[CCWG-ACCT] member organization and single membership structure

Avri Doria avri at acm.org
Wed Jul 8 23:09:21 UTC 2015


To go further.

There have been attempts to get ICANN in ATRT and other recommendations,
as a Multistakeholder organization, to become transparent by default.   
These changes are still pending, though approved


It was part of 9.4 b.

> 9.4. Develop Transparency Metrics and Reporting
> The Board should ensure that as part of its yearly report, ICANN include,
> among other things, but not be limited to:
> a. A report on the broad range of Transparency issues with supporting
> metrics to facilitate accountability.
> b. A discussion of the degree to which ICANN, both staff and
> community, are adhering to a default standard of transparency in all
> policy, implementation and administrative actions; as well as the
> degree to which all narratives, redaction, or other practices used to not
> disclose information to the ICANN community are documented in a
> transparent manner.
> c. Statistical reporting to include at least the following elements:
> i. requests of the Documentary Information Disclosure Policy
> (DIDP) process and the disposition of requests.
> ii. percentage of redacted-to-unredacted Board briefing
> materials released to the general public.
> iii. number and nature of issues that the Board determined
> should be treated confidentially.
> 8
> iv. other ICANN usage of redaction and other methods to not
> disclose information to the community and statistics on
> reasons given for usage of such methods.
> d. A section on employee “Anonymous Hotline” and/or other
> whistleblowing activity, to include metrics on:
> i. Reports submitted.
> ii. Reports verified as containing issues requiring action.
> iii. Reports that resulted in change to ICANN practices.
> e. An analysis of the continued relevance and usefulness of existing
> transparency metrics, including
> i. Considerations on whether activities are being geared
> toward the metrics (i.e. “teaching to the test”) without
> contributing toward the goal of genuine transparency.
> ii. Recommendations for new metrics.


We do not need membership for this, just a commitment to fulfill the
recommendations for full transparency that ICANN has received from
almost every review it has had of accountability and transparency.

