[CCWG-ACCT] Section 5B - community powers - consolidated draft
Paul Szyndler
paul.szyndler at auda.org.au
Thu Jul 30 07:29:51 UTC 2015
Hello all,
Below are a few comments I have just sent to Jordan about the most recent
Community Powers draft.
I am happy to help undertake the drafting changes as I feel these are
important points to address before the next round of public commentary.
Regards,
Paul
Hi Jordan,
Thanks for the time and effort that you have contributed to refining this
document.
I have a handful of comments / questions that we may wish to address before
we reach the public comment phase.
Many of these are about improving clarity and minimising the risk of
ambiguity.
* Getting language right about “petitioning” is important because it
is the first step toward community “action”. So this (page 2) is confusing:
“To trigger community consideration for the use of a community power, an SO
or AC has to agree by a resolution of its governing body that the power
should be used. A simple majority is sufficient to support a petition for
any power so it can proceed to the discussion stage”. What “simple majority”
are we referring to? Of the ccNSO Council? ccNSO membership? Of SOs and ACs?
I assume you are referring to a “simple majority” of the governing
body…..but we should be extremely precise. Also, are we intending to mandate
how each SO/AC will execute its own processes for reaching agreement /
consensus, or can each develop their own methodologies? Once again, clarity
is vital.
* Under 5B.1 (Reconsider budget or strategy/operating plans) is
there a need for overtly negative language regarding ICANN putting budgets
and plans to the community “without sufficient detail to facilitate
thoughtful consideration”? I would propose highlighting the subsequent
paragraph (04) about greater transparency and community involvement as a
preferred introductory statement. Similarly, Para 18 on changes to ICANN
Standard Bylaws is, once again, negative in tone. Can we craft these in a
more diplomatic tone? Further, the examples in Para 18 of the ccNSO’s PDP
and GNSO Stakeholder Groups are problematic for reasons that I believe Chris
has discussed with you recently.
* Para 15 on budget / plan veto: “A 2/3 level of support in the
mechanism would be required in the mechanism to reject the ICANN or IANA
budget or an operating/strategic plan the first time: a 3/4 level of support
is required for a second rejection.” Aside from drafting errors, we need to
be clearer as to who “2/3” or “3/4” refers to.
* Para 29 on removing Directors: “It is expected that this power
would only be exercised is cases of serious difficulty with a particular
director”. I don’t wish to head further down the rabbit hole of detail, but
in drafting this document, we are talking about nuclear options for the
community. Would you expect that terms such as “serious difficulty” will be
more fully defined?
Catch you on the upcoming calls,
Paul
From: accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org
[mailto:accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] On Behalf Of
Jordan Carter
Sent: Thursday, 30 July 2015 9:51 AM
To: wp1 at icann.org; Accountability Cross Community
<accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
Subject: [CCWG-ACCT] Section 5B - community powers - consolidated draft
Hi all
Attached are the community powers papers combined into one document, and
benefiting from the latest legal review and updates following our last call.
This is for discussion in our next CCWG call/s.
I draw your attention in particular to two points:
** in the "removing individual ICANN directors" paper (section 5B.3) there
was no limit on the number of times people could seek the removal of a
director: if a vote failed, a new petition could happen immediately. I have
suggested there should be a standdown period of six months - if a vote to
remove an individual director fails, a new petition could not be lodged. It
doesn't seem fair to allow the community to simply wear down an elected
director by attrition like this.
** in "recall of the ICANN Board" paper (section 5B.4), there was a
weirdness in the petitioning. We agreed that two SOs or ACs must petition to
trigger this, at least one of which needed to be an SO, but the paper had a
legacy oddness that 2/3 of the SOs and ACs would have to sign on to the
petition. This was the same threshold as the actual decision. So I have
deleted it.
The changes to the Budget paper also clarify the separateness of decisions
re IANA budget and ICANN budget.
Redline and clean versions attached. Please treat the clean version as the
authoritative one. The redline includes all changes other than formatting
and minor word changes that don't change substance, as far as I know.
cheers
Jordan
--
Jordan Carter
Chief Executive
InternetNZ
+64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
Email: <mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter
A better world through a better Internet
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/attachments/20150730/ec80122e/attachment.html>
More information about the Accountability-Cross-Community
mailing list