[CCWG-ACCT] Request for Clarification on Threshold Issue

[Cheryl Langdon-Orr]

I agree Yes this also makes sense to me...

I support yhe "may"  to SHALL and the addition od explanatory material ...
On 28 Feb 2016 8:56 am, "avri doria" <avri at apc.org> wrote:

>
> Makes sense to me to change the may to a shall and add explanatory
> material.
>
> avri
>
> On 27-Feb-16 15:03, Drazek, Keith wrote:
> >
> > Hi Thomas, Mathieu and Leon. I’m submitting the following on behalf of
> > the undersigned members/participants from the GNSO:
> >
> >
> >
> > ---------------------------------------------
> >
> > Dear CCWG-Accountability Chairs,
> >
> >
> >
> > We are very concerned with the response of the Board to the request
> > for clarification regarding the need to adjust the thresholds for the
> > Empowered Community to exercise its powers if the number of decisional
> > participants is less than 5 SOACs. Currently the text in Annex 1 and 2
> > regarding this possibility is ambiguous:
> >
> >
> >
> > “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on
> > this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> > decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support may be
> > adjusted. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to
> > have more SOs or ACs.”
> >
> >
> >
> > In our view, there is no question that the thresholds /must/ be
> > adjusted if there are fewer than five decisional participants. We have
> > acknowledged repeatedly and operated under the assumption that there
> > should not be a requirement of unanimous support for the Empowered
> > Community to exercise its powers. Yet, if there are less than five
> > decisional participants, unless the thresholds are adjusted it would
> > require unanimous support for the Empowered Community to:
> >
> >
> >
> > ·         Reject a proposed Operating Plan/Strategic Plan/Budget;
> >
> > ·         Recall the entire Board of Directors; and
> >
> > ·         Reject an ICANN Board decision relating to reviews of IANA
> > functions, including the triggering of any PTI separation process.
> >
> >
> >
> > These powers are central to ensuring that ICANN remains accountable to
> > the Empowered Community. This matter is too critical to the primary
> > purpose of the CCWG-Accountability proposal to remain unclear. As the
> > Board has noted in its own formal comments, “Leaving this issue for
> > future consideration raises the potential for renegotiation of the
> > community thresholds.  This potential for renegotiation adds a level
> > of instability and a lack of predictability.”
> >
> >
> >
> > Although it has a superficial resemblance to the recent debate over
> > thresholds in the GAC carve-out, we believe it is fundamentally
> > different. There is a great distinction between an SO or AC
> > */choosing/* to not participate, and an SO or AC being */blocked/*
> > from participation in a specific instance, as was the case in the case
> > of the GAC carve-out. We were willing to accept a unanimous threshold
> > for Board recall in the unique circumstances of the GAC carve-out,
> > where the GAC was blocked from participation, but we believe firmly
> > that if any SO or AC */elects/*, whether through a conscious decision
> > or an inability to decide, to not participate, then the non-unanimity
> > principle must be upheld.
> >
> >
> >
> > However, as we saw with the debate over the thresholds in the GAC
> > carve-out, this could be a contentious issue. It is far better to
> > resolve this matter now (and during the drafting of bylaws), prior to
> > the official transfer of the proposal to NTIA, than to delay it when
> > it could have significant negative ramifications on the transition
> > through a failure to resolve it during the implementation phase.
> >
> >
> >
> > Therefore, we respectfully request that the current text in Annex 1
> > and Annex 2 be edited to replace “may” with “shall” and add an
> > additional explanatory clause:
> >
> >
> >
> > “The thresholds presented in this document were determined based on
> > this assessment. If fewer than five of ICANN’s SOs and ACs agree to be
> > decisional Participants, these thresholds for consensus support
> > */shall/*be adjusted */to prevent the need for unanimous support among
> > the decisional Participants to exercise any of the seven Community
> > powers/*. Thresholds may also have to be adjusted if ICANN changes to
> > have more SOs or ACs.”
> >
> >
> >
> > Signed,
> >
> >
> >
> > Phil Corwin
> >
> > Steve DelBianco
> >
> > Keith Drazek
> >
> > James Gannon
> >
> > Robin Gross
> >
> > Ed Morris
> >
> > Brett Schaefer
> >
> > Greg Shatan
> >
> > Matthew Shears
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > _______________________________________________
> > Accountability-Cross-Community mailing list
> > Accountability-Cross-Community at icann.org
> > https://mm.icann.org/mailman/listinfo/accountability-cross-community
>
>
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