[CCWG-ACCT] A modest proposal to start the week

Roelof Meijer Roelof.Meijer at sidn.nl
Tue Jun 2 07:38:14 UTC 2015


Jordan,

>It is the membership model that gives the community the powers we set out in our report.

No. The membership model gives the MEMBERS the powers we set out in the report

Greg,
>A member nonprofit must be accountable to its members in a way that simply does not exist without members.

Yes. And that is exactly what we are struggling with. How do we ensure that the enhanced accountability is not just to the members but effectively to the whole community? How do we ensure that the powers are given to the community and not just to the members.

Let’s not make this seem simple and straightforward, because indeed we run the risk that we move the accountability issue from a single ICANN to multiple (shadow or not) UA’s or individuals

Best,

Roelof

From: Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz<mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz>>
Date: dinsdag 2 juni 2015 01:14
To: Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com>>
Cc: "avri at acm.org<mailto:avri at acm.org>" <avri at acm.org<mailto:avri at acm.org>>, "accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>" <accountability-cross-community at icann.org<mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>>
Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A modest proposal to start the week

Dear all

Can I thank you, Greg, for this very important point.

It is the membership model that gives the community the powers we set out in our report.

The masses of discussion regarding the legal enforceability aspect of that is just an implicit part of the package. By giving the rights of membership to the community we are giving the community, in a sense, 'ownership' of ICANN.

That's what the NTIA asked for when it said that the stewardship of the DNS was going to the MS community. That's the logic behind this model.

Whether it is implemented through UAs or individuals; the implementation details arising - all these things are important, but they aren't as important as what the model offers and why it is being pursued.

I'm just saying this to make sure there's a reminder, again, about the fundamental point of the model we have proposed.

cheers
Jordan


On 2 June 2015 at 10:58, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com<mailto:gregshatanipc at gmail.com>> wrote:
If we are relying on the Board, but have no recourse if that reliance is misplaced, then it is no longer a power.  It is instead a dispensation at the pleasure of the Board.

Indeed, these powers (particularly the power to approve/veto a budget or strategic plan) may not even be valid in the absence of a member set-up, since we are seeking to trump the Board's judgment and even their exercise of fiduciary duty.  This is far more realistic in a membership non-profit, for the following reason.

Membership fundamentally changes the "shape" of a nonprofit corporation. A member nonprofit must be accountable to its members in a way that simply does not exist without members.  The Board of a membership nonprofit board owes a fiduciary duty (among other duties) to its membership as well as to the corporation.  As I understand it, this is a fundamental basis for the reason that members are given the exceptional powers they have, and that are not given to other participants in or beneficiaries of a nonprofit corporation.

Greg

On Mon, Jun 1, 2015 at 6:08 PM, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>> wrote:
To the extent that we ware willing to rely on a Board with good faith to honour the Bylaws (as they have to date - a Board could have removed the concept of AC/SO Directors if they had chosen), I beleive that is indeed correct.

Alan


At 01/06/2015 03:42 PM, Roelof Meijer wrote:
Alan,

"The prime power is to challenge ICANN on its decisions and
to ratify some of those decisions²

The way I understand it, we do not need either UA¹s or ICANN to become a
membership organization, to do that

Best,

Roelof




On 01-06-15 16:59, "Alan Greenberg" <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca<mailto:alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca>> wrote:

>I support Avri.
>
>First, suing ICANN is NOT the only power they have. That is a last
>resort power that we are told will never (well nearly never) be
>exercised. The prime power is to challenge ICANN on its decisions and
>to ratify some of those decisions. As described in the community
>mechanisms in the CCWG Draft Proposal.
>
>We are putting these mechanisms in place because we have a lack of
>trust in the good judgement of the Board. But we are will now have an
>AC/So either appoint individuals, or appoint individuals to a UA. And
>since that AC/SO has no legal status, it cannot "enforce" that its
>representatives are truly following their directives. But we will
>trust them because they are part of our community. But if we appoint
>this same person to the Board, they are no longer trustworthy.
>
>And no doubt these views are also out of order.
>
>Alan
>
>At 01/06/2015 10:45 AM, Avri Doria wrote:
>
>
>>On 01-Jun-15 10:35, Malcolm Hutty wrote:
>> > What is it you fear that these "unaccountable UA" might do?
>>
>>That they not be accountable to the stakeholder they are allegedly
>>accountable to.
>>
>>As has been brought up by more than one of our advisers, if they are the
>>main point of ICANN accountability, it must be possible to guarantee
>>their accountability as much as we need to guarantee the Board's
>>accountability when it hold the token for ICANN accountability.
>>
>>Having been a member or observer of many of these entities I have fond
>>that they are often disorganized, ruled by a few strong personalities in
>>a sea of apathy, and given to making up rules on the fly when needed.
>>They do not even necessarily follow the rules htey have agreed to in the
>>charers, though some do, not all of them.  And for the most part, though
>>they are supposed to transparent, most aren't.
>>
>>So what i fear is that they are accountable to none except the few
>>strong personalities.
>>
>>So if we want to base our trust in ICANN on a membership model, we need
>>to make sure it is at least as accountable as what we have now.
>>
>>avri
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>---
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--
Jordan Carter

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InternetNZ

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A better world through a better Internet

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