committed to ensuring the Ombudsman has timely information, the RySG retains discretion to allocate its resources (including demands on volunteer time) as it deems best in balancing important calls on its input. Ombudsman-issued deadlines are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in		fc			_
Ombuds requests. and records from ICANN staff and constituent bodies to enable an informed evaluation of complaints and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible. But while committed to ensuring the Ombudsman has timely information, the RySG retains discretion to allocate its resources (including demands on volunteer time) as it deems best in balancing important calls on its input. Ombudsman-issued deadlines are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in			•		
evaluation of complaints and to assist in dispute resolution where feasible. But while committed to ensuring the Ombudsman has timely information, the RySG retains discretion to allocate its resources (including demands on volunteer time) as it deems best in balancing important calls on its input. Ombudsman-issued deadlines are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in			•		
committed to ensuring the Ombudsman has timely information, the RySG retains discretion to allocate its resources (including demands on volunteer time) as it deems best in balancing important calls on its input. Ombudsman-issued deadlines are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in					
discretion to allocate its resources (including demands on volunteer time) as it deems best in balancing important calls on its input. Ombudsman-issued deadlines are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in			•	· ·	
deems best in balancing important calls on its input. Ombudsman-issued deadlines are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in					
GNSO-RYSG are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable. With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in					
With respect to Recommendation #4's requiring a substantive response to the Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in					
GNSO- RYSG Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in				are inconsistent with that principle and would be unworkable.	
GNSO- RYSG Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in					
GNSO- RYSG 5.05 decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in				Ombudsman, the RySG notes, for purposes of clarity, that it retains the discretion to	
RYSG 5.05 Umbudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation #4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in	CNICO			decide which information and records, if any, are 'necessary' to respond to	
granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in		5.05		Ombudsman requests. As such, the RySG recommends striking Recommendation	
granting the Ombudsman the unfettered ability to make unreasonable requests in	RYSG			#4 as the current Bylaws sufficiently require constituent bodies to cooperate without	
				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	
				That oodid bo dinodoshablo timo hamoon	

		Recommendat	While a mandatory response time is welcome and the process described above is	SB - this suggestion of
				enforcement would completely
				change the way the IOO works.
		-		Implementing this would
		response to	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	jeapordize the work of the IOO,
		Ombuds	time be shortened to 60 days with a possible 30-day extension due to exceptional	
		requests.	circumstances. A full, fair and expeditious review of the matter at issue will go a long way strengthening the ombuds functions.	
			Additionally, it is unclear from the Recommendations what, if any, enforcement	
			mechanisms are available to the IOO. In fact, there is no discussion as to whether	
			the IOO should have any enforcement powers or mechanisms. INTA recommends that the working group examine reasonable and appropriate mechanisms of	
			enforcement that may be delegated to the IOO. INTA recognizes that, today, the	
			ombuds functions are not independent from ICANN org.	
INTA	5.06			
			Therefore, enforcement may be limited to what ICANN org may implement. If	
			enforcement mechanisms are deemed to be beyond the scope of the IOO then, at a minimum, it may be useful to map how matters resolved by the IOO may be referred	
			to appropriate bodies for enforcement as appropriate.	

_		I.S		
		Recommendat	Agreed	
		ion 5 - The		
		ICANN Office		
		of the Ombuds		
		should		
		establish		
		timelines for		
		its own		
		handling of		
		complaints		
		and report		
		against these		
		on a quarterly		
		and annual		
		basis.		
GNSO- BC	6.01			
BC	0.0.			

		Recommendat	Supports	
		ion 5 - The	Очерропо	
		ICANN Office		
		of the Ombuds		
		should		
		SHOUIU		
		establish timelines for		
		its own handling of		
		complaints		
		and report		
		against these		
		on a quarterly		
		and annual		
		basis.		
GNSO- IPC	6.02	basis.		
IPC	0.02			

		In		
			Comment: It is expected that anyone that would be engaged to handle this	
		ion 6 - The	responsibility should have proven mediation skills and training. So, recommendation	
			is agreed.	
		Ombuds		
		should be		
		configured so		
		that it has		
		formal		
		mediation		
		training and		
		experience		
		within its		
		capabilities.		
GNSO-	7 01			
вс				

		Recommendat	Supports	
		ion 6 - The		
		Office of the		
		Ombuds		
		should be		
		configured so		
		that it has		
		formal		
		mediation		
		training and		
		experience		
01100		within its		
GNSO- IPC	7.02	capabilities.		
IPC				

ALAC	8.01	ion 7 - Support	Recommendation 7: While we acknowledge and support gender diversity, we also suggest that language diversity be considered in Staff resource configuration, to the extent practical.	SB - Our recommendation is open to other diversities - what is important is to pass these comments to the IOO

