[CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed
Dr Eberhard W Lisse
el at lisse.na
Wed Jul 15 05:49:37 UTC 2015
To be really honest, this director recall business is a colossal waste of time in my view.
I personally can recall a few occasions where I was not happy with the vote of the CCNSO (s)elected Directors (or in one case the reasons advanced for the vote) but none of them affected ccTLDs in the first place and in neither case was this a deciding vote.
I do recall a huge number of occasions where the Board did their best to circumvent or never mind break Bylaws and/or established policy and/or just nodded off Staff proposals (on the Consent Agenda) with the predictably disastrous outcome.
The IRP panel had some choice words for that.
Steve and I have exchanged about this on this list already and I don't want to rehash that debate but point out that we need to get the Board governance in order before the Transition can take place. This is as important as Thomas very important observation that we must get the IANA Department sorted before the Transition can take place.
I stand by what I have said numerous times before, unless we do that, we do not have Full Consensus and it will only take one or two appointed Members to join yours truly and we do not have Consensus at all.
The way it looks at the moment all but guarantees that there will sufficient support among the ccTLDs to NOT have consensus support for the CCWG proposals and the subsequent ICG proposals, whether a ccNSO Face to Face meeting votes to approve or not.
But then realities are like facts apparently.
el
--
Sent from Dr Lisse's iPad mini
> On Jul 15, 2015, at 00:15, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca> wrote:
>
> At 14/07/2015 05:50 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote:
>> Alan,
>>
>> 1. If a group went so wrong with their selection of a Director as to warrant his/her removal, what makes you think the Alternate they selected at the same time would be better? Or even still applicable given the obvious shift in priorities or perspectives?
>> And what makes you think the replacement or the caretaker you will select after the removal will be better???? This is a tricky question. To make it more clear, what makes the US people think the Vice President they elected together with the president would be a good choice to replace the President in case of vacancy?????
>
> The US VP is selected using the teenager model of life. "I will never die", so I select my VP based not on who could do the job if I die, but who can help be get the most votes.
>
> A REALLY bad model to select if we are looking for good governance!
>
> But you do get points for thinking of it!
>
>>
>> 2. If I understand correctly, you are proposing that a number of AC/SO could remove the director appointed by a particular AC/SO. And they could do so even if the appointing organization did not agree. If that is correct, it would allow groups to gang-up on a director they did not like BECAUSE of that persons views.
>> If 4 SO/ACs decide to recall a director, it must be because he is not performing well for the benefit of the whole organization even if the appointing party is not among them. But if this bothers you, I can add a mention that the appointing body should be among the 4 SO/ACs necessary to recall a board director.
>> If you think 4 SO/ACs will likely gang-up on a director they did not like BECAUSE of that persons views, should we really trust them to appoint directors at all??
>
> Actually, I don't really think it is much of a threat, but others have raised it.
>
> Safe travels to Paris, Alan
>
>>
>> To be specific, it would allow the rest of the community (or a large part of it) to remove the At-Large Director even though At-:Large was happy with the person. Is that your intent?
>> See the above comment.
>>
>> 3. You say that a Director could be removed as "punishment" over a particular vote. If you think AC/SOs will likely do this, should we really trust them to appoint directors at all??
>> See the above comment.
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Tijani BEN JEMAA
>> Executive Director
>> Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI)
>> Phone: + 216 41 649 605
>> Mobile: + 216 98 330 114
>> Fax: + 216 70 853 376
>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> De : Alan Greenberg [ mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca]
>> Envoyé : mardi 14 juillet 2015 15:00
>> À : tijani.benjemaa at planet.tn; 'Jordan Carter'
>> Cc : 'Accountability Cross Community'
>> Objet : Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed
>>
>> Tijani, without making a more general comment, I do have several strong concerns with your proposal:
>>
>> 1. If a group went so wrong with their selection of a Director as to warrant his/her removal, what makes you think the Alternate they selected at the same time would be better? Or even still applicable given the obvious shift in priorities or perspectives?
