[CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals

Sat Jan 10 16:50:48 UTC 2015

Dear Mathieu, Paul,

It seems I did not fully understand Paul, because I agree with both his reaction and yours, Mathieu. I understood Paul to suggest (in short) that the Board should beforehand, and without knowing what they would have to implement, to agree to implement any advice from the working group. I think you will both agree that that would not be a very realistic expectation.

I am quite aware of the fact that boards commonly operate under some structure of higher authority (General assembly, shareholders, supervisory board (as SIDN has). And I consider that very good practice.
In fact, it is what I suggested in my mail of 19 december to this list:

….
The possibility of introducing such a structure is certainly not limited to organizations operating under California State (or US Federal for that matter) Law.
If the members of such a structure would be the (elected) chairs of the SO’s and AC’s and of a few other (e.g. IETF, IAB and –dare I suggest it- the SG of the ITU) to make it truly/fully multi-stakeholder, it could greatly enhance ICANN’s accountability. As the structure itself would be very accountable.

I would think that (indeed on the condition of a supermajority) this structure then could be given the power to (escalation with increase in number):

     *   On the basis of „too much noise from the community”, tell ICANN to redo a particular process;
     *   If the above does not solve the situation, call for an independent review of the issue/process;
     *   If the situation meets certain criteria, send the board (or part thereof) away;
     *   If the situation meets even stricter criteria, transfer ICANN’s role and/or the IANA function to another organization

……

That solved, I agree that it might prove a challenge for the board to agree to introduce such a structure and relinquish power to it. Especially not in this phase of developments.

I think this is yet another prove of how important it is for the CCWG and our working group to fully synchronize their work. Because if such a proposal it done in the light of „just” our work, enhancing ICANN’s accountability in general, the decision to agree to it or not is the board’s an can easily be postponed (even indefinitely). However, if the proposal for the introduction of such a structure (or any other mechanism by which the board relinquishes power) is part of the plan for the transition of the NTIA’s oversight of IANA (and in my opinion it should), agreement of the board might be much more likely or even unavoidable. Especially if the NTIA accepts the proposal and such a structure would become a precondition for the transfer.

Cheers,

Roelof

From: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill at afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill at afnic.fr>>
Reply-To: Mathieu Weill <mathieu.weill at afnic.fr<mailto:mathieu.weill at afnic.fr>>
Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 18:13
To: Roelof Meijer <roelof.meijer at sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl>>, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>>, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com>>
Cc: "accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals

Hi Roelof, All,

I may be missing something but would kindly challenge your statement that the Board would not submit to such a proposal (force implementation of items they resist to). Please note that I provide the examples below only as illustrations and not as candidate mechanisms for our group.

First of all, it is routine governance in many organisations, including private corporations or not for profits (such as Afnic which I know well), that Boards operate under the authority of general assemblies, and therefore have to submit to decisions from another body. It is even often considered good practice (for some, but not all, decisions at least, such as bylaw changes or Board appointments).

Secondly, many corporate Boards willingly commit to governance codes of conduct all over the world that limit their authorities. One of the latest examples being the "say on pay" trend amongst listed companies whereby Board submit resolutions regarding executive compensation for approval to the general assemblies (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Say_on_pay). So in order to comply with stakeholder expectations, it is an established practice that Boards do limit their own "powers".

But once again, I may have misunderstood your point.

Best
Mathieu

Le 06/01/2015 16:17, Roelof Meijer a écrit :
>mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board

How can we reasonably expect the (ICANN) board to commit to such a proposal (to force implementation of items that they do not agree to)? It would do so blindly, not knowing beforehand what those items would be. No sensible board would ever agree to this. And should not, as we as a working group are not all-knowing. And we know that the chances that the public comments on our proposals will show full consensus are nil. And even if there was a full consensus in the public comments, we know for sure that this does not equal public consensus.

Cheers,

Roelof Meijer

SIDN | Meander 501 | 6825 MD | P.O. Box 5022 | 6802 EA | ARNHEM | THE NETHERLANDS
T +31 (0)26 352 55 00 | M +31 (0)6 11 395 775 | F +31 (0)26 352 55 05
roelof.meijer at sidn.nl<mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl> | www.sidn.nl<http://www.sidn.nl/>

From: Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>>
Date: dinsdag 6 januari 2015 15:02
To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com>>
Cc: "accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals

Works for me.

From: Greg Shatan [mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com]
Sent: Tuesday, 6 January 2015 11:57 PM
To: Bruce Tonkin
Cc: accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-Accountability] WS1 vs WS2 recap and proposals

How about:

All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate to force implementation of WS2 items in the event of resistance from ICANN management and Board.
Greg Shatan

On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 7:10 AM, Bruce Tonkin <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au<mailto:Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>> wrote:
Hello All,

>>  WS 1 is designated for accountability mechanisms that must be in place of rimly committed to before IANA transition occurs.
All other consensus items could be in WS2, provided there are mechanisms in WS1 adequate for force implementation of WS2 items despite resistance from Icann management and Board.

If possible I would like to see the last phrase read:  "in case of resistance from ICANN Management and Board".   The current wording seems to assume there is some sort of default resistance.

Regards,
Bruce Tonkin
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