[CCWG-ACCT] Legal question

Fri May 1 04:34:28 UTC 2015

Also, UAs are member associations in their essence, so control of the
members gives you control of the UA.  That's very different from a
non-profit (non-membership) corporation.  So, it's really diametrically
opposite to the relationship between ICANN and the SO/ACs in very
fundamental ways.  Saying that "the same would apply" in the ICANN
situation is like saying that because you can put a penguin on top of a
television, you can put a television on top of a penguin.....

On Fri, May 1, 2015 at 12:30 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
wrote:

> If the SO/ACs created ICANN, it might apply.  Unfortunately, it's the
> other way around.
>
> On Fri, May 1, 2015 at 12:28 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>
>> Thanks Greg.
>>
>> I'll consider the points you make on policy and indeed the fundamental
>> underpinnings of the ICANN model and respond in the next day or so.
>>
>> However, on the legal question:
>>
>> Finally, I have to say I disagree with your contention that each SO/ACs
>> would need to become an unincorporated association ("UA") rather than
>> merely create one.  Admittedly, the issue of how each SO/AC can control its
>> "alter ego" has not been fully fleshed out.  However, I believe this was
>> discussed at some length on the legal sub team call and it seems that
>> between the bylaws of the UA and the charter of the SO/AC there should be
>> very tight control by the SO/AC over any actions of the UA.
>>
>>
>> I look forward to hearing how a combination of the bylaws of the UA and
>> the SO/AC charters will work to provide very tight control by the SO/AC. If
>> they do then surely the same would apply to the ICANN bylaws and the SO/AC
>> charters providing a similarly tight control over the actions of ICANN.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> Chris
>>
>> On 1 May 2015, at 13:50, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> Chris,
>>
>> Here are my preliminary thoughts:
>>
>> First, though you said you don't want to debate the example itself, the
>> example troubles me and I think it goes deeper than the example.   I think
>> that the establishment of a "TMCH for IGOs" would be new gTLD policy, and
>> almost certainly Consensus Policy, and thus should not be adopted as the
>> example states.  Instead, it should be directed down the PDP path to the
>> GNSO.  Indeed, if I am not mistaken, that is what happened and resulted in
>> the IGO/INGO Curative Rights Working Group, which may or may not make
>> policy recommendations consistent with the GAC advice.  So, I think the
>> premise that the example was meant to demonstrate -- that GAC advice is due
>> more deference than any other input to the Board and that only the Board
>> can set a course contrary to GAC advice -- seems faulty.
>>
>> This also highlights that the point is not unique to the GAC; it is
>> equally true of the GNSO (or rather, it is true of Board decisions that
>> emanate from the GNSO's processes).  The Board could adopt policy
>> recommendations from the GNSO that are reflected in the budget, only to
>> have a supermajority of the Membership send the budget back.
>>
>> Fundamentally, whether there is a Board action that results from GAC
>> Advice or from a GNSO Recommendation (or from the ccNSO or from the Staff
>> or elsewhere), it is a Board action.  And a fundamental premise of the
>> CCWG's work is that certain Board decisions will now be subject to certain
>> specified constraints being placed in the hands of the Membership.
>>
>> To answer your direct question -- this is not a fundamental shift in the
>> standing of GAC advice and thus a fundamental change in the GAC’s interface
>> with the rest of ICANN; it's something more wide-ranging than that.  It is
>> a fundamental shift in the standing of certain Board decisions (whatever
>> their provenance) and thus a fundamental change in the Board's interface
>> with the community.
>>
>> Frankly, if we were to propose that a multilateral organization gets the
>> last word over the global multistakeholder community (as represented by the
>> proposed Membership), we would have failed by most yardsticks -- not least
>> the yardstick set forth by the NTIA for the IANA stewardship transition.
>>
>> Finally, I have to say I disagree with your contention that each SO/ACs
>> would need to become an unincorporated association ("UA") rather than
>> merely create one.  Admittedly, the issue of how each SO/AC can control its
>> "alter ego" has not been fully fleshed out.  However, I believe this was
>> discussed at some length on the legal sub team call and it seems that
>> between the bylaws of the UA and the charter of the SO/AC there should be
>> very tight control by the SO/AC over any actions of the UA.