>>
>> 2. If I understand correctly, you are proposing that a number of AC/SO could remove the director appointed by a particular AC/SO. And they could do so even if the appointing organization did not agree. If that is correct, it would allow groups to gang-up on a director they did not like BECAUSE of that persons views. To be specific, it would allow the rest of the community (or a large part of it) to remove the At-Large Directo even though At-:Large was happy with the person. Is that your intent?
>>
>> 3. You say that a Director could be removed as "punishment" over a particular vote. If you think AC/SOs will likely do this, should we really trust them to appoint directors at all???
>>
>> Alan
>>
>> At 13/07/2015 06:25 PM, Tijani BEN JEMAA wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> Hi Jordan,
>>
>> I am personally quite comfortable with the logic of the appointing body being the removing body for individual directors (recognising there is work to be done in respect of NomCom appointees).
>>
>> One of the concerns that comes up in thinking about this is probably well represented by this hypothetical & fictional scenario:
>>
>> The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new gTLD programme be returned to the registries pro rata depending on the number of registrations. The Board does not agree, including the GNSO appointed directors on the Board. The GNSO removes its directors and appoints different ones who say they will support this proposal.
>>
>> I think this scenario would never play out in practice.
>>
>> Why not?
>> · two out of sixteen directors would never be credibly enough to completely change the Board's position on a matter involving significant resources and impact on the public.
>> The GNSO can recall their dissident director even if they know the Board decision will not change, just to punish him
>> · the new directors would face the same obligations the old directors faced to act in the public interest
>> I don̢۪t see how this obligation will prevent the scescenario to happen since the evaluation of the public Interest may be different from a party (or a person) to another
>>
>> The removal of individual directors is possible in very many organisations and it is only when they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start being played.
>> To ensure that this will only happen when there is dysfunction, we need to put the necessary and right rules, not permit to the appointing bodies to recall there directors without convincing reason
>>
>> I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the NomCom was contemplating removing a director, they'd be carefully considering what they could really achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it for reasons of rent-seeking or other self-interested things.
>> you are lucky to believe so even if nothing prevent it
>>
>> The whole rationale behind the power, in my view, is that it simply tightens the link between directors and their appointing bodies. It isn't and should not be a backdoor way to change directors from directors into mere avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups.
>>
>> George, I hope this is constructive.
>>
>> A last question...
>>
>> Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you would see the exercise of such a power being done by "a process that is broadly distributed in the community" as an alternative for us to consider, and seek legal advice on?
>> This is a proposals for exercising the power of recalling Board directors by a process that is well distributed in the community consisting in recalling the board directors (from 1 to 15) by the community and not a single SO or AC:
>> · The decision is taken by at least 4 SOs and/or ACs including at list 1 SO and 1 AC.
>> · All the directors have the same treatment (selected by their constituencies or by the nomcom)
>> · The SOs and ACs and the NomCom select the board directors and their interim simultaneously (the GNSO selects 2 acting directors and 2 interim ones and the ALAC selects 1 acting director and 1 interim one, etc.).
>> · All acting directors sign before taking their position as Board Director a commitment to step down in case a community decision to recall them is taken
>> · Those interim directors will fully replace the removed directors if the number of recalled directors is less than 8. In case the number reaches 8 or more, the resulting board (non recalled directors plus the interim of the recalled ones) will act as a caretaker till the selection of new directors to replace the recalled ones.
>> · This is to replace the 2 powers: stilling the whole board and recalling individual board directors.
