[CCWG-ACCT] Legal question

Fri May 1 05:09:04 UTC 2015

It really goes to how the members of the UA are chosen (a UA needs only two
members, so they can be officers of the SO/AC or chosen by some other
process) -- it need not be as you describe (though what you describe is a
reasonable possibility given the proper circumstances).  If the UA is only
activated when the SO/AC tells its appointed members to act, tight control
should not be difficult at all.

I may have to take your word on the penguins, as you are far closer to
their native habitat than I.  (Though I would note that the Central Park
penguins are international movie stars, due to the move "Madagascar" and
its offspring.)  However, to be fair, I was actually thinking of a tube
television set and not a flat screen TV, so we may have some
misunderstanding at work here as well (*See*, "Penguin on the Telly," Monty
Python, 1971, https://youtu.be/pwTqC2T6q4E)  I do think a large console TV
would not be salubrious to a penguin beneath it, while it would provide a
pleasant perch for the penguin (barring any unfortunate explosions).  With
a flat screen TV, the opposite applies.

So, in each case, it's a matter of how the object is designed, not merely a
matter of what the object is.

Greg

On Fri, May 1, 2015 at 12:53 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:

> Leaving aside your penguin analogy (and incidentally you CAN put a
> television on top of a penguin and it is, in fact, likely to stay there far
> longer than the penguin will stay on top of the television) I think you may
> have misunderstood me.
>
> I completely get that the members of the UA control it. The point we are
> discussing is how members of SO/AC who are NOT members of the UA can ensure
> that the UA doesn’t go rogue or does what the SO/AC wants.
>
> Unless I’m mistaken, to overcome the possibility that an SO or AC won’t
> itself want to become an UA or that to do so will involve a significant
> decrease in membership, the idea is that a UA is set up and those members
> of the SO or AC who feel comfortable doing so can become members of the UA
> (minimum 2) or the SOAC can nominate members. Fine. BUT the SO/AC itself is
> NOT a member and it is the SO/AC that the UA is representing as a member.
>
> How does the SO/AC ensure the UA does its bidding?
>
> Surely the only folks who can control the UA are its members so how does
> the SO/AC ensure that those UA members follow the instructions of the
> SO/AC. Surely this is precisely the same conundrum as the SO/AC ICANN one.
> For anything to be enforceable the SO/AC would need to be a legal entity or
> every member of the SO/AC would need to join the UA which amounts to the
> same thing.
>
> What am I missing here?
>
>
> Cheers,
>
>
> Chris
>
> On 1 May 2015, at 14:34 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Also, UAs are member associations in their essence, so control of the
> members gives you control of the UA.  That's very different from a
> non-profit (non-membership) corporation.  So, it's really diametrically
> opposite to the relationship between ICANN and the SO/ACs in very
> fundamental ways.  Saying that "the same would apply" in the ICANN
> situation is like saying that because you can put a penguin on top of a
> television, you can put a television on top of a penguin.....
>
> On Fri, May 1, 2015 at 12:30 AM, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
> wrote:
>
>> If the SO/ACs created ICANN, it might apply.  Unfortunately, it's the
>> other way around.
>>
>> On Fri, May 1, 2015 at 12:28 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>
>>> Thanks Greg.
>>>
>>> I'll consider the points you make on policy and indeed the fundamental
>>> underpinnings of the ICANN model and respond in the next day or so.
>>>
>>> However, on the legal question:
>>>
>>> Finally, I have to say I disagree with your contention that each SO/ACs
>>> would need to become an unincorporated association ("UA") rather than
>>> merely create one.  Admittedly, the issue of how each SO/AC can control its
>>> "alter ego" has not been fully fleshed out.  However, I believe this was
>>> discussed at some length on the legal sub team call and it seems that
>>> between the bylaws of the UA and the charter of the SO/AC there should be
>>> very tight control by the SO/AC over any actions of the UA.
