

Existing requirements for reviews of SO/AC Accountability

SO/AC	Community Represented and role within ICANN (per bylaws)	SO/AC Accountability Mechanisms
All		<p>AoC [2009] includes “(d) assessing the extent to which ICANN’s decisions are embraced, supported and accepted by the public and the Internet community”</p> <p>Bylaws Section 4.4 requires the Board to cause an independent, periodic review (every 5 years) of each SO/AC, except that the GAC “shall provide its own review mechanisms”</p>
ALAC	<p>“the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual internet users”</p> <p>“to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users”</p>	<p>Every 5 years, the Bylaws require a review to determine (i) whether ALAC has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure, (ii) if so, whether any change in structure or operations is desirable to improve its <b>effectiveness</b> and (iii) whether ALAC is <b>accountable</b> to its constituencies, stakeholder groups, organizations and other stakeholders.</p>
ASO	<p>“ASO shall be the entity established by the Memorandum of Understanding [2004] between ICANN and the Number Resource Organization (“NRO”), an organization of the existing RIRs”</p> <p>“ASO shall advise the Board with respect to policy issues relating to the operation, assignment, and management of Internet addresses”</p>	<p>Every 5 years, the Bylaws require a review to determine (i) whether ASO has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure, (ii) if so, whether any change in structure or operations is desirable to improve its <b>effectiveness</b> and (iii) whether ASO is <b>accountable</b> to its constituencies, stakeholder groups, organizations and other stakeholders.</p>
ccNSO	<p>ccTLD managers that have agreed to be members of ccNSO.</p> <p>(a) develop and recommend to the Board global policies relating to country-code top-level domains;</p> <p>(b) Nurture consensus across the ccNSO’s community, including the name-related activities of ccTLDs;</p> <p>(c) Coordinate with other ICANN Supporting Organizations, committees, and constituencies under ICANN</p>	<p>Every 5 years, the Bylaws require a review to determine (i) whether CCNSO has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure, (ii) if so, whether any change in structure or operations is desirable to improve its <b>effectiveness</b> and (iii) whether CCNSO is <b>accountable</b> to its constituencies, stakeholder groups, organizations and other stakeholders.</p>
GAC	<p>Open to all national governments (and Distinct Economies upon invitation).</p> <p>“concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between ICANN’s policies and various laws and international agreements or where they may affect public policy issues”</p>	<p>AoC [2009] includes “(b) assessing the role and <b>effectiveness of the GAC</b> and its interaction with the Board and making recommendations for improvement to ensure effective consideration by ICANN of GAC input on the public policy aspects of the technical coordination of the DNS”</p> <p>New Bylaws put it differently “(B) assessing the role and <b>effectiveness of the GAC’s interaction with the Board and with the broader ICANN community</b>, and making recommendations for improvement to ensure effective</p>

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		consideration by ICANN of GAC input on the public policy aspects of the technical coordination of the DNS; GAC is not required to undergo independent review.
GNSO	Open to registries, registrars, commercial stakeholders (BC, I{C, ISPCP), non-commercial stakeholders.  develop and recommend to the Board substantive policies relating to generic top-level domains	Every 5 years, the Bylaws require a review to determine (i) whether GNSO has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure, (ii) if so, whether any change in structure or operations is desirable to improve its <b>effectiveness</b> and (iii) whether GNSO is <b>accountable</b> to its constituencies, stakeholder groups, organizations and other stakeholders.
RSSAC	chairs and members shall be appointed by the Board.  “advise the ICANN community and Board on matters relating to the operation, administration, security, and integrity of the Internet’s Root Server System”	Every 5 years, the Bylaws require a review to determine (i) whether RSSAC has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure, (ii) if so, whether any change in structure or operations is desirable to improve its <b>effectiveness</b> and (iii) whether RSSAC is <b>accountable</b> to its constituencies, stakeholder groups, organizations and other stakeholders.
SSAC	Chair and members appointed by ICANN board.  “advise the ICANN community and Board on matters relating to the security and integrity of the Internet’s naming and address allocation systems.”	Every 5 years, the Bylaws require a review to determine (i) whether SSAC has a continuing purpose in the ICANN structure, (ii) if so, whether any change in structure or operations is desirable to improve its <b>effectiveness</b> and (iii) whether SSAC is <b>accountable</b> to its constituencies, stakeholder groups, organizations and other stakeholders.