avri


On 08-Jul-15 18:47, Avri Doria wrote:
> +1
>
> On 08-Jul-15 18:37, Kieren McCarthy wrote:
>> A quick view specifically on "rights of inspection".
>>
>> I think enabling that some entity gets this right would be one of the
>> most useful of all possible accountability improvements. 
>>
>> It would - perhaps over time - pull out any motivations that might
>> exist for ICANN to be misleading or less than truthful in its
>> reporting. This is going to be especially important as ICANN receives
>> increasingly large amounts of revenue and particularly given its
>> current weak financial controls.
>>
>> (See: http://www.ionmag.asia/2015/07/icann-finances-swallow-the-money/)
>>
>> I predict that ICANN corporate will fight hard to prevent any entity
>> from gaining this right. And that it will continue to fight hard even
>> when someone has that right. That in itself should be a good indicator
>> for why it should be a redline for the accountability group.
>>
>> To my mind, not allowing ICANN to hide information is the epitome of
>> actual accountability. If you can't hide it, then to save on
>> embarrassment you consider how best to share it. Over time, everyone
>> gains.
>>
>>
>> Kieren
>>
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 9:51 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com
>> <mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com>> wrote:
>>
>>     Roelof:
>>
>>     Derivative rights and the right of inspection are statutory rights
>>     of members under California law.  Under a multiple member model,
>>     each member could choose to exercise these rights individually. 
>>     Under a single member model, only the single statutory member
>>     would have these rights.  Maybe this could be "fixed" so that
>>     individual SOACs could exercise these rights in the name of the
>>     single member, but I don't know if that works.
>>
>>     If we don't care to have those rights (or any of the rights that
>>     members have individually), then a single member set-up might
>>     work.  I would note that the right to inspect ICANN documents
>>     (currently only available in a DIDP) has been an issue of
>>     concern.  I would also note that derivative rights are a powerful
>>     tool for enforcement against an entity.
>>
>>     I agree that when it comes to spilling the whole board, or other
>>     powers intended to be exercised by the community as a whole,, the
>>     single member model has the least issues vis a vis the multiple
>>     member model.  But when it comes to recalling an individual board
>>     member or other powers to be exercised by a single member, the
>>     single member model raises substantial issues.
>>
>>     Greg
>>
>>
>>     On Wed, Apr 22, 2015 at 11:28 AM, Roelof Meijer
>>     <Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl <mailto:Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl>> wrote:
>>
>>         Hi Ed,
>>
>>         Although I have no clue about what it actually means, I am
>>         quite positive that “components of the community” .. “be[ing]
>>         able to avail itself of derivative rights or the right of
>>         inspection” is not a requirement that we formulated as a
>>         power, nor a criterium we formulated for the selection of a
>>         mechanism. So I am at a bit of a loss where that comes from.
>>
>>         Additionally, I do not see why stakeholders represented “in a
>>         single tent” requiring a specified majority among those
>>         representatives to execute a specific power (let’s say
>>         spilling the board) would have less vitality and more blob,
>>         than stakeholders in separate legal entities equally requiring
>>         the same specified majority among those entities to execute a
>>         specific power.
>>
>>         Best,
>>
>>         Roelof
>>
>>         From: Edward Morris <egmorris1 at toast.net
>>         <mailto:egmorris1 at toast.net>>
>>         Date: woensdag 22 april 2015 16:24
>>         To: Matthew Shears <mshears at cdt.org <mailto:mshears at cdt.org>>
>>         Cc: Roelof Meijer <roelof.meijer at sidn.nl
>>         <mailto:roelof.meijer at sidn.nl>>, "avri at acm.org
>>         <mailto:avri at acm.org>" <avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>>,
>>         "accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>         <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>"
>>         <accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>         <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
>>
>>         Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] member organization and single
>>         membership structure
>>
>>         I look forward to independent counsel's analysis of this proposal.
>>
>>         Certainly my principle objection with this model is the
>>         nullification of many of the benefits membership would bring
>>         to components of the community. If the GNSO, for example, felt
>>         strongly about an issue it would not be able to avail itself
>>         of derivative rights or the right of inspection without the
>>         consent of the greater community. Diversity is the strength of
>>         the multistakeholder model and folding all rights into a
>>         single tent would dampen the vitality of the diverse bottom up
>>         process and instead submerge it into a giant blob like unit.
>>
>>         I do remain open, though, to others thoughts on the matter and
>>         thank Roelof for bringing it up.
>>
>>         Ed
>>
>>         Sent from my iPad
>>
>>         On Apr 22, 2015, at 3:02 PM, Matthew Shears <mshears at cdt.org
>>         <mailto:mshears at cdt.org>> wrote:
>>
>>>         If this would achieve the same result as the broader
>>>         membership model and at the same time be simpler to implement
>>>         shouldn't it be looked at again?  Was there a specific reason
>>>         it was discounted?
>>>
>>>         Matthew
>>>
>>>         On 4/22/2015 2:56 PM, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>>>>         Hi Avri,
>>>>
>>>>         The sole membership construction, is a possibility described
>>>>         in the legal document in several places: the comments by the
>>>>         legal experts on the PCCWG mechanism template (page 64) and
>>>>         the Community Council mechanism template (page 69). I
>>>>         sent several emails about it to the WP1 list, suggesting to
>>>>         look in the possibility as indeed it would not necessitate
>>>>         every SO and AC to become a legal entity. And, as you do,
>>>>         suggesting: "make the „Community Council” the sole member of
>>>>         ICANN (and thus a formal legal entity), consisting of either
>>>>         the SO and AC chairs or SO/AC elected representatives” (from
>>>>         an email of 14 April).
>>>>
>>>>         And I would think it would enable the SO’s and AC’s
>>>>         themselves to continue appointing directors, as they do now.
>>>>         But that’s just guessing, based on the fact that the SO’s
>>>>         and AC’s themselves would not change status
>>>>
>>>>         Best,
>>>>
>>>>         Roelof
>>>>
>>>>         From: Avri Doria <avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>>
>>>>         Organization: Technicalities
>>>>         Reply-To: "avri at acm.org <mailto:avri at acm.org>" <avri at acm.org
>>>>         <mailto:avri at acm.org>>
>>>>         Date: woensdag 22 april 2015 15:09
>>>>         To: "accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>>>         <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>"
>>>>         <accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>>>         <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
>>>>         Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] member organization and single
>>>>         membership structure
>>>>
>>>>         Hi,
>>>>
>>>>         On 22-Apr-15 08:26, Roelof Meijer wrote:
>>>>>         2)
>>>>>         What I find quite frustrating is that I have raised the
>>>>>         point of the possibility (or not) of a single membership
>>>>>         structure – an option mentioned by Sidley and Adler &
>>>>>         Colving in their legal advice – several times by now
>>>>>         without getting any substantial reaction. I am not aware
>>>>>         that any serious effort to investigate this has led to a
>>>>>         formal write-off.
>>>>         In some way that might lessen the complexity of making most
>>>>         SOAC an individual legal entity. 
>>>>
>>>>         How would it work?  Would we continue to appoint Directors
>>>>         just as we do now?
>>>>
>>>>         Or would there need to be some sort of Members Council that
>>>>         took actions, working simliarly to the the executive board
>>>>         or community council idea?
>>>>
>>>>         thanks
>>>>
>>>>         avri
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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>>>>
>>>>
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>>>         Global Internet Policy and Human Rights
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