[CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism
Robin Gross
robin at ipjustice.org
Wed Jul 29 00:26:57 UTC 2015
You are not correct in saying the GNSO was created solely to provide recommendations on gTLD policy. One of the most important things the GNSO does is appoint board members to the ICANN Board of Directors to oversee the entire operation of ICANN. The SOs are responsible for this to a much greater extent as there is only a single AC board member and two from each of the SO's. So attempts to pigeon hole the SOs into narrow and inaccurate definitions in order to take greater power in the overall ICANN structure is very disappointing (and not in line with facts of what the GNSO actually does).
Robin
On Jul 28, 2015, at 3:27 PM, Alan Greenberg wrote:
> You are conflating ccTLD, gTLD and addressing "policy matters" with overall administration of the name and address space.
>
> I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created solely to provide recommendations on gTLD, ccTLD and addressing policy under the current proposal now may combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of administrative matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations that are responsible for ensuring that ICANN is a names and numbers good custodian overseeing the stability, security of the DNS and ensuring that the public interest is preserved.
>
> Alan
>
>
> At 28/07/2015 06:49 AM, Edward Morris wrote:
>> Matt, James, Robin and all,
>>
>> I guess I have trouble understanding how organisations that were created to provide advice under the current proposal now combined have a greater ultimate say in the final determination of policy matters, such as the budget and strategic plan, than those organisations created to develop policy. The uncertainty of which groups will in the end will be involved is also unsettling. I guess like the rest of the world I'll just have to wait until representatives of ICANN appear before Senator Ed Markey and other members of the United States Congress and explain why a complete reorganisation of the function, purpose and relative standing of components of the ICANN community was necessary to achieve accountability within ICANN if, in fact, the proposed model actually does that.
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Ed
>>
>>
>>
>> From: "Matthew Shears" <mshears at cdt.org>
>> Sent: Tuesday, July 28, 2015 11:01 AM
>> To: "James M. Bladel" <jbladel at godaddy.com>, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>, "Robin Gross" <robin at ipjustice.org>, "Edward Morris" <egmorris1 at toast.net>, "wp1 at icann.org" <wp1 at icann.org>, "accountability-cross-community at icann.org Community" <accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism
>>
>> James, all
>>
>> I have to say that the more that this conversation on voting in the community mechanism persists the more I am convinced that the ACs should remain in an advisory capacity (and the fact that the weighting changed again yesterday is not encouraging). I also suspect that uncertainty over whether or not certain ACs are going to exercise their right to vote could be an unacceptable unknown in an otherwise relatively solid proposal.
>>
>> Matthew
>>
>> On 7/27/2015 3:19 PM, James M. Bladel wrote:
>>> Hi Alan -
>>>
>>> I don’t see the equivalency between ALAC and GAC on the issue of Public Interest. Agree with Robin & ED that there is significant overlap between ALAC and the NCSG, CSG, and even the customers served by contracted parties, and that both ACs should retain their “advisory” roles.
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>>
>>> J.
>>>
>>>
>>> From: < accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org> on behalf of Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca >
>>> Date: Sunday, July 26, 2015 at 21:23
>>> To: Robin Gross <robin at ipjustice.org>, Edward Morris <egmorris1 at toast.net>, "wp1 at icann.org" <wp1 at icann.org>, " accountability-cross-community at icann.org Community" < accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
>>> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] [WP1] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism
>>>
>>> Robin, the ALAC and GAC have everything to do with the Public Interest, which is paramount in ICANN's mission.
>>>
>>> Alan
>>>
>>> At 26/07/2015 09:41 PM, Robin Gross wrote:
>>>> Thanks for bringing this up, Edward. I am having a hard time accepting that ALAC and GAC should have an equal role as GNSO and CCNSO on these issues. GAC and ALAC currently have advisory roles and this proposal certainly evolves and elevates those roles in relation to the SO's, so I cannot accept it.
>>>>
>>>> GAC and ALAC should continue to have *advisory* roles, which I understand the GAC may be prepared to accept. But giving ALAC such an elevated representation (which overlaps with NCSG and CSG) is a problem in my view. If it goes out as "equal weights" to the ACs, I believe I'll be compelled to issue a minority report on this issue of weighted votes.
>>>>
>>>> Thanks,
>>>> Robin
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Jul 26, 2015, at 6:10 PM, Edward Morris wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi everybody,
>>>>>
>>>>> In reviewing document 5A2 I?ve come across what I believe is an inaccuracy that I hope we can to work together to correct. Actually, to be honest, the inaccuracy was discovered and reported to me by a member of the NCSG, which I represent on the GNSO Council. I?m referring to this paragraph, specifically that portion I have italicized:
>>>>>
>>>>> -----
>>>>>
>>>>> The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.
