[CCWG-ACCT] Further thoughts on the "empowered SO/AC model" discussion on Friday
Malcolm Hutty
malcolm at linx.net
Mon Jun 22 20:51:16 UTC 2015
On 21/06/2015 16:24, Jordan Carter wrote:
> The powers we propose (budget, bylaws controls; removal of directors or
> Board) are the *same* under the three models.
>
> Under the *bylaws only* or *voluntary* model, none of the powers are
> enforceable in law.
>
> Under the *empowered designators* model, all of the powers except budget
> / strat plan are enforceable in law.
>
> Under the *SO/AC empowered *model, an SO or AC that opted to make the
> declaration could enforce any or all of the powers in law.
>
Jordan,
You are referring to the enforceability of the specific community powers
created by the working party you chair, WP1. However I'm not sure that
is the limit of the distinction between the models.
What about the general ability to require adherence to the bylaws?
For example, a great deal of the accountability improvements this CCWG
proposes are delivered through a reformed IRP. What happens if ICANN
fails to implement the IRP, as it is required to under the Bylaws? (e.g.
if ICANN simply fail to appoint IRP panelists).
Who would have an enforceable remedy, and under what model?
My understanding is that an Empowered SO/AC would have the right to go
court to demand that ICANN be ordered to implement the IRP. By contrast,
under the Designator mode nobody would have the right to go court and
ask for an order to correct such a failure.
Is that a correct understanding?
Malcolm.
--
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