>> This has the merit to;
>> · Fulfill the requirement of having the power to remove the whole Board and to remove individual board members
>> · make the change smaller and simpler by having a single mechanism to recall the board directors instead of 2
>> · not having to find a way for the nomcom to remove their appointed directors
>> · avoid a period where ICANN run without board in place
>> · avoid the risk of having an SO or AC recalling their selected director because of the SO or AC interest and not the global public interest
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Tijani BEN JEMAA
>> Executive Director
>> Mediterranean Federation of Internet Associations (FMAI)
>> Phone: + 216 41 649 605
>> Mobile: + 216 98 330 114
>> Fax: + 216 70 853 376
>> --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> De : accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [ mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] De la part de Jordan Carter
>> Envoyé : dimanche 12 juillet 2015 04:40
>> Cc : Accountability Cross Community
>> Objet : Re: [CCWG-ACCT] An mplication of accountability models being discussed
>>
>> Thank you George, interesting post - a couple of thoughts in line below:
>>
>> On 11 July 2015 at 05:13, George Sadowsky < george.sadowsky at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> <snip>
>> Here's the question: Does the CCWG believe that the global public interest is _always_ defined by "community" consensus or "community" dictates? Yes or no? I believe that the great majority of the time the two are consistent, but I believe that there are cases in which they diverge. Is there any disagreement among us that this could happen? In that case, what should a Board member do? Which is the higher authority according to the CCWG's thinking?
>>
>> I think there will always be occasions when there is a divergence between interpretations of the global public interest on the part of different stakeholders. The ICANN Board will remain charged, I think, with bringing that global perspective to bear. But this decision is made easier by ICANN's very limited role, and by the identify of interests in its performance of that role between what the Internet and its users need, and what core operational ICANN stakeholders want: completely reliable operation of the IANA functions, and an open and accountable, bottom up, consensus driven policy process - with the Board generally validating the outcomes of consensus policy processes.
>>
>> To put it another way, the global public interest is always served by ICANN focusing on doing its core operational jobs well. Beyond that, it becomes very subjective, as you note.
>>
>> <snip>
>> This implies to me that the test for removal of a Director must rest upon a process that is broadly distributed in the community and must recognize the different organizations to which such a member is accountable as an important factor in the process.
>> What are the opinions of members of the CCWG on this point?
>>
>> I am personally quite comfortable with the logic of the appointing body being the removing body for individual directors (recognising there is work to be done in respect of NomCom appointees).
>> )One of the concerns that comes up in thinking about this is probably well represented by this hypothetical & fictional scenario:
>>
>> The GNSO demands that the proceeds of the new gTLD programme be returned to the registries pro rata depending on the number of registrations. The Board does not agree, including the GNSO appointed directors on the Board. The GNSO removes its directors and appoints different ones who say they will support this proposal.
>>
>> I think this scenario would never play out in practice.
>>
>> Why not?
>> two out of sixteen directors would never be credibly enough to completely change the Board's position on a matter involving significant resources and impact on the public.
>> the new directors would face the same obligations the old directors faced to act in the public interest
>>
>> The removal of individual directors is possible in very many organisations and it is only when they are dysfunctional that these sorts of games start being played.
>>
>> I think in any situation where an SO/AC or the NomCom was contemplating removing a director, they'd be carefully considering what they could really achieve. And they'd be unlikely to do it for reasons of rent-seeking or other self-interested things.
>>
>> The whole rationale behind the power, in my view, is that it simply tightens the link between directors and their appointing bodies. It isn't and should not be a backdoor way to change directors from directors into mere avatars for the specific interests of their appointing groups.
>>
>> George, I hope this is constructive.
>>
>> A last question...
>>
>> Do you have a concrete suggestion as to how you would see the exercise of such a power being done by "a process that is broadly distributed in the community" as an alternative for us to consider, and seek legal advice on?
>> The advice we've had so far suggests that it's simple to have the appointment and removal function with the same group, but more complicated (though not, if memory serves, impossible) for removers to be different to appointers.
>>
>>
>> cheers
>> Jordan
>>
>>
>> --
>> Jordan Carter
>>
>> Chief Executive
>> InternetNZ
>>
>> 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
>> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>> Skype: jordancarter
>>
>> A better world through a better Internet
>>
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