>>>>>
>>>>> -----
>>>>>
>>>>> The description of ALAC is simply not true.
>>>>>
>>>>> I refer everyone to the ICANN Bylaws, article X, section 4(a), which states:
>>>>>
>>>>> -----
>>>>>
>>>>> The At-Large Advisory Committee (ALAC) is the primary organizational home within ICANN for individual Internet users. The role of the ALAC shall be to consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users. This includes policies created through ICANN's Supporting Organizations, as well as the many other issues for which community input and advice is appropriate. The ALAC, which plays an important role in ICANN's accountability mechanisms, also coordinates some of ICANN's outreach to individual Internet users.
>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>>>
>>>>> ALAC was structurally designed to ?consider and provide advice? on the activities of ICANN, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet users?. It was NOT ?structurally designed to represent Internet users within ICANN?.
>>>>>
>>>>> Two inaccuracies:
>>>>>
>>>>> 1. ALAC was designed with to be the home of individual Internet users. Many Internet users are not individuals. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to be the ?home? of any of them, it?s structural remit being limited to individual Internet users;
>>>>>
>>>>> 2. ALAC was not ?structurally designed? to represent anyone. It was ?structurally designed? to ?consider and provide advice? to ICANN on behalf of individual Internet users.
>>>>>
>>>>> To help illustrate the difference, I would refer you to section 1.1 of the Board approved Non-Commercial Stakeholder group Charter, which reads:
>>>>>
>>>>> ----
>>>>>
>>>>> The purpose of the Non Commercial Stakeholder Group (NCSG) is to represent, through its elected representatives and its Constituencies, the interests and concerns of non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains.
>>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>
>>>>> The NCSG was designed to have a representative function. It is accurate to state that the NCSG was ?structurally designed? to represent both non-commercial registrants and non-commercial Internet users of generic Top-Level domains with ICANN. The same remit for it?s designated community cannot be attributed to ALAC.
>>>>>
>>>>> As an advisory committee ALAC does not have the same functional design as the NCSG, a constituent part of the GNSO, in terms of representation at ICANN. ALAC?s function is to ?consider and provide advice?. The NCSG?s function is to ?represent?. They are different.
>>>>>
>>>>> We need to be accurate in the information we put in the document we are creating for public comment. As has happened here, members of the community will pick up on inaccuracies and that will lead to credibility problems for our entire effort.
>>>>>
>>>>> I suggest that the following language be substituted in document 52A:
>>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>
>>>>> The community mechanism gives the bulk of influence on an equal basis between the three SOs for which ICANN deals with policy development and the At-Large Advisory Committee (which was structurally designed to consider and provide advice on behalf of individual Internet users within ICANN). If a new SO or another AC gains voting rights in the community mechanism at a later stage, they would receive an equal number of votes.
>>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>
>>>>> I will note that this proposed language has been taken directly from the ICANN bylaws, modified only by a joining clause. It is accurate. The previous language was not.
>>>>>
>>>>> I recognize that accuracy in description might cause some to question the appropriate role of some groups going forward. If so, it might be a conversation we need to have. At the moment, though, I?m just trying to make sure our documentation reflects reality rather than aspiration.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for considering,
>>>>>
>>>>> Ed
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> From: "Jordan Carter" <jordan at internetnz.net.nz >
>>>>> Sent: Sunday, July 26, 2015 6:30 AM
>>>>> To: wp1 at icann.org , accountability-cross-community at icann.org
>>>>> Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Revised draft - Voting weights in community mechanism
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi everyone
>>>>>
>>>>> Here is an update of the previously not-updated text on voting weights. I am sorry that I haven?t got tracked changes to show you - it?s not much changed from what was circulated a few days ago (the redline staff draft that hadn?t actually been finished).
>>>>>
>>>>> We still need to develop quorum and participation rules - I believe Bernie is working on a paper on this, for discussion next week.
>>>>>
>>>>> This is on the agenda for WP1 on 27 July.
>>>>>
>>>>> best
>>>>> Jordan
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>>> Jordan Carter
>>>>>
>>>>> Chief Executive
>>>>> InternetNZ
>>>>>
>>>>> 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
>>>>> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>>>>> Skype: jordancarter
>>>>>
>>>>> To promote the Internet's benefits and uses, and protect its potential.
>>>>> _______________________________________________
>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
>>>>> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
>>>>> https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>>>>
>>>>
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>>
>> --
>> Matthew Shears
>> Global Internet Policy and Human Rights
>> Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT)
>> + 44 (0)771 247 2987
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