>>
>> Greg
>>
>> On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 10:11 PM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>
>>> Jordan, Greg,
>>>
>>> I would like to focus upon two of Jordan’s responses in his note of 22
>>> April. Greg you asked me a similar question re the GAC point -
>>>
>>> GAC:
>>>
>>> *CD: However I see a serious incompatibility between the members’ powers
>>> and the standing of GAC advice to the Board. It’s not that GAC advice is or
>>> indeed should be invariably followed but currently where GAC advice is at
>>> odds with the position of others in the community the advice carries
>>> significant weight and there is a bylaw mandated process for rejecting the
>>> advice through a process which takes around 6 months. The change to a
>>> members based structure would mean that for certain issues the actions of
>>> members will trump GAC advice. So there is a significant shift in the
>>> carefully constructed balance of power. Now, many of us may think that such
>>> a shift is no bad thing but I wonder whether the governments of the world
>>> are going to agree?*
>>>
>>> *JC: I don't understand this. I have not seen any hint of anyone
>>> suggesting that a power that Members should have includes overriding
>>> decisions on matters of public policy, which is the advice that the GAC
>>> gives the Board and which the bylaws would continue to require it to give
>>> due deference to (perhaps with an adjustment about when that reconciliation
>>> process has to happen, should GAC change its operating principles).*
>>>
>>> *If GAC advice on public policy matters led to changes in the bylaws, or
>>> the inclusion by the Board of business or strategic plans or budgets, then
>>> the new powers might have an impact. But all that would require the Board
>>> and the GAC to do is to persuade the broader ICANN system, or at least some
>>> of it, that their ideas are ones that should be pursued.*
>>>
>>> *Does that feel like a fundamental issue to you? It doesn't to me.*
>>>
>>> I’m saying is that it might well be a fundamental issue for GAC members.
>>> Using an example is the best way to illustrate my point, though I don’t
>>> want to get into a debate on the likelihood or otherwise of the example
>>> itself. The ICANN Board receives (and will continue to receive) advice from
>>> the GAC that potentially affects the ICANN Budget.
>>>
>>> Consider a situation where the GAC advises that ICANN should create a
>>> repository, much like the TMCH, for the acronyms of IGOs. The repository
>>> would be used to advise the relevant IGO that their acronym has been
>>> registered in a given gTLD and also to advise the registrant that their
>>> registration matches a name in the repository.
>>>
>>> Assuming that the Board accepts this advice, it would then be required
>>> to make a budgetary allocation for establishment of the repository and an
>>> annual operating budget.
>>>
>>> In the scenario we are discussing regarding members’ powers, it would be
>>> possible for the community to veto the Budget on this point. This then
>>> creates a conflict between the public policy advice from the GAC and the
>>> powers of members. Should such a situation occur, how would you see it
>>> being resolved? Is this not a fundamental shift in the standing of GAC
>>> advice and thus a fundamental change in the GAC’s interface with the rest
>>> of ICANN?
>>>
>>> SOs/ACs generally:
>>>
>>>
>>> *CD: Further, quite a number of ccTLD managers are departments of the
>>> relevant government or quasi-government bodies. Not everyone runs their
>>> ccTLD with the degree of freedom that .au, .ca, .uk and .nl are privileged
>>> to enjoy. I consider it highly unlikely that sovereign governments will
>>> permit a government department to join an association in the US (or any
>>> other country for that matter).*
>>>
>>> *JC: They won't have to, to do what they do in ICANN today.*
>>>
>>> *The suggestion is they might have to if they want to take part in
>>> exercising the accountability powers set out in our report that's going for
>>> public comment.*
>>>
>>> *That said, there's a bit of an objective legal question here - which is
>>> whether the decisions of these uninc associations can be forced to take
>>> account of the views expressed in the ICANN bodies they shadow in making
>>> their decisions. If they can (which I would analogise to the ccNSO taking
>>> on board the views of non-member ccTLDs - and so I assume it is possible),
>>> much of this debate becomes moot.*
>>>
>>> You make a good point about the legal question. It is one I have yet to
>>> see an answer to.
>>>
>>> This relates to the comment I made yesterday.
>>>
>>> The only way I can see to ensure that the views of ICANN bodies are
>>> taken into account is if those SO/ACs become the unincorporated
>>> associations themselves. Creating shadow organisations gives rise to the
>>> question you raise and significant concerns regarding the accountability of
>>> these “alter egos”. To me, this seems like an attempted solution that
>>> simply adds another layer of complexity. But maybe counsel’s response to
>>> the question I raised yesterday will answer the point.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>>
>>> Chris
>>>
>>> On 30 Apr 2015, at 09:38 , Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>
>>> Thanks Greg. Clear and understood.
