[CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed
Alan Greenberg
alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca
Tue Jul 14 23:15:16 UTC 2015
At 14/07/2015 05:50 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote:
>Alan,
>
>1. If a group went so wrong with their
>selection of a Director as to warrant his/her
>removal, what makes you think the Alternate they
>selected at the same time would be better? Or
>even still applicable given the obvious shift in priorities or perspectives?
>And what makes you think the replacement or the
>caretaker you will select after the removal will
>be better???? This is a tricky question. To make
>it more clear, what makes the US people think
>the Vice President they elected together with
>the president would be a good choice to replace
>the President in case of vacancy?????
The US VP is selected using the teenager model of
life. "I will never die", so I select my VP based
not on who could do the job if I die, but who can help be get the most votes.
A REALLY bad model to select if we are looking for good governance!
But you do get points for thinking of it!
>
>2. If I understand correctly, you are
>proposing that a number of AC/SO could remove
>the director appointed by a particular AC/SO.
>And they could do so even if the appointing
>organization did not agree. If that is correct,
>it would allow groups to gang-up on a director
>they did not like BECAUSE of that persons views.
>If 4 SO/ACs decide to recall a director, it must
>be because he is not performing well for the
>benefit of the whole organization even if the
>appointing party is not among them. But if this
>bothers you, I can add a mention that the
>appointing body should be among the 4 SO/ACs
>necessary to recall a board director.
>If you think 4 SO/ACs will likely gang-up on a
>director they did not like BECAUSE of that
>persons views, should we really trust them to appoint directors at all??
Actually, I don't really think it is much of a
threat, but others have raised it.
Safe travels to Paris, Alan
>
>To be specific, it would allow the rest of the
>community (or a large part of it) to remove the
>At-Large Director even though At-:Large was
>happy with the person. Is that your intent?
>See the above comment.
>
>3. You say that a Director could be removed
>as "punishment" over a particular vote. If you
>think AC/SOs will likely do this, should we
>really trust them to appoint directors at all??
>See the above comment.
>
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Tijani BEN JEMAA
>Executive Director
>Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI)
>Phone: + 216 41 649 605
>Mobile: + 216 98 330 114
>Fax: + 216 70 853 376
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
>
>
>
>De : Alan Greenberg [mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca]
>Envoyé : mardi 14 juillet 2015 15:00
>À : tijani.benjemaa at planet.tn; 'Jordan Carter'
>Cc : 'Accountability Cross Community'
>Objet : Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed
>
>Tijani, without making a more general comment, I
>do have several strong concerns with your proposal:
>
>1. If a group went so wrong with their selection
>of a Director as to warrant his/her removal,
>what makes you think the Alternate they selected
>at the same time would be better? Or even still
>applicable given the obvious shift in priorities or perspectives?
>
>2. If I understand correctly, you are proposing
>that a number of AC/SO could remove the director
>appointed by a particular AC/SO. And they could
>do so even if the appointing organization did
>not agree. If that is correct, it would allow
>groups to gang-up on a director they did not
>like BECAUSE of that persons views. To be
>specific, it would allow the rest of the
>community (or a large part of it) to remove the
>At-Large Directo even though At-:Large was happy
>with the person. Is that your intent?
>
>3. You say that a Director could be removed as
>"punishment" over a particular vote. If you
>think AC/SOs will likely do this, should we
>really trust them to appoint directors at all???
>
>Alan
>
>At 13/07/2015 06:25 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote:
>
>
>
>Hi Jordan,
>
>I am personally quite comfortable with the logic
>of the appointing body being the removing body
>for individual directors (recognising there is
>work to be done in respect of NomCom appointees).
>
>One of the concerns that comes up in thinking
>about this is probably well represented by this
>hypothetical & fictional scenario:
>
>The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new
>gTLD programme be returned to the registries pro
>rata depending on the number of registrations.
>The Board does not agree, including the GNSO
>appointed directors on the Board. The GNSO
>removes its directors and appoints different
>ones who say they will support this proposal.
>
>I think this scenario would never play out in practice.
>
>Why not?
>· two out of sixteen directors would
>never be credibly enough to completely change
>the Board's position on a matter involving
>significant resources and impact on the public.
>The GNSO can recall their dissident director
>even if they know the Board decision will not change, just to punish him
>· the new directors would face the
>same obligations the old directors faced to act in the public interest
>I don̢۪t see how this obligation will prevent
>the scescenario to happen since the evaluation
>of the public Interest may be different from a party (or a person) to another
>
>The removal of individual directors is possible
>in very many organisations and it is only when
>they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start being played.
>To ensure that this will only happen when there
>is dysfunction, we need to put the necessary and
>right rules, not permit to the appointing bodies
>to recall there directors without convincing reason
>
>I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the
>NomCom was contemplating removing a director,
>they'd be carefully considering what they could
>really achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it
>for reasons of rent-seeking or other self-interested things.
>you are lucky to believe so even if nothing prevent it
>
>The whole rationale behind the power, in my
>view, is that it simply tightens the link
>between directors and their appointing bodies.
>It isn't and should not be a backdoor way to
>change directors from directors into mere
>avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups.
>
>George, I hope this is constructive.
>
>A last question...
>
>Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you
>would see the exercise of such a power being
>done by "a process that is broadly distributed
>in the community" as an alternative for us to
>consider, and seek legal advice on?
