[CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Paul Szyndler paul.szyndler at auda.org.au
Mon Jul 27 03:58:04 UTC 2015


All,



I have followed the development of this issue over the last few weeks and 
felt a degree of confidence in the mechanisms Jordan had outlined.

However, given the very recent consternation over the issue, I would like to 
propose a procedural solution / question.



Would it not be possible for us to separate the definition of voting 
structures from the timing of participation?

In other words – could we agree upon the voting weights for SOs and ACs 
(5,5,5,5,5,2,2) as a matter of principle and also agree that each can join 
at a time of their choosing?

Such a mechanism would require certain caveats – such as a three month 
notice period for engagement, for example.



Just an idea.



Regards,



Paul





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From: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org 
[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of 
Jordan Carter
Sent: Monday, 27 July 2015 1:43 PM
To: Arun Sukumar
Cc: <wp1 at icann.org>; accountability-cross-community at icann.org Community
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community 
mechanism



Hi everyone



We did have a great chance to discuss the voting weights question in our two 
days of face to face time in Paris a week or so ago.



This issue of representation was scoped out in our first PC report, which 
you'll recall had:



Five votes each for:

- ASO

- ccNSO

- GNSO

- GAC

- At Large



Two votes each for:

- RSSAC

- SSAC



We have clear advice that the last-mentioned ACs do not want to participate 
at this time, and I have an impression that GAC is still discussing its 
participation.



[We are, by the by, going to have to set out how the remaining ACs will be 
able to opt in at a future point, presumably on the same basis in terms of # 
of votes as set out above.]



In the public comments that came in on the voting weights, there was no 
overwhelming feedback to suggest that the ALAC numbers were a problem.



How can we workably get this matter resolved?



What is a compromise that can be lived with - is a referral of this question 
to WS2 in a suitable way possible?



I don't think we should leave the matter of votes open, and I don't think we 
should provide options again. We did that last time, and the feedback was 
happy enough with what we had proposed.



Robin, Ed, Arun, Alan, all:



what can we do to get this working?



cheers

Jordan









On 27 July 2015 at 15:25, Arun Sukumar <arun.sukumar at nludelhi.ac.in 
<mailto:arun.sukumar at nludelhi.ac.in> > wrote:

Agree with Robin and Ed on the issue of equal representation to ALAC. If 
at-large is designed to represent internet users, are we really suggesting 
that 5 votes will do justice to the diversity of views in this wide 
constituency? ALAC, in my personal opinion, should remain an advisory 
entity.

Sent from my iPad




On 27 Jul 2015, at 07:53, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca 
<mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca> > wrote:

Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, 
which is paramount in ICANN's mission.

Alan

At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:



Thanks for bringing this up, Edward.  I am having a hard time accepting that 
ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. 
GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly 
evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept 
it.

GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand 
the GAC may be prepared to accept.  But giving ALAC such an elevated 
representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. 
If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to 
issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.

Thanks,
Robin


On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:




Hi everybody,

In reviewing document 5A2 I’ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy 
that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the 
inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which 
I represent on the GNSO Council.  I’m referring to this paragraph, 
specifically that portion I have italicized:

-----

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis 
between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the 
At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent 
Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights 
in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal 
number of votes.

-----

The description of ALAC is simply not true.

I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:

-----

The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home 
within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to 
consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they 
relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies 
created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other 
issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which 
plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also 
coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.

----

ALAC was structurally designed to “consider and provide advice” on the 
activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual 
Internet users”. It was NOT  “structurally designed to represent Internet 
users within ICANN”.

Two inaccuracies:

1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many 
Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to 
be the “home” of any of them, it’s structural remit being limited to 
individual Internet users;

2. ALAC was not “structurally designed” to represent anyone. It was 
“structurally designed” to “consider and provide advice” to ICANN on behalf 
of individual Internet users.

To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the 
Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:

----

The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, 
through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests 
and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users 
of generic Top-Level domains.

---

The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to 
state that the NCSG was “structurally designed” to represent both 
non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic 
Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it’s designated community 
cannot be attributed to ALAC.

As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as 
the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO,  in terms of representation at 
ICANN. ALAC’s function is to “consider and provide advice”. The NCSG’s 
function is to “represent”. They are different.

We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are 
creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community 
will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for 
our entire effort.

I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:

---

The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis 
between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the 
At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and 
provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a 
new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a 
later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.

---

I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the 
ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The 
previous language was not.

I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the 
appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a 
conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I’m just trying to make 
sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.

Thanks for considering,

Ed







  _____

From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan at internetnz.net.nz 
<mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz>  >
Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM
To: wp1 at icann.org <mailto:wp1 at icann.org> , 
accountability-cross-community at icann.org 
<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism

Hi everyone

Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am 
sorry that I haven’t got tracked changes to show you - it’s not much changed 
from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn’t 
actually been finished).

We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie 
is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.

This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.

best
Jordan



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