>>>
>>> What will the control mechanisms be between the ccNSO and its alter ego
>>> and how will they be enforced?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Chris
>>>
>>> On 30 Apr 2015, at 09:28 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Chris,
>>>
>>> Please let me try to clarify my understanding of what is currently being
>>> proposed (in draft).  The SO/ACs will not be "converted" into legal
>>> entities.  Rather, a "mirror" or "alter ego" entity will be set up for each
>>> SO/AC, likely as a unincorporated association (which is a recognized legal
>>> entity under California law).  Each SO/AC will control its alter ego. This
>>> is quite similar to the relationship between the ASO and the NRO.  The
>>> SO/ACs will continue to exist and will perform and operate as they
>>> currently do.  The legal entities will be the members (or designators,
>>> should that route be chosen) of ICANN, with the specific rights and powers
>>> ascribed to them in that capacity by statute and bylaw.
>>>
>>> Technically, the unincorporated associations only need a minimum of two
>>> members, so any "members" of a SO/AC who don't wish to be members of the
>>> alter ego won't need to be.  The control arrangements between the SO/AC and
>>> the alter ego will ensure that all "members" of the SO/AC (and even
>>> non-members, such as non-ccNSO ccTLDs, if desired) get the appropriate
>>> "say" in any decisions that are to be carried out by the alter ego.
>>>
>>> Best regards,
>>>
>>> Greg
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Wed, Apr 29, 2015 at 6:40 PM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jordan,
>>>>
>>>> Apologies for taking so long to respond!
>>>>
>>>> Nobody is proposing converting the SOs and ACs to anything - at all -
>>>> anywhere.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I’m confused. Greg seems o think that’s exactly what was being
>>>> proposed. Do we have clarity on this yet?
>>>>
>>>> I’ll respond to the balance of your points later today.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Chris
>>>>
>>>> On 22 Apr 2015, at 16:02 , Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Hi all, hi Chris:
>>>>
>>>> On 22 April 2015 at 11:07, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hi Keith,
>>>>>
>>>>> As promised I set out in brief below some of the reasons why, in
>>>>> respect to the membership model and any model requiring the SOs and ACs to
>>>>> convert to legal entities, I have serious concerns and why I referred to
>>>>> significant sacrifices.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Nobody is proposing converting the SOs and ACs to anything - at all -
>>>> anywhere.
>>>>
>>>> The only proposal that I've seen from the lawyers is that if membership
>>>> was the model chosen, legal personality would need to be created. The
>>>> actors in the various SOs and ACs would, in exercising membership
>>>> prerogatives, act through the unincorporated associations.
>>>>
>>>> The lawyers have also been clear that even in a designator model, it's
>>>> preferable to create legal personality along those lines.
>>>>
>>>> I think it is really really really important for everyone involved in
>>>> this effort to be very precise and clear about what we are discussing and
>>>> what we aren't. So I am writing this so directly in order that if my
>>>> understanding is wrong, it gets picked up pronto! :-)
>>>>
>>>> GAC
>>>>>
>>>>> The current recommended model does not provide any viable solution for
>>>>> dealing with the GAC. It seems obvious to me that the governments involved
>>>>> in the GAC are not going to agree to form an unincorporated association
>>>>> under Californian law. If I'm right then presumably the GAC would remain as
>>>>> an advisory committee and would not be able to have a vote in any of the
>>>>> escalation mechanisms. That may be fine as the GAC may not want to have a
>>>>> vote anyway.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Indeed it may not. Being able to offer advice on public policy issues
>>>> to the ICANN Board and to appoint a non-voting liaison member to the Board.
>>>> I am looking forward to hearing their views on this (and many other
>>>> questions).
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> However I see a serious incompatibility between the members’ powers
>>>>> and the standing of GAC advice to the Board. It’s not that GAC advice is or
>>>>> indeed should be invariably followed but currently where GAC advice is at
>>>>> odds with the position of others in the community the advice carries
>>>>> significant weight and there is a bylaw mandated process for rejecting the
>>>>> advice through a process which takes around 6 months. The change to a
>>>>> members based structure would mean that for certain issues the actions of
>>>>> members will trump GAC advice. So there is a significant shift in the
>>>>> carefully constructed balance of power. Now, many of us may think that such
>>>>> a shift is no bad thing but I wonder whether the governments of the world
>>>>> are going to agree?
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I don't understand this. I have not seen any hint of anyone suggesting
>>>> that a power that Members should have includes overriding decisions on
>>>> matters of public policy, which is the advice that the GAC gives the Board
>>>> and which the bylaws would continue to require it to give due deference to
>>>> (perhaps with an adjustment about when that reconciliation process has to
>>>> happen, should GAC change its operating principles).
