[CCWG-ACCT] Section 5B - community powers - consolidated draft

[Jordan Carter]

hi Paul, hi all

On 30 July 2015 at 18:33, Paul Szyndler <paul.szyndler at auda.org.au> wrote:

> Hi Jordan,
>
>
>
> Thanks for the time and effort that you have contributed to refining this
> document.
>
> I have a handful of comments / questions that we may wish to address
> before we reach the public comment phase.
>
> Many of these are about improving clarity and minimising the risk of
> ambiguity.
>
>
>

The drafting quality reflects the time available, unfortunately. Worth
saying that up front.

> ·         Getting language right about “petitioning” is important because
> it is the first step toward community “action”. So this (page 2) is
> confusing: *“To trigger community consideration for the use of a
> community power, an SO or AC has to agree by a resolution of its governing
> body that the power should be used. A simple majority is sufficient to
> support a petition for any power so it can proceed to the discussion
> stage”. *What “simple majority” are we referring to? Of the ccNSO
> Council? ccNSO membership? Of SOs and ACs? I assume you are referring to a
> “simple majority” of the governing body…..but we should be extremely
> precise. Also, are we intending to mandate how each SO/AC will execute its
> own processes for reaching agreement / consensus, or can each develop their
> own methodologies? Once again, clarity is vital.
>
I thought "by a resolution of its governing body" and then specifying the
threshold was fairly precise...? If the petitioning threshold was right
beside those words would it be clearer?

My view of where the CCWG is at is that there is no desire to manage the
affairs of SOs or ACs so long as they are complying with the rules that do
get set out. So a simple majority does not preclude consensus approaches,
or engagement with membership, but it does not require anything other than
a vote.

Do you think we should regulate things further? Do others?

·         Under 5B.1 (Reconsider budget or strategy/operating plans) is
> there a need for overtly negative language regarding ICANN putting budgets
> and plans to the community “without sufficient detail to facilitate
> thoughtful consideration”? I would propose highlighting the subsequent
> paragraph (04) about greater transparency and community involvement as a
> preferred introductory statement. Similarly, Para 18 on changes to ICANN
> Standard Bylaws is, once again, negative in tone. Can we craft these in a
> more diplomatic tone? Further, the examples in Para 18 of the ccNSO’s PDP
> and GNSO Stakeholder Groups are problematic for reasons that I believe
> Chris has discussed with you recently.
>
>
>
On tone - I'd have no problem doing this, but I frankly don't know if I
will be allowed to (or when it would be possible to fit it in). We are
entirely out of time.

The examples in the Standard Bylaws paper are deliberately chosen, since
they are ones that are pertinent to the power & to significant constituents
of the organisation.

Do you have ones you would have preferred to see used? There are, of
course, a very large set of possibilities to choose from. :-)

·         Para 15 on budget / plan veto: *“A 2/3 level of support in the
> mechanism would be required in the mechanism to reject the ICANN or IANA
> budget or an operating/strategic plan the first time: a 3/4 level of
> support is required for a second rejection.” *Aside from drafting errors,
> we need to be clearer as to who “2/3” or “3/4” refers to.
>
>
Thanks for picking this up. "In the mechanism" is too shorthand. In
English, it means: Votes of the CMSM, with the participating SOs and ACs.
The drafting error in terms of repetition needs to be fixed - the para
should read (taking into account better language from elsewhere):

"To succeed, a veto would require a *2/3* level of support in the Community
Mechanism. A *3/4* level of support is required for a second veto on the
same budget or plan."

>
>
> ·         Para 29 on removing Directors: *“It is expected that this power
> would only be exercised is cases of serious difficulty with a particular
> director”. *I don’t wish to head further down the rabbit hole of detail,
> but in drafting this document, we are talking about nuclear options for the
> community. Would you expect that terms such as “serious difficulty” will be
> more fully defined?
>
>
No, I would not. Since the power is unlimited as a matter of law, we have
carefully only given the vaguest of examples. It was a difficult
conversation to agree to a work item for WS2 in developing a statement of
reasonable community expectations that would be useful in guiding board
members (and the community for that matter). Objective standards are off
the table in the bylaws framework for this power. As, indeed, they are for
the current power for the Board to remove directors.

Hope this helps.

cheers
Jordan


>
> Catch you on the upcoming calls,
>
>
>
> Paul
>
>
>
> *From:* accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org [mailto:
> accountability-cross-community-bounces at icann.org] *On Behalf Of *Jordan
> Carter
> *Sent:* Thursday, 30 July 2015 9:51 AM
> *To:* wp1 at icann.org; Accountability Cross Community <
> accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> *Subject:* [CCWG-ACCT] Section 5B - community powers - consolidated draft
>
>
>
> Hi all
>
>
>
> Attached are the community powers papers combined into one document, and
> benefiting from the latest legal review and updates following our last
> call. This is for discussion in our next CCWG call/s.
>
>
>
> *I draw your attention in particular to two points:*
>
>
>
> ** in the *"removing individual ICANN directors"* paper (section 5B.3)
> there was no limit on the number of times people could seek the removal of
> a director: if a vote failed, a new petition could happen immediately. *I
> have suggested there should be a standdown period of six months - if a vote
> to remove an individual director fails, a new petition could not be lodged.* It
> doesn't seem fair to allow the community to simply wear down an elected
> director by attrition like this.
>
>
>
> ** in *"recall of the ICANN Board" *paper (section 5B.4), there was a
> weirdness in the *petitioning*. We agreed that two SOs or ACs must
> petition to trigger this, at least one of which needed to be an SO, but the
> paper had a legacy oddness that 2/3 of the SOs and ACs would have to sign
> on to the petition. This was the same threshold as the actual decision. *So
> I have deleted it.*
>
>
>
>
>
> The changes to the Budget paper also clarify the separateness of decisions
> re IANA budget and ICANN budget.
>
>
>
> Redline and clean versions attached. Please treat the clean version as the
> authoritative one. The redline includes all changes other than formatting
> and minor word changes that don't change substance, as far as I know.
>
>
>
>
>
> cheers
>
> Jordan
>
>
>
> --
>
> Jordan Carter
>
> Chief Executive
> *InternetNZ*
>
> +64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
> Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
> Skype: jordancarter
>
>
> *A better world through a better Internet *
>
>
>



-- 
Jordan Carter

Chief Executive
*InternetNZ*

+64-495-2118 (office) | +64-21-442-649 (mob)
Email: jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter

*A better world through a better Internet *
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