[CCWG-ACCT] Plan B

[Jordan Carter]

Hi all, hi Alan

This reads as if it is an explanation of whatever we are labelling the
"not-enforceable" model, alongside the membership and designator based
approaches - is that fair?

cheers
Jordan

On 18 June 2015 at 22:17, Alan Greenberg <alan.greenberg at mcgill.ca> wrote:

> Given the spread between those who believe that we need ultimate
> accountability, and those who are willing to trust that the community
> wishes will be honoured, allow me to put a new variation on the table. We
> have talked about all of the parts before, but perhaps the combination is
> new.
>
> This proposal involves no Unincorporated Associates, no Designators and no
> Members.
>
> Up to now, we have been working with Bylaws that we are now told have no
> real basis in law, but which so far, have worked. I specifically refer to
> things like the SOs, ALAC and the NomCom appointing Board members, powers
> that under California law are only given to Members or Designators, but our
> less formal entities are granted these powers under the ICANN Bylaws and
> for whatever reasons, it works.
>
> I propose that we do the same with all of the community powers that we
> want (including the requirement that Bylaws and certainly fundamental
> Bylaws be approved), with the exception of formal budget approval (which
> impinges on Board fiduciary responsibility). In lieu of the latter, we
> could have a process by which and AC/SO lodges a formal objection to a
> budget or budget item, and the Board has an obligation to follow-up (I am
> not going to go into any further details here).
>
> Every Director, as a requirement of being seated signs an irrevocable
> letter saying that if by specified procedure, they are requested to step
> down, they will. The procedure might include the formal action of the AC/SO
> that appointed them, or a more widespread community request passing a
> specified level of AC/SO support - the details would need to be defined,
> but do not alter this proposal. The letter would also make reference to an
> enforcement mechanism that could be invoked. The enforcement mechanism
> might be to give the ICANN Ombudsman (or some other trustworthy and trusted
> individual) the right to take court action to require the requested
> resignation be honoured, or could give that right to the people occupying
> the AC/SO Chairs. Any such action would be funded by ICANN and funds held
> in escrow to ensure that this can be carried out.
>
> In unlikely event that a removal included the entire Board, or some number
> such that the remaining Board members do not meet minimum quorum
> requirements, the AC/SO Chairs will on an interim basis be added to the
> Board on an interim basis. This augmented interim Board would have
> caretaker responsibilities and have only limited rights (to be specified).
>
> Board member removals would be unconditional and not appealable.
>
> I believe that the threat of invoking removal will likely be sufficient to
> ensure that the community is given good control. And should that fail, the
> actual removal of the Board member(s) who do not support the community
> position can actually be removed.
>
> There are many details to be determined but I believe that this is
> workable. It allows for the most of the powers that have been requested
> with a minimum number of changes and does not create significant new
> potential vulnerabilities.
>
> Alan
>
>
>
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-- 
Jordan Carter

Chief Executive
*InternetNZ*

04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
jordan at internetnz.net.nz
Skype: jordancarter

*A better world through a better Internet *
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