>>>>
>>>> If GAC advice on public policy matters led to changes in the bylaws, or
>>>> the inclusion by the Board of business or strategic plans or budgets, then
>>>> the new powers might have an impact. But all that would require the Board
>>>> and the GAC to do is to persuade the broader ICANN system, or at least some
>>>> of it, that their ideas are ones that should be pursued.
>>>>
>>>> Does that feel like a fundamental issue to you? It doesn't to me.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> ccTLDs
>>>>>
>>>>> When we set up the ccNSO and when we did the structural review of it
>>>>> some time thereafter there was considerable discussion about how it could
>>>>> be structured precisely to avoid the need for ccTLDs to join anything.
>>>>> There was even significant concern about having to fill out a form and
>>>>> whether that implied the existence of some organisation. The concerns
>>>>> included joining something in the jurisdiction of the US and whether that
>>>>> would make a ccTLD manager in any way subject to US law, the possibility of
>>>>> being sued in the US because the manager would be deemed to have a presence
>>>>> there, how such a structure would be funded (especially if it was sued),
>>>>> whether there was any liability on ‘officers’ of the entity and so on. I
>>>>> believe that many of these concerns will still exist for many ccTLDs.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> They may or may not. But in that fifteen-years-ago debate, were there
>>>> any facts on the table about those questions? Or was it all a bit of a mess
>>>> on many fronts? Because ICANN in 2015 is, better or worse, a very different
>>>> beast to ICANN in ~ 2000.
>>>>
>>>> Perhaps more importantly, exercising some rights through an
>>>> unincorporated association would remain a choice for every ICANN
>>>> participant. Nobody would be forced to be involved. It isn't like a "Join
>>>> ICANN and have no say" - all the current structures for the "business of
>>>> the business" would remain in place.
>>>>
>>>> From the legends I have heard about this early phase in ICANN's
>>>> history, the fundamental concern was of a power-grab on the corporation's
>>>> part. Since these reforms make such a power-grab harder (and let's remember
>>>> that the end of the NTIA contract makes it easier...), I'd expect ccTLDs
>>>> and others to look at them with quite some interest.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> Further, quite a number of ccTLD managers are departments of the
>>>>> relevant government or quasi-government bodies. Not everyone runs their
>>>>> ccTLD with the degree of freedom that .au, .ca, .uk and .nl are privileged
>>>>> to enjoy. I consider it highly unlikely that sovereign governments will
>>>>> permit a government department to join an association in the US (or any
>>>>> other country for that matter).
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> They won't have to, to do what they do in ICANN today.
>>>>
>>>> The suggestion is they might have to if they want to take part in
>>>> exercising the accountability powers set out in our report that's going for
>>>> public comment.
>>>>
>>>> That said, there's a bit of an objective legal question here - which is
>>>> whether the decisions of these uninc associations can be forced to take
>>>> account of the views expressed in the ICANN bodies they shadow in making
>>>> their decisions. If they can (which I would analogise to the ccNSO taking
>>>> on board the views of non-member ccTLDs - and so I assume it is possible),
>>>> much of this debate becomes moot.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Finally -- I do think this is a really useful and constructive
>>>> discussion. As someone who is warm to the member approach, but who sees
>>>> huge benefits if we can manage a "no structural change" outcome, this is
>>>> just the convo we need to have.
>>>>
>>>> cheers,
>>>> Jordan
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> At Large
>>>>>
>>>>> I don’t know the answer to this but it strikes me that the structure
>>>>> may also be problematic for At Large community as opposed to ALAC. On that
>>>>> one over the ALAC folks to comment.
>>>>>
>>>>> There’s more but I'm rushing for my flight now. Hope this gives you a
>>>>> flavour.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris
>>>>>
>>>>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 20:46 , Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi Keith,
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks for the below. You ask a valid question and Kavouss has sent me
>>>>> an email asking the same.  I will respond in detail in the next 7 hours or
>>>>> so.
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris Disspain
>>>>> CEO - auDA
>>>>>
>>>>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 20:16, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek at verisign.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks Chris, no apologies necessary...this is exactly the kind of
>>>>> dialogue needed to advance our work.
>>>>>
>>>>> Can you be more explicit about the "significant number of sacrifices
>>>>> that would need to be made in a membership scenario" that ccTLDs face?
>>>>> Particularly if any are unique to ccTLDs?
