[CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership structure
Eric Brunner-Williams
ebw at abenaki.wabanaki.net
Thu Jan 29 00:33:30 UTC 2015
Keith,
If a "members" mechanism is proposed as a (possibly quite small) part of
an overall attempt to improve accountability related to a still
conditional transition, then we can, as Alan proposed, and I suppose
ALAC proposes, simply promote SOs and ACs to "members", or we can ask
what "members" are necessary and why.
So yes, I'm considering one notion of "member" -- one implicit in your
note to Eberhard -- the assumption that registry operators, or rather,
the delegees and contractees -- must be members.
Larry's remarks are not relevant to the idea, casually floated by
several here, that the necessary means to replace the NTIA as a nominal
source of oversight is reorganization to a membership form. You'll
notice in your excerpt Larry didn't choose to mention any specific
mechanism, reorganization to a membership form in particular, as a means
to address the example questions he did choose to cite.
Membership could stand some clarification, it doesn't necessarily mean
replication of the existing bylaws entities as members -- as this would
simply promote the promoted and exclude the excluded, which is unlikely
to substantively improve accountability should, in addition to a
reorganization, a transition actually takes place.
Eric Brunner-Williams
Eugene, Oregon
P.S. Yes, I mentioned Verisign's RZM role as an exception to the general
question, a "unique circumstance".
On 1/28/15 2:49 PM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
>
> Thanks Eric.
>
> I think you may be looking at this question far too narrowly.
>
> The charter and focus of the Accountability CCWG is not specific to
> the IANA Functions and/or the Root Zone Management
> responsibilities…that’s the immediate responsibility of the CWG
> Transition. We are primarily focused on replacing the backstop role
> currently provided by NTIA, if and when they determine the community
> has identified and recommended the requisite (and acceptable)
> accountability reforms, structure and mechanisms. The two tracks will
> necessarily come together prior to transition, of course.
>
> If there’s any question about this, I encourage you to read NTIA’s
> latest official statement, in remarks by Larry Strickling on Tuesday
> in DC (excerpt below):
>
> http://www.ntia.doc.gov/speechtestimony/2015/remarks-assistant-secretary-strickling-state-net-conference-1272015
>
> “The second process is addressing how to enhance ICANN’s
> accountability to the global Internet community in the absence of the
> contractual relationship with NTIA. Stakeholders are working through
> the Enhancing /ICANN Accountability Cross Community Working Group/
> (/CCWG - Accountability). Early reports indicate the CCWG is making
> significant progress on an agreement on the definition of the problem,
> a list of “stress tests”, and the specific short term issues that need
> to be addressed prior to the transition. /As we have consistently
> stated, it is critical that this group conduct “stress testing” of
> proposed solutions to safeguard against future contingencies such as
> attempts to influence or take over ICANN – be it the Board, staff or
> any stakeholder group--that are not currently possible given its
> contract with NTIA. We also encourage this group to address questions
> such as how to remove or replace board members should stakeholders
> lose confidence in them and how to incorporate and improve current
> accountability tools like the reviews called for by the /Affirmation
> of Commitments.”/
>
> //
>
> /Also, since Verisign’s RZM role was mentioned, I point you to NTIA’s
> March 18, 2014 FAQ on the topic:/
>
> //
>
> /http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2014/iana-functions-and-related-root-zone-management-transition-questions-and-answ/
>
> //
>
> *Q. What impact does this announcement have on the cooperative
> agreement with Verisign?*
>
> A. Aspects of the IANA functions contract are inextricably intertwined
> with the VeriSign cooperative agreement (i.e., authoritative root zone
> file management), which would require that NTIA coordinate a related
> and parallel transition in these responsibilities.//
>
> Hope this helps clarify a bit.
>
> Regards,
> Keith
>
> *From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf
> Of *Eric Brunner-Williams
> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 4:38 PM
> *To:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership
> structure
>
> Keith,
>
> To respond to your question --
>
> Other than the unique circumstance that one contractee -- Verisign
> Global Registry Service -- is, for historical reasons, one of the Root
> Zone Management (RZM) partners, and, as you mention, someone's
> employer, can anyone suggest a meaningful difference of interests in
> the continued function of the Root Management Zone between, say, a
> delegee's interests and a contractee's interests?
>
> Having worn both hats, I can't think of any.
>
> Feel free to point out something I missed, because if both ccTLDs and
> gTLDs have the same interest in the continued function of the Root
> Management Zone, then since this interest isn't unique to delegees and
> contractees, neither are necessary to provide oversight of that
> continued function.
