[CCWG-ACCT] Regarding what happens if fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be Decisional Participants in the Empowered Community
seun.ojedeji at gmail.com
Wed Feb 24 05:09:01 UTC 2016
I believe this makes sense and can be noted during implementation. However,
IMO a reduction of participating SO/AC in the "empowered community" from 5
to 4 should not cause any need for change since none of the exercise of
community powers requires more than a threshold 4 and considering that 4
still represents over 50%(4/7) of the ICANN community we should be fine. So
the current threshold proposed from paragraph 25 to 47 on Annex 2 could
still be maintained (ofcourse without any reduction)
However anything that goes below 4, I expect would make the model
impractical and require a complete overhaul.
On 24 Feb 2016 04:39, "Bruce Tonkin" <Bruce.Tonkin at melbourneit.com.au>
> Hello All,
> In response to the question from Brett Schaefer:
> >> I would hope that we could get explicit clarification and commitment
> from the Board that, if the GAC cannot decide or chooses not to become a
> decisional participant, that the Board would support lowering the
> thresholds for exercising all EC powers to avoid the requirement for SOAC
> unanimous support to exercise those powers.
> The Board supports the language in the report, at Page 72 of Annex 2:
> “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on this
> assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> Decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be
> adjusted. Thresholds would also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to
> have more SOs or ACs.”
> The Board’s earlier comment on this issue from Page 5 of our 14 December
> 2015 Comments to the Third Draft Proposal from the CCWG is as follows:
> "B. Board Comments and Supporting Rationale on Further Defining Thresholds
> The thresholds as set out in the Proposal (Pages 22-23) seem well defined
> for the design of ICANN today. The Board would not support lowering of any
> of these thresholds because these community powers represent the voice of
> the ICANN community. A reduction of the threshold could risk that a
> decision does not reflect the community’s will.
> While the thresholds seem well defined for the design of ICANN today, the
> Board recommends further defining the thresholds for exercising community
> powers in the event that the number of SOs or ACs change. Leaving this
> issue for future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of
> the community thresholds. This potential for renegotiation adds a level
> of instability and a lack of predictability. As a result, the Board
> recommends (1) clarifying that the thresholds identified in the Proposal
> are based on the current structure; and (2) identifying the percentages
> that will be applied in the event that there is a change in the number of
> SOs or ACs in the future."
> When we previously discussed this with the CCWG, we understood from Page
> 72 of Annex 2 that the CCWG does not want to set percentages and has agreed
> to revisit the thresholds if the number of participants change.
> We will further discuss this issue when it becomes clear who the future
> participants will be, and whether fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs
> agree to be Decisional Participants in the Empowered Community.
> Bruce Tonkin
> Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
> Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
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