>>>>>
>>>>> Sacrifices may be needed (including from the Board) if we are to
>>>>> accomplish the community's broader goal of ensuring the ICANN Board and
>>>>> Staff are truly accountable to the ICANN community for the next decade. As
>>>>> such, it would be good to know, as early as possible, what those sacrifices
>>>>> might be.
>>>>>
>>>>> In simple terms, I agree that determining what can and cannot be
>>>>> accomplished within the existing structure is a worthwhile exercise and
>>>>> will help to inform the community.
>>>>>
>>>>> Based on our work and the relevant independent legal analysis to date,
>>>>> it appears to me that the current construct has significant gaps and
>>>>> shortcomings and won't deliver on our goals, but I support seeking further
>>>>> advice on the topic from our independent legal advisors.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks and regards,
>>>>> Keith
>>>>>
>>>>> On Apr 21, 2015, at 5:08 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks Keith.
>>>>>
>>>>> I apologise for pinging back and forth on this but I hope the list
>>>>> will appreciate that it as an indication of how important auDA believes
>>>>> this point is.
>>>>>
>>>>> As I said on the CCWG call last week, I have serious concerns about
>>>>> the viability of the lawyers' recommended structural changes (at least from
>>>>> a cc point of view) and want to be crystal clear about what we can do or
>>>>> cannot do within the current structure.
>>>>>
>>>>> For a ccTLD there are a significant number of sacrifices that would
>>>>> need to be made in a membership scenario and I don't believe the cc
>>>>> community can decide whether those sacrifices are worth making unless we
>>>>> can weigh them against what we would be able to achieve using the current
>>>>> structure.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think that is essential that our output to the community contains a
>>>>> clear explanation of what the status quo can achieve. If it does not then
>>>>> IMO it is impossible to judge the other scenarios.
>>>>>
>>>>> I appreciate your second para and, as a lawyer, I know that time for a
>>>>> response is required. I also appreciate the time constraints under which we
>>>>> are operating. But we will lose more time if the result of our document is
>>>>> a series of questions about whether there really is a need to make the
>>>>> significant changes being recommended.
>>>>>
>>>>> In simple terms 'not nearly enough' is not an acceptable response. How
>>>>> can I know that "it" is not nearly enough unless I know what "it" is?
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris Disspain
>>>>> CEO - auDA
>>>>>
>>>>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 18:37, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek at verisign.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris,
>>>>>
>>>>> I believe the answer to your question regarding the "no change
>>>>> scenario" and "what the current configuration can achieve" is, "Not nearly
>>>>> enough."
>>>>>
>>>>> That said, I think it's a reasonable question and it should be
>>>>> referred to the CCWG's lawyers and they should be permitted reasonable time
>>>>> to consider and respond.
>>>>>
>>>>> Regards,
>>>>> Keith
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>>>
>>>>> On Apr 21, 2015, at 4:09 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Greg,
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks. At the risk of repeating myself, whilst I understand what you
>>>>> are saying, it is precisely the no change scenario that I am seeking
>>>>> clarity on. I accept that the current configuration may not be "a very good
>>>>> vehicle for many of the enhanced powers" but I want clarity on what the
>>>>> current configuration CAN  achieve. I don't believe we have that yet.
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris Disspain
>>>>> CEO - auDA
>>>>>
>>>>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 17:35, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris,
>>>>>
>>>>> The simple answer is that the SOACs as currently configured are not
>>>>> a very good vehicle for many of the enhanced powers we seek. Once you make
>>>>> them into members and give them legal personhood everything else becomes
>>>>> much easier.
>>>>>
>>>>> However, you assumed no change to the SOACs, which made the answers
>>>>> much harder.
>>>>>
>>>>> Greg
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tuesday, April 21, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Greg, All,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> With respect, I think we are overcomplicating the issue. I simply
>>>>>> want to gain a base line for the discussion about any changes necessary  to
>>>>>> achieve what we want. We agreed on jurisdiction that if we can get
>>>>>> acceptable escalations and remedies without changing jurisdiction then we
>>>>>> should leave well alone for now, I think we should apply the same principle
>>>>>> here. I am clear what the lawyers recommend we do BUT I am not clear about
>>>>>> what we can do or what compromises we need to make if we were to maintain
>>>>>> the current structure. I think that is a key part of our deliberations.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>
>>>>> --
>>>> Jordan Carter
>>>>
>>>> Chief Executive
>>>> *InternetNZ*
>>>>
>>>> 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
>>>> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>>>> Skype: jordancarter
>>>>
>>>> *A better world through a better Internet *
>>>>
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