>>>
>>>
>>> I look forward to hearing how a combination of the bylaws of the UA and
>>> the SO/AC charters will work to provide very tight control by the SO/AC. If
>>> they do then surely the same would apply to the ICANN bylaws and the SO/AC
>>> charters providing a similarly tight control over the actions of ICANN.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> Chris
>>>
>>> On 1 May 2015, at 13:50, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>> Chris,
>>>
>>> Here are my preliminary thoughts:
>>>
>>> First, though you said you don't want to debate the example itself, the
>>> example troubles me and I think it goes deeper than the example.   I think
>>> that the establishment of a "TMCH for IGOs" would be new gTLD policy, and
>>> almost certainly Consensus Policy, and thus should not be adopted as the
>>> example states.  Instead, it should be directed down the PDP path to the
>>> GNSO.  Indeed, if I am not mistaken, that is what happened and resulted in
>>> the IGO/INGO Curative Rights Working Group, which may or may not make
>>> policy recommendations consistent with the GAC advice.  So, I think the
>>> premise that the example was meant to demonstrate -- that GAC advice is due
>>> more deference than any other input to the Board and that only the Board
>>> can set a course contrary to GAC advice -- seems faulty.
>>>
>>> This also highlights that the point is not unique to the GAC; it is
>>> equally true of the GNSO (or rather, it is true of Board decisions that
>>> emanate from the GNSO's processes).  The Board could adopt policy
>>> recommendations from the GNSO that are reflected in the budget, only to
>>> have a supermajority of the Membership send the budget back.
>>>
>>> Fundamentally, whether there is a Board action that results from GAC
>>> Advice or from a GNSO Recommendation (or from the ccNSO or from the Staff
>>> or elsewhere), it is a Board action.  And a fundamental premise of the
>>> CCWG's work is that certain Board decisions will now be subject to certain
>>> specified constraints being placed in the hands of the Membership.
>>>
>>> To answer your direct question -- this is not a fundamental shift in
>>> the standing of GAC advice and thus a fundamental change in the GAC’s
>>> interface with the rest of ICANN; it's something more wide-ranging than
>>> that.  It is a fundamental shift in the standing of certain Board decisions
>>> (whatever their provenance) and thus a fundamental change in the Board's
>>> interface with the community.
>>>
>>> Frankly, if we were to propose that a multilateral organization gets the
>>> last word over the global multistakeholder community (as represented by the
>>> proposed Membership), we would have failed by most yardsticks -- not least
>>> the yardstick set forth by the NTIA for the IANA stewardship transition.
>>>
>>> Finally, I have to say I disagree with your contention that each SO/ACs
>>> would need to become an unincorporated association ("UA") rather than
>>> merely create one.  Admittedly, the issue of how each SO/AC can control its
>>> "alter ego" has not been fully fleshed out.  However, I believe this was
>>> discussed at some length on the legal sub team call and it seems that
>>> between the bylaws of the UA and the charter of the SO/AC there should be
>>> very tight control by the SO/AC over any actions of the UA.
>>>
>>> Greg
>>>
>>> On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 10:11 PM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au>
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>>> Jordan, Greg,
>>>>
>>>> I would like to focus upon two of Jordan’s responses in his note of 22
>>>> April. Greg you asked me a similar question re the GAC point -
>>>>
>>>> GAC:
>>>>
>>>> *CD: However I see a serious incompatibility between the members’
>>>> powers and the standing of GAC advice to the Board. It’s not that GAC
>>>> advice is or indeed should be invariably followed but currently where GAC
>>>> advice is at odds with the position of others in the community the advice
>>>> carries significant weight and there is a bylaw mandated process for
>>>> rejecting the advice through a process which takes around 6 months. The
>>>> change to a members based structure would mean that for certain issues the
>>>> actions of members will trump GAC advice. So there is a significant shift
>>>> in the carefully constructed balance of power. Now, many of us may think
>>>> that such a shift is no bad thing but I wonder whether the governments of
>>>> the world are going to agree?*
>>>>
>>>> *JC: I don't understand this. I have not seen any hint of anyone
>>>> suggesting that a power that Members should have includes overriding
>>>> decisions on matters of public policy, which is the advice that the GAC
>>>> gives the Board and which the bylaws would continue to require it to give
>>>> due deference to (perhaps with an adjustment about when that reconciliation
>>>> process has to happen, should GAC change its operating principles).*
>>>>
>>>> *If GAC advice on public policy matters led to changes in the bylaws,
>>>> or the inclusion by the Board of business or strategic plans or budgets,
>>>> then the new powers might have an impact. But all that would require the
>>>> Board and the GAC to do is to persuade the broader ICANN system, or at
>>>> least some of it, that their ideas are ones that should be pursued.*
>>>>
>>>> *Does that feel like a fundamental issue to you? It doesn't to me.*
>>>>
>>>> I’m saying is that it might well be a fundamental issue for GAC
>>>> members. Using an example is the best way to illustrate my point, though I
>>>> don’t want to get into a debate on the likelihood or otherwise of the
>>>> example itself. The ICANN Board receives (and will continue to receive)
>>>> advice from the GAC that potentially affects the ICANN Budget.