GNSO-BC	8.02	ion 7 - Support for gender	a person and not persons and as such the question of choice of whom a complaint can be addressed does not arise. However, it should be part of the job requirements	be useful
---------	------	-------------------------------	---	-----------

GNSO- NCSG	8.03	ion 7 - Support for gender diversity in the office	We would also like to raise our concern about recommendation 7, which currently reads as: "Recommendation 7. The Office of the Ombuds should be ideally configured (subject to practicality) so that it has gender diversity within its staff resources". The CCWG plenary discussed this issue and agreed that recommendation 7 removes the term "subject to practicality". The sub-group rapporteur was suggested to change the language to: " The office of the ombuds should be ideally configured so that it has gender, and if possible other forms of diversity within its staff resources" (Transcript of the meeting, page 19). This suggestion was supported by the group. We do not see this change reflected in the final report which was put up for public comment.	BT - This is indeed an error - this was in "strike through" in the executive summary of the document but not in the main body of the document where the recommendations can be found.
---------------	------	---	---	---

			1
ICANN Board 8.0	ion 7 - Support for gender diversity in the office	Per the report, the primary objective of this recommendation is to ensure that the community has choices as to whom in the Ombuds Office the community can bring their complaints and feel more comfortable doing so. The ICANN Board agrees that consideration needs to be given on the availability of alternative resources for the Ombuds Office. While ICANN is not able to make employment decisions based on considerations such as gender, nationality, or many other protected characteristics, there are likely ways to coordinate adjunct resources to making available to the community additional, more diverse points of entry into the Ombuds Office, that can be implemented. As a preliminary note, ICANN has already provided additional inroads into the Ombudsman office. For example, female members of the senior leadership of ICANN have served as a first point of contact to raise complaints regarding harassment, where the complainant didn't feel comfortable going directly to the Ombuds. There are other inroads as well, such as the Complaints Officer, or members of ICANN's executive team that can be an initial point of contact for comfortably expressing complaints that can then be brought to the Ombuds. There might also be a need for consideration of how cultural differences impact the Ombuds Office's consideration of any individual matter, and whether supplemental resources are necessary to better serve the ICANN community. The current Ombuds has informed the Board that he is developing a community liaison network of trusted volunteers from the constituencies to act as complaint intake for anybody who is uncomfortable approaching the Ombuds directly. We hope this is also serves as a way to address this community concern. Additional information is needed to consider the full scope of the recommendation and any potential budgetary impact. If this recommendation seeks to have ICANN have a bigger staff in the Ombuds Office, as opposed to identifying other ways to have supplemental resources available, the resource implication and	

		Recommendat	Agreed	
		ion 8 - ICANN		
		should		
		establish an		
		Ombuds		
		Advisory		
GNSO-	Q ()1	Panel.		
вс	3.01			
01100				
GNSO-	9.02		Supports	
IPC		Recommendati		

		1_		
ICANN Board	9.03	ion 8 - ICANN should establish an Ombuds Advisory Panel.	The recommendation to include an advisory panel is a significant change, and does not seem appropriate for implementation at this time. The Board suggests that focusing on how the Ombuds Office can be strengthened should come first, and then consideration can come later as to whether additional advisory mechanisms are needed. When reading this recommendation, the Board identified many of questions that support this conclusion. These include: - What is the role of the broadly powered Advisory Panel in relation to the proper role of ICANN org and the Board with respect to the Office of the Ombuds? - What is the scope of advice that the Advisory Panel is to give the Ombuds, outside of involvement on non-complaint work? Or, does the Advisory Panel only have power to contribute to the hiring, firing and evaluation of the Ombuds Office? - How does the notion of an Advisory Panel with powers relating to selection and termination of candidates work in practice with the Section 5.2 of the ICANN bylaws, which requires the Office of the Ombuds to be independent. Is it foreseen that there is a bylaw change here? - Would the Advisory Panel be purely advisory or more of 'wise counsel'? - How would the proposal work with Section 5.1(c) of the Bylaws, which require 3/4s vote of the entire Board to dismiss the Ombudsman? What weight would the Board put in such Advisory Panel's recommendations on termination? - How is the expertise of the Advisory Panel assessed in relation to the tasks it to undertake in relation to the Ombudsman? - How can the Ombuds retain the confidentiality obligations per the ICANN Bylaws, with the role of the Advisory Panel?	
			put in such Advisory Panel's recommendations on termination? - How is the expertise of the Advisory Panel assessed in relation to the tasks it to undertake in relation to the Ombudsman?	