>This is a proposals for exercising the power of
>recalling Board directors by a process that is
>well distributed in the community consisting in
>recalling the board directors (from 1 to 15) by
>the community and not a single SO or AC:
>· The decision is taken by at least 4
>SOs and/or ACs including at list 1 SO and 1 AC.
>· All the directors have the same
>treatment (selected by their constituencies or by the nomcom)
>· The SOs and ACs and the NomCom
>select the board directors and their interim
>simultaneously (the GNSO selects 2 acting
>directors and 2 interim ones and the ALAC
>selects 1 acting director and 1 interim one, etc.).
>· All acting directors sign before
>taking their position as Board Director a
>commitment to step down in case a community decision to recall them is taken
>· Those interim directors will fully
>replace the removed directors if the number of
>recalled directors is less than 8. In case the
>number reaches 8 or more, the resulting board
>(non recalled directors plus the interim of the
>recalled ones) will act as a caretaker till the
>selection of new directors to replace the recalled ones.
>· This is to replace the 2 powers:
>stilling the whole board and recalling individual board directors.
>This has the merit to;
>· Fulfill the requirement of having
>the power to remove the whole Board and to remove individual board members
>· make the change smaller and simpler
>by having a single mechanism to recall the board directors instead of 2
>· not having to find a way for the
>nomcom to remove their appointed directors
>· avoid a period where ICANN run without board in place
>· avoid the risk of having an SO or
>AC recalling their selected director because of
>the SO or AC interest and not the global public interest
>
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Tijani BEN JEMAA
>Executive Director
>Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI)
>Phone: + 216 41 649 605
>Mobile: + 216 98 330 114
>Fax: + 216 70 853 376
>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>De :
>accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
>[
>mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org]
>De la part de Jordan Carter
>Envoyé : dimanche 12 juillet 2015 04:40
>Cc : Accountability Cross Community
>Objet : Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed
>
>Thank you George, interesting post - a couple of thoughts in line below:
>
>On 11 July 2015 at 05:13, George Sadowsky
><<mailto:george.sadowsky at gmail.com> george.sadowsky at gmail.com> wrote:
>
><snip>
>Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that
>the global public interest is _always_ defined
>by "community" consensus or "community"
>dictates? Yes or no? I believe that the great
>majority of the time the two are consistent, but
>I believe that there are cases in which they
>diverge. Is there any disagreement among us
>that this could happen? In that case, what
>should a Board member do? Which is the higher
>authority according to the CCWG's thinking?
>
>I think there will always be occasions when
>there is a divergence between interpretations of
>the global public interest on the part of
>different stakeholders. The ICANN Board will
>remain charged, I think, with bringing that
>global perspective to bear. But this decision is
>made easier by ICANN's very limited role, and by
>the identify of interests in its performance of
>that role between what the Internet and its
>users need, and what core operational ICANN
>stakeholders want: completely reliable operation
>of the IANA functions, and an open and
>accountable, bottom up, consensus driven policy
>process - with the Board generally validating
>the outcomes of consensus policy processes.
>
>To put it another way, the global public
>interest is always served by ICANN focusing on
>doing its core operational jobs well. Beyond
>that, it becomes very subjective, as you note.
>
><snip>
>This implies to me that the test for removal of
>a Director must rest upon a process that is
>broadly distributed in the community and must
>recognize the different organizations to which
>such a member is accountable as an important factor in the process.
>What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point?
>
>I am personally quite comfortable with the logic
>of the appointing body being the removing body
>for individual directors (recognising there is
>work to be done in respect of NomCom appointees).
>)One of the concerns that comes up in thinking
>about this is probably well represented by this
>hypothetical & fictional scenario:
>
>The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new
>gTLD programme be returned to the registries pro
>rata depending on the number of registrations.
>The Board does not agree, including the GNSO
>appointed directors on the Board. The GNSO
>removes its directors and appoints different
>ones who say they will support this proposal.
>
>I think this scenario would never play out in practice.
>
>Why not?
> * two out of sixteen directors would never
> be credibly enough to completely change the
> Board's position on a matter involving
> significant resources and impact on the public.
> * the new directors would face the same
> obligations the old directors faced to act in the public interest
>
>The removal of individual directors is possible
>in very many organisations and it is only when
>they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start being played.
>
>I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the
>NomCom was contemplating removing a director,
>they'd be carefully considering what they could
>really achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it
>for reasons of rent-seeking or other self-interested things.
>
>The whole rationale behind the power, in my
>view, is that it simply tightens the link
>between directors and their appointing bodies.
>It isn't and should not be a backdoor way to
>change directors from directors into mere
>avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups.
>
>George, I hope this is constructive.
>
>A last question...
>
>Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you
>would see the exercise of such a power being
>done by "a process that is broadly distributed
>in the community" as an alternative for us to
>consider, and seek legal advice on?
>The advice we've had so far suggests that it's
>simple to have the appointment and removal
>function with the same group, but more
>complicated (though not, if memory serves,
>impossible) for removers to be different to appointers.
>
>
>cheers
>Jordan
>
>
>--
>Jordan Carter
>
>Chief Executive
>InternetNZ
>
>04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
><mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz>jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>Skype: jordancarter
>
>A better world through a better Internet
>
>
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