>>>>
>>>> Consider a situation where the GAC advises that ICANN should create a
>>>> repository, much like the TMCH, for the acronyms of IGOs. The repository
>>>> would be used to advise the relevant IGO that their acronym has been
>>>> registered in a given gTLD and also to advise the registrant that their
>>>> registration matches a name in the repository.
>>>>
>>>> Assuming that the Board accepts this advice, it would then be required
>>>> to make a budgetary allocation for establishment of the repository and an
>>>> annual operating budget.
>>>>
>>>> In the scenario we are discussing regarding members’ powers, it would
>>>> be possible for the community to veto the Budget on this point. This then
>>>> creates a conflict between the public policy advice from the GAC and the
>>>> powers of members. Should such a situation occur, how would you see it
>>>> being resolved? Is this not a fundamental shift in the standing of GAC
>>>> advice and thus a fundamental change in the GAC’s interface with the rest
>>>> of ICANN?
>>>>
>>>> SOs/ACs generally:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> *CD: Further, quite a number of ccTLD managers are departments of the
>>>> relevant government or quasi-government bodies. Not everyone runs their
>>>> ccTLD with the degree of freedom that .au, .ca, .uk and .nl are privileged
>>>> to enjoy. I consider it highly unlikely that sovereign governments will
>>>> permit a government department to join an association in the US (or any
>>>> other country for that matter).*
>>>>
>>>> *JC: They won't have to, to do what they do in ICANN today.*
>>>>
>>>> *The suggestion is they might have to if they want to take part in
>>>> exercising the accountability powers set out in our report that's going for
>>>> public comment.*
>>>>
>>>> *That said, there's a bit of an objective legal question here - which
>>>> is whether the decisions of these uninc associations can be forced to take
>>>> account of the views expressed in the ICANN bodies they shadow in making
>>>> their decisions. If they can (which I would analogise to the ccNSO taking
>>>> on board the views of non-member ccTLDs - and so I assume it is possible),
>>>> much of this debate becomes moot.*
>>>>
>>>> You make a good point about the legal question. It is one I have yet to
>>>> see an answer to.
>>>>
>>>> This relates to the comment I made yesterday.
>>>>
>>>> The only way I can see to ensure that the views of ICANN bodies are
>>>> taken into account is if those SO/ACs become the unincorporated
>>>> associations themselves. Creating shadow organisations gives rise to the
>>>> question you raise and significant concerns regarding the accountability of
>>>> these “alter egos”. To me, this seems like an attempted solution that
>>>> simply adds another layer of complexity. But maybe counsel’s response to
>>>> the question I raised yesterday will answer the point.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Chris
>>>>
>>>> On 30 Apr 2015, at 09:38 , Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Thanks Greg. Clear and understood.
>>>>
>>>> What will the control mechanisms be between the ccNSO and its alter ego
>>>> and how will they be enforced?
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Cheers,
>>>>
>>>> Chris
>>>>
>>>> On 30 Apr 2015, at 09:28 , Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Chris,
>>>>
>>>> Please let me try to clarify my understanding of what is currently
>>>> being proposed (in draft).  The SO/ACs will not be "converted" into legal
>>>> entities.  Rather, a "mirror" or "alter ego" entity will be set up for each
>>>> SO/AC, likely as a unincorporated association (which is a recognized legal
>>>> entity under California law).  Each SO/AC will control its alter ego. This
>>>> is quite similar to the relationship between the ASO and the NRO.  The
>>>> SO/ACs will continue to exist and will perform and operate as they
>>>> currently do.  The legal entities will be the members (or designators,
>>>> should that route be chosen) of ICANN, with the specific rights and powers
>>>> ascribed to them in that capacity by statute and bylaw.
