[CCWG-ACCT] A path to Dublin and beyond

[Alan Greenberg]

Subject to the following comments, I would 
support this, and I suspect it would have general acceptance within At-Large.

The caveats:

- There are a number of ALAC comments to the 
current proposal that will still apply and will 
be critical. Pending the details analysis and 
resolution of the comments, I remain optimistic.

- Steve's message does not talk about "the 
model", so I presume it will be some variation of 
the board proposal (often referred to as MEM, 
even though the MEM is only a component of it). 
That proposal calls for the AC/SOs to take formal 
action through their Chairs. That idea was 
rejected by the CCWG quite a while ago for a 
number of reasons (reluctance of the people 
filling the Chair position to get involved at a 
personal level, the difficulty associated with an 
ongoing action at the time the Chair changes are 
the prime ones that I recall). The CCWG moved to 
UA and then the Empowered AC/SO as a result, and 
then to the Community Mechanism. The proved to be 
a stumbling block, but perhaps the Empowered 
AC/SO or Community Mechanism could be adapted to work here.

Alan

At 03/10/2015 05:00 PM, Chris Disspain wrote:
>Steve,
>
>Thank you for this. It chimes In essence with 
>what I, and some others, have been saying for a while.
>
>If we can coalesce around the powers you have 
>listed (there may still be issues for some 
>around the budget power and some differences 
>around detail but nothing insurmountable IMO) 
>and agree a pathway for ICANN 3.0 and beyond 
>then I believe we can walk together as a community through the transition.
>
>Happy to do whatever it takes to bring this to 
>fruition in Dublin or shortly thereafter.
>
>Cheers,
>
>Chris
>
>On 4 Oct 2015, at 07:34, Steve DelBianco 
><<mailto:sdelbianco at netchoice.org>sdelbianco at netchoice.org> wrote:
>
>>Here are my own thoughts on a path to Dublin and beyond.
>>
>>I was thinking about Jonathan Zuck’s 
>>suggestion 
>>(<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/005764.html>link) 
>>that a change to Membership model could be done 
>>in Work Stream 2 —” if we create lasting 
>>leverage for community to enact a change despite board resistance.
>>
>>Then I read Bruce Tonkin's recent post 
>>(<http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-October/006098.html>link) 
>>describing why our present AC/SO participation 
>>falls short of representing the global M-S 
>>community, and suggesting this is why the board 
>>might not approve a move to Membership at this time.
>>
>>Their posts, along with responses on list, 
>>suggest a way we can deliver by Dublin on 
>>enforceable accountability enhancements, 
>>thereby giving us powers to impose reforms to 
>>the AC/SO model after the IANA transition.
>>
>>Consider this:
>>
>>Let’s use the leverage of the IANA transition 
>>to get bylaws changes give the current AC/SO 
>>community the powers we require, with adequate 
>>enforceability.   Plus, we ensure those powers 
>>are enough to force a future change to ICANN 
>>governance structure and/or Membership, if the 
>>community comes to consensus around what that 
>>new ICANN governance structure look like.
>>
>>That would mean we focus CCWG on finishing 
>>details and bylaws language for these 
>>enforceable powers exercised by supermajority of ACs and SOs:
>>
>>1. Power to block a proposed Operating Plan/Strat Plan/Budget
>>2. Power to approve changes to Fundamental 
>>Bylaws and Articles of Incorporation
>>3. Power to block changes to regular bylaws.
>>4. Power to appoint and remove individual board directors
>>5. Power to recall the entire board of directors
>>6. Mechanism for binding IRP where a panel 
>>decision is enforceable in any court 
>>recognizing international arbitration results — 
>>even if ICCANN’s board refused to participate 
>>in the binding arbitration.  (assuming CCWG 
>>lawyers verify this works without activating a Membership model)
>>
>>I think we are close enough to get consensus 
>>around the above powers before we leave 
>>Dublin.   And based on what we’ve heard 
>>recently, the board will support the powers described above.
>>
>>But there’s one more we have to add before 
>>losing the leverage of this IANA transition:
>>
>>Let’s put into ICANN bylaws a method where 
>>the community can show consensus to undertake a 
>>review of ICANN's governance structure, either 
>>because the powers above aren’t working, or 
>>just because the community overwhelmingly wants 
>>to review governance.   The goal of the 
>>Governance Review is to recommend a new 
>>governance model that might even include moving 
>>to Membership.  To Bruce’s point, any 
>>proposal emerging from this Governance Review 
>>would include assurances that ACs and SOs are 
>>representative of global internet users and protected from capture.
>>
>>This same bylaw could describe a process for 
>>board acceptance of a consensus proposal 
>>emerging from the Governance Review:  it would 
>>take 2/3 board majority to object to the 
>>proposal on the grounds that it is not in the 
>>global public interest, triggering a 
>>board-community consultation.  After 
>>consultation, a new community proposal would 
>>take 3/4 board majority to object.   If the 
>>board objected a second time, we would have the 
>>power to recall that entire board, or to pursue binding arbitration.
>>
>>Again, these are my personal thoughts about a 
>>way forward that is based on what others have said recently.
>>
>>—Steve DelBianco
>>
>>
>>
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