[CCWG-ACCT] A path to Dublin and beyond
Avri Doria
avri at acm.org
Mon Oct 5 03:30:18 UTC 2015
Hi,
While people are deciding the SD model sufficient to meet our
requirements, I question whether the inability of that model with regard
to direct shared decisions on implementation of a separation process is
not a serious enough flaw to make the model unacceptable. In the CM
model, the community shares the power to decide on approval of a
separation recommendation, in the SD model, the community needs to rely
on indirect methods like Board approval, appeals, court proceedings and
replacing the Board.
avri
On 04-Oct-15 18:21, Jonathan Zuck wrote:
> Great note Jordan and expansion of the Zuck proposal Steve. ;)
> Seriously though, we need to get people past being concerned about
> future reforms, be they structural or not. We don't need to represent
> Sole Designator as less than effective, merely sufficient to empower
> the community to make further reform in a dynamic and geographically
> expanding environment. That has always been our objective for WS1,
> pre-transition.
> Jonathan
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> From: Jordan Carter <mailto:jordan at internetnz.net.nz>
> Sent: 10/4/2015 6:02 PM
> Cc: Accountability Cross Community
> <mailto:accountability-cross-community at icann.org>
> Subject: Re: [CCWG-ACCT] A path to Dublin and beyond
>
> Thanks Steve, this is quite a good prospectus and is similar to where
> my own thinking has been going.
>
> I have one concern and a suggestion to mitigate it.
>
> If I was a decision-maker on this proposal - either the ICANN Board,
> NTIA or indeed the Congress itself, or even an ICANN SO or AC - I
> would be very uncomfortable at anything which suggested "we will
> reevaluate the model after the transition, because we aren't sure this
> is a durable accountability settlement".
>
> The signal of uncertainty and of future work that this sends is
> problematic.
>
> If membership is the straw that breaks the camel's back, my preference
> would instead be the bones of a settlement like this:
>
> - the community powers are put into the bylaws (Steve's list below
> 1-5) - and for me, I am happy with modifying the Budget powers in a
> range of ways to be agreed to further reduce the already minimal
> disruption the CCWG's approach would create (the Board's proposal is
> helpful in doing this).
> - the IRP approach largely as the CCWG has set out (Steve's list below 6)
> - a Designator foundation that renders the board removal powers
> completely enforceable
> - probably the Sole Designator model, operating by SO/AC consensus for
> NomCom director removal and the rest of the powers, and appointing SOs
> and ACs for their appointed Directors
>
>
> Taking this approach mitigates the "future governance change" concern
> which I think is a real one, and ensures that a key instrument of
> redress is enforceable.
>
> It is clearly not as powerful a set of tools as the membership model,
> which on an objective basis remains my preference.
>
> That said: I take the concerns about "changing the engine in flight"
> seriously. I think that the comments about the scale of the change
> created by membership are wrong and misleading, but some of the
> participants in this process hold them sincerely and seem unlikely to
> accept analysis that contradicts their entrenched views.
>
> So in terms of our *requirements*, which are meant to be guiding our
> work, I personally am prepared to step back to indirect enforceability
> of some of the powers by means of membership, back to designator. The
> additional enforceability of membership on the budget power, if it is
> going to prevent consensus, should not be something to die in a ditch
> over.
>
> We can get almost all the way there. CMSM and MEM would both be
> redundant and off the table. Multistakeholder consensus building at
> work....?
>
> A last thought: I have never placed much importance on the "other
> statutory powers" a membership would allow. I know others have.
> Certainly on transparency and disclosure, it's clear to me just by
> watching and participating in our CCWG process that there are hidden
> depths that need badly to be exposed to sunlight - and that's a piece
> of work that needs to be pushed along promptly next year. I know
> others have a different view though, eloquently expressed by Ed among
> others. So this needs more discussion.
>
>
> I don't present my thinking above as a definitive compromise, but I
> hope that it helps to demonstrate that like others, I have been
> listening to discussion, and recognise a need for me and all of us to
> get out of the competitive "my way or the highway" tone that has
> emerged in the past few weeks.
>
> So long as others show the same willingness to move, we should be able
> to get into a more collaborative work method, which is what the
> community deserves from all of us.
>
>
> all best,
> Jordan
>
> On 4 October 2015 at 09:33, Steve DelBianco <sdelbianco at netchoice.org
> <mailto:sdelbianco at netchoice.org>> wrote:
>
> Here are my own thoughts on a path to Dublin and beyond.
>
> I was thinking about Jonathan Zuck’s suggestion (link
> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-September/005764.html>)
> that a change to Membership model could be done in Work Stream 2 —
> if we create lasting leverage for community to enact a change
> despite board resistance.
>
> Then I read Bruce Tonkin's recent post (link
> <http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/accountability-cross-community/2015-October/006098.html>)
> describing why our present AC/SO participation falls short of
> representing the global M-S community, and suggesting this is why
> the board might not approve a move to Membership at this time.
>
> Their posts, along with responses on list, suggest a way we can
> deliver by Dublin on enforceable accountability enhancements,
> thereby giving us powers to impose reforms to the AC/SO model
> after the IANA transition.
>
> Consider this:
>
> Let’s use the leverage of the IANA transition to get bylaws
> changes give the current AC/SO community the powers we require,
> with adequate enforceability. Plus, we ensure those powers are
> enough to force a future change to ICANN governance structure
> and/or Membership, if the community comes to consensus around what
> that new ICANN governance structure look like.
>
> That would mean we focus CCWG on finishing details and bylaws
> language for these enforceable powers exercised by supermajority
> of ACs and SOs:
>
> 1. Power to block a proposed Operating Plan/Strat Plan/Budget
> 2. Power to approve changes to Fundamental Bylaws and Articles of
> Incorporation
> 3. Power to block changes to regular bylaws.
> 4. Power to appoint and remove individual board directors
> 5. Power to recall the entire board of directors
> 6. Mechanism for binding IRP where a panel decision is enforceable
> in any court recognizing international arbitration results — even
> if ICANN’s board refused to participate in the binding
> arbitration. (assuming CCWG lawyers verify this works without
> activating a Membership model)
>
> I think we are close enough to get consensus around the above
> powers before we leave Dublin. And based on what we’ve heard
> recently, the board will support the powers described above.
>
> But there’s one more we have to add before losing the leverage of
> this IANA transition:
>
> Let’s put into ICANN bylaws a method where the community can show
> consensus to undertake a review of ICANN's governance structure,
> either because the powers above aren’t working, or just because
> the community overwhelmingly wants to review governance. The
> goal of the Governance Review is to recommend a new governance
> model that might even include moving to Membership. To Bruce’s
> point, any proposal emerging from this Governance Review would
> include assurances that ACs and SOs are representative of global
> internet users and protected from capture.
>
> This same bylaw could describe a process for board acceptance of a
> consensus proposal emerging from the Governance Review: it would
> take 2/3 board majority to object to the proposal on the grounds
> that it is not in the global public interest, triggering a
> board-community consultation. After consultation, a new community
> proposal would take 3/4 board majority to object. If the board
> objected a second time, we would have the power to recall that
> entire board, or to pursue binding arbitration.
>
> Again, these are my personal thoughts about a way forward that is
> based on what others have said recently.
>
> —Steve DelBianco
>
>
>
>
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>
> --
> Jordan Carter
>
> Chief Executive
> *InternetNZ*
>
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> Skype: jordancarter
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>
> /A better world through a better Internet /
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