>>>>
>>>> Technically, the unincorporated associations only need a minimum of two
>>>> members, so any "members" of a SO/AC who don't wish to be members of the
>>>> alter ego won't need to be.  The control arrangements between the SO/AC and
>>>> the alter ego will ensure that all "members" of the SO/AC (and even
>>>> non-members, such as non-ccNSO ccTLDs, if desired) get the appropriate
>>>> "say" in any decisions that are to be carried out by the alter ego.
>>>>
>>>> Best regards,
>>>>
>>>> Greg
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Wed, Apr 29, 2015 at 6:40 PM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Jordan,
>>>>>
>>>>> Apologies for taking so long to respond!
>>>>>
>>>>> Nobody is proposing converting the SOs and ACs to anything - at all -
>>>>> anywhere.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I’m confused. Greg seems o think that’s exactly what was being
>>>>> proposed. Do we have clarity on this yet?
>>>>>
>>>>> I’ll respond to the balance of your points later today.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Chris
>>>>>
>>>>> On 22 Apr 2015, at 16:02 , Jordan Carter <jordan at internetnz.net.nz>
>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>> Hi all, hi Chris:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 22 April 2015 at 11:07, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Keith,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As promised I set out in brief below some of the reasons why, in
>>>>>> respect to the membership model and any model requiring the SOs and ACs to
>>>>>> convert to legal entities, I have serious concerns and why I referred to
>>>>>> significant sacrifices.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Nobody is proposing converting the SOs and ACs to anything - at all -
>>>>> anywhere.
>>>>>
>>>>> The only proposal that I've seen from the lawyers is that if
>>>>> membership was the model chosen, legal personality would need to be
>>>>> created. The actors in the various SOs and ACs would, in exercising
>>>>> membership prerogatives, act through the unincorporated associations.
>>>>>
>>>>> The lawyers have also been clear that even in a designator model, it's
>>>>> preferable to create legal personality along those lines.
>>>>>
>>>>> I think it is really really really important for everyone involved in
>>>>> this effort to be very precise and clear about what we are discussing and
>>>>> what we aren't. So I am writing this so directly in order that if my
>>>>> understanding is wrong, it gets picked up pronto! :-)
>>>>>
>>>>> GAC
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The current recommended model does not provide any viable solution
>>>>>> for dealing with the GAC. It seems obvious to me that the governments
>>>>>> involved in the GAC are not going to agree to form an unincorporated
>>>>>> association under Californian law. If I'm right then presumably the GAC
>>>>>> would remain as an advisory committee and would not be able to have a vote
>>>>>> in any of the escalation mechanisms. That may be fine as the GAC may not
>>>>>> want to have a vote anyway.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Indeed it may not. Being able to offer advice on public policy issues
>>>>> to the ICANN Board and to appoint a non-voting liaison member to the Board.
>>>>> I am looking forward to hearing their views on this (and many other
>>>>> questions).
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> However I see a serious incompatibility between the members’ powers
>>>>>> and the standing of GAC advice to the Board. It’s not that GAC advice is or
>>>>>> indeed should be invariably followed but currently where GAC advice is at
>>>>>> odds with the position of others in the community the advice carries
>>>>>> significant weight and there is a bylaw mandated process for rejecting the
>>>>>> advice through a process which takes around 6 months. The change to a
>>>>>> members based structure would mean that for certain issues the actions of
>>>>>> members will trump GAC advice. So there is a significant shift in the
>>>>>> carefully constructed balance of power. Now, many of us may think that such
>>>>>> a shift is no bad thing but I wonder whether the governments of the world
>>>>>> are going to agree?
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> I don't understand this. I have not seen any hint of anyone suggesting
>>>>> that a power that Members should have includes overriding decisions on
>>>>> matters of public policy, which is the advice that the GAC gives the Board
>>>>> and which the bylaws would continue to require it to give due deference to
>>>>> (perhaps with an adjustment about when that reconciliation process has to
>>>>> happen, should GAC change its operating principles).
>>>>>
>>>>> If GAC advice on public policy matters led to changes in the bylaws,
>>>>> or the inclusion by the Board of business or strategic plans or budgets,
>>>>> then the new powers might have an impact. But all that would require the
>>>>> Board and the GAC to do is to persuade the broader ICANN system, or at
>>>>> least some of it, that their ideas are ones that should be pursued.