_	ı	I		
			Comment: Agreed, but extension should be subject to a community-based feedback	
		ion 9 - Revise	mechanism to the "Advisory Panel" covering Ombuds performance over the	
		Ombuds	previous 5years.	
		employment		
		contracts to a		
		five year fixed		
		term;		
		termination for		
		cause only.		
CNICO				
GNSO- BC	10.01			
вс				
	I	l		

			Supports, We encourage a community feedback mechanism that feeds into the IOO as part of this process.	
		term; termination for cause only.		
GNS IPC	O- _{10.02}	_		

ICANN Board	10.03	ion 9 - Revise Ombuds employment contracts to a five year fixed term;	The Board understands the reasoning behind the recommended changes to the Ombuds employment contract, but is concerned that the creation of a 5-year fixed term contract with strict termination limitations may not provide motivation for high performance from the Ombuds. It should be a collective goal across ICANN that the Ombuds strive for exemplary performance in service to the ICANN community, and not be rewarded through keeping a contract because the minimum performance levels have been met. Similarly, if the Ombuds is doing a good job and is gaining trust and expertise, why would there be a recommendation to only extend his/her term for up to 3 years? Further, the current Ombuds has reported to ICANN that he does not view this recommendation as a means to promote or protect the independence of the office. The CCWG-Accountability might consider alternative ways of addressing issues it is seeking to solve, so as to not discourage high quality Ombuds and experience. It may be preferable to retain Ombuds compensation based on some objective criteria, such as delivery on the reporting goals detailed in recommendation 10 of this report.	

GNSO- BC	Recommendat ion 10 - Communicatio ns plan, including the formal annual report.	Agreed	
GNSO-IPC	Recommendat ion 10 - Communicatio ns plan, including the formal annual report.	Supports	

			Recommendation 11: We recognize that the items proposed will address important,	
		ion 11 - With	high-level policies expected to be observed by the Office of the Ombudsman;	
		input from	therefore, we do not believe restricting the Ombudsman from certain activities (i.e.	
		across the	socializing) as suggested by certain members of the Community is a necessary	
		community,	detail to codify in such policy. We expect the Ombudsman would understand their	
			role, hence would observe his/her duties accordingly; Community policing of the	
			Ombudsman should not be a solution to fix a performance issue.	
		policy for any	·	
		Ombuds		
		involvement in		
		non-		
		complaints		
		work.		
ALAC	12.01			

GNSO- BC	12.02	Recommendat ion 11 - With input from across the community, ICANN should develop a policy for any Ombuds involvement in non-complaints work.	

			Supports. However, we request further detail as to what "non-complaint work" the	
			Ombuds Office would be involved with in ICANN.	
		input from		
		across the		
		community,		
		ICANN should		
		develop a		
		policy for any		
		Ombuds		
		involvement in		
		non-		
		complaints		
GNSO-		work.		
GNSO-	12.03			
"				
I				

		ion 11 - With input from across the community,	With respect to Recommendation #11 (regarding the Ombudsman's efforts in "non-complaints work" – including involvement in policy design), the RySG has a concern about clarity. The role of the Ombudsman is to act as a neutral dispute resolution practitioner. While the Ombudsman may accept "questions" in addition to complaints, it should be made clear that the Ombudsman does not have free rein to formally engage in policy development unless, and to the extent that, the	
		develop a policy for any	Ombudsman is formally asked to do so by a policy development process. The RySG believes that any level of Ombudsman activity in a policy design process, if and as so requested, should be given 'as-is' without any implication of stamp-of-approval.	
GNSO- RYSG	12.04	WOIK.		

ICANN Board	12.05	ion 11 - With input from across the community, ICANN should develop a	The guidance detailed in the report is a strong enhancement and clarification for the Ombuds function, and the Board supports this recommendation. We note that an interdependency exists between this work and the work of the Transparency Subgroup. The Transparency Subgroup recommends some specific involvement of the Ombuds in the DIDP process. To the extent the Transparency recommendation is an expansion of the role of the Ombuds, it would be valuable to apply this criteria to the Transparency report recommendation to consider requests to expand the Ombuds role.	

		The additional	Agreed	
		recommendati		
		on by the		
		Transparency		
		sub-group with		
		respect to		
		involving the		
		Ombuds in the		
		DIDP process		
		should be		
		considered		
		using the		
		criteria in		
	13.01	recommendati		
GNSO-		on 11. This		
вС		specific point		
		will be noted in		
		the public		
		comment		
		process for		
		this document		
		to gauge if the		
		community		
		supports these		
		additional		
		recommendati		
		ons when		
		considering		
		the criteria in		
		recommendati		
		on 11.		