>
> Whether there is some other interest that requires the inclusion of
> delegees and/or contractees in some membership oversight scheme is
> possible. Consistency and correctness of policy implemented by the
> Root Zone Management (RZM) partners, as Eberhard points out (and as I
> thought was common knowledge among those of us with 10+ years of
> involvement), is such an interest, which of course, is not shared by
> contractees, which are governed solely by contract.
>
> To restate: a possible membership model need not include duplicated
> interests, and the interest in the continued function of the Root
> Management Zone is sufficiently general that no claim of interest in
> it must promote the claimant to member status, whatever that may be in
> the cloud of "membership" proposals.
>
> Eric Brunner-Williams
> Eugene, Oregon
>
> On 1/28/15 11:58 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
>
> Eric,
>
> To be clear, no one has ever said that, “…only registries can
> provide the necessary oversight of the Board as it relates to the
> continued function of the Root Zone Management.” Where did you get
> that?
>
> In order for any accountability structure to be meaningful and
> acceptable, it should represent all members of the community and
> there should be appropriate balance among all community
> participants and interests.
>
> As an employee of a gTLD Registry and Chair of the GNSO Registries
> Stakeholder Group, I can state definitively that we have a strong
> interest in ICANN’s accountability to us and to the rest of the
> community.
>
> I find your suggestion that registries might not have a place in a
> possible cross-community membership model odd, to say the least.
>
> Regards,
>
> Keith
>
> *From:*accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
> <mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org>
> [mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] *On
> Behalf Of *Eric Brunner-Williams
> *Sent:* Wednesday, January 28, 2015 12:51 PM
> *To:* accountability-cross-community at icann.org
> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [CCWG-ACCT] got some lawyerly answers on membership
> structure
>
> On 1/28/15 8:50 AM, Drazek, Keith wrote:
>
> If a ccTLD manager is not a member of the ccNSO, is paying no
> fees to ICANN and is not bound by ccNSO policy, please help me
> understand how they are impacted and why they would care about
> the ICANN Board's accountability mechanisms to its community.
> I fully understand why every TLD registry cares about the IANA
> functions and changes to the root zone file, but our issue of
> greater ICANN Accountability is a broader discussion than the
> IANA-specific concerns and accountability mechanisms currently
> being addressed via the CWG Transition.
>
>
> It is not so very long ago that a (previous) Executive and
> (previous) Board made changes requested by delegees of iso3166
> code points conditional upon a form of agreement. The policy
> pursued by that Executive and that Board were not subject to
> substantive community review (notice and comment) prior to being
> implemented, with the accountability issue I hope many, not just
> the directly concerned, still recall.
>
> Additionally, the interests of parties (of any type) need not
> encompass the union of all interests of all parties in the
> mechanisms and policies relating to accountability.
>
> The pursuit of the narrow self-interest of a hypothetical ccTLD,
> or gTLD, delegee or contractual party, through its operator,
> should not, by itself, remove a party pursuing its narrow
> self-interest from what ever may eventually be a body of
> "members". Were it so, the removed would be at least some of those
> the USG observed in the AOC which constitute " a group of
> participants that engage in ICANN's processes to a greater extent
> than Internet users generally."
>
> However, given the general awareness that the continued function
> of the Root Zone Management (RZM) partners is of fundamental
> importance, and the limited interest _as_delegees_or_contractees_
> in issues other than the continued function of the Root Zone
> Management (RZM) partners, it seems unnecessary to encumber the
> problem of accountability-via-membership (already quite difficult
> if not intractable, in my opinion) with notions that delegees and
> contractees, as delegees or contractees, contribute an interest
> absent but for their status as "members", whether represented en
> toto, or as self-organized aggregates, or by lottery.
>
> In simple terms, why registries-as-members at all? Does anyone
> believe only registries can provide the necessary oversight of the
> Board as it relates to the continued function of the Root Zone
> Management?
>
> I think that the function of the Board is general oversight of the
> registries, arising from its technical coordination of unique
> endpoint identifiers delegated authority, and contractual
> oversight arising from its delegated contracting authority, so the
> assumption that registries have a necessary place in a
> hypothetical membership model is one that should be examined
> carefully for self-interest and self-dealing, as well as for
> necessity and utility.
>
> Eric Brunner-Williams
> Eugene, Oregon
>
>
>
>
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