>>>>>
>>>>> Does that feel like a fundamental issue to you? It doesn't to me.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> ccTLDs
>>>>>>
>>>>>> When we set up the ccNSO and when we did the structural review of it
>>>>>> some time thereafter there was considerable discussion about how it could
>>>>>> be structured precisely to avoid the need for ccTLDs to join anything.
>>>>>> There was even significant concern about having to fill out a form and
>>>>>> whether that implied the existence of some organisation. The concerns
>>>>>> included joining something in the jurisdiction of the US and whether that
>>>>>> would make a ccTLD manager in any way subject to US law, the possibility of
>>>>>> being sued in the US because the manager would be deemed to have a presence
>>>>>> there, how such a structure would be funded (especially if it was sued),
>>>>>> whether there was any liability on ‘officers’ of the entity and so on. I
>>>>>> believe that many of these concerns will still exist for many ccTLDs.
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> They may or may not. But in that fifteen-years-ago debate, were there
>>>>> any facts on the table about those questions? Or was it all a bit of a mess
>>>>> on many fronts? Because ICANN in 2015 is, better or worse, a very different
>>>>> beast to ICANN in ~ 2000.
>>>>>
>>>>> Perhaps more importantly, exercising some rights through an
>>>>> unincorporated association would remain a choice for every ICANN
>>>>> participant. Nobody would be forced to be involved. It isn't like a "Join
>>>>> ICANN and have no say" - all the current structures for the "business of
>>>>> the business" would remain in place.
>>>>>
>>>>> From the legends I have heard about this early phase in ICANN's
>>>>> history, the fundamental concern was of a power-grab on the corporation's
>>>>> part. Since these reforms make such a power-grab harder (and let's remember
>>>>> that the end of the NTIA contract makes it easier...), I'd expect ccTLDs
>>>>> and others to look at them with quite some interest.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> Further, quite a number of ccTLD managers are departments of the
>>>>>> relevant government or quasi-government bodies. Not everyone runs their
>>>>>> ccTLD with the degree of freedom that .au, .ca, .uk and .nl are privileged
>>>>>> to enjoy. I consider it highly unlikely that sovereign governments will
>>>>>> permit a government department to join an association in the US (or any
>>>>>> other country for that matter).
>>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> They won't have to, to do what they do in ICANN today.
>>>>>
>>>>> The suggestion is they might have to if they want to take part in
>>>>> exercising the accountability powers set out in our report that's going for
>>>>> public comment.
>>>>>
>>>>> That said, there's a bit of an objective legal question here - which
>>>>> is whether the decisions of these uninc associations can be forced to take
>>>>> account of the views expressed in the ICANN bodies they shadow in making
>>>>> their decisions. If they can (which I would analogise to the ccNSO taking
>>>>> on board the views of non-member ccTLDs - and so I assume it is possible),
>>>>> much of this debate becomes moot.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Finally -- I do think this is a really useful and constructive
>>>>> discussion. As someone who is warm to the member approach, but who sees
>>>>> huge benefits if we can manage a "no structural change" outcome, this is
>>>>> just the convo we need to have.
>>>>>
>>>>> cheers,
>>>>> Jordan
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> At Large
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I don’t know the answer to this but it strikes me that the structure
>>>>>> may also be problematic for At Large community as opposed to ALAC. On that
>>>>>> one over the ALAC folks to comment.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> There’s more but I'm rushing for my flight now. Hope this gives you a
>>>>>> flavour.
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 20:46 , Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Hi Keith,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks for the below. You ask a valid question and Kavouss has sent
>>>>>> me an email asking the same.  I will respond in detail in the next 7 hours
>>>>>> or so.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris Disspain
>>>>>> CEO - auDA
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 20:16, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek at verisign.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks Chris, no apologies necessary...this is exactly the kind of
>>>>>> dialogue needed to advance our work.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Can you be more explicit about the "significant number of sacrifices
>>>>>> that would need to be made in a membership scenario" that ccTLDs face?
>>>>>> Particularly if any are unique to ccTLDs?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sacrifices may be needed (including from the Board) if we are to
>>>>>> accomplish the community's broader goal of ensuring the ICANN Board and
>>>>>> Staff are truly accountable to the ICANN community for the next decade. As
>>>>>> such, it would be good to know, as early as possible, what those sacrifices
>>>>>> might be.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In simple terms, I agree that determining what can and cannot be
>>>>>> accomplished within the existing structure is a worthwhile exercise and
>>>>>> will help to inform the community.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Based on our work and the relevant independent legal analysis to
>>>>>> date, it appears to me that the current construct has significant gaps and
>>>>>> shortcomings and won't deliver on our goals, but I support seeking further
>>>>>> advice on the topic from our independent legal advisors.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks and regards,
>>>>>> Keith
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Apr 21, 2015, at 5:08 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks Keith.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I apologise for pinging back and forth on this but I hope the list
>>>>>> will appreciate that it as an indication of how important auDA believes
>>>>>> this point is.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> As I said on the CCWG call last week, I have serious concerns about
>>>>>> the viability of the lawyers' recommended structural changes (at least from
>>>>>> a cc point of view) and want to be crystal clear about what we can do or
>>>>>> cannot do within the current structure.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> For a ccTLD there are a significant number of sacrifices that would
>>>>>> need to be made in a membership scenario and I don't believe the cc
>>>>>> community can decide whether those sacrifices are worth making unless we
>>>>>> can weigh them against what we would be able to achieve using the current
>>>>>> structure.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I think that is essential that our output to the community contains a
>>>>>> clear explanation of what the status quo can achieve. If it does not then
>>>>>> IMO it is impossible to judge the other scenarios.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I appreciate your second para and, as a lawyer, I know that time for
>>>>>> a response is required. I also appreciate the time constraints under which
>>>>>> we are operating. But we will lose more time if the result of our document
>>>>>> is a series of questions about whether there really is a need to make the
>>>>>> significant changes being recommended.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> In simple terms 'not nearly enough' is not an acceptable response.
>>>>>> How can I know that "it" is not nearly enough unless I know what "it" is?
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris Disspain
>>>>>> CEO - auDA
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 18:37, Drazek, Keith <kdrazek at verisign.com> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I believe the answer to your question regarding the "no change
>>>>>> scenario" and "what the current configuration can achieve" is, "Not nearly
>>>>>> enough."
>>>>>>
>>>>>> That said, I think it's a reasonable question and it should be
>>>>>> referred to the CCWG's lawyers and they should be permitted reasonable time
>>>>>> to consider and respond.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Regards,
>>>>>> Keith
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Sent from my iPhone
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Apr 21, 2015, at 4:09 AM, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Greg,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Thanks. At the risk of repeating myself, whilst I understand what you
>>>>>> are saying, it is precisely the no change scenario that I am seeking
>>>>>> clarity on. I accept that the current configuration may not be "a very good
>>>>>> vehicle for many of the enhanced powers" but I want clarity on what the
>>>>>> current configuration CAN  achieve. I don't believe we have that yet.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris Disspain
>>>>>> CEO - auDA
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 21 Apr 2015, at 17:35, Greg Shatan <gregshatanipc at gmail.com>
>>>>>> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Chris,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The simple answer is that the SOACs as currently configured are not
>>>>>> a very good vehicle for many of the enhanced powers we seek. Once you make
>>>>>> them into members and give them legal personhood everything else becomes
>>>>>> much easier.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> However, you assumed no change to the SOACs, which made the answers
>>>>>> much harder.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Greg
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On Tuesday, April 21, 2015, Chris Disspain <ceo at auda.org.au> wrote:
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Greg, All,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> With respect, I think we are overcomplicating the issue. I simply
>>>>>>> want to gain a base line for the discussion about any changes necessary  to
>>>>>>> achieve what we want. We agreed on jurisdiction that if we can get
>>>>>>> acceptable escalations and remedies without changing jurisdiction then we
>>>>>>> should leave well alone for now, I think we should apply the same principle
>>>>>>> here. I am clear what the lawyers recommend we do BUT I am not clear about
>>>>>>> what we can do or what compromises we need to make if we were to maintain
>>>>>>> the current structure. I think that is a key part of our deliberations.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Chris
>>>>>>>
>>>>>> --
>>>>> Jordan Carter
>>>>>
>>>>> Chief Executive
>>>>> *InternetNZ*
>>>>>
>>>>> 04 495 2118 (office) | +64 21 442 649 (mob)
>>>>> jordan at internetnz.net.nz
>>>>> Skype: jordancarter
>>>>>
>>>>> *A better world through a better Internet *
>>>>>
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